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ABSTRACT
The vast literature in finance examining the impact of takeovers on the share price of the
bidder and target firms finds conclusive results for targets and inconclusive results for
bidders. For both the UK and the US, previous studies show target firms to experience
large positive abnormal returns at the time of the bid-announcement while bidder firm
shareholders experience small abnormal gains as well as losses. Previous studies also show
that approximately half the acquirers experience positive post-acquisition performance.
There exists a serious gap in extant knowledge on what factors lead some acquirers to
experience a positive post-acquisition performance while other acquirers experience a
decline in their wealth. In this study we examine whether target firm managerial resistance
to a takeover may be one factor which can affect the post-acquisition performance of
acquirers. By segregating our sample of acquirers by the target firm management response
to a takeover we are able to examine the post-acquisition performance of different acquirer
types.
This study attempts to fill the gaps in our knowledge regarding the relative performance of
different acquirer types by addressing three research questions:
i) what is the relative post-acquisition performance of different acquirer types?
ii) what are the sources of long run post-acquisition value creation for each acquirer type?
how effective are the agency monitoring mechanisms in determining the long run post-
acquisition performance for each acquirer type?
In attempting to address the above questions we also examine a number of subsidiary issues
that arise in the context of the relative post-acquisition performance of different acquirer
types defined in terms of their financial profile. The subsidiary issues are:
i) whether the acquirer firm size affects the long run post-acquisition performance?
whether the acquirer's profile as a glamour or value stock, measured by the market to
book value, affects the long run post-acquisition performance?
whether the acquirer's profile as a glamour or value stock, measured by the price to
earnings ratio, affects the long run post-acquisition performance?
We use a sample of 547 acquirers, consisting of friendly, single hostile, multiple hostile and
white knights, in takeovers completed between the period 1983 to 1995 to generate wealth
gains. Wealth gains are measured in the form of abnormal returns and estimated by event
study methodology using five different benchmark models (i.e. Fama and French Three
Factor, market to book value, size, mean and market adjusted models). Then we use
multiple regression analysis to test a range of hypothesis based on previous literature in
finance with respect to our research questions.
Our results show that single hostile acquirers outperform all other acquirer types in
each of our three long run event windows. White knights tend to have a higher post-
acquisition performance than either multiple hostile and friendly acquirers. Friendly
acquirers tend to have the worst post-acquisition performance compared to other
acquirer types. We find differences in the impact of the sources of value creation and
agency monitoring mechanisms on different acquirer types. Consistent with previous
studies we find that shareholders of value acquirers (based on the PE ratio and market
to book value) experience greater wealth gains than shareholders of glamour acquirers.
We also find that shareholders of large acquirers tend to experience greater wealth
gains than shareholders of smaller acquirers.
xiv
CHAPTER ONE
OBJECTIVES AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most extensively researched areas in finance has been whether mergers
create value. This has become a very important question for researchers to answer as
the level of takeover activity has increased since the 1960s. Acquisitions have become
an integral part of western economies and have taken root in Eastern Europe and other
emerging economies. Even though the takeover activity has been phenomenal in these
countries over the last thirty years, by European standards it has been much higher in
the UK (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1994 p3). For example, during 1988, which was the
peak year of takeover activity in Europe, Jenkinson and Mayer (1994:p3 ) show that
there were 937 corporate acquisitions in the UK, with a value of billion. In France,
the figure was 537 takeovers with a value of £.7 billion while in West Germany 534
corporate acquisitions took place. More recent data from Dugan (1998:p11) shows
that completed takeovers in Europe were worth US$262.7 billion in 1996 and
US$447.6 billion in 1997. Of this, 34% of takeovers were carried out in the UK
compared to 14% in France, 12% in Germany, 10% in Switzerland, 5% each in the
Netherlands and Italy, and 18% in the rest of Europe.
The UK does not only have the highest level of takeover activity in Europe but also
has a very large number of failed bids where the bidder does not manage to gain
control of the target firm. The reason for this is that a very high proportion of UK
takeovers are launched without seeking the prior approval or agreement of the target
firm management'. During the peak takeover period of 1984 to 1989, an average of
26% of bids for quoted UK companies were contested. 23
 Jenkinson and Mayer
(1994:p7) show that of the ten largest completed UK takeover bids carried out in
1989, seven of them did not receive the support of the target board and hence, were
hostile takeovers. Jenkinson and Mayer (1994: p6-11) show that of the ten largest
bids made each year between 1984-89, 40 out of 60 bids were hostile. Of these 40
hostile bids, in 47% of the cases the bidder failed to gain control of the target firm. In
27% of the cases there was a second bidder who was either a white knight or another
hostile bidder. For the target firm, the probability of a successful defence against a
takeover decreased with a second bidder with a failure rate on average of 34%. 4 More
recent data from Acquisitions Monthly (January, 1997:p34/5) shows that almost 10%
of all completed acquisitions, in 1996, for publicly listed targets were hostile. Out of
the ten largest acquisitions completed in 1996, with a market value of 1.17.2 billion,
four of them were hostile takeovers with a market value of 18.2 billion.
As the level of takeover activity has increased over the last thirty years, the level of
academic literature examining their causes and consequences has also expanded. The
literature concerned with consequences of takeovers shows overwhelming support for
A takeover consists of one target firm and at least one bidder firm. In a takeover, the latter purchases the
shares and takes on the liabilities of the former. A successful bidder firm is referred to as an acquirer.
2 The average number of hostile bids per year was calculated from data supplied by Acquisitions Monthly
(1986 to 1990) and Investors' Chronicle (1983 to 1985).
3 A hostile bid, or contested takeover bid, is one, which does not receive the support or approval of the target
firm's management. Under these circumstances, the target firm may employ a number of defensive strategies
in order to avoid or stop the takeover. Sudarsanam (1991) lists over twenty defensive tactics at the disposal
of the target firm of which one of the most frequently used strategies is to look for a friendly bidder. The
friendly bidder in these circumstances is referred to as a 'white knight' because it attempts to save the target
from the 'clutches' of the hostile bidder. There are instances in a hostile takeover when another company
enters the battle to take control of the target firm without the approval of its management. We refer to bids
involving two or more hostile bidders as multiple hostile takeovers. The different acquirer types are
described in detail in section 2.2.2.
In other words, out of the 27% of hostile bids with a second bidder only 34% failed.
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the case of target firm's shareholders experiencing a wealth gain (Hon and Kyriazis,
1997a; Sudarsanam et al., 1996; Franks and Harris, 1989; Jensen and Ruback, 1983) at
the time of the announcement. The literature also shows that gains for target firm
shareholders tend to be higher in a hostile takeover than in a friendly one (Gregory, 1997;
Franks and Harris, 1989). Second, in a multiple bid, where there is more than one bidder,
the target firm shareholders tend to experience greater wealth gains compared to takeovers
with only one bidder (Franks and Harris, 1989). Third, in a white knight bid, the target firm
shareholders tend to receive greater wealth gains than in non-white knight takeovers such
as Banerjee and Owers (1992). There are a number of reasons why target firm shareholders
should gain from a merger and these have been well documented and tested in finance
literature.
Even though there has been a considerable amount of published research in the area of
mergers, there are still a number unresolved issues. One such issue is the acquirer's post-
acquisition performance and the factors which determine whether the takeover is a success
or a failure.' To date, there does not appear to be conclusive evidence to show that
acquirer firm shareholders experience either positive or negative wealth effects. The
empirical studies, so far, indicate that acquirers can experience negative gains (Dodd, 1980;
Sudarsanarn et al., 1996) close to zero gains (Gregory, 1997) and positive returns (Jensen
and Ruback, 1983; Franks et al., 1991; Loughran and Vijh, 1997 for cash takeovers).
This study is motivated by the inconclusive results from previous studies regarding the
post-acquisition performance of acquirers. Although the average post-acquisition acquirer
performance may be inconclusive, there is no reason to assume that this experience is
shared by all acquirer types. One reason for the inconclusive result regarding acquirer post-
Failure in this case refers to a takeover, which results in negative post-acquisition acquirer firm shareholder
wealth. This is different from a failed bid whereby the bidder firm fails to gain control of the target firm.
3
acquisition performance is that a large number of previous studies ignore the motivations
underlying the takeover. For example, a friendly takeover, according to Morck et al.
(1988b) is motivated by synergy i.e. the idea that 2 + 2 > 4. On the other hand, hostile
takeovers are disciplinary in nature and attempt to correct target firm managerial failure
(Franks and Mayer, 1996). However, this type of distinction cannot be made for white
knights whose motives are less clear than those of other acquirer types.
A white knight, by its very nature, enters the competition to gain control of the target firm
after a hostile bidder has been identified. In this case, if synergy is a motive then a white
knight need not wait for a hostile bidder to make the first approach to the target firm. On
the other hand, if discipline is a motive, it is most likely that the white knight will not
receive the support of the target firm management. In this research we use a rigorous and
clear-cut definition to differentiate between different acquirer types in order to study their
relative long run post-acquisition performance.
The following part of this chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, we
describe the background to, and development of, mergers in the UK. We then define the
focus of this research. We aim to explain the distinction between the various types of
bidders based on the mood of the bid. This is important because different bidders have been
shown to differ in their impact on the shareholder wealth effects of the acquirer. This is
followed by detailing the objectives that this thesis hopes to achieve. In the penultimate
section of this chapter, we look in depth at the contribution that this research makes
towards extending our knowledge in the area of corporate takeovers. Finally, we present a
preview of the chapters that follow and their respective conclusions.
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1.1 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE UK
Early mergers were usually in related areas and were carried out to reduce competition and
exploit economies of scale6 '7 . Post-war experience of takeovers has taken on a new
meaning. No longer are bidder firms content to take over targets in their own industry, but
they do so in other areas of business as well, (see Hughes, 1989 for a survey of the post
war impact of mergers in the UK). Along with the rise of takeovers, the emergence of a
totally new type of bidder firm has arisen whose main objective is to take over targets and
sell the component divisions. This type of acquirer is known as a corporate raider and
assumes that the component parts of the target firm to be worth more than the whole. Over
the last fifty years there have been six periods where there has been a boom in merger
activity. These were the years 1958 to 1960, 1966 to 1968, 1970 to 1972, 1975 to 1978,
1983 to 1989 and 1992 to 1995 (Peacock and Bannock, 1991; Financial Statistics, 1998). 8
A number of reasons have been put forward to explain the rise of takeovers, and more
precisely hostile bids, which often give rise to white knights. First, it was generally believed
that large firms were necessary to operate at the minimum efficient scale of production.
This was important in the early merger waves (i.e. 1966 to 1968 and 1970 to 1972) which
led to the creation of large companies such as GEC which acquired two of its main rivals,
namely AEI and English Electric, or British Motor Holdings which merged with Leyland
to form British Leyland Corporation. Many of the takeovers in the late 1960s and early
6 Strictly speaking, an acquisition or takeover is when the majority share capital of a firm, usually referred to
as the target, is purchased by another company, usually referred to as the bidder. In contrast, a merger is
when two or more companies pool or combine their resources to create a new entity which has the ability to
exercise control over those assets. In this study we use the term acquisition, merger and takeover
interchangeably.
7 The UK takeover experiences mirror those of the US to a large extent and both can be described
simultaneously (see Cooke, 1986:ch1; Peacock and Bannock, 1991 p21).
8 We show the end of the merger boom to take place in 1995 to match the end of our sample period although
the number and value of takeovers continued to increase.
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1970s were encouraged by the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) which was a
government body with the aim of promoting structural change and efficiency (see Cosh,
Hughes and Singh, 1980). Second, the post-war period has seen a greater use of equity
markets as the main source of long run finance for firms. This has meant that as equity
markets have risen, bidders have been more able to carry out takeovers by financing them
through the issue of new equity. King (1989) found that during the period 1960-86
between 25% and 65% of UK takeover activity was financed by issuing new equity.
Morgan and Morgan (1990) argue that a takeover brings considerable revenues to a whole
host of groups such as lawyers, accountants and so on. These groups have a vested interest
in promoting takeovers, especially if the potential fees are considerable. Under these
circumstances, advisers have a strong incentive to seek and identify possible targets for
their clients in order that they themselves may earn higher profits. Advisers may also
develop new ways of financing takeovers such as junk bonds, which were popular in the
1980s, in order to earn greater profits from an increase in takeover activity 9 . These new
instruments allowed bidders to raise huge sums of money, especially for hostile takeovers,
or where the bidder was smaller than the target. The latter usually appeared in the disguise
of a corporate raider, whose aim was to acquire undervalued companies and break them up
into smaller companies so they could be sold separately.
In the face of mounting hostile bids, targets began to develop new strategies to maintain
their independence. Sudarsanarn (1991) details over twenty different types of defensive
strategies employed by targets, such as challenging the logic of the bid, making a profit
9 Bond issues, with a rating assigned by credit rating agencies such as Moody's Investor Services, Standard and
Poor etc., in the top four categories, are referred to as investment grade bonds. Bond issues which are assigned a
credit rating below the top categories are referred to as non-investment grade or more commonly as high yield or
junk bonds (Stimpson, 1991:p73). The high yield bond market opens the possibility of credit for some firms that
previously had no access to it.
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forecast, revaluation of assets and so on. One of the most frequently used defensive
strategies, according to Sudarsanam (1994b), was for the target firm to seek an alternative
bidder or white knight. The target firm management may seek a white knight, even though
they may have preferred to remain independent, because this may be a better alternative
than to be taken over by the hostile bidder. The effectiveness of a white knight is reflected
by Sudarsanam (1994b) who shows it to be the most successful defensive strategy
employed by a target firm facing a hostile bid.
1.2 FOCUS OF THIS RESEARCH
In a review article, Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarise evidence from previous studies,
which shows that approximately half the acquirers experience positive post-acquisition
performance. The question then arises as to what factors lead to some acquirers to
experience a positive post-acquisition performance while other acquirers experience a
decline in their wealth. Target firm management resistance may be one factor which can
affect the post-acquisition performance of acquirers. This is because an initial refusal by the
target firm management may require the bidder to increase the price it is prepared to pay in
order to acquire the target, and hence affect the post-acquisition return. In the case of a
multiple bid (i.e. more than one bidder for a single target), it is very likely that the acquirer
will have to overpay to purchase the target (Varaiya, 1988; Gilberto and Varaiya, 1988).
This research investigates the effect of target firm managerial resistance on the post-
acquisition performance of different acquirer types. We then aim to explain the different
acquirer type post-acquisition performance by analysing their relationship with various
sources of value creation, which have been cited in the literature dealing with takeovers.
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that there is a relationship between firm performance
and the extent to which various agency control mechanisms are used. We attempt to test
this for our sample of acquirers by examining the relationship between post-acquisition
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acquirer performance and agency monitoring mechanisms. Finally, in the process of
investigating the long post acquisition performance of acquirers, we also make a distinction
between large and small market value, value and glamour acquirers.°
L2.1 IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL RESISTANCE
The vast bulk of takeovers tend to be friendly in that the bidder firm receives the approval
of the target board. However, where approval from the board of the target firm is not
received, a bidder may choose to mount a hostile bid. In a situation where the bidder firm
experiences resistance from the target management to the bid, it is likely to have an impact
upon the division of gains between the two groups. This impact of managerial resistance
cannot be determined from a prior argument. On the one hand, the management-
shareholder alignment hypothesis suggests that target firm resistance would be in the
interest of its shareholders because it leads to a higher premium.
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests that target firm resistance reflects an
attempt by managers to protect their job security, thereby reducing the probability of the
takeover succeeding. In many ways, target finn resistance could impose considerable costs
on target firm's shareholders, as managers employ corporate resources in opposing what
could be a beneficial takeover. In the recent hostile takeover of Forte by Granada, the
former spent over £35 million in an attempt to defend itself from latter (Financial Times
24/1/96 p26). In many ways, hostile takeovers are a mechanism by which inefficient target
firm managers can be removed if the bid is successful (Morcic, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988b).
I ° Glamour firms are characterized by high market to book values and price to earnings (PE) ratios. Value
films on the other hand have a low market to book value and PE ratio.
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If the target firm resistance succeeds, shareholders lose the opportunity to realise the gains
that would result from the offer.11
Bid hostility can also arise from information asymmetry because target firm managers have
inside information that is not available to the bidder firm. If the bidder firm is uncertain as
to the future prospects of the target firm it is more likely to seek a friendly takeover because
the target management's inside knowledge becomes quite important. On the other hand, if
the bidder is fairly certain and knowledgeable of the target's future prospects then the target
management's inside information becomes less valuable (Schnitzer ,1996).
Target firm managerial resistance may lead to an auction taking place, i.e. more than one
bidder. This is because target firms may receive additional bids before the first bid has
lapsed, such as that from a white knight. A white knight is normally a late entrant into the
'bidding competition' who receives the support of the target firm management. In bids
involving multiple hostile or white knight bidders, the successful bidder may have to pay
more than the other bidders in order to acquire the target. Varaiya (1988) argues that the
overpayment by the winning bidder in a multiple bid stems from its higher valuation of the
target firm. Winners tend to overestimate the value of the target firm.
Our first aim is to determine the shareholder wealth effects experienced by bidders, both in
the short and in the long run. Secondly, we also aim to determine the relative wealth gains
for different acquirer types. Wealth gains in this study are measured in terms of shareholder
I I Of course this assumes that the offer by the hostile bidder is far higher than what the target firm
management can deliver in the future
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abnormal returns estimated using event study methodology 12. We use five different models
to estimate the abnormal returns for acquirers over a three-year post-acquisition period, for
547 publicly quoted acquisitions completed between 1983 and 1995. The empirical
evidence from previous studies suggests that bidders in both hostile and multiple bids suffer
negative wealth gains at the time of the bid and the period after. Banerjee and Owers
(1992) find that hostile bidders experience a loss in shareholder wealth of -0.2% from the
day before the bid announcement till the day after. De et al. (1996) find that successful
acquirers in a multiple bid suffer a wealth loss of -1.71% at the time of the bid
announcement compared with 0.03% for single bidders. Similar results have been found by
Smiley and Stewart (1985) for white knights with losses of-3.3%.
1.2.2 SOURCES OF POST-ACQUISITION VALUE-CREATION
The second focus of this research is to investigate why takeovers take place. The simple
answer to this question would be that the target firm is undervalued and there are efficiency
gains to be made. If this were the case, then one would expect all takeovers to lead to
wealth gains for acquirer firm shareholders. However, the empirical evidence does not
support this and we know that different acquirer types experience differing relative post-
acquisition shareholder wealth effects. In this study, we limit ourselves to looking at the
synergistic, wealth transfer, target misvaluation and disciplinary sources of post-acquisition
wealth creation for different acquirer types.
12 Event study methodology attempts to measure the impact of a new item of information such as a dividend or
takeover announcement of a company. This is done by calculating the abnormal return or the return which is not
expected. The first step to this is to predict what the normal return would have been in the absence of the new
information. The second step is to subtract the estimated return from the actual return to obtain the abnormal return.
This methodology is explained in considerable detail in Chapter 4.
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A very common reason for takeovers is to exploit synergies that arise as a result of
combining two or more separate companies. Synergy can be divided into three categories,
namely operational, financial and managerial. Operational synergy is based on the idea that
average costs fall as output is increased (Estrin and Laider, 1995). At the same time, the
combined group can benefit from economies of scale in marketing, purchasing or inventory
through bulk buying, etc. The combined group is also able to capture economies of scope
where a multi-product firm is able to produce two separate goods at a cost which is lower
than the total cost of producing these goods by two single product firms. Operational
synergy is more likely to occur when the bidders and targets are from the same industry
rather than those from differing industries. This has been found by Chatterjee (1986), Singh
and Montgomery (1987), Datta et al. (1992) and more recently by Barnes (1998) amongst
others. However, other studies such as Lubatlin (1983), Limmack and MacGregor (1992)
provide evidence that conglomerate takeovers can lead to superior post-acquisition
performance relative to non-conglomerate mergers. At the same time, Seth (1990), and
Slusky and Caves (1991) found no have difference in the performance of related and
unrelated takeovers.
Takeovers may also provide the merging firms scope to exploit financial synergies, of
which there are three types. The first type of financial synergy is the exploitation of the tax
advantage of unused debt capacity, whereby if one party in a merger already operates at, or
near, its optimal gearing level with a firm that has unused debt capacity then the combined
firm will be able to gain from exhausting the unused debt capacity. This type of financial
synergy predicts that the larger the difference in debt between the target and bidder firms
the greater the increase in synergy. The second type of financial synergy arises from the
complementary growth opportunities of the bidder and target firms. In other words, the
mismatch between the resources and investment opportunities available to the merging
firms allows the takeover to create value for both target and bidder firm shareholders. The
third type of financial synergy is uncorrelated cash flows between the target and bidder
firms which may reduce the risk of the combined group. The reduction in risk largely arises
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from a fall in the variability of earnings which may enable their debt obligations to be more
easily met and thereby reduce the bankruptcy risk of both firms.
Managerial synergy arises when a more efficient management team purchases an
inefficiently managed company. This obviously assumes that management skills are
transferable from one company to another. Rosen (1972) has identified three types of
managerial synergy, namely firm-specific, industry-specific and generic managerial skill. The
first refers to each firm's specific managerial skills which are particular to only one company
and cannot be transferred to other companies. Second, industry-specific managerial skills
refer to the skills managers acquire through familiarity with the specific industries. Due to
the industry specific nature of these managerial skills they can only be transferred in related
takeovers. Third, generic managerial skills refer to the general competence of managers. As
these are the most general forms of managerial skills they are the most likely to be
transferred, both in related and non-related takeovers.
Post-acquisition value-creation can also occur through the transfer of wealth from one
group to another. This assumes that acquisitions do not lead to an increase in total wealth.
Wealth can be transferred from four different groups to the bidder firm shareholders. One
group is the customers who suffer as a result of an increase in monopoly power arising
from a concentration in the market. Second, wealth can be transferred from the
government to bidder firm shareholders through tax reductions which can encourage
companies to merge. 13 Third, mergers can force employees to accept a lower real salary or
even redundancies. Finally, wealth can be transferred from target firm shareholders to the
13 King (1986) argues that a tax wedge may exist which favours acquisitions, as opposed to new investments
i.e. the taxation system may make it more favourable for a firm to expand through and acquisition rather than
the purchase of plant and machinery.
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bidder firm shareholders. The simplest manner by which this can be achieved is through the
purchase of undervalued companies without paying a takeover premium.
The misvaluation theory suggests that the bidder places a different value on the target firm
from that of the stock market. The misvaluation can arise out of two factors; the first is that
the bidder firm management feel that the target firm is not operating at its full potential,
either due to the target firm managers being inefficient at managing their company or the
bidder may have some private information regarding the target firm. Second, the tnis-
valuation theory also suggests that differences between the market value and the
replacement cost of the target could motivate an acquisition. A firm wishing to add to
existing capacity, or diversify into new markets, may find it cheaper to acquire a target
rather than invest in new plant and machinery.
Sudarsanam et al. (1996) find that the differential managerial efficiency of the bidder has a
significant effect on the acquirer returns. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988b) argue that
friendly bids are motivated by synergy while hostile bids are disciplinary in nature. If
discipline is the primary motive of bidders, then it implies that target firms underperform
prior to the bid (Asquith, 1983). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that better performing
companies are less likely to become takeover targets. The empirical evidence from Walsh
(1988) shows that mergers are a mechanism by which inefficient management is removed.
For the UK, Franks and Mayer (1996) find that 90% of hostile target firm management are
replaced in the two years subsequent to the takeover. In contrast, friendly target firm
management are replaced in only 50% of the cases over the same period.14
14 Franks and Mayer (1996) report no pre-bid underperformance of targets but they accept that hostile bids
are disciplinary in nature. The higher management turnover in hostile bids reflects the disciplinary nature of
the takeover.
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1.2.3 AGENCY MONITORING MECHANISMS AND POST-
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE
The failure of some large and prominent companies, such as British and Commonwealth
Holdings, Maxwell Communications, Polly Peck etc., has highlighted the need for
corporate accountability. This is also important in the area of takeovers where 'efficient'
control systems may prevent management from carrying out 'bad' acquisitions. In the
absence of owners or shareholders managing the company, agents have to be appointed
leading to a separation between ownership and control. This separation between
ownership and control has meant that not just day-to-day operations of a company but
strategic decisions are left to managers. However, in that event, managers may seek to
further their own cause. Even if there is a contract between the shareholders and the agents,
there is no guarantee that the latter will perform according to the wishes of the former.
We investigate the relationship between takeovers and three types of agency monitoring
mechanisms, namely debtholders, corporate governance and owners." Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argue that in the post-Modig,liani and Miller (1958) framework, debt may
be considered a monitoring tool by creditors and shareholders. Debtholders have the ability
to restrict the activities of managers by imposing covenants. Common examples of
restrictions placed on managers by debtholders include reduced dividend payments and
limits on future borrowings. Managers can attempt to reduce the level of restrictions
placed on them by debtholders through supplying greater information which reduces
uncertainty, and hence information asymmetry. It is likely that if debtholders are informed
of the present situation and future direction of the company, they are less likely to impose
15 We refer to agency monitoring mechanisms as explicit or implicit controls placed on the firm's
management so that they carry out actions which maximize the economic welfare of stakeholders. A firm
may have a number of stakeholders such as employees, customers, creditors etc. but not all of these are
equally influential or have the same aims. Therefore, our research is limited to stakeholders who have
broadly similar aims and influence on the agents.
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restrictive terms on the managers. Jensen (1986a) argues that the fear of managers not
being able to service their firm's debt acts as an effective motivating force leading to a
much more efficient organisation. 16 In terms of takeovers, bidders will be "influenced" not
to overpay or carry out "foolish" acquisitions.
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) defines corporate governance as a "system by
which companies are directed and controlled". One important aspect of the corporate
governance structure that monitors the behaviour of top management is the board of
directors. This is because the board sets the standard that top management have to adhere
to, and if they don't they are removed, at least in theory. Aspects of effective corporate
governance providing efficient agency monitoring are the inclusion of non-executive
directors, non-CEO duality and top management with outside experience. 17 Non-executive
directors perform the important task of evaluating the performance of top management.
The empirical evidence shows that the presence of non-executives increases the relative
performance of companies (see Mayers et al., 1997). Similarly, if the role of CEO and
chairman is performed separately, greater discipline is induced. The evidence regarding the
relative performance of companies with and without CEO duality is inconclusive. Duggal
and Cudd (1996) find that companies with CEO duality tend to perform less well compared
to those without. One reason for this may be that the concentration of power leads to
management entrenchment to the detriment of shareholders. However, there is also
evidence to show that this is not always the case as combined roles can promote focused
objectives and a clear line of command (Lai and Sudarsanam, 1997). Finally, top
16 Increased efficiency can be brought about in a number of ways such as canying out restructuring strategies
(Ofek, 1993).
17 We defme top management experience as executive or non-executive directorships held by the Chief
Executive Officer or Chairman in other companies. An experienced top management will have a large
number of outside directorships because other companies will want to exploit their knowledge and skills. At
the same time, outside directorships extend the top management's outside experience.
15
management outside experience is also argued to lead to superior firm performance (see
Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Subramanyam et al., 1997).
Shareholders are the third group of agency monitors we examine in this study. One
development that has taken place in the UK equity market is the move away from private
investors to institutional shareholders. Although large shareholders can be very important as
agency monitors, they do not all have the same incentives as private investors to do so. For
example, large shareholders associated with the directors such as founding family trusts,
etc., may be more aligned to the directors. In the case of institutional investors, they
themselves are judged by their ability to select well performing firms with a good
management team. This may mean that institutional shareholders have a strong incentive to
influence the performance of companies in which they invest their clients' funds. Failure on
the part of institutional investors to select profitable and well performing firms may have a
negative impact on their own performance.
1.2.4 RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF HIGH BOOK TO
MARKET VALUE, PE RATIO AND MARKET
CAPITALISATION ACQUIRERS
The classic Sharpe-Linter-Black version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) states
that there exists a cross-sectional linear relationship between expected returns and beta. In
this model beta explains the variation in share returns. The Sharpe-Linter-Black CAPM
model has been widely tested and studies such as Dycicman et al. (1984) state that the
model can be supported for short run data. Fama and French (1992) show that the beta
does not capture much of the cross sectional variation in average share returns. Fama and
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French (1992) find support for firm size and book to market value in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in share returns. 18
The failure of beta to explain the long run cross-section of expected returns has led
researchers to look for alternative explanatory variables. One such variable is size or market
capitalisation of the company, which Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) find to be
important in explaining the cross- sectional variations in share returns. Levis (1989) for the
UK finds that large and small companies experience different returns°. The size difference
has an impact on the relative performance of bidders. Higson and Elliott (1998) show that
small acquirers (i.e. with a low market capitalisation) in their sample experience CAR,s of -
1.14% over a two-year post-acquisition period while the largest hundred bidders in their
sample received a wealth gain of 1.33% during the same period. This implies that larger
acquirers out-perform smaller ones.
The book to market value is the ratio of the book value of equity against its market value
and attempts to proxy for unobservable common risk factors (Fama and French, 1992 and
1993). Fama and French (1993) argue that the book to market value ratio captures the
'relative distress' factor of a firm. In other words, the risk of a firm is related to its expected
earnings and firms that are assumed to have low expected earnings tend have a low share
price and a high book to market value. Barber and Lyon (1996) examined the relative
performance of high and low book to market value companies and found that the former
18 The non-uniform performance of companies has led researchers to categorise firms by their characteristics, such as
book to market value, PE ratio etc. Firms characterised by low book to market value, high PE ratio etc. are referred
to as glamour shares. On the other hand, firms characterised by high book to market value, low PE ratio etc. are
referred to as value shares.
19 Dimson and Marsh (1996) show that the size effect for the UK is not constant. Between 1955 to 1988
small companies have tended to outperform larger ones. However, the relationship has now inverted with
larger companies outperforming smaller ones, except for the years 1993 and 1994.
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performed considerably better than the latter over the years 1972 to 1984. Rau and
Vermaelen (1998) found that high book to market value bidders experienced higher wealth
gains than low book to market value bidders.
An often used technique in differentiating between companies is to examine the share price
to earnings per share ratio (PE). More formally, the PE ratio is the "esteem at which the
company is held by investors" (Brealey, Myers and Marcus, 1995:p.449). However,
empirical evidence, such as Levis (1989) for the UK, shows that over a long tun period
shareholders of companies with a low PE ratio tend to experience higher abnormal returns
than companies with a high PE ratio. For the US, Fama and French (1992) and
Lalconishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) find similar results with differences of 9.4% and
in abnormal returns respectively between the highest and lowest PE portfolios of •
companies.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
In the above discussion we have explained the issues that will be examined by this thesis.
We now set out our specific objectives. The three focal points of this thesis are to consider
the relative post-acquisition performance of different acquirer types. In Section 1.2.1 we
saw that different acquirer types had different motives and differing post-acquisition
performance. In particular, we are interested in white knight acquirers because their
motives tend to be less clear than those of friendly and hostile acquirers. The second focus
of this research is to determine the factors which may explain why some bidders experience
positive long run post-acquisition returns while other bidders do not. The third focus is to
be able to examine the effect of agency monitors such as the corporate governance
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structure, debtholders and shareholders on the performance of the acquirer. These foci can
be summarised as follows:
i)	 What is the relative long run performance of different acquirer types during
the post-acquisition period?
What are the sources of long run post-acquisition value creation for each
acquirer type?
How effective are agency monitors in determining the long run post-
acquisition performance of acquirers?
The thesis will also attempt to look at a number of subsidiary issues that arise in the context
of the relative post-acquisition performance of different acquirer types defined in terms of
their financial profile. The subsidiary issues are:
i)	 Whether the acquirer firm size affects the long-term post-acquisition
acquirer performance?
Whether the acquirer's profile as glamour or value stock, measured by the
book to market value, affects the long-term post-acquisition performance?
Whether the acquirer's profile as growth or value stock, measured by the
price to earnings ratio, affects the long-term post-acquisition performance?
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1.4 CONTRIBUTION TO RESEARCH
This research differs from previous UK studies of successful takeovers in a number of
ways. The main contributions of this work to our understanding of takeovers are firstly the
analysis of post-acquisition performance by acquirer type. The literature in the area of
takeovers has largely tended to focus on the overall performance of bidders, regardless of
the mood of the takeover. The mood of the bid is especially important in our understanding
of the long-term post-acquisition performance of acquirers. In this respect, this is one of
very few UK studies using event study methodology that examines white knight and
multiple hostile acquirers as separate groups of acquirers. This study is also one of a few
that distinguishes between the different acquirer groups, using a rigorous and clear cut
definition.
Secondly, this is to our knowledge the only UK study that examines the impact of the
agency monitoring mechanisms on the long run post-acquisition performance of the
acquirer. This thesis examines three agency monitoring devices which attempt to reduce
agency conflicts, namely the corporate governance, debt and ownership structure of the
firm. The results of this analysis will allow us to better understand the relationship between
long run post-acquisition performance and each of these devices, and thereby assess their
effectiveness.
Third, this is the only study for the UK, to our knowledge, that uses a daily reference
portfolio to match the bidder firm based on size and book to market value. The vast bilk of
previous UK studies, using event study methodology, tend to use only the general market
index (such as the FT All Share Index) or the HGSC for small companies as a benchmark.
Fama and French (1992) amongst others have shown the general market index to be a very
poor benchmark by which to calculate the abnormal performance of bidder firms. In this
study, we construct a daily index of returns for all UK listed companies from 1980 to the
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present. The indices are then divided into quintiles based on size as well as market to book
value.
Recent empirical evidence shows that long run event studies tend to be misspecified and the
test statistic cannot be relied upon. (See Kothari and Warner, 1997; Barber and Lyon, 1996
and 1997; Cowan and Sargeant, 1997). In long run event studies there is a tendency for
positive or negative performance to appear where none exists. The main cause of this
problem is the inability of standard parametric tests to satisfy the common assumption in
event studies of a zero mean and unit normality2°. Although, studies such as Gregory
(1997) use the bootstrapping method this study attempts to employ an alternative technique
suggested by Cowan and Sargeant (1997). The Cowan and Sargeant (1997) technique
attempts to overcome problems associated with the bootstrapping technique.
1.5 CONCLUSION AND PREVIEW OF THE THESIS
This thesis is organised into ten chapters, of which this the introductory chapter developed
the central focus of the research. In this chapter we have shown that of all the European
countries, the UK has the highest levels of corporate takeovers (Jenkinson and Mayer,
1994:p3). We have also shown that a large number of takeovers in the UK are hostile in
that they do not receive the support of the target firm (Jfenkinson and Mayer, 1994:p6).
The second chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature, which seeks to
explain shareholder wealth effects due to a merger. We show that three alternative
methods have been developed to study the post-acquisition performance of acquirers,
namely accounting-based data, surveys and share price data. From this chapter, we
" Unit normality refers to a distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (Adkins, 1964)
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conclude that, in the case of target firms there appears to be conclusive evidence to
show that shareholders receive a wealth gain but the results for acquirers tend to be
inconclusive.
In Chapter 3 we present and discuss certain factors which have been found to affect
acquirer returns. We find these certain factors may affect post-acquisition performance
of acquirers but they are inadequate at explaining the inconclusive result that we have
to date. We find that there is still a gap in our knowledge regarding the relative
performance of acquirers that needs to be filled. We argue that, in part, the
inconclusive acquirer post-acquisition firm results may be due to previous studies not
segregating acquirers by the mood of the bid.
The fourth chapter describes the structure of our sample data. Our study uses
shareholder returns calculated using event study methodology, and in this chapter we
describe this technique along with its shortcomings. We also explain the econometric
issues in event study methodology such as tests of statistical significance,
bootstrapping etc. Recent studies have shown that the Sharpe-Linter-Black CAPM
model is inadequate at explaining the cross- sectional returns. In this chapter we review
the literature concerning the importance of size, market to book value and PE, in
explaining the cross sectional variation in returns. In this chapter we also describe the
basis and manner in which our reference portfolios were constructed.
The fifth chapter investigates the first of the three issues to be addressed in this thesis
i.e. the relative performance of different acquirer types. In the first part of the chapter
we highlight some methodological issues which are specific to this chapter. In the
second section of the chapter we empirically investigate and report the results for our
hypotheses and propositions. Chapter 6 reviews the literature on the sources of post-
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acquisition value creation. The literature has shown that synergy, wealth transfer and
target firm misvaluation are important sources of post-acquisition value creation.
Chapter 6 also develops the hypotheses which we empirically test in Chapter 7 for our
sample of acquirers. In the second section of Chapter 7 we define the sources of value
creation and control variables. In the third section of this chapter we use the results
from chapter five (discussed in the previous paragraph) to test the relationship between
post-acquisition acquirer performance and the sources of value creation which is
discussed in Chapter 6. In chapter eight we review the literature relating to agency
monitoring mechanisms and their influence on firm performance and formulate the
hypotheses which we empirically test in Chapter 9. In Chapter 9 we discuss the
methodological issues specific to this chapter and report our results. Finally, chapter
ten summarises the results of our study and suggests directions for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO
ACQUIRER GAINS IN CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS:
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
2. INTRODUCTION
The research on mergers has a very long history and is growing as new techniques
become available. Previous studies examining the post-acquisition performance of
acquirers tend to use three main types of analytical techniques, namely large sample
accounting-based analysis, survey studies and event study methodology (i.e. the use of
share prices). Accounting based analysis involves examining the pre- and the post-
acquisition performance of the merging companies using financial variables from
company annual accounts. These studies are commonly known as ex-post studies
because they consider the company's performance after the takeover. In contrast to
this, survey based studies involve examining each takeover individually. This approach
attempts to be more specific and carry out an in-depth analysis of the, companies
involved. The third approach, in order to analyse the performance of the merging firm,
is to use share price information i.e. event study methodology.
Early research using event study methodology such as Halpern (1973) sought to
answer the question of whether or not mergers are value. In the process, these studies
attempt to explain the average wealth experiences of the shareholders. That is, they
combine the shareholder wealth effects of both the target and bidder firm shareholders.
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More recent research attempts to disaggregate the data, and examine whether the
shareholders of target and bidder firms have different wealth experiences following a
bid announcement. The vast literature in finance examining the impact of takeovers on
the share prices of the bidder and target firms finds conclusive results for targets and
inconclusive results for bidders. For both the UK and the US, previous studies show
target firms to experience large positive, and statistically significant, abnormal returns
at the time of the bid announcement. Examples of US studies which show this to be the
case are Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) and more
recently Schwert (1996). For the UK, Franks and Harris (1989), Sudarsanam et al.
(1996) and Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) have also found the same results as the US
studies.
The empirical evidence on the returns to shareholders for bidder firms is more
ambiguous. At the time of the bid announcement, US and UK studies report bidder
firm shareholders to experience small and statistically significant abnormal losses (see
Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Dodd, 1980; Sudarsanam et al., 1996; Gregory, 1997;
Loughran and Vijh, 1997)2. On the other hand, Franks Harris and Titman, (1991) find
bidders to experience small positive gains, and argue that previous studies which report
negative returns do so due to benchmark errors rather than to mis-pricing at the time
of the bid announcement.
In this chapter we review the literature focusing on the performance of targets and
acquirers using share price, accounting data and survey based techniques. We diScuss
the literature relating to the latter two techniques in order to provide a basis of
2 Loughran and Vijh (1997) report negative bidder abnormal returns for equity offers and positive ones for
cash tender offers.
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comparison with the share price, or event study based, research of analysing the
performance of acquirers. By examining the results from alternative techniques we are
better able to determine if changes in equity values are due to a takeover, real
economic gains/losses, or simply due to capital market inefficiencies.
2.1 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH USING ACCOUNTING DATA
Studies using accounting based measures of post-acquisition performance tend to
focus on profitability. One reason for the popularity in the use of profitability as a
performance measure is that it is a reflection of the efficiency with which a firm uses its
assets. The measure of profitability, using ratios such as return on capital employed
(ROCE), includes changes in the size of the assets of a firm as a result of the merger.
Therefore, any benefit arising from the merger will affect the profitability of the
acquirer firm. Early studies using accounting measures, such as those by Lev and
Mandelker (1972), compare eleven different accounting measures for a sample of 69
US takeovers, during the period 1947 to 1968, and a matching control sample of
firms'. The results show that differences in net income over total assets and the ROCE
are statistically significant at the 1% level, between the pre- and post acquisition
period. However, the difference between the control sample is small and statistically
insignificant.
Utton (1974) and Meeks (1977) both find that measures of profitability deteriorate in
the post-merger period relative to a control sample of firms. Utton (1974) examines a
sample of 39 matched UK acquirers during the period 1961 to 1970. A comparison of
3 The bidder sample is matched against a control group Of firms with similar pre-bid financial characteristics.
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the profitability for the sample of acquirers to their industry average performance
shows there to be very little difference between the two. However, a comparison
between the sample of acquirers to a random control group of firms shows the former
to experience lower levels of profitability growth during the post-acquisition period.
Meeks (1977) also examines UK takeovers and finds similar results to Utton (1974)
with significant post-acquisition under-performance. In the sixth year after the
takeover, more than, 60% of acquirers experience significant losses.
Cosh et al. (1980) examine the financial performance of 225 acquirers during the
period 1967 to 1970. The study compares the average pre- and post-acquisition
financial characteristics (i.e. size, profitability, leverage and shareholder return) of the
acquired, acquiring and a control group of firms. The results show that there is a
marked difference in the pre-acquisition characteristics of the acquired, acquiring and
control group of firms. However, there tends to be less of a difference between the
acquired and the control group of firms. Acquirers tend to have higher growth rates,
leverage ratios and size. In the post-acquisition period the acquirers have higher levels
of growth, leverage and shareholder return than the control group of firms. In the case
of profitability, Cosh et al. (1980) find only weak evidence that merging firms are more
profitable in the post-acquisition period than the control group of firms. From these
results, Cosh et al. (1980) conclude that takeovers do not have a negative effect on the •
post-acquisition performance of acquirers.
Holl and Pickering (1988) examine 133 UK takeovers during the period 1963 to 1975
consisting of 50 completed 50 abandoned and 33 contested bids. The last category
refers to the situation where two or more bidders are bidding for the same target firm.
Holl and Pickering (1988) find that bidders in their sample tend to be much larger,
more profitable and have faster growth rates than targets in the pre-bid period.
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However, during the post-acquisition period successful bidders experience a significant
decline in their performance relative to unsuccessful bidders. Target firms which
manage to successfully resist a hostile takeover experience a significant improvement
in their post-bid performance. These results indicate that a takeover bid may stimulate
the efficiency/management of target firms who successfully resist an acquisition. This
study also shows target firms which resisted a takeover experience a greater growth in
firm size rather than profits. This may be due to managerial entrenchment as the target
firm management's primary aim may be to increase the size of its firm and not
necessarily profit. It may be the case that the target firm management, previously
involved in hostile bids, feel that an increase in size will be an effective deterrent
against future bids.
Parkinson and Dobbins (1989) examine a sample of 68 targets who successfully resist
takeover during the period 1975 to 1984. This study finds that in the pre-bid period
target firms have lower profits, are more liquid and carry out less future growth related
investment than bidders. Two years after the bid, targets who manage to successfully
resist a takeover improve their ROCE, ROE, EPS AND PE ratios. Successful bidders,
on the other hand, experience a significant decline in their ROCE, ROE, EPS and PE
ratios. This result lends further support to Holl and Pickering's (1988) finding that a
takeover bid improves the performance of targets who successfully manage to resist an
acquisition while successful bidders experience a decline in their performance.
Teller and Ho!! (1991) examine a sample of 55 UK takeovers during the period 1977
and 1981. Using the PAS score as a measure of financial performance, the study finds
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that for bidders it is 51.5 while for targets it is 48.1 4. The difference between the two
groups of companies is not statistically significant, and hence the hypothesis that
bidders are financially superior to targets in the pre-bid period cannot be supported.
Taffler and Ho11 (1991) cannot find evidence to support Ho11 and Pickering's (1988)
and Parkinson and Dobbins's (1989) finding that target firms who successfully resist a
hostile takeover improve their post-bid performance. Taffler and Ho11 (1991) find that
successful bidder firms do not experience any significant improvement in their financial
performance, which is consistent with HoII and Pickering (1988) and Parkinson and
Dobbins (1989).
Unlike previous studies that find successful bidder firms to experience a decline in the
post-acquisition performance, Healy et al. (1992) obtain the opposite result. Using a
sample of 50 US takeovers during the period 1979 to 1984 the authors find that
operating cash flow returns improve for acquirers during the post-acquisition period
relative to their industry average performance. In the pre-merger period the study did
not find any evidence of acquirers experiencing higher than average industry
performance. In the case of horizontal mergers the increase in operating cash flow was
much more salient, implying that operating synergies may contribute to the
improvement in performance. Healy et al. (1992) also show that the level of research
and development does not affect the post-acquisition bidder performance. In the pre-
merger period the median level of research and development undertaken by bidders
was 2 while in the post-merger period it was 2.1 relative to the industry. The results
show that both the pre- and post-bid research and development expenditures are
comparable.
4 The Performance Analyses Score (PAS) is a measure derived through discriminate analysis of a set of
financial ratios for a sample of failed and solvent firms (see Tattler 1983)
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Manson et al. (1994) analyse the operating cash flow gains following a takeover for a
sample of 38 acquirers and targets during the period 1985 to 1987. This study uses a
similar method to that of Healy et al. (1992) of comparing cash flows after adjusting
for industry averages. By comparing the combined acquirer and target pre- and post-
acquisition cash flow levels the study finds them to be higher during the latter period
than in the former. Based on these results Manson et al. (1994) conclude that,
"operational cash flow gains result from takeovers and that these gains are related to
the market's assessment, at the time of takeover, of these gains".
One can summarise the literature using accounting data to conclude that bidders
experience superior pre-acquisition performance relative to the industry and compared
to the target. In the post-acquisition period acquirers experience a significant decline in
their financial performance. The only exception here is the study by Healy et al. (1992)
which shows acquirers to experience an improvement in financial performance during
the post-acquisition period. The decline in post-acquisition profitability suggests that
managers may have the desire to increase firm size, lending support to the management
entrenchment hypothesis as opposed to the shareholder alignment hypothesis. In the
case of targets who resist a hostile bid, their performance improves significantly. From
this one can conclude that there is a disciplinary motive to some of the takeovers.
Accounting based studies provide an alternative form of analysis of the gains accruing
from a takeover to research using share prices. However, accounting-based studies
suffer from a number of problems. First, company accounts are based on accounting
principles adopted. This is especially the case for takeovers, where the acquirer can use
either acquisition or merger accounting (see Sudarsanam 1995:ch10). Second,
accounting based studies which use a matching sample of firms may have difficulty
defining characteristics of such a control group. The impossibility of obtaining a
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perfect match or control group may lead to the possibility of sample bias appearing in
the results. Having said this, accounting-based studies do not suffer from the problems
associated with event study based methodology which are discussed in Chapter 4 such
as its reliance on the CAPM model or in some cases the arbitrary selection of the event
date.
2.2 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH USING SURVEYS
Studies that attempt to use a survey approach in order to analyse the performance of
the merging firms do so by examining each takeover event individually. Some survey-
based studies may also separate the acquired parts of the company from the activities
of the parent company to fully analyse the gains made from the takeover. In addition to
this, survey-based studies may also seek the opinions of management, through an
interview, regarding the gains/losses arising from the takeover. Alternatively, the
survey may attempt to carry out a questionnaire to obtain information from those who
took part in the takeover. This approach has the advantage in that it obtains 'first hand'
information from those who were either influential or actually made decisions
regarding the takeover. In this way, one is more able to determine the motives behind
the takeover. However, this approach not only suffers from the problems associated
with questionnaires and interviews but also that managers may conceal the truth
especially if the takeover has not been a success.
An early study that uses a survey approach to study the post-acquisition performance
of acquirers is by Kitching (1967) for a sample of 19 US mergers. Interviews with
managers show that a third of them thought their takeover to be a failure. However,
we are not able to compare managers' opinions with the stock market response to the
takeover, as the study did not report the share price change. For the UK, Newbould
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(1970) examines a sample of 38 horizontal UK takeovers using the same methodology
to that of Kitching (1967). Extensive interviews with managers of the acquiring firm
show that half of them did not benefit from any synergistic gains from the takeover. In
the case of takeovers which lead to synergistic gains, these tend to be of an
insignificant magnitude. From these results Newbold (1970) concludes that takeovers
do not lead to any synergistic gains, and if they do they are very small.
Mueller (1985) examines 1,000 US takeovers during the period 1950 to 1972 using
accounting data on individual business units as opposed to consolidated company
accounts of the merged firms. The study finds no evidence to support the argument
that mergers improve efficiency of the combined firm. The acquired units perform no
better and perhaps even worse than the non-acquired companies in the same market
sector. 82% of acquired units experience a decline in their sales. For the same period,
only 12% for non-acquired companies experience a decline in their sales. Mueller
(1985) argues that the decline in the acquired firm's performance takes place after the
takeover and not necessarily before.
More recently, a study by the management consultancy division of Coopers and
Lybrand (1993), examining 50 UK takeovers, finds that in half the takeovers managers
argue that they did not achieve their pre-acquisition financial performance expectations
for the combined firm. In many respects this result is in line with share price data
studies which show that half the number of acquirers experience post-acquisition
decline in their relative share price (see section 2.3). The main reasons put forward by
managers for the post-acquisition under-performance are a difference in bidder and
target management attitudes, and inadequate post-acquisition integration planning
during the pre-acquisition period.
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Survey-based studies show that the average acquirer tends not to experience any
positive gains from a takeover and is more likely to under-perform relative to its peer
group. However, there are also acquirers who do benefit from takeovers in terms of
growth and profitability. This leads us to conclude that certain acquirers have the
necessary skills, knowledge and judgement to extract value from a takeover and make
it successful. Unfortunately, survey-based studies do not list the types of successful or
unsuccessful acquirers. Instead, survey based studies present some factors which may
contribute towards post-acquisition acquirer failure. Some of these factors are lack of
proper post-integration planning, diversity in cultures between target and bidder firms
and lack of clear pre-bid strategy resulting in the choice of an inappropriate target firm.
2.3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES USING EVENT STUDY
METHODOLOGY
The third approach of examining the pre- and post-bid performance of merging
companies is through the use of share price data in order to predict the rates of return
that would have been obtained in the absence of an event, in this case a takeover bid.
This type of approach is more commonly known as event study methodology and is by
far the most popular method which previous studies use in examining shareholder
wealth effects for the merging firms. Event study methodology attempts to calculate
the difference between the actual and the predicted returns, called the abnormal return.
We show in Chapter 4 that there are several different models available in order to
estimate the predicted returns. Although event study methodology is a very popular
technique that researchers use in their analysis of shareholder wealth effects due to a
takeover, it is not free from criticism. We discuss some of these criticisms against
event study methodology in Chapter 4.
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One early study that uses event study methodology to assess the post-acquisition
performance of merging firms is by Halpern (1973). This study examines the abnormal
returns for the combined bidder and target firm. Halpern (1973) argues that any
separation of gains to bidders and target firms is quite arbitrary and has no economic
justification 5
 . Using monthly data for the period 1950 to 1965, for successful mergers,
this study finds consistently positive combined bidder and target shareholder wealth
gains for the period three months prior to the announcement date. The Cumulative
Abnormal Return (CAR) increases from less than 0.4%, three months prior to the
announcement, to almost 8% on the month of the announcement 6. The largest
increases in CARs occur during the one month prior to, and including, the month of
the bid announcement.
More recent literature separates the effects of a merger for both the target and bidder
firm shareholders. These studies largely use industrial firms in their sample. However,
there are some studies that consider only non-industrial firms (see James and Weir,
1985; Pettway and Triffts, 1985; Neely, 1987; Bertin et al., 1989; Hannan and Wolken,
1989). The main reason for excluding the financial sector, (i.e. banks and insurance
companies) is that, unlike industrial companies, their day to day operations are usually
regulated. Moreover, in some countries such as the UK, bank takeovers require
approval from the Bank of England (i.e. the central bank). In the US, financial
regulation did not allow bank takeovers until recently (see Pettway and Triffts, 1985).
Such restrictions are not placed on industrial firms unless the takeover is against the
public interest. In this section we aim to present the literature relating to shareholder
5 Halpem (1973) does not separate returns accruing to bidder and target firm shareholders because, for his
sample of companies, he does not have adequate information to determine which party initiated the takeover.
6 Abnormal returns are the difference between actual and expected returns. We describe the calculation of
abnormal returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) in detail in Chapter 4.
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wealth gains accruing from a takeover for target firms first and then bidder firms. In
reviewing the literature, we make a distinction between US and UK studies due to
differences between the two countries in takeover regulation, tax laws etc. We first
present the main empirical studies for the US and then for the UK.
2.3.1 TARGET FIRM SHAREHOLDER WEALTH GAINS
Review of US Studies
An early study that segregates the gains for bidder and target firms is that by
Mandelker (1974). This study uses data from the Federal Trade Commission listing of
252 completed takeovers during the period 1948 to 1967, using monthly share prices.
This study finds target firm shareholders to experience a CAR of 12% during the
period -40 months to -1 month before the completion of the merger. The results also
show a dramatic rise in the average monthly abnormal returns during the seven months
prior to completion. The CARs are consistently negative during the period -35 to -7
months before completion. In the six months before completion the CAR becomes
positive. One explanation for this behaviour in the results is that positive information
regarding the acquisition flows to the market at about this time.
Later studies by Ellert (1976), Langetieg (1978), Dodd and Ruback (1977), and Dodd
(1980) confirm the findings of Mandelker (1974). Ellert (1976) carries out a similar
study to that of Mandelker (1974) whereby he examines 311 acquisitions during . the
period 1950 to 1970. Using monthly data from the University of Chicago Centre for
Research on Share Prices (CRSP) database, the study finds that target firms show a
negative CAR for the period -100 to -8 months, prior to the completion. However,
from -7 months prior to the merger completion the CAR increases to 15%, statistically
significant at the 1% level. One explanation for the negative CAR, during the period -
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100 to -8 months prior to completion, is that target firms are poorly managed. The
positive abnormal returns start from seven months prior to the announcement which is
consistent with Mandelker's (1974) study and, again, the explanation is the possible
flow of information to the market.
Langetieg (1978) attempts to replicate Mandelker's (1974) study using five different
benchmark models.' Langetieg (1978) finds that his results have the same sign as those
of Mandelker (1974) but they differ in magnitude. Both Mandelker (1974) and
Langetieg (1978) find target firms to experience negative pre-merger CARs for the
period -72 to -19 months. As we explain above, Mandelker (1974) argues that target
firm pre-merger underperformance is a reflection of their poor management. However,
Langetieg (1978) cannot support this claim as he finds both targets and firms in the
control sample to experience similar pre-merger negative CARs. Furthermore, the
'paired-difference' tests between targets and the control group show excess returns not
to be significantly different from zero. Targets begin to experience positive abnormal
returns from about six months prior to the merger, which is consistent with Mandelker
(1974). (Langetieg, 1974 does not report returns for targets in the month of the
merger or the post-merger period.) From these results Langetieg (1978) concludes that
the inclusion of an industry factor has a considerable impact on the performance
measurement. The positive pre-merger excess returns indicate that the merger
contributes to shareholder wealth.
7 Langetieg (1978) uses four variations of the market model along with a control group. We describe the
market model, along with a size based control group, in Chapter 4.
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Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Dodd (1980) use a similar methodology to Mandelker
(1974) and Ellert (1976) but instead of focusing on the merger completion date as the
event date they examine the first date of the bid announcement. 8 Using the first date of
the bid-announcement has now become the . common approach for researchers
examining the shareholder wealth gains from a takeover. The reason for this is that it
allows one to examine the reaction of the stock market to the takeover, prior to the
effective date of the merger. Dodd and Ruback (1977) is one of the first studies to use
the bid-announcement date as the event date and to consider targets in unsuccessful
takeovers. Dodd and Ruback (1977) examine a sample of 136 targets in successful,
and 36 targets in unsuccessful, tender offers during the period 1958 to 1976. The study
finds that shareholders of both successful and unsuccessful target firms experience
positive and statistically significant, at the 1% level, abnormal returns in the month of
the bid-announcement. For targets in successful tender offers the abnormal return in
the Month of the bid-announcement is 21% while for unsuccessful targets it is
marginally lower at 19%. From the month of the bid-announcement to a year later,
targets experience statistically insignificant CARs of 8% and -3% for successful and
unsuccessful tender offers'.
Dodd and Ruback (1977) conclude that bid-announcements lead to an improvement in
wealth for target firm shareholders in successful and non-successful tender offers.
However, they are marginally higher for the former than the latter. Also, once it
appears that the tender offer will become unsuccessful, target firm shareholders begin
to experience a decline in their wealth. Dodd (1980) uses a similar methodology to
8 An event date is the day on which an event, such as a bid announcement or completion, takes place.
9 There are many types of tender offers with different kinds of provisions and a bidder need not purchase
100% of the shares in the target firm. The terms 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' tender offer refer to where
the bidder manages to acquire all the shares that it had sought to purchase (see Weston et al., 1998:p10).
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Dodd and Ruback (1977) for a sample of 71 successful and 80 unsuccessful targets in
takeover bids, during the period 1971 to 1977. Dodd (1980) finds targets to
experience positive and statistically significant, at the 1% level, abnormal returns of
4%, at the time of the bid-announcement, for all takeover targets. However, targets in
unsuccessful takeovers experience an abnormal return of 5% while it is 3% for targets
in successful takeovers. During the post-bid period (i.e. +1 to +35 days) targets in
unsuccessful takeovers experience a decline in their CAR of -10% while targets in
successful takeovers experience a gain of 5%. From these results Dodd (1980)
concludes that targets earn a large positive abnormal return from the announcement of
a merger. However, the gains are initially larger for targets in unsuccessful, rather than
successful, takeovers but decline for the former as it becomes apparent that the merger
will not continue.
Asquith (1983) examines 211 successful, and 91 unsuccessful, takeover bids during the
period 1962 to 1976 to find that a bid-announcement leads to a wealth gain for target
firm shareholders. However, shareholders of targets in unsuccessful takeover bids
experience a decline in their wealth. In the pre-bid period (i.e. -480 days to the bid
announcement date) the CAR is consistently negative for targets in both successful and
unsuccessful takeover bids. Following on from the bid-announcement date, only
targets in successful takeover bids experience .consistently positive CARs till the
outcome date while targets in unsuccessful takeover bids experience consistently
negative CARs. On the day of the bid-announcement the abnormal returns for targets
in successful takeover bids is 3% while for targets in unsuccessful takeover bids is
20/0'. On the day of the bid outcome targets in successful takeover bids experience
I ° Asquith (1983) does not report significance levels for the CARs.
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abnormal returns of 1% while for targets in unsuccessful takeover bids the abnormal
return is -3%.
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) adopt a slightly different approach from previous
studies by focusing on targets firms after an unsuccessful tender offer. Bradley et al.
(1983) segregate their sample of 112 targets in unsuccessful tender offers during the
period 1963 to 1980 into those which receive a subsequent bid and those which do
not. The results show that targets which receive a subsequent takeover bid experience
higher abnormal returns than those which do not receive subsequent takeover bids.
The sample of targets subsequently taken over experience a statistically significant, at
the 1% level, CAR of 17% over the period one month after the initial bid offer until
two years later. Over the same period, targets which are not subsequently taken over
experience a statistically significant, at the 1% level, CAR of -27%. From these results,
Bradley et al. (1983) conclude that target firm shareholders benefit from an acquisition
only if there is an opportunity to exploit potential synergies.
In a review article, Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarise evidence from thirteen
studies that consider shareholder wealth effects due to mergers. Unlike some of the
earlier studies, which use the completion date as the event date, all of the studies in
Jensen and Ruback's (1983) review follow the Dodd and Ruback (1977) method of
using the announcement date as the event date. However, the studies are not consistent
in terms of the time period under observation or the length of the event windows.-
Nevertheless, all the studies produce fairly consistent results in that the target firm
shareholders receive a positive wealth gain as a result of a merger or tender offer. In
the case of successful takeovers all the CARs are statistically significant at the 1% and
range from 14% to 22% depending on the event window and type of takeover. For the
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seven studies which examine tender offers, the gain to target firm shareholders is
statistically significant at the 1% level and range from 17% to 34%.
Weighting the abnormal returns to allow for sample size show that the CARs for target
firms are 8% and 10% for successful, and unsuccessful, takeover bids respectively
during the two day announcement period". For the period, 20 days prior to the bid-
announcement date till 20 days after, the CARs for targets in successful and
unsuccessful takeover bids are 16% and 17% respectively. Finally, from ten days prior
to the bid-announcement to the outcome date, targets in successful and unsuccessful
takeover bids experience wealth gains of 20% and to -3% respectively. In the case of
unsuccessful takeovers, the gains to targets are lost as it becomes apparent that the
merger will fail. From these results the authors conclude that takeovers generate large
positive and statistically significant, at the 1% level, gains for target firm shareholders.
However, for targets in unsuccessful takeovers the gains tend to decline.
As we mention above, Jensen and Ruback's (1983) review of previous studies
examining shareholder wealth effects for the merging firms considers the period prior
to 1981. A later review which focuses on takeover studies between 1981 and 1987 is
contained in Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988). The authors find that target firm
shareholders experience positive and statistically significant abnormal returns prior to
the bid announcement. Jarrell et al. (1988) point to a number of influences on the pre-
bid trading of target firm shares which may affect their behaviour. The influences are
articles in the financial press, and information that develops on the bidder's foothold
acquisition in the target. In the case of friendly bids there may be preliminary
"The authors do not report the t-statistic for weighted CARs.
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communication. Jarrell et al. also find that abnormal returns tend to be larger in tender
offers than in mergers. In both tender offers and mergers, the gain to target firm
shareholders is not as a result of a redistribution of wealth from bidder firm
shareholders but due to "real wealth gains".
Although Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) largely examine the shareholder wealth
effects for 399 acquiring firms during the period 1975 to 1984, they also report CARs
for target firms. The entire sample of target firms experience statistically significant, at
the 1%, CARs of 28% for the period -5 to +5 days relative to the announcement date.
Schwert (1996) reports similar results for a sample of 1,814 targets during the period
1975 to 1991. For the period -42 to +126 days, the abnormal returns for tender offers
is 35% and statistically significant at the 1% level. The unweighted average of the
annual abnormal returns for all tender offers during the years 1985 to 1991 is
statistically significant at 37%. For the years 1992 to 1996, covering 1,280 bids, the
average of the median premiums paid to target firm shareholders is 32% while the
average premiums is slightly higher at 41%, both of which are statistically significant.
Loughran and Vijh (1997) use a slightly different method to compute the abnormal
returns over a period of time to previous studies. Previous studies tend to use the CAR
while Loughran and Vijh (1997) use the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR). 12 For
a sample of 516 acquisitions including 419 mergers and 97 tender offers during the
period 1970 to 1989, the study finds that target firm shareholders experience abnormal
returns which are consistent with previous studies. During the period -2 to 0 days,
target firm shareholders experience BHARs of 26% and 25% respectively. However,
12 We show how to calculate the CAR and BI-JAR along with the differences between them in Chapter 4.
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not all target firm shareholders experience the same level of abnormal returns at the
time of the bid announcement.
Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that target firm shareholders in the top quartile,
measured by the target to bidder market capitalisation, experience lower pre-bid
BHARs than targets in the lower quartiles. Average pre-bid (i.e. -2 to 0 days) BHARs
for targets in the lowest quartile is 28% while for those in the top quartile it is 20%.
(Both BHARs for high and low quartile targets are statistically significant at the 1%
level.) Loughran and Vijh (1997) argue that in the five years following the failed bid,
targets experience a decline in their BHARs especially in the case of those in the top
target to bidder size quartile. 13 However, after the bid-completion, the decline in
BHARs is more likely to be a reflection of bidder firm underperformance and not that
of the target firm.
Review of UK Studies
The results from UK studies confirm US evidence, in that target firm shareholders
experience a large and statistically significant wealth gain at the time of the bid
announcement. One of the earliest studies that uses UK data is by Franks, Broyles and
Hechts (1977) which considers 70 mergers in the brewery and distilling industry. The
study uses monthly data for the period 1955 to 1972 and examines CARs for both the
bid-announcement and outcome dates. Franks et al. (1977) find consistently negative
CARs for the period 40 months to one month prior to the bid announcement date.
From one month prior to the bid-announcement date until the outcome date, the CARs
When reporting post-bid target BHARs, Loughran and Vijh (1997) assume that the capital from the target
firm is invested in the bidder firm.
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are consistently positive. The CARs are 16% and 21% for the period -40 months to the
bid-announcement and from the bid-announcement till the outcome date. The greatest
increase in the abnormal return occurs on the day of the bid-announcement. This study
supports US findings that news of the merger leaks out prior to the official
announcement.
Firth (1979) examines 224 mergers where the bidder firm holds less than 30% of the
target firm equity at the time of the bid announcement during the period 1972 to 1974.
Using monthly data, the study finds target firm shareholders receive CARs of 33% for
the period -48 months until the announcement month. In the month of the bid-
announcement, targets experience an abnormal return of 22%. In the two months
following the bid-announcement, targets experience a CAR of 1%. Firth (1979) argues
that the initial stock market reaction to the bid-announcement needs no correction. In
this respect, stock markets adjust both immediately and correctly to any new
information.
In a later paper, Firth (1980) examines target firms in successful and unsuccessful
takeovers during the period 1969 to 1975. In the case of 434 targets in successful
mergers, the CARs are consistently negative from -48 months till -2 months relative to
the bid announcement date. In the month of the bid-announcement targets in
successful and unsuccessful takeovers experience, statistically significant at the 1%
level, abnormal returns of 28% and 31% respectively. For the three months after the
bid-announcement, targets in successful takeovers experience positive abnormal
returns in the region of 1%. In the case of 129 targets in unsuccessful takeovers, the
results show that for the period -48 months to -4 months the CARs are consistently
negative. In the month of the bid-announcement targets in unsuccessful takeovers
experience an abnormal return of 31%. During the three months following the bid-
43
announcement, targets in unsuccessful takeovers continue to report positive abnormal
returns averaging a little over 1% per month. For the longer event window of two
years after the bid-announcement date, the CAR is 4% for targets in unsuccessful
takeovers. This is different from the US studies which show the target firm
shareholders to lose their wealth gain as soon as it becomes apparent that the merger is
going to fail.
Franks and Harris (1989) examine the shareholder wealth effects for 1,898 'targets in
takeovers completed between 1955 and 1985. In the month of the bid-announcement
target, firms experience a statistically significant, at the 1%, abnormal return of 23%.
For the longer event window of -4 months to +1 month, target firms experience
statistically significant, at the 1% level, abnormal return of 26%. Franks and Harris
(1989) find that abnormal returns in the month of the bid-announcement are not equal
across the different types of target firms. For targets which are less than half the size of
the bidder, the abnormal return is 28% while those which are larger than the bidder the
abnormal return is 20% in the month of the bid-announcement. A comparison of the
abnormal returns for targets, during the period -4 months to +1 month, in the UK with
those in the US show there to be no statistically significant difference". From these
results, Franks and Harris (1989) conclude that targets experience positive and
statistically significant abnormal returns at the time of the bid announcement which are
comparable to those in the US after controlling for the method of payment.
14 The comparison between the performance of UK and US targets is made after controlling for tender offers.
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Limtnack (1991) finds that shareholders of targets in completed and abandoned
takeovers experience positive and statistically significant, at the 1% level, abnormal
returns at the time of the bid-announcement. This study uses a sample of 552 targets in
successful and unsuccessful takeover bids during the period 1977 to 1986. The results
show that in the month prior to the bid-announcement, target firms in successful and
unsuccessful takeovers experience positive and statistically significant, at the 1% level,
CARs of 4% and 5% respectively. From the day after the bid-announcement to one
day before the outcome date the CAR is 6% (significant at the 1% level) for targets in
successful takeovers while the CAR is -3% and statistically insignificant for targets in
unsuccessful takeovers. Using size or value weighted returns, Limmack (1991) finds
that targets experience abnormal returns of 19% (significant at the 5% level) for the
three months before the announcement till the outcome date. From these results
Linunack (1991) concludes that both targets in successful and abandoned bids
experience large and positive abnormal returns. However, in the case of unsuccessful
bids the CAR declines and becomes negative in the post-bid period.
More recently, Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Sudarsanam, Roll and Salami (1996)
and Hon and Kyriazis (1997a) find results that support earlier studies with regard to
target firm shareholder wealth effects at the time of the bid announcement. Roll and
Kyriazis (1997a), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), and Sudarsanam et al. (1996)
investigate an almost identical time period of 1979 to 1989, 1980 to 1989 and 1980 to
1990 for a sample of 287, 345 and 429 UK targets respectively' s . All the studies find
target firm CARs to be statistically significant during the bid-announcement period.
Kennedy and Limmack (1996) find that, in the month of the bid-announcement, targets
experience a CAR of 29% which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Sudarsanam
15 Holl and Kyriazis (I 997a) and Kennedy and Liinmack (1996) used monthly data while Sudarsanam et al.
(1996) used daily data.
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et al. (1996) find that on the day of the bid- announcement target firms experience an
abnormal return of 14% which is statistically significant at the 1% level. loll and
Kyriazis (1997a) find that, in the month of the bid- announcement target, firms
experience an abnormal return of 22% which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
For the longer event windows of three months before until four months after the bid-
announcement, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) find that targets firm shareholders
receive a CAR of 42% which is statistically significant at the 5% level. For the period
20 days before the announcement date till 40 days after, Sudarsanam et al. (1996) and
Holl and Kriazis (1997a) obtain an almost identical and statistically significant, at the
1% level, CAR of 29% and 26% respectively'. More recently, Barnes (1998)
examines a slightly later period to that of Holl and Kyriazis (1997a), Sudarsanam et al.
(1996) and Kennedy and Limmack (1996) but still finds targets to experience large
positive abnormal returns. For a sample of 775 takeovers, during the period 1987 to
1993, Barnes (1998) finds that targets experience CARs of 25% during the period -40
days to 0. As in previous studies, such as Limmack (1991), targets in unsuccessful
takeovers experience lower CARs than those in successful takeovers at 25% and 32%
respectively.
The evidence to date, which we summarise in Table 2.1, suggests that target firms
underperform relative to the general market index and to a control group of firms until
about forty days prior to the bid-announcement. However, during the period forty days
prior to the bid-announcement till the actual event date target firm shareholders
experience a positive and statistically significant abnormal return. Jarrell et al. (1988)
argue that articles in the financial press, information that develops on the bidder's
foothold acquisition in the target firm, and leaking of news regarding preliminary
16 As Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) use monthly data we report the CARs for the period is -1 to +2 months.
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communication between the merging firms go a long way towards explaining the
positive abnormal returns which target firm shareholders experience immediately prior
to the bid-announcement. Targets in successful takeovers maintain their positive
abnormal returns until the completion date while those in failed takeover bids
experience a decline in their share price. Finally, targets which are considerably smaller
than the bidder experience higher abnormal returns at the time of the bid- .
announcement than targets which are larger than the bidder.
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2.3.2 BIDDER FIRM SHAREHOLDER WEALTH GAINS
Review of US Studies
In the case of bidder firms, the results from past studies tend to be somewhat mixed
with shareholders experiencing positive, negative and zero abnormal returns at the time
of the bid-announcement. The inconclusive performance of bidder firms, at the time of
the bid-announcement, is true for both US and UK studies. The mixed results relating
to bidder firm returns date to the very early studies investigating the shareholder
wealth effects from a merger, such as those by Mandelker (1974) and Ellert (1976).
Mandelker (1974) finds that for a sample of 241 successful bidders, during the period
1941 to 1962, the abnormal returns prior to, and in the month of, the merger are
positive. For the period 40 months before the merger to 40 months after, the CAR is
6%". For a shorter event window of one month before the merger and two months
after, the CAR is 1%. In the month of the merger the abnormal returns are 0.2%. From
these results Mandelker (1974) concludes that acquisitions are profit maximising
activities carried out by the acquiring firm.
Ellert (1976), for a sample of 205 bidder firms during the period 1950 to 1970, finds
that takeovers lead to a fall in shareholder wealth for the acquiring firms. For the
period 100 months to one month before completion, the CAR is 23% and statistically
significant at the 1% level. In the month of the bid completion the abnormal return for
bidders is negative at -2%. Ellen's (1976) results are in line with those of Mueller
(1977) who reviews the results from eight previous studies which investigate mergers
from 1941 to 1969, with a number of overlapping periods. A comparison of these
studies shows bidder firm shareholders not to experience any improvement in their
17 Mandelker (1974) does not report the significance levels for the CARs.
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wealth. Even when there is a positive wealth gain it is not significantly different from
that of the control sample of firms. Moreover, studies in Mueller's (1977) review,
which show the bidder firm shareholders to experience positive wealth gains, are not
statistically significant from zero to any respected level.
Dodd and Ruback (1977) consider a sample of 124 successful and 48 unsuccessful
bidder firms, in tender offers, during the period 1958 to 1976. During the year prior to
the tender offer, successful and unsuccessful bidder firms experience statistically
significant, at the 1% level, and positive CARs of 12% and 8% respectively. In the
month of the tender offer, successful bidder firms experience an abnormal return of 3%
which is significant at the 5% level. Over the same period, unsuccessful bidder firms
experience a statistically insignificant and much lower abnormal return of 0.6%. In the
post-bid announcement period both successful and unsuccessful bidders experience
negative CARs.
Dodd (1980) examines a sample of 66 cancelled and 60 completed takeovers during
the period 1971 to 1977, and finds that any gains from a bid-announcement accrue not
to bidder firm shareholders but to those of the target. Unsuccessful bidder firm
shareholders experience a small negative return on the day of the bid announcement of
-1% which is higher than that for completed takeovers which are -0.2%. As in
previous studies, bidders in both successful and cancelled takeovers experience
positive CARs during the 40 days prior to the bid announcement. The CAR for the
period -40 days to -1 day is 7% and 6% for cancelled and completed takeovers
respectively. In the post-bid period both bidders in cancelled and completed takeovers
experience positive CARs although they are larger for the latter. Bidders in cancelled
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takeovers experience a CAR of 2% for the 35 days following the bid announcement
while it is 1% for bidders in completed takeovers.
Asquith (1983) examines 196 successful and 89 unsuccessful bidders during the period
1962 to 1976 and finds that there is very little stock market reaction for the bidding •
firms on the day of the bid-announcement. On the day of the bid-announcement
successful bidders experience an abnormal return of -0.5% while for unsuccessful
bidders the abnormal return is 0%. Again, on the outcome day there is very little stock
market reaction for bidder firms. Successful bidder firms experience an abnormal
return of 0.2% while for unsuccessful bidders it is 0%. In both cases the abnormal
returns are statistically insignificant. However, after the outcome date, shareholders of
successful bidders experience a decline in their wealth. From these results Asquith
(1983) concludes that shareholders of the acquiring firms experience very little, if any,
change in their wealth on the announcement of a bid or the failure of a takeover.
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) find that bidders in general experience statistically
significant, at the 1% level, and positive abnormal returns. During the 20 days prior to
the bid- announcement, bidders experience statistically significant, at the 1% level,
CARs of 2.8%. The CAR for the two day bid-announcement period is 1% and
statistically significant at the 1% level. Asquith et al. (1983) find that bidders who carry
out a number of takeover bids for different target firms over a period of time
experience much higher CARs at the time of their most recent bid-announcement than
bidders who carry out no previous bids. Bidders who carry out between two and four
takeover bids in the last eight years experience CARs of 3% on the announcement of
their most recent bid. In contrast to this, bidders with no previous experience of
takeover bids experience CARs of 2% on the day of the bid announcement. The results
lead Asquith et al. (1983) to argue that part of the positive CARs which bidder firms
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experience may be due to the market's reactions to previous bids. The results also
show successful bidders to experience CARs which are 40% greater than those for
unsuccessful bidders for the period -21 day to the bid-announcement date. Asquith et
al. (1983) find successful bidder firms to receive a reward (i.e. a higher abnormal
returns) for their victory which may lend support to the argument that acquirers gain
from a merger.
In their review article, Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that the announcement period
(i.e. -20 to +20 days) CARs are positive for all the studies in their review. The average
CARs during the period -20 to +20 days are 1% and 2% for successful and
unsuccessful bidders respectively. However, these positive returns largely occur
during the pre-announcement period as both the announcement date and the post
acquisition period CARs are negative. During the two day bid-announcement period
(i.e. -1 to 0 days) the CARs for the whole sample of studies are -0.05% and 0.2% for
successful and unsuccessful bidders respectively. From the bid-announcement to the
outcome date the authors find a negative abnormal return averaging -2% and -5% for
successful and unsuccessful bidders. During the one year post acquisition period all
the studies, except one, report a negative CAR averaging -5.5%. Jensen and Ruback
(1983) conclude that mergers are zero net present value (NPV) investments. The
authors also argue that the positive returns for terminated bid is consistent with bidders
attempting to maximise shareholder wealth. Once the bidder management realise that
the target is over-valued they abandon the takeover.
Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) review studies which examine shareholder wealth
effects from the 1980s to find that bidder firms experience positive and statistically
significant, at the 1% level, abnormal returns at the time of the bid-announcement.
During the period -10 days to +5 days bidders experience CARs of 1% while for the
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longer event window (i.e. -10 days to +20 days) the CARs are 2%. Although bidders
experience modest increases in their share price at the time of the bid-announcement,
this is not necessarily the case for successful bidders who experience share price falls as
often as rises. Jarrell et al. (1988) conclude that the evidence from their review of
previous studies suggests that takeovers "reflect economically beneficial reshuffling of
productive assets".
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) examine a sample of 236 successful interfirm tender
offers between 1958 and 1984. Due to the change in legislation regarding tender
offers, the study partitions the sample into three time periods (i.e. 1963-68, 1968-80
and 1981-84). The study finds that CARs for acquirers are sensitive to the time period
under investigation. Acquirers making a tender offer during 1963-68 experience
statistically significant at the 1% level CARs for the period -5 to +5 days of 4%.
During 1968-80 acquirers experience statistically insignificant CARs for the period -5
to +5 days of 1.3%. However, for the later period (i.e. 1981-84) acquirers experience
statistically significant, at the 1% level, negative CARs for -5 to +5 days of 3%.
Franks et al. (1991) examine a sample of 399 US takeovers during the period 1975 to
1984. At the time of the bid-announcement the whole sample of acquirers experience
wealth losses of-1% which are not statistically significant. However, in the three year
post-acquisition period the authors compare their returns using four different
benchmark models which show bidders to experience wealth losses as well as gains."
Of the four benchmark models, the equally weighted index and the ten factor model
show bidders to experience small and statistically insignificant wealth losses. The value
18 See Chapter Four for a discussion of the different benchmark models.
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weighted index shows bidders to experience small positive CARs while the eight factor
model exhibits no statistically significant abnormal performance for the sample of
acquirers. From these results Franks et al. (1991) conclude that negative post-
acquisition returns from previous studies are "due to benchmark errors rather than to
mis-pricing at the time of announcement".
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) examine a sample of 937 mergers during the
period 1955 to 1987 in order to test if acquirer post-acquisition returns are dependent
on the benchmark as Franks et al. (1991) claim is the case. This study finds that both
the value weighted index and the Returns Across Time and Securities (RATS) returns
are statistically significant and negative at 10% and 11% respectively over the five
years following the acquisition. Agrawal et al. (1992) argue that their results are robust
to a variety of specifications and are not due to changes in the beta following a merger.
Agrawal et al. (1992) conclude that "the efficient market anomaly of negative post-
merger performance highlighted in Jensen and Ruback (1983) is not resolved". This
conclusion is contrary to Franks et al.'s (1991) results which Agrawal et al. (1992)
argue to be specific to the time period under consideration, and the mixing of tender
offers with mergers. Agrawal et al. (1992) find that acquirers experience negative post-
acquisition returns for takeovers in the 1950s, 1960s and the 1980s but not for those in
the 1970s which is when the bulk of the Franks et al. (1991) mergers take place.
Loderer and Martin (1992) attempt to test if the post-acquisition acquirer returns are
negative. Loderer and Martin (1992) also attempt to find out if post-acquisition
acquirer returns are period specific as Agrawal et al. (1992) claim or dependent on the
benchmark as Franks et al. (1991) argue is the case. For a sample of 1,298 acquirers
during the period 1966 to 1986 Loderer and Martin (1992) find negative returns in the
first three years following a takeover but not for the fourth and fifth year.
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Furthermore, post-acquisition acquirer returns are negative only for takeovers in the
1960s and zero for those acquisitions taking place in the 1970s and 1980s. From these
results Loderer and Martin (1992) conclude that, on average, acquirers do not
experience returns greater than, or less than, a control sample of firms during the first
five years following a takeover.
Schwert (1996) examines 1,814 takeovers during the period 1975 to 1991 to find that
•
acquirers experience a post-acquisition abnormal return which is not significantly
different from zero. Prior to the bid-announcement, i.e. -42 to -1 days, bidders
experience statistically insignificant returns of 10%. Bidder firm shareholders
experience very little stock market reaction on the day of the bid-announcement, with.
an abnormal return of 0.5%. During the year following the bid-announcement, bidder
firms experience a negative CAR of 7%. From these results Schwert (1996) concludes
that the 'runup costs' (i.e. the probability of a successful takeover multiplied by the bid
premium) is an added cost to the bidder leading to negative post-acquisition CARs.
Using buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) Loughran and Vijh (1997) also find
acquirers to experience negative post-acquisition returns. For the period 1970 to 1989,
the study examines a sample of 434 acquirers in mergers and their matching firms,
chosen on the basis of market value and book to market ratio. Loughran and Vijh
(1997) find that acquiring firms experience five year post-acquisition BHARs of -16%.
From these results Loughran and Vijh (1997) conclude that mergers are not in the best
interests of bidder firm shareholders.
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Review of UK Studies
Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977) is one of the first UK studies to examine the
shareholder wealth effects for merging firms. The study examines a sample of 94
takeovers in the brewing and distilling industry during the period 1955 to 1972. The
results from this study show that for the period two years prior to the bid-
announcement, acquirers experience positive CARs of 5%. In the month of the bid-
announcement, acquirers experience positive but very small abnormal returns of 0.1%.
In the month of the bid outcome, acquirers experience a negative abnormal return of
1%. In the two year post-acquisition period, acquirers experience negative CARs of
5%. Franks et al. (1977) argue that one explanation for the decline in abnormal returns
from the bid-announcement to two years after the acquisition is that the market
corrects "unduly optimistic forecasts of future earnings at the time of a takeover".
Firth (1979 and 1980) find bidder firm shareholders to experience negative returns at
the time of the bid-announcement and during the post-acquisition period. Firth (1979)
examines a sample of 224 bidders during the period 1972 to 1974 and finds bidder
firms offering a non-equity payment experience CARs of 1% for the period four years
prior to the bid announcement. Over the same period, bidders offering equity payments
experience a CAR of 5%. In the month of the bid-announcement, bidders experience
negative abnormal returns of -2% and -3% for those offering equity and non equity
considerations respectively°. For the two year post-acquisition period, both bidders
offering equity and non-equity payments experience very small negative CARs of
0.5%. Firth (1979) concludes that there are no gains or losses associated with
takeovers for acquiring firms. More importantly, the stock market reacts correctly to a
bid-announcement without the need for any revisions.
19 Neither Firth (1979) nor Firth (1980) carries out tests of statistical significance.
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In a later study, Firth (1980) examines a larger sample of 486 takeovers during the
period 1969 to 1975 and also differentiates between successful and non-successful
bidders. Firth (1980) finds pre-bid CARs to be much lower than those in Firth (1979)
and statistically insignificant. In the month of the bid-announcement, Firth (1980) finds
successful and unsuccessful bidders to experience abnormal returns of -6%. For the•
period three years after the bid-announcement, Firth (1980) finds that successful and
unsuccessful bidders experience CARs of 0% and 3% respectively. Firth (1980) argues
that the relative superior performance of unsuccessful bidders against successful
bidders may be due to the market taking a pessimistic view of takeovers for acquiring
firms. If a bidder fails in its attempt to acquire the target, the stock market views this
as good news and hence the positive CARs.
Barnes (1984) considers a small sample of 39 acquirers between 1974 and 1976 and
finds that there is very little stock market reaction to a bid-announcement. However,
once the takeover is complete the stock market views it as bad news and there are
significant downward movements in the share price of acquirers. The CARs for
acquirers declines from 1%, for the period -1 to the announcement month, to -4% for
the period from the outcome to a month after. Dodds and Quek (1985) examine a
larger number of bidders to that of Barnes (1984), covering a sample of 70 acquirers
during the period 1974 to 1976. Dodds and Quek (1985) find acquirers to experience a
CAR of -0.2% in the month of the bid-announcement, with 62% of acquirers reporting
a negative wealth effect. However, in the case of active acquirers (i.e. those who have
carry out a number of takeovers) the average abnormal return in the month of the bid-
announcement is -2%, with 64% of companies reporting a negative return. For non-
merger activeti  bidders the abnormal return is considerably larger at 1% in the month of
the bid-announcement, with 60% of bidders reporting a negative return. Five years
after the bid-announcement, the CARs for the whole sample of takeovers is -7% while
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. for active merger and non-merger active firms it is -4% and -11% respectively.
However, none of the CARs are statistically significant to any reasonable level.
Franks and Harris (1989) carry out a comprehensive study of 1,058 bidders during the
period 1955 to 1985 and find them to experience small and statistically significant
CARs. In the month of the bid-announcement, bidders experience statistically
significant, at the 1% level, abnormal returns of 1%. Franks and Harris (1989) find a
non-linear relationship between the relative size of the target to bidder, and the
abnormal returns. Where the target is either larger than or less than half the size of the
bidder, the abnormal returns to the bidder are negative at 1% and 0.1% respectively in
the month of the bid-announcement. For targets between 50% and 100% of the size of
the bidder, the latter experience positive abnormal returns of 2% in the month of the
bid-announcement. Franks and Harris (1989) also examine the post-acquisition
performance of acquiring firms using a number of different benchmark models and find
that the CARs are sensitive to the model used. The market model shows bidders to
experience a negative CAR during the period +1 month to +24 months. However, the
market adjusted and CAPM models both show a positive CARs of 5% during the
period +1 to +24 months.
Limmack (1991) examines 552 bids announced during the period 1977 to 1986 with
adequate data. As in the case of Firth (1980) the sample is divided into successful and
unsuccessful bidders. The CARs for bidder firm shareholders, during the six months
prior to the bid announcement, is 7% and 9% for successful and unsuccessful bidders
respectively. Unlike Firth (1980), Limmack finds a difference in the abnormal returns
depending on the final outcome of the bid. In the case of successful bids the CAR from
one month prior to the announcement to completion is 0.1% while for unsuccessful
bidders it is -0.6%; although neither is statistically significant. Successful bidder firm
60
shareholders experience a negative but close to zero return during the period from the
bid-announcement to the date of bid outcome. During the same period the abnormal
return for unsuccessful bidders is -4% and statistically significant at the 5% level. For
the period six months before the bid-announcement until completion the CARs are
-0.2% and -6% for successful and unsuccessful bidders respectively, of which only the
latter are significant at the 1% level. The post-outcome CAR is also much lower for
unsuccessful bidders than successful mergers at -1% compared to 0.2%.
Three UK studies examining an almost identical period have found results which
confirm earlier studies. Sudarsanam et al. (1996), Linunack and Kennedy (1996), and
Roll and Kyriazis (1997a) examine the periods 1979 to 1989, 1980 to 1989 and 1980
to 1990 respectively. Sudarsanam et al. (1996) differs from the other two studies in
that it uses a larger sample of 429 of acquirers, than 345 (Limmack and Kennedy,
1996) and 178 (Holl and Kyriazis, 1997a) as well as using daily as opposed to monthly
data. Sudarsanam et al. (1996) find that on the day of the bid announcement acquirers
experience abnormal returns of -1% 20 . Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) find that in the month
of the bid-announcement successful bidders experience wealth losses of -2%. For the
longer event windows of -20 to +40 days, relative to the bid-announcement date,
acquirers experience CARs of -4% according to Sudarsanam et al. (1996). A similar
CAR was obtained by Roll and Kyriazis (1997a) of -4% for the period -1 to +2
months. Kennedy and Limmack (1996) find that in the first and second year after the
bid-announcement, acquirers experience CARs of -0.2% and -5% respectively with
only the second year CAR being statistically significant at the 1% leve1.21
" The CARs for both Sudarsanam et al. (1996) and 	 and Kyriazis (1997a) are statistically significant at
the 1% level for acquirers.
21 The study does not report bidder returns in the month of the announcement or the immediate period
surrounding it.
61
Gregory (1997) sought to investigate if bidders actually did experience negative
abnormal returns at the time of the bid-announcement or whether the returns were due
to some type of specification error. Using six different benchmark models of
calculating abnormal returns, this study reports similar results to previous studies22.
Gregory (1997) examines a sample of 420 UK acquirers during the period 1984 to
1992. The study excludes takeovers below £10 million in order to remove 'noise' that
occurs from smaller acquisitions. The results across all six models show that in the
month of the bid-announcement acquirers experience wealth losses ranging from 0.3%
to 0.7% although none of them are statistically significant. From the bid-announcement
date to completion bidder, BHARs range from -0.5% to 1.5% with none of them being
statistically significant. For the period two years after the bid-announcement the CARs
range from -8% to -12.4%, with all the models being significant at the 1% level.
Gregory (1997) concludes that bidders experience negative abnormal returns in the
post-announcement period and "the long run post-acquisition performance of UK
acquiring firms is significantly negative and that this result is robust to alternative
benchmark specifications".
More recently, Higson and Elliott (1998) examine a sample of 830 takeovers during
the period 1975 to 1990, using monthly data. The results from this study show that in
the month of the bid-announcement the BHARs accruing to bidders is 0.2%. For the
one, two and three months after the bid-announcement the BHARs are 0.1%, 0.4%
and 0.6% respectively. None of the BHARs are statistically significant to any
reasonable level. The one and two year post-acquisition BHARs tend to be negative at
-0.7% and 1% respectively while the three year BHAR is positive but not statistically
significant at 0.8%. Higson and Elliott (1998) conclude that acquirers experience zero
n The models used in Gregory (1997) and the differences between them are discussed in Chapter 4.
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BHARs for the three years following a takeover. This result is in sharp contrast to
those of Gregory (1997) who finds acquirers to experience negative BHARs during the
post-acquisition period. One reason for this may be that Gregory (1997) excludes bids
where the target firm is valued below £10 million and it may be the case that Higson
and Elliott's (19980 results are affected by 'noise'.
The issue of 'noise' may also be relevant for Barnes (1998) who finds similar results to
Higson and Elliott (1998). Like Higson and Elliott (1998) the study by Barnes (1998)
does not exclude takeovers below £10 million. Instead, Barnes (1998) considers a near
exhaustive sample of 755 takeovers during the period 1987 to 1993. Barnes (1998)
finds that bidders experience statistically insignificant CARs of 0.4% for the period -40
days to 0. Also, there appears to be very little difference between the CARs for
successful and unsuccessful bidders. Barnes (1998) argues that bidder firm
performance at the time of the bid announcement is a reflection of its eagerness to
merger. Our knowledge to date suggests that bidders experience positive, negative and
zero abnormal returns at the time of the bid announcement. Table 2.2 summarises
research findings from previous studies for the US and the UK which are 'largely
similar.
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2.4 DYNAMICS OF THE BID PROCESS
The empirical evidence presented so far suggests that target firms experience
considerable wealth gains at the time of the bid announcement. In the case of bidder
firms there appears to be an inconclusive result, with empirical studies showing both
small positive and negative wealth effects during the bid announcement and post-
acquisition periods. The literature in finance has sought to identify possible factors
related to the dynamics of the bid process which may be important in determining
bidder performance. In this section we present some of these possible factors and
discuss the empirical evidence in their support. The possible factors discussed in this
section are empirically tested in Chapters 7 and 9, as control variables to capture the
dynamics of the bid process.
2.4.1 BIDDER'S TOEHOLD
When the shares of a company are widely held it may not be worthwhile for a
shareholder with a small shareholding to spend money on monitoring the performance
of its management. The reason for this is that the small shareholder can 'free-ride' on
the monitoring activities of other shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980). By doing
this, small shareholders are able to benefit from any changes or improvements made on
the firm's performance without incurring a cost. In the case of takeovers, Grossman
and Hart (1980) argue that the free rider problem reduces any incentive that an
outsider may have in carrying out a costly acquisition in order to improve the
performance of the target firm. This is because small (i.e. atomistic) shareholders will
only sell their shareholding if they receive a price which is equal to the market price
plus a premium.
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The premium required by each atomistic shareholder varies depending on the
differences in their marginal utility curves, capital gains tax and expectations regarding
future profitability of the target as an independent enterprise. Furthermore, the
individual decision of atomistic shareholders to accept or reject the bidder's offer does
not affect the success of the takeover bid. However, if the takeover bid is successful,
atomistic shareholders benefit from the improvements brought about by the takeover.
In this way, atomistic shareholders are able to benefit from the efforts of the acquirer in
identifying the full potential of the target. Of course, if all the target firm shareholders
expect to free-ride the bid will fail and none of the shareholders will have a free ride.
Grossman and Hart (1980) propose a solution to the free-rider problem which involves
the bidder acquiring a pre-bid shareholding in the target firm". In the situation where
the bidder firm owns a proportion of the target firm's equity it is referred to as the
'bidder's toehold'. The bidder's toehold allows the acquirer to share in any increase in
the value of the target firm due to a takeover. Therefore, the larger the bidder's
toehold the greater the added value that accrues to the bidder firm from the
acquisition. The likelihood of the acquirer being able to earn added value from the
acquisition provides an incentive for it to carry out a takeover. This assumes that the
related costs of a takeover, such as bid costs, are lower than the gain from the toehold.
Also, for the pre-bid stake building strategy to succeed it has to be done in
anonymously.
2' Under the UK Companies Act 1985, shareholdings in excess of 5% have to be reported to the Company
Announcements Office and disclosed in the annual accounts. As from 31 st May 1990 the reporting figure
was reduced from 5% to 3%. Under the City Code on Takeover and Mergers bids are divided into Mandatory
and Voluntary based on the bidder's shareholding in the target firm. Once a bidder has acquired in excess of
29.9% of the target firm equity or holds 30%, and increases it by annual purchases of 1% or more, a
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Shleifer and Vishny (1986a) propose a variation to the Grossman and Hart (1980)
model by considering tender offers whereby the target firm shares are owned by one
large shareholder and numerous atomistic shareholders. Shleifer and .Vishny (1986a)
make two assumptions; the first is that the gain from the toehold is equal to or larger
than the bid costs. Second, the bid premium is equal to the expected added value due
to the takeover. Under the Shleifer and Vishny (1986a) model, an increase in the
shareholding of the large shareholder leads to an eventual takeover and a rise in the
target firm share price. (The large shareholder need not be the eventual bidder and can
play an important role by facilitating a bid by a third party.)An increase in the value of
the target firm reduces the subsequent bid premium. With a fall in average bid
premiums the bidder is able to make a profit, even if small post-acquisition
improvements are made to the target firm. Therefore, the Shleifer and Vishny (1986a)
model predicts a negative relationship between the size of the bidder's toehold and the
bid premium.
Under the Shleifer and Vishny (1986a) model, once a large shareholder has built up a
stake in the target firm, a takeover becomes certain. Hirshleifer and Titman (1990)
relax this assumption and propose a model whereby the outcome of the bid depends on
three factors; namely post-acquisition increase in target value, bid premium and
information asymmetry. First, a bidder who expects to make large profits from post-
acquisition improvements will not make a low offer due to the high opportunity cost of
failure. Second, the probability of a bid succeeding increases with a large toehold and
the possibility of diluting minority interests. Third, Hirshleifer and Titman (1990)
argue, that with symmetric information, the bidder can purchase by bidding 1% above
the post-acquisition value in a tender offer. With asymmetric information, not even a
Mandatory bid has to be made. Voluntary bids are those where the bidder holds less than 30% of the target
firm (see Sudarsanam 1995:66).
70
strategy of over-bidding will guarantee success as a higher bid premium will be
interpreted as the post-acquisition value is even higher. Hence, Hirshleifer and Titman
(1990) predict not only an increase in the probability of a bid success with a toehold
but also a fall in average bid-premium.
In a more recent study, Choudhry and Jegadeesh (1994) argue that the size of the
toehold signals the post-acquisition value of the target. Using a theoretical model the
authors show that bidders with a low post-acquisition target value tend not to have
toeholds. Furthermore, these bidders refrain from purchasing target firm shares in the
open market, even when the price is below their planned price in order to credibly
signal their types and bid a lower amount. On the other hand, a bidder with a large
toehold signals a high value for the target, and hence the subsequent bid-premium
increases (Choudhry and Jegadeesh, 1990).
An early empirical study that examines the relationship between bidder's toehold and
the division of shareholder wealth between the acquirer and target firms is Franks
(1978). Using a sample of 71 UK mergers in the breweries and distilling sector, during
the period 1955 to 1972, the study finds statistically significant differences between
takeovers with and without bidder's toeholds. For the period four months prior to the
announcement to one month after the CAR for bidder firms with toeholds is 4%.
However, for bidder firms without toeholds the CAR is much lower at 2%. In the case
of target firms where the bidder has a toehold, the CAR is 16% while for those without
toeholds it is 17%. From these results, Franks (1978) concludes that a bidder's
toehold increases the abnormal returns for the acquirer firm at the time of the bid-
announcement. In the case of the target firm, the bidder's toehold has no effect on
abnormal returns at the time of the bid-announcement.
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Franks and Harris (1989) examine 1,058 acquirers over the period 1955 to 1985 to
determine if the bidder's toehold is important in affecting acquirer abnormal returns at
the time of the bid-announcement. Unlike Franks (1978) which simply separates
takeovers between those which have a bidder's toehold or not, the later study by
Franks and Harris (1989), considers the size of the toehold. Franks and Harris (1989)
categorise bidders as those controlling more or less than 30% of the target firm's
equity. The results from the study show that, in the month of the bid announcement,
bidder firm shareholders with no toehold experience an abnormal loss of -0.5%, while
bidders with less than 30% toehold in the target firm experience an abnormal return of
0.3%, and it is 2% for bidders with more than a 30% toehold. In the case of target firm
shareholders, those with no toeholds experience an abnormal return of 21%, while
those with a toehold of less than 30% receive abnormal returns of 28% compared to
22% for toeholds over 30%". The lack of statistical significance in their results leads
them to conclude that that there is evidence to support the view that toeholds reduce
the gains for other (i.e. non-toehold) target firm shareholders or give the bidder any
purchasing advantage to reap large profits.
Sudarsanam et al. (1996) empirically investigate the extent to which the bidder's
toehold in the target firm can explain the abnormal return. The results from this study
show that the CARs for various windows are positive, for both bidders and targets,
prior to the bid- announcement. However, after the bid-announcement, bidders
experience a consistent negative CAR for all event windows while that for targets it is
positive. Sudarsanam et al. (1996) find that the bidder's toehold has a negative impact
which is statistically significant, at the 1% level, on target firm abnormal returns it the
time of the bid-announcement. A toehold has negative but statistically insignificant
24 Only returns for toeholds of over 30% were statistically significant at the 5% level for acquirers while all
the returns for targets were significantly at the 1% level.
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impact on bidder firm abnormal returns at the time of the bid-announcement. From
these results Sudarsanam et al. (1996) conclude that a higher bidder toehold reduces
the bid premium but does allow the bidder to retain benefits from the takeover.
In summary, we can say that the theoretical literature examining bidder's toehold
argues that it provides a possible solution to the free rider problem (Grossman and
Hart, 1980). Further, the toehold increases the probability of a subsequent takeover bid
and reduces the bid-premium (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The probability of a
successful takeover is increases with a toehold (Hirsleifer and Titman, 1990). The
toehold may signal the post-acquisition value of the target in that low value is
associated with low or no bidder shareholding in the target firm (Choudhry and
Jegedeesh, 1994). The empirical evidence suggests that bidders with a toehold
experience higher abnormal returns at the time of the bid-announcement (Franks and
Harris, 1989 amongst others). In the case of targets the abnormal return is lower at the
time of the bid-announcements where the bidder has a toehold (Franks, 1978).
2.4.2 THE METHOD OF PAYMENT
In a perfect market one would expect the investor to be indifferent between the various
methods of payment because there would be no difference in his wealth." However, in
reality this is not the case and investors have very definite preferences for certain forms
of payment. There are a number of reasons why investors may prefer a certain form of
payment but the two most important are informational asymmetry and tax differences
25 Shapiro (1990:p538) defines a perfect capital market as one that is characterised by no taxes, transaction,
flotation or information costs.
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for different types of shareholders. In this section we review the theoretical and
empirical literature relating to the method of payment.
2.4.2.1	 THE EFFECTS OF INFORMATIONAL
ASYMMETRY ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
In a merger situation there may exist an unequal distribution of information or the
quality of information between the bidder and target firms. It may be the case that the
target firm has superior information regarding itself. Under this condition the target has
a clear advantage and will only agree to trade with the bidder if the value of its assets is
less than the consideration being offered. From the bidder's point of view, a lack of
quality information poses the problem of inaccurately valuing the target, i.e. leading to
a valuation risk, and therefore is more likely to make an equity offer'. The obvious
reason for this is that it reduces the problem of adverse selection as any price paid now
is determined by the future profitability of the takeover (or combined group) and hence
the target firm shareholders bear some of the valuation risk. On the other hand, if the
bidder has private information regarding the value of its equity then the target
shareholders face a similar problem of adverse selection in that the equity offer may be
overvalued. It will be profitable for the bidder to exploit and convert its overvalued
equity into real assets. If this is the case the target firm shareholders may presume that
cash offers will only be made if the bidder believes its equity to be undervalued. In this
way the method of payment acts as an information signal and in cash offers bidder firm
shareholders receive a higher abnormal return than in equity offers.
26 Valuation risk is referred to as the possibility of a bidder incorrectly valuing the target's assets.
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Myers and Majluf (1984) examine a model with managers having superior information
relative to their own shareholders. Under this model bidder firm managers attempt to
exploit their superior information by altering the method of payment. For example, if
the managers judge (based on the superior information available to them) their firm's
shares to be overvalued then it is most probable that the takeover will be funded
through the sale of its equity. On the other hand, if the managers judge their firm's
shares to be undervalued they are more likely to finance the takeover using debt. These
conclusions imply that new equity will only be issued if the increase in value to new
shareholders is less than that obtained from using the proceeds of the equity issue.
Also, the issue of new equity does not provide any information to the market but
simply shows that a transfer of wealth has taken place from new to existing
shareholders.
Hansen (1987) develops a theoretical model to illustrate the choice of method of
payment, under imperfect information, during a merger. The conclusions of the model
are that under conditions where the target has an information advantage, i.e. is fully
aware of its and the bidder's true value while the latter only knows its own true value,
three possible outcomes will exist. First, equity offers will dominate cash offers as a
medium of payment. This reflects the fact that an equity offer establishes the actual
post-acquisition price. In this case the bidder can use an equity offer to reduce the
problem of adverse selection associated with the uncertainty surrounding the target's
true value. From the target's point of view an equity offer is preferred because it has
no difficulty in determining the value of the equity offer since it has an information
advantage". Therefore, if a cash offer with a pre-transaction value of LC is acceptable
27 The dominance of the equity offer in Hansen's model is based on the assumption that the bidder is able to
create value from the acquisition. It is doubtful if the dominance of equity offers will hold in the absence of
this assumption (i.e. where the bidders fail to create value from the takeover).
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to the target, then an equity offer of LE which is at least equal to, or greater than LC
will also be acceptable to the target. The pre-transaction value of LC puts a floor
below which LE will not be accepted.
The second outcome in Hansen's (1987) model is where the probability of an equity
offer decreases as the size of the bidder increases relative to the target. This conclusion
is based on the idea that contingent pricing advantage of equity offers depends on the
extent to which the target adds to the bidder's assets. Where the bidder is substantially
larger than the target, in size, the beneficial price contingent effect of an equity is
negligible. The third outcome reflects the fact that the contingent pricing advantage of
an equity offer favours targets with high market value relative to the bidder. Similarly,
this outcome also reflects the fact that as the bidder's gearing increases the contingent
pricing advantage of equity offers also increases.
Wansley et al. (1983) examine 189 US mergers of which 87 are equity offers. The
study finds that 40 days before to 40 days after the bid-announcement the CARs for
target firm shareholders with cash offers is 22% while for equity offers the CAR is
17%. Huang and Walkling (1987) find that cash offers lead to abnormal gains of 29%
for target shareholders. Again, for equity offers abnormal gains are at half the level at
14%. Travlos (1987) examines the impact of the method of payment on both bidders
and targets to find similar results to those of Wansley et al. (1983). For the two day
bid-announcement period target firm CARs are 12% for takeovers with equity
payments while it is 17% for cash. In the case of bidder firms the two day bid-
announcement CARs are -1.5% and 0.24% for equity and cash payments respectively.
Travlos (1987) concludes the bidder firms earn only 'normal' abnormal returns in the
case of cash payments.
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Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) examine a 30 year time period from 1955 to 1985
both for the UK and the US and report similar results. In the case of cash offers,
Franks et al. (1988) find that in the month of the bid-announcement target firm
shareholders receive an abnormal gain of 25% for the US sample and 30% for the UK.
However, bidder firm returns are much lower at 2% for the US and 0.7% for the UK.
In the case of equity offers, the bidder firm returns are -0.1% for the UK and -1% for
the US while target firm shareholders experience abnormal gains of 15.1% for the UK
and 11.1% for the US. Franks et al. (1988) conclude that bidder firms offering cash
experience greater wealth gains than those offering equity.
Salami (1994) examines a sample of 504 UK takeovers during the period 1980 to
1989. This study finds that the market views high private information to be associated
with the use of equity payments. On the day of the bid announcement, all bidders
experience statistically significant, at the 1% level, abnormal returns of -1%. The
market adjusted abnormal returns are -0.1% and -2% for pure cash and equity offers
respectively at the time of the bid-announcement. Bidders offering a mixture of either
cash or equity and cash with equity experience abnormal returns of -4% and 7%
respectively. These results are consistent with those of Limmack and McGregor (1992)
which also examine UK takeovers over a similar time period. Litnmack and McGregor
(1992) find statistically insignificant abnormal returns of -0.2% for bidders offering
cash and -3% for those offering equity. Limmack and McGregor (1992) find their
sample of bidders offering cash with equity to experience statistically significant, at the
1% level, abnormal returns of-6%.
More recently, Gregory (1997) examines the long run post-acquisition performance of
acquirers who use different forms of payment methods. Gregory uses a sample of 452
acquirers during the period 1984 to 1992, of which 333 use equity as the payment
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method, 84 use cash and 35 use a mixed form of consideration. The study shows that
for all six abnormal return models, acquirers offering equity experience lower wealth
gains than those offering cash for the two years following the acquisition.
To summarise, the theoretical and empirical literature examining information
asymmetry and the method of payment implies that it may influence shareholder wealth
for both the target and bidder firms. In the first instance, Myers and Majluf (1984)
argue that the method of payment conveys information in that a cash offer assumes the
bidder's equity is undervalued while an equity offer suggests that it may be overvalued.
Where the target firm has an information advantage, Hansen (1987) argues three
outcomes are possible i.e. equity offers will dominate cash offers, the probability of the
equity offer diminishes with the bidder to target size and finally the contingent pricing
advantage of equity offers depends on the extent to which the takeover increases the
bidder's assets. The empirical literature finds higher abnormal returns for cash rather
than equity offers at the time of the bid announcement and in the post-acquisition
period. (Wansley et al., 1983; Travlos, 1987; Huang and Walkling, 1987; Franks et al.
1988; Limmack and McGregor, 1992; Salami, 1994; Gregory, 1997).
2.4.2.2	 TAXATION AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
The gains made on the sale of any shares, under the UK taxation system are, when
realised, liable for capital gains tax (CGT) and this may affect the preferences of target
firm shareholders as to the method of payment. In the UK, the scope for increasing
value through tax planning in an acquisition is extremely limited unlike the USA
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(Salami, 1994:p37)." Nevertheless, it still may be very important for a bidder to
efficiently plan for any tax liability due to a takeover because not to do so may lead to
costly mistakes. From the shareholders point of view, taxation can have a direct impact
on their wealth. Under present UK tax laws the sale of shares by a tax paying
individual is taxable unless consideration is received by the vendor in the form of
shares or debentures in another company. Therefore, in an equity offer the vendor can
claim 'roll over' relief and avoid the immediate payment of capital gains tax
(Sudarsanam, 1995:p179)." Therefore, in an equity payment, the tax liability is not
immediately due and the target firm shareholders have considerable flexibility as to the
timing of realisation of the payment and the associated tax burden".
In an efficient market, the differing tax of equity and cash offers will force bidders to
either finance the acquisition through an equity offer or else offer a higher premium in
a cash offer. The latter is to compensate target shareholders for the capital gains tax
arising from the sale of their shares. Taxation systems around the world are not
homogenous and differ considerably, and an example of this is the ability to 'roll over'
Capital gains Tax (CGT). In the UK, the rollover of CGT applies to any proportion of
the equity payment while in the US the equity must form at least half the consideration
in order for CGT rollover to apply. Another difference between the UK taxation
system and that of other countries is the ability to accelerate the rate of depreciation on
the target firm's assets. In the US, bidders can step up the rate of depreciation on the
28 For the US, prior to the Tax Reform Act 1986 it was assumed that tax planning could independently add
value to an acquisition. Niden (1988:ch2) discusses the tax planning opportunities which were available to
acquirers.
28 If the vendor holds more than 5% of the equity then to obtain roll over relief it will be necessary to
demonstrate that the transaction is executed for genuine reasons and not to avoid tax payments.
30 Under UK tax regulation the tax on the sale of shares is paid at the end of the financial year after taking
into account allowances, losses from other qualifying investments, etc. (Sudarsanam, 1995: p179) .
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target's assets, assuming certain conditions are met 31 . The effect of this is to lower the
post-acquisition tax liability of the firm compared to the combined pre-acquisition tax
of the merging firms.
There is no conclusive evidence to support the tax compensation hypothesis i.e. cash
offers have a higher premium to offset the tax liability. Although Carleton et al. (1983),
Wansley et al. (1983) and Huang and Walkling (1987) all show cash offers to have a
higher bid premium, it can be the case that they are due to information asymmetry
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) and not due to tax reasons. Franks et al. (1988) add further
doubt to the ability of the tax compensation hypothesis to explain the higher bid
premium which previous studies observe in cash offers. In the case of the UK, Franks
et al. (1988) investigate the performance of acquirers and targets before and after the
introduction of Capital Gains Tax (CGT) in 1965. If the introduction of CGT affects
investor preferences between equity and cash payments then prior to 1965 there should
be no difference in the target bid premium. The results show that prior to 1965 there is
a difference in the target bid premium in the bid-announcement month of 8% and 16%
after 1965. These results lead Franks et al. (1988) to conclude that "CGT can entirely
explain differences in the premia of the two kinds of offers is therefore rejected".
Franks et al. (1988) also test for the tax compensation hypothesis which holds if 'cash
or equity' offers have a lower bid premium than 'all cash' offers. The reason for this is
that, under the former, an individual is able to reduce any adverse personal tax
consequences of the offer. For the UK, the study finds the target bid premium to be
28% for 'cash or equity' offers and 31% for cash only offers during the period -4 to +1
months. The comparable results between 'cash or equity' and cash offers leads Franks
et al. (1988) to conclude that the tax compensation hypothesis does not hold and
31 For a detailed description of the conditions, see Hayn (1989) and Niden (1988:ch2).
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personal tax considerations do not fully explain the higher target bid premium in cash
offers.
For the US, Niden (1988:ch4) uses a number of proxies to test for the tax impact of a
takeover. The tax proxies in Niden's (1988:ch4) are the CGT position of the target
shareholders on the method of payment, proportion of target firm shares held by
institutional investors, variability of the target firm's market adjusted return in the pre-
bid period and the target firm's dividend yield. The latter measure is a proxy for the
type of investor holding the company's shares. Niden (1988:ch4) argues that low tax
investors buy shares in high yield companies and vice versa. The tax proxies are
regressed against the type of consideration offered using a Logit regression. The
results show the tax proxies not to be statistically significant or to have the expected
sign. From these results Niden (1988:ch4) concludes that no relationship exists
between the tax status of the target firm shareholders and the form of consideration
offered in a takeover.
2.4.3 FREE CASH FLOW
Free cash flow is defined as the "cash in excess of that required to fund all projects that
have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital"
(Jensen, 1986). Sudarsanam (1995:ch2) argues that such a cash flow is usually
available to mature companies with few growth opportunities. Managers of companies
with free cash flow can either distribute it to shareholders through a dividend payout,
purchase shares in their own company i.e. share buyback or change the firm's capital
structure so that debt is increased and equity is reduced. All these three options will
reduce the size of the free cash flow and according to Jensen (1986a) reduce the
power of managers and increase external monitoring of their behaviour. However,
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managers need not follow any of these three options and can invest the firm's free cash
flow in projects with a negative present value. Jensen's (1986a) free cash flow
hypothesis predicts that managers with free cash flow, and a lack,. or absence of
positive net present value projects, will tend to invest the surplus funds in projects with
a negative net present value rather than distributing it to shareholders 32. In the case of
a takeover this implies that a bidder with a high level of free cash flow is more likely to
pay a high bid premium to target shareholders. The effect of the higher bid premium is
a transfer of wealth from bidder firm shareholders to target firm shareholders.
Lang et al. (1991) test the hypothesis that free cash flow will lead managers to invest in
projects with a negative net present value. The authors use Tobin's Q ratio as a
measure of investment opportunities available to the company. Firms with a high
Tobin's Q ratio are likely to have projects with a positive net present value and
therefore use their resources effectively'. On the other hand, firms with a low Tobin's
Q ratio tend to have projects with negative net present value. The results from the
study show a negative relationship between bidder firm abnormal returns and the level
of free cash flow (i.e. measured as Tobin's Q ratio). In fact, for every 1% increase in
the free cash flow there is a decrease of 1% in the bidder gains from a takeover.
However, the study could not conclusively show that there is a transfer of wealth from
the bidder firm shareholders to the target firm shareholders because the target firm
abnormal gains are not associated with the level of bidder firm's free cash flow.
32 Jensen (1986a) argues that diversification or unrelated mergers generally fit this category and predicts that
they will lead to lower total gains.
33 Tobin's Q ratio is defined as, "the ratio of the market value of the firm's securities to the replacement costs
of its assets" (Weston et al., 1998:p78).
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2.4.4 THE IMPACT OF RELATIVE TARGET SIZE ON
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
Relative size of the target and the bidder firms may affect the distribution of takeover
gains because the share price impact of the acquisition may be disguised by the size of
the former. Where the bidder is considerably larger than the target, the sterling gains,
even if evenly split, between the merging firms, will translate into smaller returns for
the former. The gains from a takeover for the merging firms will translate into different
abnormal returns depending upon their size. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983)
examine shareholder wealth as a result of the difference in the size of the bidder and
target firms. The results show that for the mergers before 1969 (the year of new US
takeover regulation) where the target is larger than 10% of the size of the bidder, the
latter experience a CAR of 7% during the period 20 days before and including the
announcement day'. After 1969, bidder CARs fall to 4% for the same group. For
targets which are smaller than 10% of the size of the bidder firm, the CARs for the
latter are 3% and 2% for mergers before and after 1969 respectively. Asquith et al.
(1983) also find a positive and statistically significant, at the 1% level, relationship
between bidder CARs and the relative size of the merging firms.
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) examine the relative size of the bidder and target firms on
the CARs accruing to US merging firms during the period 1963 and 1986. The authors
find that the relative size of the target to the bidder firm has a positive and statistically
significant effect on bidder CARs. The results show that if the target firm has a market
value twice that of the bidder the estimated CAR for the latter increases by 1%. In
other words, as the target firm increases in size relative to the bidder, the CARs of the
34 This was the only event window for which the sample was portioned, based on relative target and bidder
sizes.
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former increase significantly. This suggests that the willingness of large bidders to pay
a more generous price to smaller targets rather than to larger ones.
Sudarsanam et al. (1996) examine a sample of 429 UK takeovers during the period
1980 and 1990. The study finds a positive and statistically significant relationship , at
the 1% level, between bidder and target CARs over the 20 days before and 40 days
after the announcement and the relative size of the merging firms. This result suggests
that bidder firm shareholders gain when their firm takes over relatively smaller target
firms. However, the study finds that the importance of the relative size of the merging
firms on their CARs may be a time sensitive variable. Sudarsanam et al. (1996) divide
the sample into two time periods i.e. before and after 1985 and find that relative size is
only important in the latter case for both bidders and targets and statistically significant
at the 1% leve135.
2.4.5 BUSINESS CYCLES AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
In 1989, there were almost 1,500 takeovers of or by publicly listed companies in the
UK while in 1981 the figure was less than 200 (Sudarsanam, 1995:chl). This uneven
pattern of takeover activity is not limited to the UK. For the US, De Bondt and
Thompson (1992) found that between 1926 and 1988 merger activity has occurred in
waves with peaks in 1928, 1932, 1955, 1967/8, 1982, 1989 and 1995. The extent of
acquirer firm shareholder wealth gain may be dependent on the level of takeover
activity and in periods of economic growth it may be lower.
Sudarsanam et al. (1996) provide no explanation as to why they choose 1985 to partition their sample.
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Jensen (1988) argues that mergers do not only occur in waves but affect certain
industries at certain periods in time. The explanation given for this is that when
changes occur in the industry some firms may have difficulty adjusting to them. Instead
of pursuing change within the firm which may have a high probability of failure,
managers attempt to make their companies 'good' takeover targets. In the UK building
societies sector, some firms have realised that they may not be sufficiently large
enough to compete effectively against banks. At the same time new entrants in the
financial services market, such as telephone and internet banking, supermarkets etc.
have increased competition and driven profit margins lower. Therefore, instead of
changing their organisation they have attempted become takeover targets (Economist
19/7/97). Examples of these building societies include the Bristol and West,
Birmingham Midshires and the National and Provincial.
DeBondt and Thompson (1992) found a market wide relationship between economic
variables (e.g. Gross Domestic Product etc.) and the number of takeovers. Becketti
(1986) argues that an important economic variable affecting takeovers is the interest
rate available on Tu.' rated corporate bonds. For the US, the return on this type of
corporate bond is very sensitive to the immediate outlook for the economy. A high
`Baa' yield signals bad times ahead and an increased need for overall corporate
restructuring. The high interest rates may also make it difficult for small firms to
finance forcing, them to become takeover targets. More recently, Yagil (1996)
investigated the relationship between macro-economic variables such as the interest
rate and the degree of takeover activity in the US during the period 1954 and 1979.
Yagil (1996) found a positive and statistically significant relationship, at the 1% level,
for both the interest rate and change in investment against the level of merger activity.
Based on these results, Yagil (1996) concludes that "whether mergers are motivated
by operating or financial synergy, they are closely related to macro-economic factors".
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2.5 CONCLUSION
The previous research examining the post-acquisition performance of acquirers largely
uses three different methodologies. In the first instance previous studies compare the
pre- and post merger performance of firms using accounting based measures. This
chapter shows that studies using accounting data conclude that bidders experience
superior pre-bid performance relative to the industry and to the target. However, the
performance of acquirers tends to decline significantly in the post-acquisition period.
The only exception is Healy et al. (1992) which finds acquirers to experience an
improvement in their financial performance during the post-acquisition period.
Accounting based studies show that managers are more likely to increase firm size, as
opposed to profitability lending support, for the management entrenchment hypothesis
as opposed to shareholder alignment.
The second type of methodology that previous studies examining takeovers use is a
micro level or survey based approach. This type of methodology attempts to
investigate each takeover individually, and in some cases, by separating the acquired
units from the parent company. Studies using a survey study approach tend to show
acquirers to experience a post-acquisition decline in performance. With hindsight, half
the number of acquirer firm managers view the acquisition as a failure. The third, and
most popular technique that previous studies use to investigate the post-acquisition
performance of acquirers is event study methodology. This is a dynamic approach to
the analysis of shareholder wealth effects which does not suffer from the same
problems as accounting or survey based methodologies.
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In this chapter, we reviewed the literature which seeks to explain shareholder wealth
effects due to a merger using event study methodology. Early research using event
study methodology attempts to answer the question whether mergers are value-
creating or not. These studies are more concerned with the average performance by
combining the effects on both bidder and target shareholders. The literature shows
average returns to be between 12% and 28% (Halpern, 1973). More recent studies
individually examine the returns accruing to target and bidder firm shareholders. One
clear conclusion in both US and UK studies, is that shareholders of target firms receive
statistically significant and positive wealth gains while bidder firms shareholders
receive small positive, negative and zero CARs. A large number of previous studies
using event study methodology have also sought to identify certain factors which may
affect the distribution of takeover gains between the bidder and target firm
shareholders. In this chapter we have presented and discussed the literature examining
five of these factors namely: bidder's toehold; method of payment; free cash flow; the
relative size of the bidder and target and the economic cycle.
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CHAPTER THREE
ACQUIRER TYPE AND POST-ACQUISITION
PERFORMANCE:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND HYPOTHESES
3. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter we show that the research examining takeovers, using share
prices, finds target firm shareholders to experience positive and statistically significant
wealth gains at the time of the bid-announcement (see Limmack, 1991; Sudarsanam et
al., 1996; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996 and Ho11 and Kyriazis, 1997a). For bidders,
the results tend to be inconclusive with previous studies showing both small positive
and negative abnormal returns at the time of the bid announcement (see Franks et al.,
1991; Sudarsanam et al., 1996; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; Ho11 and Kyriazis,
1997a; Gregory, 1997; Higson and Elliott, 1998). Also, very little previous research
has sought to examine the relative performance of different acquirer types. Morck et
al. (1988) argue that hostile and friendly bidders have totally different motives. Studies
which separate takeovers by the mood of the bid find that hostile acquirers experience
lower wealth losses than either friendly or white knight acquirers in the long run
(Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; Gregory, 1997).
Previous studies examine certain factors, which attempt to explain bidder firm
performance at the time of the bid-announcement and during the post-acquisition
period. As we show in Chapter 2, the literature relating to bidder's toehold in the
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target firm, the method of payment, bidder firm free cash flow, relative target and
bidder firm size and the economic cycle go a long way towards explaining bidder firm
performance at the time of the bid-announcement and the post-acquisition period.
However, none of these factors can fully explain the inconclusive results for bidder
firms. In other words, there is still a gap in our knowledge regarding bidder firm
returns. In view of this gap - regarding what affects bidder performance at the time of
the bid-announcement and post-acquisition period - researchers, have sought to
segregate takeovers by their motives. The theoretical and empirical literature suggests
that the mood of the takeover bid is an important variable which influences the bid-
announcement period returns (see Franks and Mayer, 1996; Ho11 and Kyriazis, 1997a;
Sudarsanam et al., 1996; De et al., 1996). In this chapter we explain the theoretical
reasons why the mood of the takeover is likely to influence shareholder wealth and
review the relevant empirical evidence for both the UK and the US. In discussing the
literature relating to acquirer type and post-acquisition performance we are also able to
identify areas which require further research and hence develop our hypotheses.
3.1 THE IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL RESISTANCE ON
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
The literature review in section 2.3 shows that the target firm shareholders experience
positive returns starting from a short period before the bid-announcement until
completion. In the case of bidders the results are not so clear-cut and a difference in
opinion exists. One reason for the difference in the evidence, relating to bidder firm
shareholder returns, may be due to managerial resistance by the target firm. This is
commonly referred to as the 'mood' of the bid which can either be friendly or hostile
i.e. the bidder does or does not receive the recommendation of the target firm
management respectively.
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Two hypotheses can be put forward to explain the mood of the takeover bid or the
reaction of the target firm management (Gaughan, 1996:p152). The first one is the
shareholder welfare or management alignment hypothesis, which argues that managers
aim to maximise their shareholder's wealth. By rejecting a bid, target firm managers
aim to obtain a higher price for their company and hence a higher bid premium for their
shareholders. In the case of a friendly takeover bid, managers may feel that this is the
highest price that can be obtained for their company. To reject the bid under these
circumstances would result in giving up a profitable opportunity.
The second hypothesis is the managerial welfare or entrenchment hypothesis, which
claims that rejection of a bid, is driven by self-interest 2. Managers may reject a bid to
retain their jobs and other related privileges which can be detrimental to shareholders'
interests. Resistance could therefore impose costs on shareholders as managers expend
corporate resources opposing what could be a beneficial takeover and shareholders
lose the opportunity to realise the gains resulting from these offers. However, if a
second (and in some cases a third) bidder enters the competition to acquire the target
then it is very likely that target firm shareholder's gains will be higher. The managerial
entrenchment hypothesis does not exclude the possibility that target firm shareholders
may eventually be able to obtain higher returns. In this section we discuss the different
types of acquirers which we examine in this study and the previous studies detailing
their relative pre- and post-acquisition performance.
See Shleifer and Vishny (1986a) for a discussion of how managerial entrenchment can be adopted and
carried out.
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3.2 ACQUIRER TYPES
Managerial resistance or non-resistance leads to different types of bidders and takeover
situations. The most common is a friendly bidder, which receives immediate
acceptance from the target firm board of directors. Friendly bidders can also be
thought of as those who do not face any defensive strategy from the target firm (see
section 4.2). Bidders whose offers are rejected and encounter some form of defensive
tactic by the target firm are referred to as hostile bidders. There are also multiple bids
where the target firm receives more than one offer, which can either be friendly or
hostile. In this research we identify four types of successful bidders as follows:
Single friendly bidder - the only bidder and it receives the recommendation of the
target board.
ii	 Single hostile bidder - the only bidder and it wins despite resistance by the target
management.
iii	 Multiple hostile bidder - the bidder which wins in competition with other hostile
bidders or a white knight.
iv	 White knight bidder - a friendly bidder which wins in competition with other hostile
bidders for control of the target firm.
The exact method by which the sample data of bidders are collected is described in
section 4.2. The sample size of each acquirer type is shown in Table 4.2.
3.3 DETERMINANTS OF MANAGERIAL HOSTILITY
The managers of a target firm have a choice of whether to recommend the bid to their
shareholders on a friendly basis or to reject it and ask the shareholders to do the same.
Managerial alignment and entrenchment are two reasons why target firm managers
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may accept or reject a bid. However, neither of these two theories can explain the
characteristics of targets, which accept or reject takeover bids. In this section we
examine previous literature which has sought to identify factors which may lead to a
hostile takeover bid.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988b) examined the Fortune 500 companies in 1980 to
identify characteristics of targets firms that made them resist a takeover bid. In the
sample, 40 companies received a hostile bid, whilst 42 received a friendly bid during
the period from 1981 to 1985. The first characteristic which Morck et al. (1988b)
examined was ownership of the target firm which can be divided into six categories.
The first category considered whether the descendants of the founding family were
present in the top management. In a hostile takeover bid the target was less likely to be
managed by members from the founding family. On average 41% of founding family
members were present in the top management of targets in friendly bids, while for
hostile takeovers it was only 10%. Secondly, ownership by the target board directors
was also much less in the case of hostile takeovers, with a mean of 8% compared to
21% for friendly targets. In the case of ownership by the top two directors (i.e.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer), it was three times larger for friendly targets
than for hostile targets. The average age of the chairman of both hostile and friendly
targets was roughly the same at 57 and 59 years respectively. Finally, the dollar value
of the top management's stake in the company differed significantly between the two
groups. In the case of friendly bid targets, it was US$83.75 million, while for hostile
targets it was US$9.22 million.
Schnitzer (1996) argues that information asymmetry can lead to hostility in a takeover
bid. The information asymmetry comes about because the target firm managers have
inside information that is not available to the bidder firm managers. The bidder's
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decision as to whether to launch a hostile or friendly bid depends very much on the
uncertainty regarding the future value of the target firm. The higher the level of
uncertainty regarding the future value of the target, the greater the likelihood of a
friendly bid because the target managers' inside knowledge becomes more important.
Schnitzer (1996) also finds that the likelihood of a hostile bid increases with target
board preference for control and their holding of shares. The probability of a hostile
bid is also related to the cost of mounting a hostile bid. In other words, the greater the
costs of mounting a hostile bid, the higher the probability of a friendly bid.
Powell (1997) examined 411 UK targets, in successful takeovers, during the period
1984 to 1991 and found significant differences between the characteristics of those
involved in friendly compared to hostile bids. Targets, which resist a hostile bid, were
found to have high levels of free cashflow and operating profit and be of a greater size.
In part, these factors reflected the ability and the financial resources of the target firm
to mount and effectively execute a defence against a hostile bidder. On the other hand,
for targets involved in a friendly bid were found to have high levels of financial
leverage and had a lower market capitalisation. By adjusting the target characteristics
for economy and sector averages, the study found that the significant determinants in a
hostile bid remained the same with the addition of growth in sales and tangible assets
entering the list. For targets in friendly bids the list of significant characteristics was
increased by the inclusion of tangible assets. The results also showed that firm and
industry specific characteristics were important in determining hostile takeovers and to
some extent were time sensitive.
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3.4 BID HOSTILITY AND BIDDER FIRM SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH
Hostile takeovers, as discussed in section 3.1, are those which are opposed by the
target board's management. A characteristic feature of the UK stock market has been
the large number of hostile takeovers relative to the total number of acquisitions.
Between 1984 and 1989 a total of 26% of bids for UK publicly listed companies were
rejected by the target management (Jenlcinson and Mayer, 1994:7). Hostile takeovers
are very high in the UK relative to other western countries. In Germany there have
been less than six reported cases of hostile bids throughout the whole post war period.
In France only a tiny proportion of takeovers have involved hostile bidders. In Japan
hostile takeover bids have been extremely rare (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1994:p8).
On the surface it may seem that hostile bids are not attractive because of the costs that are
incurred in gaining control of the target firm. More importantly, to gain control of the
target firm the hostile bidder will have to pay a premium on the market price, thereby
driving up the purchase price. This does not mean that a friendly takeover offers any greater
financial benefits because a bidder has to pay a price which is attractive to the target firm
managers'. If the target firm managers do not receive such a payment they will refuse to
give their consent to the takeover. In this situation a hostile bid becomes an alternative
mechanism for corporate control which does not require the consent of the target firm
managers.
3 In some cases side payments or benefits may be paid to the target firm management but these also have to be
attractive in order to gain their support for the takeover.
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In their attempt to win control of the target firm, bidders frequently raise the price that
they are willing to pay. This may have a negative effect on bidder firm shareholder
wealth. Of course, for the target firm it leads to greater wealth gains than those
available with a friendly takeover. While managerial resistance may affect the division
of gains, its precise impact cannot be determined from theoretical arguments. The
wealth maximisation hypothesis suggests that resistance would be in the target firm
shareholder's interest since it can result in a higher bid premium from either the current
bidder or another bidder. However, managerial welfare (or entrenchment) hypothesis
argues that managerial resistance reflects an attempt by managers to protect their job
security. Resistance to a takeover can impose costs on target shareholders as managers
expend corporate resources opposing beneficial takeovers, and their shareholders lose
the opportunity to realise the gains from these offers.
Although all takeover bids for public companies in the UK have to be made to the target
firm shareholders, the bidder may seek to gain an initial approval from the target firm
management. Of course, even if the target firm management disapprove of the takeover bid
the bidder firm can still continue with it. A hostile bid according to the definition we have
used (see sections 3.2) will face some kind of defensive action from the target firm
management. In response to such a bid, target firm shareholders have to individually decide
whether or not to tender their shares to the bidder firm4.
4 We accept that in some cases the target firm management may initially reject a takeover bid and then recommend it
after a higher price has been offered or put forward to the shareholders.
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The empirical studies examining acquirers in hostile bids have found rather mixed results
both for the UK and the US. For the US, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983) have found that
bidders, in tender offers who were unsuccessful in their bid, experienced positive CARs for
the period -20 to 180 days'. However, when a second bidder acquired the target the first
bidder experienced negative CARs during the period -20 to 180 days. Bradley et al. (1983)
argued that the difference in CARs between bidders who were unsuccessful in a tender
offer and those who lost to a second bidder represented the market's perception of lost
opportunities. Jensen and Ruback (1983) reviewed six previous studies which examined
both successful and unsuccessful tender offers. The results from these studies showed
successful and unsuccessful bidders in tender offers experienced average CARs of 3.8%
and -1.1% respectively'. In the case of mergers, successful and unsuccessful bidders
experienced CARs of 1.4% and 2.5% respectively. Rather different results were found by
Loderer and Martin (1990) for a near exhaustive sample of takeovers between 1966 and
1984. This study found bidders in mergers, experienced higher CARs than those in tender
offers. In the case of bidders in tender offers and mergers the CARs were 0.5% and 1%
respectively.
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) examine 404 tender offers during the period 1963 to 1986 which
shows bidders experience positive and statistically significant at the 1% CARs of 9% during
the period -10 to +20. The study also finds target firm opposition to the tender offer to
have a negative, and statistically significant at the 1% level, impact on acquirer CARs.
However, the impact and the statistical significance of the target firm opposition to the
tender offer is not constant throughout the whole period. In the 1960s, target firm
5 In the US tender offers have been the most frequently used tool in hostile takeovers and therefore a number of
studies have examined this type of takeover (Gaughan, 1996:217).
6 The event windows for each of these studies differed, as did the sample size.
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opposition has the greatest negative impact (i.e. -5%) on bidder firm CARs while in the
1970s it is -1.8%. Jarrell and Pouslen (1989) argue that the changing impact of target firm
opposition on bidder CARs is related to the regulatory and financial environment.
Franks et al. (1991) examine 399 takeovers completed during the period 1975 to 1984 and
find acquirers experience negative and statistically insignificant mean adjusted CARs of 1%
during the bid-announcement period. In the case of opposed bids, the mean adjusted bidder
CARs are -3.5% and statistically significant at the 10% level. Franks et al. (1991) compare
results from the mean adjusted returns against alternative benchmarks and find acquirers in
opposed bids to experience CARs of 0.1% to 1.3% depending on the benchmark used
during three year post-acquisition period. Friendly acquirers, on the other hand, experience
CARs of-0.3 to 0.8% depending on the benchmark over the same time period'.
Although Banerjee and Owers (1992) examine white knight bidders, they nevertheless
compare their results against a group of hostile bidders. The authors examine 47
hostile bidders during the period 1978 to 1987. In the case of a successful hostile
bidder the CAR is -0.2% on the day before to the day of the bid-announcement. The
results show that hostile bidder firm shareholders to experience positive CARs of 0.7%
for the period, four days before to the day of the bid-announcement. For the longer
window of 50 days before to the day of the announcement, the CAR is -1.9%. In terms
of dollar gains/losses, they are US$1.499 billion for the event window -50 days to the
announcement of the white knight bidder entering the contest. The bulk of this return
7 Only the value weighted, mean adjusted and the ten factor CARs are statistically significant at 99%, 95%
and 95% respectively. (The study does not carry out a test of differences between the CARs.)
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is made at the time of a second bid announcement s . Like Banerjee and Owers (1992)
the study by Niden (1993) also focuses on white knights while also comparing their
relative performance with hostile bidders. Niden (1993) examined a sample of 73
bidders involved in successful and unsuccessful hostile mergers and tender offers. The
results showed that during the bid-announcement period the full sample of bidders
experienced abnormal returns of -2.2%, statistically significant at the 1% level. Hostile
bidders experienced statistically insignificant abnormal returns of - 1.5% during the
same period. In dollar terms the difference in median shareholder wealth between the
full sample and hostile bidders was $1.2 million.
Loughran and Vijh (1997) examine 947 takeovers during the period 1970 to 1989 and
find acquirers to experience negative and statistically insignificant buy and hold
abnormal returns (BHARs) of 6.5%, against a control sample, during the five year
post-acquisition period. Acquirers in mergers experience BHARs of -16% which are
statistically significant at the 1% level. However, acquirers in tender offers experience
much higher, and statistically significant at the 10% level, BHARs of 43% over the
same period. Loughran and Vijh (1997) argue that, "on average, [mergers] were not in
the best interests of [the acquirer firm] shareholders".
For the UK, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) examine a sample of 345 UK friendly and
hostile takeovers during the period 1980 to 1989. Using a size based index, the results
show that for the three months prior to the bid-announcement, the whole sample of
bidders experienced CARs of 2.9% while for hostile and friendly bidders it is 4.9% and
2.2% respectively. In the first year after the bid-announcement bidder CARs are -0.2%,
None of the CARs was statistically significant to any reasonable level.
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0.1% and 0.3% for the whole sample, hostile and friendly acquirers respectively. In the
second year after the bid-announcement, the CARs are -5%, -5.4% and -6.1% for the
whole sample, hostile and friendly acquirers respectively.
Sudarsanam et al. (1996) examine a similar period to Kennedy and Limmack (1996)
but use a regression to determine the explanatory power of the takeover mood. The
dependent variable is the CAR for -20 to +40 days along with various independent
variables. The study finds that a hostile bid has a positive and statistically significant at
the 5% level effect on bidder firm CARs. However, separating the sample into
takeovers, before and after 1985. The study reveals a hostile bid to have a negative and
statistically insignificant effect on bidder CAR for the earlier period. For the latter
period, a hostile bid leads to a positive and statistically significant effect on bidder
CARs, implying that the mood of the bid has a non-constant effect on bidder returns
(i.e. a time sensitive variable). Similar results are obtained by Holl and Kyriazis (1997a)
who model the relationship between wealth creation and bid resistance for a sample of
178 UK takeovers during the period 1979 to 19899.
Gregory (1997) examines a sample of 452 takeovers with a market value above £10
million during the period 1984 to 1992. The results show that acquirers in hostile
takeovers experience negative and, in four out of the six benchmark models,
statistically significant abnormal returns. In the case of acquirers in friendly takeovers
the abnormal returns are also negative for all the six benchmark models. Hostile
acquirers experience higher abnormal returns compared to friendly acquirers in four
out of the six benchmark models. Gregory (1997) argues that acquirers in friendly
Ho!! and Kyriazis (1997a) carry out a simultaneous regression.9
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takeovers tend to overpay in order to acquirer the target and this is reflected in their
post-acquisition share price performance. However, the tests of differences between
benchmark models shows that abnormal returns are statistically insignificant.
Higson and Elliot (1998) examine 830 takeovers during the period 1975 to 1990 of which
about 15% of the sample were hostile acquirers'. This study finds that hostile acquirers
experience higher BHARs compared to friendly acquirers at the time of the bid
announcement. During the two year post-acquisition period hostile acquirers experience
BHARs of 13% which are statistically significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the whole
sample of acquirers experience BHARs of-1% over the same period. Friendly acquirers, on
the other hand, experience negative BHARs of -4%. Further, Higson and Elliott (1998)
argue that the stock market not only reacts favourably to hostile acquirers but does not
correct expectations formed at the time of the bid-announcement. Barnes (1998) finds
similar results for a sample of 412 acquirers during the period 1987 to 1993. Barnes (1998)
finds hostile acquirers to experience marginally higher abnormal returns compared to
friendly acquirers during the post-acquisition period . However, the difference in abnormal
returns between friendly and hostile acquirers is not statistically significant.
The empirical evidence examined in this section suggests that hostile acquirers experience
higher post-acquisition abnormal returns than friendly acquirers. On reason as to why this
may be the case is that hostile bids are carried out in order to replace inefficient managers
(Morck et al., 1988b). Also, it is likely that after a takeover the hostile bidder is able to
infuse his better management ability upon the target firm. Based on this evidence we can
derive the following hypothesis:
Higson and Elliott (1998) define a hostile bid as one where the first bid is rejected.
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Hypothesis 1
Shareholders of hostile acquirers experience greater wealth gains than shareholders
of friendly acquirers.
3.5 WINNER'S CURSE IN MULTIPLE BIDS
The vast bulk of literature on takeovers shows that shareholders of bidder firms suffer
a loss or a small positive gain in wealth at the time of the bid-announcement (see
Mandelker, 1974; Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Firth, 1979 and 1980; Bradley, 1980;
Jensen and Ruback, 1983; De et al., 1996; Gregory, 1997). The loss in wealth, for
bidder firms, can be attributed to two factors, namely overpayment and hubris. The
hubris theory, as advanced by Roll (1986) suggests that bidders attempt to value the
target which may be above that of the market, leading to a positive error. The positive
error can arise from a lack of experience in carrying out takeovers or the
refusal/inability to learn from past mistakes. Roll (1986) argues that the bidder
convinces itself that its valuation is correct and the market may have simply
miscalculated the target or the gains arising from the combined firm.
Seyhun (1990) examines a sample of 337 US completed takeovers during the period
1975 to 1986 but could find no evidence to support the hubris hypothesis. What is
more likely, and the evidence in Chapter 2 suggests that, even though bidder firm
managers intend on maximising shareholder wealth, they simply get things wrong for
whatever reason. The evidence from Chapter 2 suggests that bidders may misjudge the
value of the target and carry out a takeover that does not maximise its own shareholder
wealth. The question then arises is whether two bidders who compete to acquire the
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same target (i.e. a multiple bid) also 'get it wrong'? In a multiple bid the successful
bidder can only gain control of the target firm if they offer to pay more than the other
bidders. In managing to achieve control of the target firm in a multiple bid, the winning
bidder is more likely to have overpaid. The phenomenon of the winning bidder having
overpaid in a multiple bid is referred to as the 'Winner's Curse".
Evidence of Winner's Curse shows that the market negatively responds to overpayment
(Sung, 1993). A bid involving a white knight, is by definition a multiple bid with
similarity to an auction. Varaiya (1988) and Giliberto and Varaiya (1989), argue that
for non-financial firms and financial firms respectively, a winning bidder in a multiple
bid values the target, on average, in excess of its true value and ends up overpaying.
The severity of this problem increases with the uncertainty concerning the true value of
the target and the number of multiple bidders. Michel and Shaked (1988) find support
for this and show that winning bidders in a multiple bid experience CARs which are
8% lower than those for single bidders during the 50 days following the bid-
announcement. Similarly, De et al. (1996) finds successful bidders in an auction
experience negative gains in the range of -1% to -2% compared to single bidders of
0% to 0.5%. For the UK, Gregory (1997) finds that in four out of the six benchmark
models the shareholders of the winning bidder, in a multiple bid, experience large
wealth losses relative to single bidders. Only the Hoare Govett size adjusted and the
three factor returns show single bidders to underperform the winning bidder in a
multiple bid. From our discussion above we can derive the following hypothesis:
II In a takeover involving more than one bidder the acquirer likely pays in excess of the expected value of the
firm. The acquirer (or winning bidder) is cursed because its bid exceeds the value of the target (Weston et
al., 1997)
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Hypothesis 2
Shareholders of single bid acquirers experience greater wealth gains than
shareholders of acquirers in an auction.
3.5.1 WHITE KNIGHT BIDDERS
The entrance of a friendly second bidder or white knight, turns a takeover contest into an
auction, whereby the firm willing to pay the highest price acquires the target. However, the
motivations behind a white knight can be argued to be quite different from those of a hostile
bidder. A white knight bidder may also differ from a hostile bidder in terms of pre-bid
strategic evaluation of the bid, and easier access to information about the target 12 . The
latter may arise because a white knight is arranged by a target management faced with a
hostile bid. The provision of information may act as an inducement to the white knight in
that it reveals an opportunity that was not previously considered.
Smiley and Stewart (1985) examine 36 successful and 12 unsuccessful white knight
takeovers during the period 1972 to 1978. The sample of white knight bidders is matched
with a control group of the same size. Using common financial performance measures, the
study finds that the white knight sample and the control group are very similar during the
pre-bid period. The results point out that white knights perform better than the market prior
to the bid-announcement with CARs of 17% for the period 5 years prior to the date of
12 In the UK, under the non-statutory, self-regulating City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, the target
management cannot withhold information from the unfriendly bidder that it has given to a favoured bidder
(Sudarsanam 1995, Ch. 6). However, the hostile bidder has to specify the information which it wishes to
receive and is not entitled to ask, in general terms for 'all the information' supplied to its rival (rule 20.2 of
the Code). Thus the information advantage to the white knight may not be completely lost.
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announcement. However, in the first nine months after the takeover, successful white
knights, experience negative CARs of 5%. The results show that white knights
underperform their control group throughout the three-year post-announcement period.
Banerjee and Owers (1992) examine the welfare implications of white knight takeovers
using the concepts of the Pareto Criterion and the Kaldor-I-Ecks Principle. The Pareto
Criterion is where it is possible to make one party better off without making another party
worse off (see Estrin and Laidler, 1995). Through an exchange, both parties reach a point
of Pareto Optimum - i.e. no-one can be made better off without making somebody else
worse off A variation of Pareto Optimality is the Kaldor-Hicks Principle, which examines
the relative change to each party in an exchange. In other words, the Kaldor-Hicks
Principle holds if the improvement in wealth to one party outweighs the losses to the other
party so that, on a combined basis, both parties are better off than before the exchange took
place. In this respect, the Pareto Criterion considers both the efficiency and equity of the
welfare gain as opposed to the Kaldor-Hicks Principle, which examines only change in total
welfare. In a takeover the Pareto Criterion holds if both the bidder and target firm
shareholders experience an improvement in their wealth. In the case of the Kaldor-Hicks
Principle, only the combined shareholder wealth of the bidder and target firm needs to
improve.
With a three party contest - i.e. a target, one hostile bidder and a white knight bidder -
the general Pareto Optimality situation may not be achievable. This is because in order
to acquire the target, the white knight usually has to pay a price greater than the other
bidder. By doing so, the shareholders of the target firm experience an improvement in
welfare that is larger than it would have been in the absence of a white knight bid.
White knights, on the other hand, may experience a decline in welfare as they may
overpay in order to acquire the target. Banerjee and Owners (1992) argue that white
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knights have a greater likelihood of experiencing a decline in their welfare. This is
because of the friendly nature of a white knight bid which has the "economic
connotation of resulting in a socially undesirable outcome on [the] acquisition".
However, even if there is a potential for one party in an exchange to experience a loss
in welfare while another gains, a transaction can still take place under the Kaldor-Hick
Compensation Arrangement. The Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Arrangement states that
the party that has the potential to experience an improvement in welfare can bribe the other
party so as to allow the exchange to take place. Bribery can take various forms such as
sharing the economic welfare gains accruing to the winner with the loser so that both
experience an improvement in welfare.
Banerjee and Owers (1992) investigate the welfare experiences of 100 US white knight
bidders during the period 1978-1987. The study shows that on the day of the bid-
announcement white knights experience statistically significant (at the 1% level) wealth
losses of 1.7%. Over the two-day period, i.e. one-day before to the bid-announcement
day, the CARs are -3% (significant at the 1% level). In the ten days after the bid-
announcement the CARs are 0.33% and not statistically significant. Target firms, on
the other hand, experience statistically significant (at the 1% level) positive CARs for
all the event windows leading to a positive combined wealth effect. From these results
the authors find support for the Kaldor-Hicks Principle but not for the more stringent
efficiency and distributional requirements of the Pareto Optimum. Although Banerjee
and Owers (1992) find evidence that supports the Kaldor-Hicks principle, it does not
uphold the Kaldor-Hick Compensation.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986a) examine two defensive strategies adopted by target firm
management, namely greenmail and white knights, and their effects on shareholder
wealth. The authors provide a theoretical model in which the white knight firm enters
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the contest after a target firm receives an unwanted offer. The model assumes that in a
contest the firm wishing to pay the highest price will win and hence ignores the other
bids. The price paid by the potential acquirer has to be high enough to induce the
target shareholders to sell their shares. The presence of a hostile bidder dictates the
minimum price that a white knight bidder has to pay in order to acquire the target. The
minimum price may force the white knight to overpay in order to acquire the target. In
practice the target firm management may recommend shareholders to accept a lower
price bid by a white knight. If this is the case target firm shareholders will accept the
lower bid on non-price considerations such as loyalty. If target firm shareholders place
a higher value on non-price considerations than there may not be a need for the white
knight to raise its price to that of the other bidder.
Niden (1993) compares the shareholder wealth effects for 334 US white knight, hostile
and friendly bidders during the period 1974 to 1984. At the time of bid announcement
the whole sample of bidders experience an abnormal loss of-2%. White knight bidders
experience a far greater abnormal loss of -4% than hostile bidders at -1.5% while
friendly bidders experience a loss of -2% during the period one day before and
including the announcement day 13 . The differences are far greater when one compares
the median dollar losses which are US$5 million for the entire sample, US$4.5 million
for friendly bidders and over two and a half to three times as much for white knight
bidders at US$13 million, over the same period. The differences in losses are
statistically significant for both white knight against friendly bidders and white knights
against hostile bidders at the 1% level. Targets on the other hand do extremely well
under a white knight bidder and worse with a friendly bidder. Abnormal returns for
targets in white knight, hostile and friendly bids are 0.5%, 0.5% and 0.3% respectively.
13 Niden (1993) uses an event window which is -1 to 0 days for bidders who do not change their offer price.
For bidders who revise their offers the event window starts at -1 and continues to the date of the last revision.
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Again the returns are significantly different between the white knight sample and the
friendly bidders at the I% level.
For the UK Gregory (1997) finds that for five out of the six benchmark models white
knight acquirers experience higher BHARs compared to friendly and hostile acquirers
during the two-year post-acquisition period. Hostile acquirers experience higher
BHARs for only the Dimson-Marsh model. (Due to the small number of white knights
statistical inferences could not be drawn.) Our discussion suggests that shareholders of
targets in white knight takeovers experience higher abnormal returns than in takeovers
involving other acquirer types at the time of the bid-announcement. In the case of
shareholders of white knight acquirers previous studies show them to experience
greater wealth losses at the time of the bid-announcement than other acquirer types.
3.5.2 WHITE KNIGHT AS AN UNPLANNED BIDDER
An obvious characteristic of a white knight bid is that it is reactive, being cobbled
together by a harried target management when faced with a hostile bid 14. While the
target's defensive impulse behind the white knight bid is apparent, less transparent is a
possible similar motivation behind the white knight's willingness to play the role. Such
a shared fear of hostile bids and the consequent need for a common defence may lead
to the stock market perception that the takeover may not be value enhancing for a
white knight bidder (Banerjee and Owers 1992). The hurried and unplanned nature of a
14 This is also true of the white knights in our sample where in all except one case, the white knight bidder
emerged before a hostile bid was announced. In the one instance that a white knight made the first
announcement it was done after information regarding an unwanted bid was leaked to the market Also,
white knight bidders entered the competition to gain control of the target firm within 40 days of the hostile
bid.
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white knight bid may also lead to the market perception that the strategic logic behind
the bid is not sound. Thus, the market is likely to put less value on the target's merger
with a white knight than with a hostile or friendly bidder.
The disadvantage of an unplanned bid may be mitigated by the easier access that a
white knight will have to information about the real performance and prospects of the
target". Such privileged access can reduce the information asymmetry between the
target and bidder. More importantly, this greater access to information reduces the
scope for overpayment of premium by the bidder. However, the moot question is why
the white knight had not exploited this advantage with an earlier friendly bid and thus
pre-empted the hostile bidder? 16 Thus, on balance, the advantage of easier access to
target firm information may be offset, at least partly, by the perceived lack of
forethought behind the white knight bidr.
Empirical evidence regarding white knights shows that they tend to overpay in order to
gain control of the target firm and as a consequence of this they experience significant
wealth losses (section 3.5.1). The loss in shareholder wealth for white knight acquirers may
be due to the stock market having a negative perception of a bidder who wishes to
takeover a target fearful of hostile bid (Banerjee and Owers, 1992). It may also be the case
15 Under rule 20.2 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers the target management cannot withhold
information provided to one bidder while supplying it to another.
16 One could argue that prior to the emergence of a hostile bidder, the white knight would have been required
to pay higher managerial rents to the target board and negotiate on the basis of inforination asymmetry
(Schnitzer 1996). Once the hostile bidder has been identified, the friendly relationship between the white
knight and target firm reduces the level of uncertainty regarding the value of the latter firm as it provides
greater information (see previous footnote).
' 7 Even if the white knight bidder may have considered taking over the target firm, the sudden timing of the
hostile bid may mean that the white knight bidder may not have been fully prepared.
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that the late entrance of a white knight, and in a short space of time from the bid-
announcement by the first bidder, may mean that the takeover has little logic behind it. If
the white knight bidder has a constructive strategy and the target is a part of this then it
would not wait for a hostile bidder to appear on the scene. Of course, there is no reason
why a white knight bidder cannot exploit the vulnerable nature of the target faced with a
hostile bid. The white knight cannot pay a price lower than that offered by the hostile bidder
because if it were to do so it would not gain control of the target'''. However, the white
knight may be in a position to obtain access to information that may allow it not to overpay.
The evidence above suggests that shareholders of white knight acquirers are likely to
suffer a wealth decrease or a smaller wealth gain than the shareholders of a bidder in a
single bid whether friendly or hostile. Between a winning hostile bidder and a winning
white knight however, the latter has the information advantage (see section 3.5.1) and
can, therefore, value the target more accurately. Consequently, the white knight's
shareholders may suffer less from the Winner's Curse than those of a multiple hostile
bidder. Also, the friendly nature of the white knight bid means that it receives the
acceptance of the target firm managers and needs only shareholder approval. It may
also mean that target firm managers may be more willing to give up any managerial
rent in order to safeguard their position (Schnitzer 1996)' 9 . Results from previous
studies allow us to derive the following hypotheses:
18 The board of the target firm can recommend a lower white knight bid and target firm shareholders can
accept on non-price considerations such as loyalty.
19 Managerial rent is defined as the difference between his present reward (i.e. salary, privileges etc.) and
what the next best alternative will provide.
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Hypothesis 3
Shareholders of non-white knight acquirers experience greater wealth gains than
shareholders of white knights acquirers.
3.6 CONCLUSION
No one theory has been found to explain why takeovers have taken place (Jensen and
Ruback, 1983) or the bid-announcement and post-acquisition performance of bidders.
However, certain factors have been identified which may explain the relative
performance of bidders at the time of the bid-announcement and during the post-
acquisition period. In this chapter we have presented and discussed both the
theoretical and empirical literature relating to the mood of the bid (or type of acquirer).
This chapter has shown that there are four different types of acquirers; namely
friendly, hostile (single and multiple)and white knights. Morck et al. (1988) argue that
friendly takeovers were motivated by synergy while hostile bids were disciplinary in
nature. However, the motives of the white knight bidder cannot easily be identified. If
synergy were a motive, the white knight would not have waited till a hostile bidder had
been identified. Similarly, if discipline was a motive it is likely that a white knight
would not have received the support of the target board.
In this chapter we reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature relating to the
relative performance of different acquirer types. Our discussion showed that the
evidence to date has found that targets in hostile takeovers experienced greater wealth
gains than those in friendly takeovers. (Franks and Harris, 1996). Bidders in hostile
bids experienced wealth losses, which were greater than those in friendly bids, but
lower than those in a white knight bid at the time of the bid- announcement. White
HO
knight bidders experienced wealth losses that were higher than either friendly or hostile
• bidders at the time of the bid-announcement. From our discussion of previous studies
we formulated three hypothesis which sought to extend and overcome gaps in our
knowledge relating to the relative performance of different acquirer types.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
4 INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts to describe both the sample data used in this study and the event
study methodology which allows us to estimate shareholder wealth effects which we
report in the next chapter. There are four parts to this chapter. In the first part we
describe data sources and explain the criteria we employ for defining a bid as either
white knight, hostile or friendly. The second part examines event study methodology
and models used by previous studies in estimating abnormal returns. In this section we
consider some of the weaknesses in employing event study methodology and discuss
some of the ways in which they can be overcome. The third part of the chapter
considers the various econometric issues involved in event study methodology such as
the size effect, thin trading and bootstrapping'. The fourth part of this chapter deals
with the issue of the cross-sectional variation of average returns and discusses the
construction of reference portfolios used in this study.
4.1 OBTAINING THE INITIAL SAMPLE OF MERGERS
Over the last few years there has been a large increase in the availability of
computerised databases on mergers and acquisitions. However, the problem with
almost all of these databases is that they hold only recent data. For example, the
In this chapter we raise various methodological issues relevant to our study and in the following chapter we
state exactly which technique we employ.
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Acquisitions Monthly database `Amdata' has data on mergers and acquisitions from
only 1985. Our study employs data from 1983 and therefore, it was virtually
impossible to use just this source. For the period before 1987 Amdata did not specify
the mood of the takeover and this was an additional reason for using other sources.
4.1.1 PRIMARY SOURCES
The main primary sources of data were the EXTEL news summary cards, the Stock
Exchange microfiches and Year Book, the Investors' Chronicle, the index of the
Financial Times, the Financial Times Mergers and Acquisitions International,
Acquisitions Monthly magazine and company accounts. The initial list of mergers
during the period 1983 to 1995 was compiled by surveying the list of mergers and
acquisitions printed in the Investors' Chronicle for the period before 1985. For the list
of mergers and acquisitions after 1985 the Acquisitions Monthly magazine was used.
The EXTEL news summary cards, along with the Stock Exchange microfiches, were
used in order to determine the mood of the bid and the outcome dates for each bid.
From 1987 the Acquisitions Monthly magazine listed the mood of each bid and the
names of all competing bidders. The outcome dates from 1985 were collected from the
Acquisitions Monthly magazine. For the earlier period the Financial Times was used.
Data on boardroom changes was collected from the Stock Exchange Year Book,
Hemmington Scott Corporate Register and Company Guides; Directory of Directors
and annual company accounts2. Another primary source for share price and dividend
data was ICV/Datastream. In addition to this, Datastream was also used in order to
2 We also used these sources to cross check our data for accuracy.
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obtain the returns on the Financial Times All Share Index, which served as one of our
five benchmarks. The share prices obtained were also used to construct our own
reference portfolios (see section 4.15).
4.1.2 SECONDARY SOURCES
We used secondary data such as Limmack's (1991) sample of acquisitions, which
covered the period 1977 to 1986 3 . This sample consisted of a huge amount of data on
a variety of bids including abandoned bids. This study did not employ Lirrunack's
(1991) list but used it largely to compare and cross-check our list of bids obtained
from the Investors' Chronicle.
4.2 DEFINING THE MOOD OF THE BID
The most common method of determining the mood of any bid is to consider the
reaction of the management of the target company to any formal, or informal, bid
offer. According to this definition, a hostile bid would be one where the management
of the target company immediately rejects a bid from a bidder firm. Of course, there
are a number of reasons why the target firm management may wish to reject the bid
offer. The most important of these reasons could be to obtain a higher price.
Therefore, the target company management may have the intention to sell to the bidder
firm, with rejection amounting to a simple tactic to extract a higher price. A variation
to the simple method of determining the mood to the bid is to identify if a defensive
3 This was kindly supplied by the late Peter Ho11.
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strategy has been employed by the target firm. 4
 If a defensive strategy is employed, one
can argue that the bid is unwanted because the cost of employing such a tactic falls on
the target company. All defensive strategies have the additional cost of employing
advisers such as merchant banks, lawyers, accountants, public relations consultants and
stockbrokers.' This is quite different from the target firm management simply saying
'No' to a bid, which has no transactional cost, attached to it whatsoever.
We can illustrate the definition of a hostile bid by looking at some of the cases in our
sample such as the bid by BTR for Hawker Siddeley in 1991. On 20th September 1991
BTR announced a £1.5 billion takeover bid for Hawker Siddeley which the board of
the target company immediately rejected. Two days later the board of Hawker•
Siddeley initiated a series of defensive strategies beginning with the announcement of a
demerger. The Hawker Siddeley defence document, published on 10th October 1991,
announced that the company would carry out a 'radical restructuring', which included
disposal of half the businesses to concentrate on core areas of electrical motors,
industrial batteries and aerospace related industries. There were a number of reasons
for doing this but the main one was to reduce the attraction of the target company to
the bidder by disposing of subsidiaries which the bidder may be most interested in 6 . At
the same time, an announcement of a demerger was expected to increase the value of
Hawker Siddeley and make the takeover more expensive for BTR.
A defensive strategy is any action taken by the target firm management in order to resist the takeover. See
Sudarsanam (1991).
5 For a detailed description of the role of advisers in a takeover see Sudarsanam (1995:ch7).
6 Asset sales of this type are designed so those parts of the company which are valuable, or of most interest to
the bidder, are removed from the rest of the operations. In doing so, it is hoped that the bidder will not
continue with a bid for the parts of the target company which are least attractive to it.
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In response to Hawker Siddeley's defensive activities, the BTR board retaliated by
attacking Hawker Siddeley's performance, thereby intensifying the conflict. BTR's
board also argued that if the takeover were to succeed there would be a greater
potential for Hawker Siddeley to grow. On the 8th November 1991, BTR increased its
bid to 1.1.55 billion, which was rejected by the board but accepted by the majority of
the shareholders. There were two aspects that made this bid hostile, and are present in
all bids defined as such in our study; the first is that the bid is rejected by the board and
the second is that the target company mounts some kind of defensive strategy.
The management of the target firm may receive more than one bid offer, which it may
immediately reject. Again, we examine if defensive strategies had been employed
against each bidder to determine the mood of the bid for the reasons explained above.
In this study we define a situation where there is more than one hostile bidder as a
multiple hostile bid. We can illustrate a multiple hostile bid from the cases in our
sample. A typical example is that of Brooke Bond which received a takeover bid from
Tate and Lyle and Unilever. Initially, Tate and Lyle made a bid for Brooke Bond on
5th July 1984, which was rejected by the latter's board. A series of defensive strategies
were employed by the target board to maintain its independence. While Brooke Bond
was defending itself from Tate and Lyle, the company received a bid from Unilever on
21st September 1984.
The board of the target company also rejected the bid from Unilever and began to
defend itself from both companies. Meanwhile, both bidder companies were competing
against each other to acquire Brooke Bond shares while also trying to persuade
shareholders to accept their offer. At the end of this contest, Unilever gained victory
after launching a dawn raid on Brooke Bond shares and having received the majority
of acceptances. As with hostile bids, one can identify three aspects to multiple hostile
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bids. The first is that all the bids are rejected by the board of the target company, even
if the second bid is higher than the first. Secondly, the target firm employs defensive
strategies against both bidders. Third, the contest usually results . in each bidder
attempting to outbid the other firm.
In contrast to hostile bids, there are friendly bids, which have been agreed and
recommended by the management of the target company. The announcement of these
bids is usually followed by positive statements by the board of both the target and
bidder firms. The vast bulk of bids that take place in the UK are of this type and
consist of both small and large bidders. One interesting point that occurs with friendly
bids is that the mood does not remain constant and changes over time. Hostility of the
target firm can be eliminated in many ways but the easiest is to make a very attractive
offer. This fickleness of target management mood limits the usefulness of this definition
as the takeover starts off being hostile and ends up being friendly. Our definition of
friendly is more clear cut in that a bid has to be agreed without the use of any defensive
tactic'.
In between the hostile and friendly bid, one has the white knight bid although, by
definition, it is a friendly bid. A white knight bidder is a second bidder and usually
enters the contest after a hostile bidder has been identified. The role of the white knight
bidder is to 'save' the target firm from a takeover by a hostile bidder. The case of Rank
Hovis McDougall provides a good example of a white knight bid used in this study. On
5th October 1992 Hanson launched a bid for Rank Hovis McDougall which was
rejected by the target board. However, the chairmen of both companies met the next
7 In our definition of friendly bids we include those which may have been rejected but are accepted once a
higher price is offered without the use of any defensive tool.
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day to exchange their views on the bid. Hanson was supported by Goodman Fielder
Wattie who announced that they were willing to purchase Rank Hovis McDougal's
European baking and milling business if the Hanson bid succeeded. In response to this
and the criticisms made by Hanson, the target firm's management announced that they
would demerge the company into three separate companies, and the shareholders
would receive shares in each one.
On 29th October 1992 Tomkins launched an agreed bid for Rank Hovis McDougal. In
Tomkins the board of Rank Hovis McDougall found a white knight, which would save
them from Hanson. In the face of a rival bid, Hanson decided not to enter into a
contest and withdrew from battle by abandoning the bid. The important aspect of a
white knight bidder is that it has the backing of the target board and enters the bidding
game after a hostile bidder has been launched. We summarise definitions of different
acquirer types as follows:
i	 Single friendly bidder - the only bidder and it receives the recommendation of the
target board.
ii	 Single hostile bidder - the only bidder and it wins despite resistance by the target
management.
iii	 Multiple hostile bidder - the bidder which wins in competition with other hostile
bidders or a white knight.
iv	 White knight bidder - a friendly bidder which wins in competition with other hostile
bidders for control of the target firm.
118
4.3 SAMPLE OF ACQUISITIONS
From the primary and secondary sources, a comprehensive list of all successful UK
takeovers completed between 1983 and 1995 was compiled. From this initial list of
over a thousand acquisitions, those involving either a private (i.e. non-listed) or
foreign-listed bidder or target were removed. 8 This brought the list of acquisitions
down, to almost eight hundred, with the bulk of these being friendly bids. The third
screening that took place was to make sure that the share price, dividend data (in order
to calculate the returns) and the market to book value were available on
ICV/Datastream. (The market to book value was required to calculate the market to
book value adjusted returns.) This left a sample of 696 takeovers, consisting of
friendly, white knight, single and multiple hostile bids.
More recent studies on takeovers have tended to focus their attention on large
acquisitions. One such study is by Gregory (1997) which removed all takeovers where
the bid value was less than £10 million. Gregory (1997) argued that "even though the
cut off, whilst somewhat arbitrary, was chosen to avoid the problem of 'noise' which
could occur when firms acquire very small companies" 9 . Although we agree with
Gregory (1997) in that acquisitions of 'micro' companies is of little economic
significance, we disagree with the arbitrary cut-off point of £10 million in 1996 prices.
Instead, we examine all the companies listed on the UK Stock Exchange between 1983
8 There are studies which have examined takeovers of private companies but as they do not have a quoted
share price they cannot be used in an event study based research such as ours. The complexity, and for some
countries impossibility, of calculating accurate reference portfolios leads us to exclude foreign listed
acquirers.
9 Gregory (1997) does not define or describe what he refers to as 'noise' but argues that small acquisitions
are of little economic significance and therefore not worthy of any attention. Takeovers of larger companies
tend to lead to more significant effects on their industry and the stock market. The latter usually occurs
because shares of larger companies are more widely held (hence followed) and traded.
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and 1995. 10 We construct quintiles for all the companies listed on the UK Stock
Exchange and take the value of the largest firm in the smallest quintile as the cut off
value for takeovers in our sample. We refer to all the companies in the smallest quintile
as micro stocks. Any bid value below that of the largest company in the smallest
quintile is removed. On 1st January 1996, the value of the smallest company, out of the
micro stocks was just £.300,000 while the largest was about £10 million".
As any student of finance is aware, £10 million on 1st January 1996 is not the same as
on 1st January 1983, when our sample starts. Simple present value calculations tell us
that it is inappropriate to have a standard cut-off point throughout the whole period.
Instead of a standard cut-off point, such as the type used by Gregory (1997), we
calculate the one-year present value of £10 million for each year using the inflation
rate as the discount rate. Using the present value of £10 on 1 d January 1996, as the
starting point, we have the cut-off points for each year, as shown in Table 4.1
10 This is explained in detail in section 4.15 where we discuss the construction of reference portfolios.
II We use 1st January 1996 because our sample of completed takeovers ends on 31st December 1995 and to
be consistent with studies such as Gregory (1997). However, reversing the process and using the data for
1983, when our sample starts, does not drastically alter the number of takeovers in our study.
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Table 4.1 Cut-Off Values for Our Sample of Takeovers Between 1983 and 1995
Retail Price
Index
Inflation
Rate
Cut Off Value For Takeovers in Our Sample
(i.e. Real Value of £10m)
1996 - - 10
1995 149 3.40 9.67
1994 144.1 2.42 9.43
1993 140.7 1.59 9.28
1992 138.5 3.75
.
8.94
1991 133.5 5.87
.
8.43
1990 126.1 9.46 7.68
1989 115.2 7.76 7.06	 •
1988 106.9 4.91 6.69
1987 110.3 , 4.14 6.41
1986 385.9 3.40 6.19
1985 373.2 6.08
_
5.83
1984 351.8 4.98 5.53
1983 335.1 4.59 5.27
Source and Notes:
Inflation is calculated as the annual percentage change in the retail price index (RPI).
RPI data is obtained from Annual Abstract of Statistics 1987 and 1996
1974 and 1987 are base years for the retail price index.
Using the cut off values from Table 4.1 leaves the final sample with 547 takeovers
consisting of friendly, white knight, single hostile and multiple hostile bids. Table 4.2
illustrates the number of takeovers by the mood of the bid. The greatest proportion of
bids are friendly, followed by single hostile and then white knight takeovers. We also
find that generally bidders tend to be concentrated in the top two quintiles (i.e. quintile
4 and 5). The concentration of large firms in our sample is most noticeable for white
knights who have 89% of the sample in the top two quintiles. In the case of multiple
hostile acquirers 70% of the sample appear in the top two quintiles with none of them
in the bottom quintile. Although, single hostile acquirers are represented in the lower
quintiles the sample is nevertheless skewed towards the top quintiles. Friendly
acquirers are less concentrated in the top quintiles compared to other acquirer types.
Table 4.3 shows the number of successful takeovers for each year of the sample. The
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peak years for takeovers were from 1985 to 1988/9. Prior to 1986, the number of
takeovers was increasing each year. After 1988/9 the number and value of takeovers
fell substantially and continued to drop each year until 199512.
Table 4.2	 Number of Successful Takeovers by Acquirer Type
Type of Bid Number % Size Quintile
1 2 3 4 5
White Knight Bidders 27 (4.9) 1 1 1 5 19
(3.7) (3.7) (3.7) (18.5) (70.4)
Multiple Hostile Bidders 20 (3.7) 0 2 4 7 7
(0.0) (10.0) (20.0) (35.0) (35.0)
Single Hostile Bidders 75 (13.7) 3 3 11 11 47
(4.0) (4.0) (14.7) (14.7) (62.6)
Friendly Bidders 425 (77.7) 18 37 63 118 189
(4.2) (8.7) (14.8) (27.8) (44.5)
Total Bids 547 (100) 22 43 79 141 262
(4.0) (7.9) (14.4) (25.8) (47.9)
Notes:
i) For definitions of bidder type see section 4.2
ii) Size quintile 1 refers to the smallest 20% of list on the UK Stock Exchange in the
year of the bid announcement (excluding micro shares). For a discussion of the
construction of our size quintiles see section 4.15.
iii) Figures in brackets refer to percentages
12 Our sample of acquirers may not correspond exactly to figures from Acquisition Monthly or the Office of
National Statistics Acquisition and Mergers Bulletin because we exclude acquirers which are foreign owned,
non-listed or where the value of the target is below the threshold as shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.3	 Number of Successful Takeovers for Each Year of the Sample
Year 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
White Knight 3 2 4 3 4 3 3 1 0 1 1 1 1
Multiple Hostile 0 5 1 8 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
Single Hostile 5 5 12 10 10 6 8 5 5 1 2 3 3
Friendly 11 26 39 85 71 55 41 20 17 8 16 14 22
Total 19 38 56 106 85 67 53 26 23 10 19 18 27
Notes:
i) Bid year refers to'the year in which the bid announcement was made public.
ii) For definitions of bidder type see section 4.2.
4.4 TIMING OF EVENTS
We refer to the first day of public announcement of a takeover as the day on which the
bid becomes known to non-insiders or the public at large 13 . In some cases, a public
announcement is made on the same day as a formal offer is made to the management of
the target firm. Even though a formal offer may be made to the target firm board it
does not mean that the necessary offer documents have been received by the target
board. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers lays down a very strict timetable as
shown in Table 4.4, the days by which various documents have to be sent and received.
The timetable also lays down the date of completion, which is usually taken to be the
day when the bid becomes unconditional. In this study the bid-announcement date is
obtained from Acquisitions Monthly for bids after 1985 and the Financial Times for
those prior to 1985.
13 In the case of white knight and multiple hostile bids we use the announcement date on which these
acquirers enter the competition to gain control of the target firm.
123
Table 4.4	 Bid timetable under the City Code
Announcement day Formal announcement of the takeover bid with terms and
conditions.
Posting day (Day 0) Date the offer document is posted (it cannot extend to more
than 28 days from the offer announcement date)
Day 14 Final date for target response to offer documents
Day 21 First offer closing day which may be extended. The offeror may
purchase shares above 30%, in the target firm, under voluntary
offer rules.
Day 35 End	 of grace	 period	 for	 acceptance	 when	 offer	 went
unconditional on Day 21
Day 39 Final date for publication of new information by target firm.
Day 42 Date	 at	 which	 target	 shareholders	 can	 withdraw	 their
acceptances if offer is unsuccessful on Day 21
Day 46 Final date for bidder to revise and post offer terms.
Day 60 Final	 closing	 date	 —	 the	 bid	 either	 fails	 or	 is	 declared
unconditional as to acceptances.
Day 81 Final date for clearing all bid conditions attached to bid.
Day 102 Final date for delivery of consideration.
Source: Sudarsanam (1995:p87)
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4.5 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY
Event study methodology is a convenient tool which researchers have employed in
order to analyse the impact of a specific event on the share price". Early studies
employing the technique were by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) which
examined the effect on the share price of a share split; Ball and Brown (1968)
considered the effects of earnings announcements; Ibbotson (1975) examined initial
public offerings, and Mandelker (1974) examined the effect on the share price of
merger announcements. These early studies led to a glut of studies employing this
technique, especially in the US and UK. (See Campbell, Lo and MacKinley, 1997:ch4
for a detailed description of event study methodology).
Event study methodology rests on the idea of selecting a specific event date during an
event period. The event date is the date at which a particular activity occurred such as
a merger announcement, share split and so on. The event period is the time period
under examination surrounding the event date". However, there may be a number of
event dates that can be used in the case of a merger. One can consider the
announcement date as well as the completion date. After the selection of the event
date/period is made, the next step is to estimate the actual and predicted returns
discussed later in this chapter. The difference between the actual and predicted returns
result in the abnormal return as shown in equation 4.1:
14 It is assumed that the impact of a news item such as a bid announcement can be measured because the
share price adjusts to new information quickly. In this respect event study methodology assumes semi-strong
market efficiency i.e. incorporates historical and public information.
15 The event period may be examined where there exists difficulty in determining the event date or the effects
last for more than one day.
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AR„ = Rir — C11	 (4.1)
where:
Altit is the abnormal return for the ith firm during period t
Rit is the return for the ith firm during period t.
Cit is the control rate of return in the absence of the event for the ith firm
during period t.
4.5.1 ESTIMATING ACTUAL RETURNS
The actual returns are calculated from the observed share prices for the companies in the
sample. Actual returns are calculated for both the estimation period and the observation
period. The returns are calculated as shown in equation 4.2 below. In equation 4.2 the term
R, is the estimated actual return for company i = 1, 2, 3, ...., n over time t = 1, 2, 3, ...., n.
The return includes dividends and therefore it is calculated as the sum of the capital gain
plus the dividend received during the holding period:
P. + D.
loge (R,i ) = loge ( ID	 I - loge (Pii +D. 1 ) —log e (pa_ l )	 (4.2)
where:
Pft is the price of the share in firm i at period L16.
Pik/ is the price of the share in firm i at one time period before time t.
D, is the cash dividend per each share in firm i during time pert. 17
16 One can use either the opening or closing share price as long as one is consistent.
17 We use the ex-div date share price as opposed to the actual date the dividend is paid. The reason for this is
that shareholders purchasing shares in the company after the ex-dividend date are not entitled to receive the
dividends.
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The usual practice is to convert the prices and dividends into a natural logarithmic
form in order to allow for continuous compounding. Also, the logarithmic returns are
less skewed and therefore more normally distributed (see Markowitz, 1959; Fama et
al., 1969).
4.5.2 ESTIMATING PREDICTED RETURNS
If an event, such as a bid announcement, were to occur it is assumed to affect the share
price. The effect of the event can then be measured simply as the change in the share
price. However, to do this will lead to incorrect results as it does not take into
account share price fluctuations prior to the event. One way of overcoming this .
problem is to estimate the predicted returns for the estimation period. Any deviation
of the return for the company from the estimated value can be attributed to the event.
In this section we present and discuss the various models that have been put forward to
predict 'normal' returns during the observation period.
4.5.2.1 THE RAW RETURNS MODEL
Some of the very early studies that measured the abnormal returns did so by
calculating the actual realised returns after the event. This assumes that the expected
returns are equal to zero and therefore any actual returns by definition must be
abnormal returns. The method can be criticised for not taking into account changes in
the market portfolio of shares or risk. The raw returns model is calculated as shown in
equation 4.2.
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4.5.2.2 THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPM) AND
THE MARKET MODEL
The CAPM was introduced by Sharpe (1964), Linter (1965) and Black (1966) in order to
explain how the capital market evaluates the prices of assets under conditions of
equilibrium. CAPM assumes that all investors have the facility to borrow and lend funds at
the prevailing market rate of interest. The second assumption of CAPM is that all investors
have the same expectations regarding the existing investment projects. CAPM seeks to
explain the relationship between risk and return for any asset, in that there exists a positive
relationship between risk and return. Risk, according to this model, can be divided into two
categories namely systematic or market risk which cannot be reduced through portfolio
diversification and non-systematic risk which can be reduced through portfolio
diversification. Under the CAPM model the return is calculated as the expected return from
an efficient combination of risky assets plus a risldess asset such as a treasury bill' s . The
CAPM model can be expressed in the following manner:
E(R) = R + A[E(R„, i )— Rf ]	 (4.3)
where:
E(R) is the predicted return for the ith firm during period t.
E(Rn„t) is the expected return on the market portfolio.
Rf
 is the return on the risk free asset.
13; measures the sensitivity of the share to movements in the market.
18 A treasury bill is a bill issued by the government.
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The sensitivity of the share price to movements in the stock market can be thought of as the
systematic risk which cannot be reduced through portfolio diversification. Formally, the
systematic risk is equal to the covariance on the return of a particular share (i.e. Il k) and the
return from the market (i.e. Rng) divided by the variance of R.. The difference between the
return on the market (Rint) and the risk free rate of return (Rf) is referred to as the market
risk premium and represents the excess return of the market index over a riskless asset that
one receives as compensation for bearing the market level systematic risk.
The market model is derived from the CAPM and was first used by Fama, Fisher, Jensen
and Roll (1969) in their study which examined the behaviour of share prices on the
announcement of share splits. The market model employs the same linear relationship as the
CAPM between return on a particular share and the return on the market portfolio. The
market model is written as:
R„ = a; + AR,„, + e11
	 (4.4)
where:
eit is the random error term which reflects that part of a firm's return which is not
explained by movements in the market index. The market models assumes that the
error term is homoscedastic, follows a normal distribution, has zero expected value
and is serially independent
ai is the regression constant obtained from regressing Rh on ItTnt . This measures
the mean return over the estimation period which is not explained by the
market.
(3; is the market risk or the systematic risk obtained from regressing Rit on Rmt
Rrtg is the return on the market portfolio represented by the market index at time
period t.
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The ordinary least squares regressional analysis is applied to equation 4.4 during the
estimation period in order to estimate the predicted returns for the observation period.
During the regressional analysis, the returns are converted into a logarithmic form and
the results are used to obtain the predicted returns for the observation period.
According to the market model, the returns for the firm are dependent on
movements in the market index so that the predicted returns are related to each firm's
specific characteristics and the market portfolio performance.
4.5.2.3	 MEAN ADJUSTED RETURNS MODEL
This model assumes that the average return obtained during the pre-event period
represents the predicted return during the observation period. This means that the
return of each share will not be affected by movements in the market and the beta term
in equation 4.4 will be equal to zero. Under this type of assumption equation 4.4 can
be written as follows:
ER
log R if = Y  
n
	 (4.5)
where:
Itit is the predicted return for each company (i.e. i) at time t.
Rai is the average historical return for each firm i.
y is the starting point of the estimation period in days, weeks etc.
x is the end point of the estimation period in days, weeks etc.
n is the number of points during the estimation period.
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4.5.2.4
	 MARKET ADJUSTED RETURNS MODEL
The market-adjusted model assumes that the return on any share should be equal to the
return from the market portfolio during the observation period. This means that the
standard market model, as in equation 4.4 above, can be used but the alpha term is
assumed to equal zero and the beta term is one for all companies in the sample. In this
respect the market-adjusted model entirely relates the predicted return with that of the
market portfolio. This has the disadvantage of not relating specific characteristics such
as risk of individual returns of each firm with those of the market portfolio.
4.5.2.5
	 SIZE AND MARKET TO BOOK ADJUSTED
RETURNS MODEL
Like the market adjusted returns model, the size adjusted returns model assumes that
the alpha term is assumed to equal zero and the beta term is one for all the companies
in the portfolio. However, the size-adjusted model assumes that the return for a
company should be related to a portfolio of companies of similar size°. The size-
adjusted model can be argued to be a more reliable predictor of returns because
companies of a similar size behave largely the same (Dimson and Marsh, 1996). 20 The
market to book value adjusted model return is calculated in the same manner but we
change the constituents of the portfolio. Like the size adjusted model, the market to
19The construction of reference portfolios is explained in section 4.15
20 Dimson and Marsh (1996) argue that a comparison of the Hoare Govett small company index to either the
FT All Share Index shows them to behave very differently over time implying that the size of the firm affects
its performance.
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book value adjusted model aims to improve the match between the sample firm and the
control group. To obtain the market to book value portfolios all the control sample of
companies are segregated by size (i.e. market capitalisation) into quintiles. Each
quintile is then sub-divided into smaller quintiles based on their market to book value.
In total we end up with 25 market to book value groups (i.e. 5 size quintiles multiplied
by 5 market to book value sub-groups).
4.5.2.6 FAMA AND FRENCH THREE FACTOR ADJUSTED
RETURNS MODEL
The importance of beta in the Sharpe-Linter-Black capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
came.into question in the late 1970s and early 1980s with work of Basu (1977) and
Banz (1981). The results from these studies show that the price to earning ratio and
market capitalisation provide greater explanatory power than beta (see section 4.14 for
a discussion on the cross-sectional variation in returns). Fama and French (1992)
conclude that the market to book value also has considerable predictive powers. In
Fama and French (1993), the authors report an empirical extension of the CAPM
abnormal returns model which incorporates both the market to book value and market
capitalisation.
Fama and French's (1992) justification, or rationale, for expanding the CAPM model
is that size and market to book value factors are very important in explaining average
returns across shares21 . However, size and market to book value by themselves cannot
21 We discuss in detail the rationale for including the difference in returns between the low and high book to
market value as well as small and large companies in section 4.14.
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explain the large difference in average returns between equity return and the risk free
rate. Fama and French (1993) argue that the relationship between returns from equity
and the risk free rate can best be explained by what they refer to as, 'the market
factor', i.e. the Sharpe-Linter-Black version of the CAPM model. The Fama and
French (1992) empirical CAPM abnormal return can be written as:
FF = R,, — R + ,6 (R — R ft ) + ,2(SML ) + A3(HML )	 (4.6)
where:
FF is the abnormal return using the Fama and French Three factor model for
firm it at time period t
Rit is the return for firm i.
Rft is the risk free return.
Rnn is the return on the market portfolio.
HML is the excess return for low book to market value companies (i.e. bottom
50%) compared to a portfolio of high book to market value companies (i.e. top
50%)22.
SML is the excess return on small 30% of companies on the market compared
to the 30% of largest companies23.
Bib 1Bi2, Bi3 respectively refer to the slope coefficients obtained by calculating
the return for company i against the excess return on the market, market to
book value and market capitalisation indices24.
22 The database of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange was manually compiled by taking the
1979 fourth quarter list of companies on the Risk Management Service Quarterly Review. This was then
updated on a quarterly basis for new listings, delistings, change of name and mergers using data supplied in
the Stock Exchange Quality of Markets.
23 The SML portfolios were constructed by obtaining market capitalisation values, for each year from 1980 to
1998, from Datastream for all UK listed companies. In the case of SML an average or equally weighted
return was calculated for the smallest and largest 30% of the companies on a daily basis. The difference
between the return for smallest and largest portfolios form the SML value on a daily basis. In order to take
account of changes in market capitalisation and the introduction of new companies, as well as delistings, we
rebased the portfolios every three months.
24 The HML portfolios were constructed by obtaining market to book values, for each year from 1980 to
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Fama and French (1993) use the 28-day US Treasury bill rate as the risk-free rate (see
equation 4.6). For our study, we use the return on the 28-day UK government treasury
bill rate. However, the risk-free rate is provided as an annualised figure, rather than
simply the rate received by the investor for the month. For our purposes, the situation
is slightly different because we use daily data. This does not mean that one can simply
take the annualised rate and divide it by 360 days. The annualised rates compound the
returns including any cashflows which are received during the period. In other words,
the annualised rate is higher than what one would receive for holding a 28-day
Treasury Bill. Therefore, the annualised Treasury Bill rate has to be converted into a
daily rate in order for use in equation 4.6.
One can convert annualised rates in daily rates by first calculating the market value of
the government bill. This is simply the face value of the treasury bill discounted by the
interest rate and calculated as:25
MITt = 100 - (t x r x 100)	 (4.7)
1998, from Datastream for all UK listed companies. However, Datastream did not keep market to book
values for all UK companies during the early period. For the later years the drop out rate falls to about 25%
and in this respect the Fama and French Three Factor model may suffer from survivorship bias for the UK.
All the companies with market to book values were ranked and divided into two equal sized groups i.e. high
and low market to book value. For each day and average or equally weighted return was calculated for both
portfolios. The difference between the returns on the high and low portfolios forms our HML value. In order
to take account of changes in the market to book values and the introduction of new companies as well as
delistings we rebased the portfolios every three months.
25 This procedure was kindly made available to me by Professor Roy Batchelor.
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where:
MV is the market value of a 28-day treasury bill.
t is the time to maturity as a proportion of 365 days.
r is the percentage interest rate per annum.
The second stage is to calculate the yield on the treasury bill which is:
FV—MV 
Monthly Return or Yield = Y —
	
	 (4.8)
MV,
where:
Y is the monthly return or yield from the treasury bill.
FV is the face value of the treasury bill.
MV is the market value or price of the treasury bill.
Finally, for our purposes, we have to convert the monthly yield such as the one from
equation 4.8 into a daily rate26 . This is done by calculating 1/28th of the monthly yield
- i.e.:
+ Y)X8
	(4.9)
26 For our purposes we used a daily series of an annualised risk free rate of return which was converted in an
effective daily return using equation 4.10.
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The whole procedure can summarised as":
Daily return = 100
)48
1 (4.10)
100[(1 — 28365 )
4.6 ESTIMATION OF CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS
The most important step in using event study methodology in assessing the effect of a
takeover is to calculate the change in shareholder wealth in terms of the abnormal return.
What is of interest is not only the impact of a specific event on a single company but all the
companies in the sample and, therefore, one has to calculate the average abnormal return
(AAR,) for a particular time period. The AAR, for all the companies in a sample can be
calculated for a particular time period t as follows:
AR,
AAR, = 	
	 (4.11)
where:
AAR, is the average abnormal for a portfolio of firms i = 1,2,3„n during the
period t.
ARit is the abnormal return for the ith firm during period t.
N is the number of firms in the portfolio.
27 Strictly speaking this expression can be further simplified.
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Once we calculate the AAR's for each period(i.e. day, week etc.) we then calculate the
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). The CAR provides a picture of the total effect of the
event over a period of time under observation. The CAR, for time period t is calculated as
follows:
CARE =EAAR,
	
(4.12)
1=x
where:
x refers to the stating point in the event window (t).
n is the last time period in the event window (t).
4.7 INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTION T-STATISTIC
Each CAR has to be measured for statistical significance by testing it against the null
hypothesis (Ho) that abnormal performance is absent and the alternative hypothesis
(H 1 ) that it is present. The test statistic shown in equation 4.13 assumes that the cross-
sectional correlation between the abnormal returns for any two companies i and j
equals zero. This assumption will be valid where the event dates for the sample of
merging companies are widely spread over a long period of time. The independence
assumption t-statistic is calculated as follows:28
SAR =  AR,'
SD(AR„) (4.13)
28 The term 'independence' assumes that event dates are not clustered. See Brown and Warner (1980, 1985).
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1.n
E AR
AR ,
 
_  d
(4.15)
where :
Altit is the abnormal return for company i during period t.
SD(AR) is the standard deviation of the abnormal return calculated as:
i=n
E(AA, - AR) 2
	 (4.14)
SD(AR,t) — i.x d — 1
where:
t = x refers to the starting date of the observation period.
t = n is the final date of the observation period.
d is the total number of days (or weeks, months etc.) in the observation
period.
A R i is calculated as:-
Given this, the independence assumption t-statistic for N firms on day t is simply calculated
as the standardised abnormal return for day t divided by the square root of the number of
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observations in the sample (i.e. N firms) as shown in equation 4.16.
E sAR1N, D
sAl?fIND 1=1 
V.-Kr
	 (4.16)
The t-statistic for a multi-day (or weekly, monthly etc.) period i.e. to test the CAR using the
independence assumption can be obtained as shown in equation 4.17:
t=t2
E sARtmin
scAR,ND 	 z'	
'	 ../t2 —t1+1
(4.17)
where:
SARtIND is the standardised abnormal return for the portfolio with normal
distribution.
tl= is the starting interval of the event window.
t2= is the final interval of the event window.
4.8 DEPENDENCE ASSUMPTION TEST STATISTIC
If the event date for takeovers is clustered in any particular calendar time, or the firms
are in identical or related industries, then the assumption of • cross-sectional
independence in the abnormal returns is violated 29. The test statistic that one employs
29 The term dependence implies that event dates are clustered, see Brown and Warner (1980,1985).
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AR, 
SAR,DEP — 
SD(AR) (4.18)
in this case is the dependence assumption t-test as shown in equation 4.18.
where:
AlIt is the average abnormal return.
SD(AR) is the standard deviation which is given by equation 4.19 shown
below:
I= n
I (AA — AR)2
SD(AR) — t= x 
d —1
	 (4.19)
where:
t ----x is the starting date of the observation period.
n is the final date of the observation period.
d is the number of intervals within the period (i.e. number of days, weeks
etc.)
is calculated as shown in equation 4.15
The dependence t-statistic for a multi-day period or cumulative return is calculated as
follows:
CAR, 1, i2
SCA Ri'7, P2 — 	
SD(AR)Vt2— ti +1 (4.20)
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where:
ti and 12 are the starting and end point of the interval period
CARt1,12 is the cumulative abnormal return as shown in equation 4.12
SD is the standard deviation as shown in equation 4.19.
4.9 THE PROBLEM OF THIN TRADING
The market model estimation of the beta term suffers from a bias which is commonly
referred to as the thin trading problem. The thin trading problem arises as a result of
the non-synchronous trading between shares which are not frequently traded but
included in the sample and those which are frequently traded and form part of the
benchmark or market index. In the event of non-trading, the last share price is
recorded. However, if a share price is recorded to be the same for a number of time
periods due to infrequent trading then the market model generates biased and
inconsistent OLS estimates. Dimson (1979) demonstrates that the estimated betas of
infrequent traded shares rises as the trading interval rise. This means that shares which
are frequently traded will have an upward bias in the beta while those which are
infrequently traded will have a downward bias when the market model is estimated.
The estimation bias will be greater the longer the shares remain non-traded. This is
more likely to occur in the case of daily data, rather than monthly, data. Also, there is a
greater likelihood that the infrequently traded shares are the smaller companies. The
biased beta estimates, if used, result in biased estimates of abnormal returns and
consequently misspecified results in an event study.
A number of approaches have been suggested to overcome the problem of thin trading.
The most commonly referred to approaches are those applied by Scholes and Williams
(1977), Dimson (1979) and Fowler and Rorke (1983). All of these approaches have
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13.1 ± 130,0+1
13sw=
(4.21)
1 +2 r1
the common objective of attempting to reduce the downward bias in the beta estimates
of infrequently traded securities by regressing a combination of synchronous and non-
synchronous market returns on each of the security returns examined.
4.9.1 SCHOLES AND WILLIAMS MODEL
Scholes and Williams (1977) show that under the assumption that a transaction takes
place in every time period a consistent estimate of the beta term would be:
where:
is the slope coefficient in an OLS regression of R it against
f:34, is the slope coefficient in an OLS regression of Rit against Rm,i.
[3, 1 is the slope coefficient in an OLS regression of Rit against Rni,i+1.
r 1 is the first order serial correlation of the market index.
The method involves running a single OLS regression of the return of each share
return (N) against the return on the market index (R nn). The first term has one lagged
return for the market index, the second uses the current return for the market index
and the third uses one leading return for the market index. All the betas from the
regression are summed up and divided by the first order serial correlation plus one.
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4.9.2 DIMSON MODEL
The Dimson (1979) aggregated coefficient estimator does not require a transaction to
take place in every measurement interval. The Dimson (1979) estimate of the beta term
is obtained by regressing the share return on day t against a range of leading,
synchronous and lagging returns from the market index in order to obtain a set of slope
coefficients. The Dimson (1979) method can be illustrated as:
n	 (4.22)
fiDad = EA
t.—n
where: f3, t = -n, ....,0„n are the slope coefficient in a multiple regression of the
return on the security in period t against the return on the market index
in period t-n, 	 .,O, 	 . t+n.
4.9.3 FOWLER AND RORKE MODEL
Fowler and Rorke (1983) argued that the Dimson (1979) method was misspecified
especially in the case where the share skips a single price observation. At the same
time, the Fowler and Rorke (1983) method aims to improve the Scholes and Williams
method (1977) by adding an extra leading and lagging term. The Fowler and Rorke
method can be illustrated as:
(13-2+ 134+130+13+1+13+2) 	 (4.23)
1 +2(p1+p2)
OFW =
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where:
f3„ is the slope coefficient from regressing the share return in period t
against the return on the market in period t+n.
r1 is the first order serial correlation-coefficient of the market index.
r2 is the second order serial correlation coefficient of the market index.
The f3Fw expression can be generalised for shares that skip two or more consecutive
observations as:
+13-n+1	 + 13. + 131+ i3n)	 (4.24)
PFR =
[1 +2(p '
 p2
In our study we do not use any of the three thin trading adjustments mentioned above
because they are relevant for the CAPM model which we do not use. In our study we use
size and market to book value portfolios which attempt to match the acquirers in our
sample.
4.10 BIASES IN LONG RUN EVENT STUDIES
Event study methodology is very effective in measuring the impact of an event on the
shareholder wealth in the short run. Since event study methodology was used, a number of
new models have been developed in order to estimate the predicted returns along with tests
of statistical significance (see sections 4.7 and 4.8). Event studies examining a long run
period may suffer from some weaknesses or biases which we discuss in this section.
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Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1996 and1997) argue that long run
event study statistical tests of significance are misspecified with a strong tendency to
indicate an abnormal performance when none is present. Their findings show that results
for previous studies may have been due to model misspecification rather than any
temporary or permanent mispricing. Event studies attempt to estimate the abnormal return
but over a long run period the expected return estimates across different benchmark models
can be very large. In other words, long run event study results are very sensitive to the
model used for estimating expected returns. Event study tests tend to accumulate average
returns during a specific period to arrive at the CAR. The reason for this is that a positive
bias occurs due to the bid-ask spread which is accumulated with a traditional CAR 30 . Not
only does the CAR vary widely with the benchmark model used to estimate the abnormal .
returns, but so do the variance and hence the test statistic. Kothari and Warner (1997)
argue that CAR variance estimation models underestimate its true level, hence over-reject
the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance31.
An alternative method which avoids positive biases from additive accumulation is the buy
and hold procedure (Roll, 1983). This approach is argued by Cowan and Sargeant (1997)
to more accurately reflect the actual change in the value of the company with any dividends
re-invested. This is because the buy and hold return is an arithmetic return which when
multiplied gives the actual wealth changes unlike log returns. The buy and hold abnormal
return (BHAR) is calculated as shown in equation 4.25:
3° Each share price has a buying and selling price (i.e. bid-ask) with the latter being higher. Event studies
overcome this problem by using a mid price (i.e. the average of the bid-ask price) but this is higher than what
the investor would get if he were to sell his shares.
31 This type of bias is sometimes referred to as the measurement bias.
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where:
BHAR =n(1+ HPAR„)— 1	 (4.25)
HPARit is the holding period abnormal return for company i over period 1. The
]]PAR it attempts to imitate an investor who purchases shares for a specified period
and is calculated as:
HPARR
 = HPRit - HPR benclunark,t	 (4.26)
where:
HP& is calculated as shown in equation 4.27
P — P + D
HPR„ — a	 a-1	 a (4.27)
where:
Pk is the share price at period t.
Pit-i is the share price at period t-1.
Dit is the gross tax dividend if the share becomes ex-div during the period t.
and
HPRbenchma±, t is the buy and hold return on the benchmark during time period t..
For short windows such as a few days or even a single day, the difference between the
traditional CAR and BHAR is trivial. For longer windows, Conrad and Kaul (1993)
amongst others, argue that the BHAR more accurately reflects the experiences of the
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investor than a policy of regular rebalancing.
The fourth type of bias arises from excluding returns for companies that are no longer
present. In other words, CARs are sensitive to survival bias and there occurs the problem
of how to weight firms which do not survive the observation period. This problem can
potentially affect the specification of test statistics. Kothari and Warner (1997)
acknowledged this to be a potential problem but their tests using buy and hold abnormal
returns showed that misspecification errors were not highly sensitive to survival bias. In a
large sample study (such as ours) the problem of survival bias is reduced because only a
tiny proportion of companies drop out due to either bankruptcy (e.g. Polly Peck, British
and Commonwealth Holdings etc.) or being targets themselves at a later date (e.g. Ward
White, TSB etc.).
Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that long term tests of abnormal returns around firm
specific events are severely misspecified. The same conclusion is arrived at by Barber
and Lyon (1997) who attribute long run misspecification, using a market index, to new
listings, rebalancing and skewness bias. New listing occurs when the structure of the
benchmark changes as new companies are added during the holding period. Barber
and Lyon (1997) argue that new stocks underperform existing shares, leading to a
downward bias. Cowan and Seargeant (1997) test for new listing bias by comparing
portfolios with and without new shares over a one, three and five year periods. They
found that new listing bias was largely limited to smaller companies32.
32 In our example we exclude stocks i.e. the smallest 20%, so the effect of new listing bias will be minimal at
best (see section 4.3).
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Rebalancing refers to changing the constitutent shares in a benchmark due to changes
in these companies. For example, the constituent shares in the Financial Times 100
index are changed every quarter to reflect changes in the market capitalisation of these
companies. The rebalancing bias takes place when the compounded returns from a
benchmark are calculated assuming that periodic changes take place while those of the
sample companies are compounded without rebalancing. Barber and Lyon (1997)
argue that monthly rebalancing leads to a negative bias in the portfolio returns. The
third type of bias that can occur is the skewness bias33 . The skewness bias is when
averaging the returns of companies in the benchmark reduces the skewness of the
portfolio. Therefore, the skewness of the sample of companies (in our case acquirers)
is greater than the skewness of the benchmark portfolio, hence the abnormal return, is
also positively skewed. This leads to a negative bias in the statistical tests of the mean
abnormal return34.
4.11 BUY AND HOLD CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN T-
STATISTIC
The buy and hold t-stat tests the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional average
abnormal return during the event period is zero, as well as that for the sub-periods.
The literature in this area, such as Kothari and Warner (1997) tends to calculate the t-
stat based on the independence assumption as follows:
33 Positive skewness refers to when the mean is greater than the median.
34 The reason for this is that uniform random samples from a positively skewed population contain more
observations which are below the real or true mean than above thereby inducing a negative bias in the
statistical tests of the mean.
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AHPARIA
'„AR = 0(AIIPARpt)
(4.28)
AHPARpt = 77.1 HPARii
j.1 (4.29)
where:
AHPARpt
 is the average holding period abnormal return for the portfolio over the
period t and is calculated as:
where:
HPARit is simply the holding period abnormal return as shown in equation
(4.26).
N is the number of companies in the sample.
i is the ith company.
t is the time period under investigation.
S(AHPAR pi )is the standard deviation of the average holding period
abnormal return of the portfolio and is calculated as follows:
where:
NS(AHPAR 0 )= 11 1-(E BHAR„ —BHAR p,) 2	 (4.30)
N
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BHARpt
t BHAR S(AHPAR,„)x117
(4.31)
The buy and hold test statistic will be unit normal if the average returns during the
period t are independent and identically distributed.
To calculate the t-statistic over a period of T days, one can use the following formula:
where:
	
BHAR is the buy and hold cumulative abnormal return as calculated in
equation 4.13 and 9(AHPAR pt ) is explained above in equation 4.30.
4.12 BOOTSTRAPPING TECHNIQUES
As we have discussed above, long run event studies suffer from a positive skewness in
abnormal returns, in part due to extreme observations. Extreme observations and the
associated non-normality can cause statistical tests to be severely mis-specified. One
manner by which one can overcome some of the problems associated with skewness
and extreme observations is to use a nonparametric test such as the bootstrap
procedure. The logic behind the bootstrap procedure is to improve the manner in
which standard errors are estimated. The bootstrap procedure is able to calculate
standard errors when the available formulas make assumptions, such as a normally
distributed sample, which are not relevant for the data in question. Of course; the
procedure can also be used to test or verify that the assumptions regarding the data do
not affect the results. The usual manner of calculating the standard error is as follows:
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Sy = Al (11; - 11) )
	
(4.31)
where:
Yi is the sample value.
_
Y  is the sample mean.
n is the number of observations.
The result from this formula is determined by the sampling distribution 35 . The sampling
distribution itself is determined by the distribution of the population and the formula •
used to estimate the statistic.
One can derive the sampling distribution analytically in some but not all the cases. For
example one can calculate the standard error as shown in equation 4.31 (with a
normally distributed population). The second case, when the standard error can be
calculated analytically, is where the population size rises to infinity. In this case the
sampling distribution converges to a normal distribution and one can use this
'asymptotic' result to calculate the standard errors on a finite sample even though we
know it to be incorrect. If the sample distribution is non-normally distributed then
equation (4.31) cannot be used to calculate the standard errors. However, the
bootstrap technique overcomes this problem through simulation in that the observed
distribution is assumed to be a good substitute for the actual or underlying distribution.
If this assumption holds then the bootstrap procedure produces a good estimate of the
35 The probability distribution of the sample mean is called the sampling distribution (Gujarati, 1992:68).
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standard error as well as all the other statistical measures of accuracy.
The bootstrap procedures can be broken down into a series of steps. The first is to
start with a data set containing N observations. From the data set, x observations are
randomly selected, with replacement. In such a random procedure some observations
will appear once, more than once, or not at all. The sub sample of x observations is
then used to calculate the test statistic. The whole process of selecting x observations
and calculating the statistic is repeated again and again while keeping a record of the
estimated statistic for each replication. The accuracy with which the sampling
distribution is estimated depends on the number of replications carried out. The
established literature in finance using this technique tends to carry out 1,000
replications (see Cowan and Sergeant, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997 etc.) which is
argued to produce good estimates for the standard error. The standard error under the
bootstrap procedure is estimated as in equation 4.31 but the sample mean of the
replications is substituted for the actual sample mean.
4.12.1CRITICISMS OF THE BOOTSTRAP PROCEDURE
One problem with the bootstrapping technique is the fact that it is relatively new and
the limits of its applicability are not entirely understood. Stine (1990) argues that the
bootstrapping technique may fail for statistics which rely on a, "very narrow feature of
the original sampling process". The reason for this is that the simulation procedure
does not remove the bias in the sample used to carry out the replications, and may
actually exaggerate it. Therefore, the more representative the sample (from which the
replications are carried out) is of the whole population the more likely that the
simulation will produce an accurate estimate with a narrow or biased sample of the
whole population.
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Efron and Stein (1981) argue that the bootstrapping procedure is effective because of
the underlying assumption of reproducing the population based on the sample. This
assumes that the sample is a good approximation of the entire population to allow one
to produce good estimates of the sampling distribution. This assumption also gives rise
to two situations where it may not hold. The first of these is that the smaller the
original sample, the lower the probability that all the essential characteristics of the
population will be represented in the sampling process (Schenker, 1985). This problem
is of particular relevance to the development of bootstrapped confidence intervals
which rely on the tails of the estimated sampling distribution.
The second situation under which the underlying assumption of bootstrapping may fail
is when the original sample data is not collected using random sampling techniques.
This may lead to a doubt as to whether the empirical distribution function (EDF) is a
good estimator of the population distribution function (PDF). In the case of takeovers,
their non random nature makes this an important limitation on the use of the bootstrap
technique.
4.12.2 THE WINSORISING TECHNIQUE
The range of returns that an acquirer can experience are from -100% to infinity. The
former arises because the most a shareholder can lose is the amount of money invested.
However, the maximum positive returns that a bidder can experience are not limited
and in theory can reach infinity. Therefore, the returns are more biased towards
positive returns than towards negative returns, leading to extreme skewness in the
data. Extreme skewness and other types of non-normality can lead to incorrectly
specified statistical tests.
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In an empirical study it is not always possible to avoid extreme observations nor is it
correct to remove them from the sample. However, it is possible to limit the deviation
of the extreme observations to a desired degree from the central limit. 36 The deviation
from the central limit is arbitrarily set and is referred to as winsorising. Winsorising can
be defined more formally as "a method of estimating the mean of a sample of
observations by using linear systematic statistics and replacing extreme observations by
those next in magnitude" (Marriott, 1990)37 . Hence, the winsorising procedure
reduces the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis as the observations move closer
to one another. Cowan and Sargeant (1997) argue that "winsorised abnormal returns
should be less likely to produce a false positive result and not much more likely to
produce a false negative one" [than non-winsorised abnormal returns].
The literature on statistics has identified a number of weaknesses in the winsorising
method, such as the choice of maximum deviation, from the central limit. It may be the
case that one can use a level of deviation which improves the final results. However,
there are general norms, such as setting the maximum value to two or three standard
deviations, which limit the validity of this criticism. More recently, researchers such as
Cowan and Sergeant (1997) show that winsorising produces results which are equal, if
not superior, to the bootstrapping technique. Further, it is much simpler to apply than
the bootstrapping technique and does not suffer from the same problems such as those
described in 4.12.1. According to Cowan and Sergeant (1997), "winsorising the data
allows the investigator to explore the sensitivity of the influence to extreme returns".
36 The central limit theory states that the distribution of the sample mean averages towards the normal
distribution as the sample size grows regardless of the underlying distribution (Gujarati, 1992:70).
37 This procedure was proposed by CP Winsor for dealing with extreme observations.
154
They go on to argue that limiting the extreme observations increases the robustness of
the results38.
4.13 CRITICISMS OF EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY
Although event study methodology has been very popular in finance, it has faced a number
of criticisms which future studies have to take into account. The most basic of these
criticisms is that the results solely depend on the choice of the event date which may be
arbitrarily determined. Some events such as mergers have a number of dates which have an
impact on the share price. Early studies used the completion date, or the date the bid
became unconditional, as the event date but these results underestimated the true effect of
the takeover. Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977) compared the abnormal returns on the
announcement date against those from the completion date and found the latter to be much
lower. One reason for this was that the market had discounted much of the information
regarding the bid prior to the completion. The study also found that the abnormal returns
accrued some three to four months prior to the formal announcement because of market
anticipation.
The results obtained through event study methodology are dependent on the length of
the estimation and observation periods. The reason for this is that as the time period
increases, the firm changes and so do its characteristics, as well as its performance. A
change in the characteristics leads to a change in the risk and reward to holding the
shares in the company. In the case of the market model, the oci and the 13; term may
38 We carry out winsorising to two standard deviations (see section 4.1.3).
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differ depending on the pre-event period. Franks and Harris (1989) find support for the
argument that the bidder firm beta changes after the takeover. Loderer and Mauer
(1986) also argue that a change in the bidder firm beta takes place after the takeover
but focus primarily on the alpha term. They claim that prior to the takeover the alpha
term will be biased upwards as the bidder firms begin an acquisition programme39 . This
overestimate of the alpha term for the bidder firms will result in a negative bias in the
market model residuals after the takeover.
Different studies employing event study methodology tend to use differing lengths of
event windows. One reason for this is that the choice of the event window is quite
arbitrary with some studies focusing on the announcement period while others
concentrate their efforts on the completion or even the post-completion period. One
example of a study that focused its attention on the post-completion period is Ruback
(1988a) which examined a three-year post-acquisition period. A relatively long post-
announcement period was chosen because it fully captured the impact of the bid in the
long run. Of course, using long event windows does mean that there is an increasing
bias in the abnormal returns obtained due to the shifts in the alpha and beta terms.
Brown and Warner (1980) argue that the problem of changing alpha and beta terms
can be avoided if short event periods are selected. Short event windows also avoid
problems associated with size adjusted returns, discussed in section 4.14.1. below.
The firm prior to a takeover is not necessarily the same as the one after the takeover,
largely due to the change in its risk characteristics. The risk characteristics of the
39 Loderer and Mauer (1986) argue the market model parameter estimates to be positively biased for bidder
firms if the estimation period is limited to the pre-bid period. They argue that the estimation bias is stronger
for the alpha term because bidders (in most cases) initiate takeovers following a period of earnings growth.
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combined group may differ from the pre-takeover position for a number of reasons but
the most common are the difference in sizes, levels of gearing or even industry sectors
whereby the target firm's activities are totally unrelated to the bidder firm's. If the
bidder firm's risk characteristics change after the takeover then any use of the pre-bid
beta will lead to erroneous abnormal returns. One way around this problem is to use a
combination of the pre-takeover and post-takeover betas. This means that the betas
will be calculated using an estimation period which precedes the takeover and an
estimation period that covers the post-acquisition period (Bradley, Desai and Kim,
1988).
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) compared the pre-bid alpha against a mixture of the
pre- and post-bid alphas. This study found that the average pre-bid alpha was -0.01%
while the post bid average alpha was -0.02%. Although the post bid alpha was twice as
large as the pre-bid alpha, neither of them were significantly different from zero.
Bradley et al. (1988) argued that the constant term to be negative and close to zero.
Bradley et al. (1988) also argued that these results may be different from Loderer and
Mauer (1986) because the latter used monthly data, and the problem of biased alpha
term may be specific to it.
A major criticism of event study methodology, especially in the case of the market
model, stems from its reliance on the CAPM which has recently been brought into
question. The CAPM has suffered from allegations that it is incapable of explaining the
variation of return and risk and their interrelationship. Fama and French (1992) found
that a higher beta term does not necessarily imply a higher return nor does a lower beta
term lead to lower returns. The study used monthly data for the period 1941-90 and
divided the sample into different portfolio groups based on beta. The results showed
that beta could not totally explain the variation of returns, regardless of the presence of
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other variables in the model, leading to the conclusion that the positive relationship
between risk and reward could not be confirmed. However, other studies such as the
one by Kothari et al. (1995) have provided contradictory evidence to that of Fama and
French (1992). Kothari et al. (1995) used annual data for the US which showed that
the beta term was capable of explaining a part of the cross-sectional variation in the
expected returns. More importantly, it may be somewhat premature to reject the
CAPM model because Kothari et al. (1995) found that the book to market value ratio,
although useful, could not be substituted for beta, as Fama and French (1992) report in
their study.
According to event study methodology, the statistical significance of abnormal returns
is tested by cross-sectionally averaging in the event period and then testing the
hypothesis that the average abnormal return is zero. However, this procedure assumes
that the abnormal returns are independent (i.e. the cross-sectional correlation between
the abnormal returns for any two firms should equal zero) and do not suffer from the
clustering problem. This arises when the event date for one company is the same for
another company. Collins and Dent (1984) used both analytical and simulation
techniques in order to investigate the problem of cross-sectional correlation of returns.
The results from this study show that "severe errors of inference" can result if the
event date is the same for all the firms in an industry. The reason for this is that the
variance is no longer constant. This usually occurs if there is a regulatory change that
affects most firms in an industry. There are a number of ways by which one can reduce
the problem of cross sectional correlation. The most frequently used method is that
suggested by Brown and Warner (1985) whereby they construct a dependence t-
statistic (this is discussed in section 4.9).
Event studies have dominated empirical research on takeovers for over thirty years.
Even though they have been argued to suffer from weaknesses such as estimation bias,
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changing risk characteristics etc., it does not render the procedure useless. Instead, the
weaknesses associated with event study methodology focus on areas of concern that
should be borne in mind when formulating conclusions, based on these results and
using this procedure. Research using event studies has shown that for its successful
application it is important that the event date is correctly identified. In cases where the
date is difficult to identify, or the event is partially anticipated, event studies have been
less successful (Campbell et al., 1997:ch4). Event studies are subject to a number of
possible biases such as those arising from accumulating abnormal returns (see section
4.6) and from non-synchronous trading (see section 4.9). However, these problems
can be eliminated by using buy and hold returns for the former and thin trading
adjustments for the latter. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) argued that in their tests
with a large sample size, accurate event dates, and short estimation and observation
periods, the market model performed extremely well in estimating abnormal
performance. In conclusion, event studies have increased our knowledge of takeovers.
4.14 CROSS SECTIONAL VARIATIONS IN ABNORMAL
RETURNS
One of the most influential and widely tested areas of finance research has been that of
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 4° Sharpe (1964), Linter (1965) and Black
(1972) argued that there existed a linear relationship between a cross section of
expected returns and beta. It was further argued that beta was sufficient to explain the
cross variation in returns without supporting these claims through any tests. Although
there may be some support for the Sharpe-Linter-Black version of the CAPM model,
4° How the Sharpe-Linter-Black CAPM model measures the market risk of a share depends on the sensitivity
of its movements to market shares. The sensitivity of share rise to market movements is referred to as beta
and it measures the systematic risk of a share (Brealey et al. 1995).
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in the short run, using daily and monthly data, in the long run, it has been argued to be
misspecified.41
The failure of beta to explain the long run cross-sectional variation of expected returns
has led researchers to look at alternative variables. The early studies in this area were
by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) which found that the company size or market
capitalisation added to the explanatory power of the beta-adjusted cross section of
average returns. After controlling for beta they found the average returns for small
companies are high while for large companies the opposite is true. 42 More recently,
Fama and French (1992) and Knez and Ready (1996) have found evidence to support
the results of these earlier studies. Similar results have been found for other major
countries, e.g. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) for Japan, Hawawini and Viallet
(1987) for France and Levis (1989) for the UK.
Another important determinant that has been found to explain the cross-sectional
variation in returns is the PE ratio. Nicholson (1960) attempted to examine the
relationship between the PE ratio and average returns and found that low PE ratio
companies had returns, which were higher than the average. For the UK, Levis (1989)
found that during the period 1961 to 1985, the lowest PE quintile had an average
monthly return of 1.5% compared to 1% for the highest-ranking quintile. Similar
results were also found by Strong and Xu (1997) with a monthly difference of 0.6%
between the highest and lowest PE deciles. In the case of takeovers, Rau and
41 For support of the Sharpe-Linter-Black CAPM model in the short run see Dycicman, Philbrick and Stephen
(1984).
42 Recent studies such as Dimson and Marsh (1998) show that average returns for smaller companies is not
always higher than that for larger companies. In the case of the UK, during the period 1993 to 1997, larger
companies have higher abnormal returns than smaller companies.
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. Vermaelen (1998) examined a sample of 987 US acquisitions, during the period 1980
to 1989, and found that low PE bidders outperformed high PE bidders.
Another contradiction of the Sharpe-Linter-Black CAPM model is that the expected
returns are positively related to the ratio of the market-to-book-value. 43 The ability of
the market to book ratio to explain expected returns has been considered by a number
of researchers (Stattman, 1980; Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein, 1985; Fama and
French, 1995 for the US; Chan et al., 1991 for Japan; Arshanpalli et al., 1997 for 18
countries in North America, Europe and the Pacific Rim). The general conclusion of
these studies is that low market to book ratio companies tend to perform better over
the long run than the high market to book ratio companies.
4.14.1 MARKET CAPITALISATION
The ability of firm size to capture a significant proportion of the average cross-
sectional returns is now undisputed. The wealth of literature in this area from Banz
(1981) and Reinganum (1981) to date have shown that share returns are on average
negatively related to size". The very different share price behaviour of large and small
firms can be explained by two theories, namely risk adjusted valuation and relative
dispersed effect. In the case of risk adjusted valuation, one can argue that size is a
43 The market to book value is defined as the firm's market capitalisation against the book value of its
common equity. Sometimes this ratio is expressed as the book to market value and in this research will
make references to both versions of the ratio.
" For the UK, the relationship between size and return depends on the time period under consideration.
Dimson and Marsh (1996:exhibit 25) show that from 1955 to 1988 small companies outperformed large
companies except for 1975. Dimson and Marsh (1996, 1998) show that from 1989 onwards large companies
have outperformed small companies apart from 1993 and 1994.
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proxy for risk. As smaller companies have a greater risk attached to them they should
also offer higher rewards. Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) argue that the size effect is
similar to high and low grade corporate bonds, which in principle capture default risk
through their returns.
The size effect is of considerable importance when analysing the shareholder wealth
effects by acquirer type especially in the long run. The size effect becomes more
relevant in long run studies because of its time varying nature (Dimson and Marsh,
1986). 45 Barber and Lyon (1996) found that during the period 1973 to 1984 small
firms experienced wealth gains of 2% per month for both financial and non-financial
firms. Large firms during the same period experienced monthly returns of 1%.
However, in the following 10 years, (i.e. 1984 to 1994), the situation was reversed
with small firms experiencing monthly returns of 1.1% and 1% while large firms gained
a wealth increase in monthly returns of 1.21% and 1.3%, for financial and non financial
firms respectively.
Franks et al. (1991) examined a sample of 399 US acquirers during the period 1975 to
1984. This study found that the post-acquisition performance of different sized
acquirers was not the same. For instance, the smallest quintile of acquirers, by market
capitalisation, experienced abnormal returns of 1.85%. During the same period the
quintile of largest acquirers experienced abnormal returns of 0.23%. Franks et al.
(1991) suggest that previous studies which found a non-zero performance for acquirers
may be due to the size effect.
45 This occurs because of variability and/or seasonality in the size effect.
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Although, Agrawal et al. (1992) argued that the positive post-acquisition acquirer
results obtained by Franks et al. (1991) were specific to their sample time period and
the fact that they did not differentiate between tender and non-tender offers they
nevertheless found a similar size effect. Agrawal et al. (1992) examined a sample of
937 US mergers and 227 tender offers completed between 1955 and 1987. The results
showed that for the whole sample of bidders the three year post-acquisition CAR was
-7.38%, statistically significant at the 1%. However, the smallest quintile of bidders
experienced statistically insignificant CARs of 2.4%, 1.3%, -0.2%, -1.5% and -3.4%
for 1,2,3,4 and 5 years after the takeover. Large bidders experienced much greater and
statistically insignificant CARs of -5.9%, -5.2, -9,3, -10.3 and —16.3 for the period
1,2,3,4 and 5 years after the takeover. From these results the authors concluded that
acquirers tended to under-perform in the long run, regardless of the benchmark used,
•contrary to results obtained by Franks et al. (1991). However, smaller bidders are
likely to experience lower wealth losses than larger bidders.
Although, the size effect in the UK is time dependent, recent studies such as Higson
and Elliott (1998) tend to show that smaller bidders outperform larger ones". Higson
and Elliott (1998) examined 830 UK takeovers completed between 1975 to 1990. The
entire sample of bidders experienced statistically insignificant abnormal returns of 0.2%
in the month of the bid. Three months after the acquisition, the whole sample of
acquirers, experienced CARs of -0.32%. Partitioning the sample shows that the
abnormal returns are not equally divided between the different sized bidders. The
largest hundred bidders experienced statistically insignificant CARs of -1.7% and 1%
for the month of the bid and three months after the takeover respectively. These results
indicate that larger bidders experienced lower abnormal returns than to smaller bidders.
46 The study does not report abnormal returns for the smaller companies.
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4.14.2 MARKET TO BOOK VALUE
Research investigating the cross sectional returns has shown that there are several
predictable components. One such predictable component is the firm's market to book
value. This is not a new variable and dates back to the work of Graham and Dodd
(1934) who called for a strategy based on selecting firms with a high book to market
value. Fama and French (1992) argued that the book to market ratio was a proxy for
unobservable common risk factors and their findings support this view.
An alternative explanation for the predictive power of the book to market ratio is
provided by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Lakonishok et al. (1994) claim
that financial ratios are capable of predicting share returns because they capture the
systematic errors of investor expectation of future returns and the inefficiency of stock
markets. The systematic errors can be divided into two groups: the first is associated
with the inability of investors to differentiate between systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
This error comes about because investors assume that value shares (i.e. ones with a
low market to book value) are more risky than glamour shares (i.e. those with a high
market to book value). This error is reflected in the share price and corrected over a
period of time leading to a reversal of performance.
The second type of systematic error is the result of stock market response to different
groups of firms (i.e. glamour, value etc.) 47. This comes about because, with a 'bad
news' item, investors become overpessirnistic regarding the future performance of
value shares. Similarly, any 'good news' leads investors to become overoptimistic
regarding future performance of glamour shares. This type of stock market response is
47 This result assumes that arbitrage is incomplete.
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reflected in the share price, which is corrected over a period of time leading to a
reversal in relative performance. La Porta (1996) examined IBES earnings forecasts
for companies listed on CRSP and Compustat, during the period 1982 to 1991. The
results showed that the market was over-pessimistic in estimating raw returns of the
lowest MTBV quintile (i.e. value firms) which were assumed to be 8.6% compared to
an actual growth of 29.5% (i.e. a difference of 20.9%) over a ten year period.
Similarly, growth shares were assumed to increase earnings at a faster level of 26.13%
for the highest quintile compared to an actual rate of 8.6% over the 10-year period.
Fama and French (1992) found greater support for the predictive power of market to
book value than they did for size. Also, market to book value has been found not to
suffer from the same time varying properties as size. Barber and Lyon (1996) looked at
'growth' and 'value' firms over two time periods, namely 1973 to 1984 and 1984 to
1994. From 1973 to 1984, non-financial and financial 'value' firms experienced a
monthly return of 2.6% and 2.5% respectively. For the period, 1984 to 1994, the
monthly returns for value firms were 1.7% and 1.3% for non-financial and financial
value firms respectively. Similar results were found by Kothari and Warner (1997)
where value firms had a positive return on average while growth firms had a negative
return on average over a three-year period.
Very few studies have examined the differential performance of bidders based on their
market to book value. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) examined a sample of 987 takeovers
during the period 1980 to 1991. The results showed that glamour acquirers (i.e. those
with a high market to book values) in a merger experienced gains of -21%, -22% and -
14% during the first, second and third years respectively after completion - all
statistically significant at the 1% level. This is contrasted by value acquirers (i.e. those
with a low market to book value) who received wealth gains of 9%, 7% and 10%
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during the first, second and third years after completion - all significant at the 1% level.
Glamour acquirers suffered worse wealth losses than value acquirers, in bids financed
by either equity or cash. Glamour acquirers received wealth losses of -18.63%, -
13.63% and -3.83% in the first, second, and third years respectively after completion
(only the first two were statistically significant at the 1% level) compared to -3.3%, -
2.44% and -3.02% for value bidders in equity financed bids (none of the value CARs
were statistically significant). In cash financed bids, glamour acquirers suffered wealth
losses of -13.08%, -20.88% and -9.39 in the first, second and third year respectively
after completion, compared to 7.57%, 4.32% and 9.69% for value bidders.
4.14.3	 SHARE PRICE TO EARNINGS (PE) RATIO
A commonly used technique in valuing shares is to look at the price to earnings ratio
(PE) which "is a measure of the esteem in which the company is held by investors"
(Brealey, Myers and Marcus, 1995:p449). One reason for this is that it is easy and
convenient for investors to calculate using all known or past information. Ball (1978)
found earnings announcements resulted in excess returns which led him to conclude
that the PE ratio is a proxy for future returns. Recent studies have found evidence to
the contrary where companies with a low PE ratio outperform those with a high PE
ratio in the long run. Levis (1989), for the UK, found that a portfolio of the smallest
PE ratio companies had a monthly return of 1.48% compared to 0.90% for the
portfolio of the highest PE ratio companies.
Similar results have been found for other countries. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok
(1991), for Japan, found a difference of 5% between the portfolios of the highest and
lowest PE companies. For the USA, Fama and French (1992) and Lakonisholc, Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) found differences of 9% and 4% respectively between the highest
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and lowest PE portfolios with the former outperforming the latter. Even in long run
studies such as Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1989), for the period 1951 to 1986, there
appears to be a strong negative relationship between PE and abnormal returns. In an
international study of France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, Brouwer et al.
(1996) found that a portfolio of companies with the lowest values outperformed one
with the highest PE values by 5%.
The PE ratio is not only a measure of the esteem which investors hold a company in
(Brealey et al., 1995:p449) but is also reflective of the industry. The reason for this is
that companies within the same industry tend to have similar PE ratios (Goodman and
Peavy, 1983). There have been some studies, such as Goodman, Peavy and Cox
(1989) which have found that the PE ratio acts as a good proxy for size and this may
explain why differences in companies with different PE ratios experience differing
returns. However, this relationship is not conclusive, as Brouwer et al. (1996) point
out that in their sample of companies there was no correlation between PE ratio and
either size or market-to-book value.
The studies above show that for a sample of low and high PE ratio companies the
share price performance is very different. If this is true for a random sample of
companies then one can argue that for a random sample of bidders the same should
hold. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) is one of the few studies that have examined bidders
with different PE ratios. The study did not find any support for the argument that high
PE bidders tend to purchase low PE targets. In fact, their study shows that there was
little difference between the PE of bidders and targets".
48This study did not partition the acquirer sample based on PE ratio during the post-acquisition period.
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4.15 CONSTRUCTING REFERENCE PORTFOLIOS
In order to calculate size, market to book and Fama and French Three Factor Model
abnormal returns, in this study we constructed our own reference portfolios. The
reference portfolios were based on two factors, namely the size (i.e. market
capitalisation) and market to book value of the firm. The first step in the construction
of the reference portfolios was to compile a list of all firms listed on the London
International Stock Exchange between 1980 to the present. This was done by
obtaining the initial list from the Winter 1979 edition, of the Risk Management Service
Journal, produced by the London Business School. Then, every quarter in 1980,
companies entering the London Stock Exchange (i.e. initial public offerings) were
added to the list. The list for 1980 was also adjusted for mergers, suspensions and
change of names. The latter exercise was carried out to keep a track of companies for
future changes. The details of these changes were obtained from the Stock Exchange
Quality of Markets Quarterly Report. 49 Then, the Datastream codes were obtained
and inserted onto the list.
Once the list for 1980 was completed, the whole process was repeated for 1981. In
this way, for each year the quarterly list for the previous period was used to add to,
and remove, companies from the list for that quarter. The daily share price, market
capitalisation and market to book values were obtained from Datastream. 5° The price
used is the end of day mid-price, and market capitalisation is defined as the number of
shares outstanding multiplied by the current share price. The market to book value is
49 Between Q1:1980 and Q3:1990, this data was in tables B1 to B3. From Q3:1990 until Q4:1992, the data
was in tables Bl, 84 and B5. After Q4:1992, the data was in tables B9, B13, B14 and B15.
5° Morse (1984) states that the only reason for favouring monthly data over daily data is where there exists
uncertainty regarding the announcement date. This problem does not occur in our study, as we know
precisely the bid announcement dates and hence favour daily data.
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defined as the market capitalisation, as described above, divided by the net tangible
assets. The latter value is obtained from the last published accounts of the company.
The returns for each company were calculated as the one-day 'buy and hold' return, as
shown in equation 4.25.
At the beginning of each quarter, all the companies listed on the London Stock
Exchange were ranked according to their market capitalisation and formed into
quintiles. Companies in the smallest quintile were removed from the sample because of
their size. On 1' 1 January 1996, the smallest company in the bottom quintile had a
market capitalisation of only £300,000 while the largest had one of about £,10 million.
Many of these companies in the lowest quintile (i.e. micro companies) suffered from
thin trading largely due to the difficulty in trading in these shares. Also, all the
acquirers in our sample were larger then the values of the companies in the smallest
quintile so it made little sense to include them in our reference portfolios 51 (see section
4.3). We use the value of the largest company in the bottom quintile (i.e. micro
companies) as our threshold to eliminate companies from our index.
Of the remaining four quintiles, the companies were ranked once again by market
capitalisation and formed into new quintiles. In each quintile, the return for each day
was averaged across the companies. In other words, there was a single average daily
return for each quintile52 . (We refer to this, as the size quintile returns in our size-
adjusted calculations of abnormal returns.) When calculating the Fama and French
(1993) style, small and large company returns we use exactly the same method as
51 See section 4.3 for a description of the data.
$2 The daily return is the average of the buy and hold returns for all firms in the portfolio.
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described above but create three groups, i.e. 30% of the largest companies and 30% of
the smallest companies (again excluding micro firms as described above)53.
We calculate quintiles based on market capitalisation as well as for market to book
values. For each quarter, we rank all companies by market capitalisation to form
quintiles54 . We then rank the companies in each quintile by their market to book value
to form sub-quintiles. For each of the 25 smaller groups the daily average return is
calculated. 55 (We refer to this as the market to book sub-quintile when calculating the
market to book adjusted returns). However, for the purposes of the Fama and French
Three-Factor Model we rank all companies above our threshold (as explained above)
for each quarter and form two groups i.e. 50% of the highest and 50% of the lowest
market to book value companies. For each of the two groups a daily average return is
calculated (see sections 4.5.2.5 and 4.5.2.6).
4.16 CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided the background for the results, which will be presented and
discussed in the next chapter. This chapter has explained the construction of the
sample of 547 UK takeovers during the period 1983 to 1995. The chapter also
explained the sources of data and the manner in which they were collected. The
hypotheses tested in the next chapter are dependent upon the mood of the takeover
and this chapter has sought to explain how this was determined.
53 See section 4.5.2.6 for a description of the Fama and French Three Factor Model.
54 In other words, the size and MTBV portfolios were rebased every quarter.
55 This study ranks the companies first by market capitalisation and then by market to book value. Rau and
Vermaelen (1998) show that a ranking or sorting of companies, initially by MTBV and then by market
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Although event study methodology has come under criticism, it still remains a very
important and usefiil mechanism by which the impact of a takeover on shareholder
wealth can be measured. Criticism of event study methodology centres on the length of
the observation period, changes in the risk characteristics of the sample firms,
appropriate test statistics and the problem of non-synchronous share trading between
sample and benchmark companies. The latter can be overcome by carrying out
adjustments to the returns (see Scholes and Williams, 1997; Dimson, 1979 and Fowler
and Rorke, 1983). Recently, the bootstrapping and winsorising techniques have been
applied to improve the manner in which test statistics are estimated (see Kothari and
Warner 1997 and Cowan and Seargeant, 1997 respectively). In the case of changing
risk characteristics, one can use a combination of pre- and post-event betas (see
Bradley et al., 1988). Biases that occur in long run event studies can, to a large extent,
be overcome by using more appropriate benchmarks as well as buy and hold returns.
Finally, the chapter discussed the underlying assumption of event study methodology,
namely the CAPM model and studies which show that other variables are also capable
of explaining the variations in expected returns apart from beta. In addition to the
beta, we have discussed the effects of size, market to book value and PE ratio on
expected returns. The specific manner in which these variables are tested is discussed
in the next chapter.
capitalisation makes little difference to the result
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CHAPTER FIVE
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS BY ACQUIRER
TYPE: THE EMPIRICAL TEST AND RESULTS
5 INTRODUCTION
In the UK, the vast bulk of takeovers are friendly in that the board of directors of the target
firm recommend acceptance of the bid. However, there are instances where this is not the
case and the bid becomes hostile as the target board attempts to defend itself from the
bidder firm. Of course, the target firm may reject a bid purely to obtain a higher price but,
as we show in section 4.2, the mood of the bid can be determined by the language and
defence mechanisms employed by the target firm. In Chapter 3 we show that previous
studies find the mood of the bid to affect acquirer firm shareholder wealth at the time of the
bid-announcement.
In this chapter we attempt to empirically examine how differences in acquirer type affects
shareholder wealth, both in the short and long run. We test three explanations that have
been put forward to explain the differing acquirer wealth effects: (i) target firm resistance to
the takeover bid (see section 3.4); (ii) the presence of a second bidder (see section 3.5); (iii)
whether the bid was planned or unplanned (see section 3.5.2). This research goes beyond a
replication of earlier studies which examine the impact of the mood of the takeover bid on
acquirer shareholder wealth, in that we seek to identify the source of the differing acquirer
shareholder wealth effects based on the above theoretical arguments.
In Chapter 4 we showed that market capitalisation, market to book value and price to
earnings ratio (PE) have to some degree been argued to affect the post-acquisition
performance of different acquirer types. There is now strong evidence that both size and
market to book value explain cross-sectional variation in average returns (see section 4.13).
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Similarly, an earnings related variable such as the PE ratio has also been found to help
explain average returns (see Levis, 1989; Chan et al.., 1991; Fama and French, 1992).
This chapter is divided into three sections; the first discusses the specific methodological
issues, relating to this chapter. In the second section, we empirically investigate and report
the results for the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3 for a sample of 547 UK takeovers
completed during period 1983 to 1995. In the third section we examine the relative
performance of glamour and value acquirers as well as large and small acquirers. We also
construct a range of benchmarks to test the robustness of our results which include market
capitalisation (i.e. size), market to book value and Fama and French type three factor model
returns. For each benchmark, shareholder wealth effects are calculated, for different
acquirer types. Differences in shareholder wealth effects across acquirer types are then
tested for statistical significance.
5.1 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
In Chapter 4 we discussed a broad range of methodological issues relating to event studies.
In this section we focus on issues which are relevant for our study.
5.1.1 AGGREGATING ABNORMAL RETURNS
In Chapter 4 we discussed two different methods of aggregating abnormal returns received
over a number of time periods i.e. cumulative abnormal return (discussed in section 4.6 and
shown in equation 4.12) and the buy and hold abnormal return (discussed in section 4.10
and shown in equation 4.25). The results reported in this study use the BHAR (as shown in
equation 4.25) because it avoids positive biases from additive accumulation and better
reflects the actual returns accrued to shareholders (Conrad and Kaul, 1993; Cowan and
Sargeant, 1997).
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5.1.2 THE BENCHMARK PROBLEM
Franks et al.. (1991) showed that using the mean adjusted CARs acquirers experienced
negative returns of -1% at the time of the bid-announcement. However, when alternative
benchmark models were used, acquirers were found to receive positive CARs in two of the
four cases (i.e. the value weighted and eight portfolio models). To overcome this problem
we calculate abnormal returns for our sample of acquirers using five different benchmark
models. By calculating abnormal returns using a number of different benchmark models we
are not only able to compare our results with previous studies but avoid problems which
are specific to any one technique.
In table 4.2 we saw that our sample is not homogeneous in size therefore it is inappropriate
for us to use a general market index such as the Financial Times All Share Index. Gregory
(1997) matches his sample of acquirers against the Hoare Govett Small Companies
(HGSC) index. For our purposes the HGSC index is inappropriate because it is a monthly
series whereas we are using daily data. Instead, we calculate our own benchmark portfolios
starting from 1980 (i.e. three years before the first bid announcement in our sample) to the
1998. We calculate two different types of benchmark portfolios, i.e. one based on market
capitalisation and the second on market to book value (see section 4.15 for a discussion on
the construction of these benchmark portfolios).
5.1.3 PROBLEMS WITH MIS-SPECIFICATION
Kothari and Warner (1997), along with Barber and Lyon (1997), argue that long run
studies using abnormal returns may be mis-specified, showing positive or negative returns
when none are present. This is likely to occur due to the presence of extreme observations
and a skewed data set (Cowan and Sargeant 1997). In chapter four we discussed two
different types of parametric tests namely boostrapping and winsorilmg (see section 4.12
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and 4.12.2) which can overcome these problems. Although, bootstrapping has been used in
some recent studies (such as Ikenberry et al., 1995; Kothari and Warner, 1997) it does
suffer from various problems which are discussed in section 4.21. To overcome the
problems associated with boostrapping we use the. winsorizing technique which is, "better
specified and often more powerful than previously proposed tests" (Cowan and Sargeant
1997). In this study we carry out winsorising to two standard deviations.
5.1.4 SURVIVORSHIP BIAS
Mitchell and Lehn (1990) provide empirical evidence which shows that companies which
carry out tad takeovers' become takeover targets themselves. They find that the
probability of a firm being a target is inversely related to the share price effects associated
with the firm's earlier acquisitions: the more negative these effects, the higher the likelihood
of a subsequent takeover attempt. Methodologically, the exclusion of firms which do not
survive the full period for which the study is carried out can lead to a survivorship bias. In
other words, the results of the study are based on firms which survive while excluding those
which do not. The rate at which firms exit from our sample (i.e. the drop out rate of firms)
is about 10% over a three year period. The drop out rate in our study is in line with
takeover frequency in general in the UK1.
Hughes (1993) reports that annually, on average, between 2.7% and 4.2% of the UK
quoted companies were taken over during the period 1982-90. The overall average is about
3.5% or about 10.5% in a three year period, as in our case. Therefore, our sample of
acquirers are no more vulnerable to takeovers than the average UK firm. Moreover, there
are not enough non-surviving (i.e. firms who have either been taken over or cease to trade)
firms in our sample to significantly affect our results. This is consistent with I-Egson and
Elliott (1998) who also find that their sample of acquirers was no more likely to be taken
Over 90% of the non-surviving acquirers in our sample are taken over by another company. The rest simply go out of
business, such as British and Commonwealth or Polly Peck.
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over than any other company listed on the UK stockmarket. FEgson and Elliott (1998) also
find that the difference in BHARs between including and excluding non surviving firms is
not statistically significant. In this study we calculate the returns for all acquirers in our
sample until the day of delisting for the companies taken over during the holding period.
5.1.5 EVENT DAY AND WINDOWS
The main aim of this chapter, as mentioned in the introduction, is to find the impact of a
takeover announcement on different acquirer types both in the short and long run. As such,
we use the first bid-announcement date as the event date (see section 4.4). In the case of
white knight or multiple hostile bidders we use the date on which its intention was first
made public. We use an estimation period of 250 days (i.e. -290 to -41) to obtain the
parameters for our benchmark models so that we can calculate the predicted returns. The
estimation period ends 40 days before the bid-announcement so as to exclude effects of
market anticipation.
We examine six event widows which cover the period before during, and after, the bid-
announcement. The first event window we calculate is for the period -40 to -2 days and
attempts to examine acquirer shareholder wealth effects leading to the bid-announcement.
This event window also highlights the level of market anticipation to the bid-announcement.
The next window examines the period immediately surrounding the bid-announcement (i.e.
-1 to +1) and measures the non-anticipated response to the bid-announcement. The third
event window examines shareholder wealth effects after the bid-announcement through to
outcome. (Usually the outcome of a bid is determined 40 days after the bid-announcement.)
In order to examine the long run performance of acquirers, we calculate BHARs for the
periods -40 to +250, -40 to +500 and -40 to +750 days. These event windows also enable
us to compare our results with previous studies.
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5.2 RESULTS
In this section we report the BHARs experienced by different acquirer types for various
holding periods. This section is divided into two parts. First, we discuss the results for each
holding period. The second part of this section discusses the overall results in relation to
our hypotheses and previous studies. We report winsorised results in Tables 5.1 to 5.10 and
the non-winsorised results in appendix 1 to 9.
5.2.1 PRE BID-ACQUIRER SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS
In Table 5.1 we see that the returns for the whole sample are positive and in the region of
2% although slightly lower for the mean adjusted model, with all the CARs being
statistically significant at the 1% level for all models. This result is consistent with the
literature which shows bidders to experience positive pre-bid abnormal returns (see section
2.3.2). For the UK, Parkinson (1991) finds that her sample of acquirers to receive a CAR
of 4.35% which is statistically significant at the 10% level for the period two months before
till the announcement month. Limmack (1991) obtains a similar positive CAR of 2.99% for
the two months prior to the announcement month. More recently, Kennedy and Limmack
(1996) report bidders to experience returns of 2.92%, which are statistically significant at
the 10% level, for the period three to one month before the bid announcement. This CAR
was obtained using a size-based control model which compares well with our result of
2.82% using our size adjusted mode12.
Segregating the results by acquirer type, we see from Table 5.1 that for each benchmark
model, shareholders of multiple hostile acquirers experience higher wealth gains than all
other groups. In the case of multiple hostile acquirers, the BHARs range from 3.8% to
6.2%, with the mean adjusted and FFTF models being statistically significant at the 10%
2 As explained in Chapter 4, we construct our own size portfolios for the period 1980 to 1998- see section 4.14 for
further details.
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Table 5.1	 Pre-Bid Announcement Winzorised Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns
(BHARs) by Acquirer Type
The pre-bid announcement period is defined as days -40 to -2. A single friendly (F) acquirer is
sole bidder recommended by the target management. A single hostile (SH) acquirer is the only
bidder for the target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white
knight (WK) acquirer is a friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile
bidder and wins the contest. A multiple hostile (MB) acquirer is one which wins in
competition with another hostile bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial
Times All Share Index, and size and market to book value portfolios are based on data
obtained from Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book
value portfolios is explained in section 4.14. Winsorising is carried out with extreme
observations replaced by two standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the
proportion of positive observations in each group. a'b'c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance
levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as percentages.
_	
PANEL A: BHARs by Acquirer Type
Model
•
Whole
Sample
Friendly Single
Hostile
White
Knight
Multiple
Hostile
Market (FT All Share)
Adjusted Returns
2.97.
p57.6a
2.89'
p=56.9a
3.26'
p=64.0a
2.68
p=51.9
3.94
p=55.0
Mean Adjusted Returns 1.39'
p=51.9`
1.30b
p=52.2`
0.55
p=48.0
1.46
p=55.6
6.22'
p=55.0
Size Portfolio Adjusted
Returns
2.19'
p=54.7a
2.09'
p=53.9a
2.71b
p=57.3 b
0.01
p=51.9
3.80
p=65.01
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns 2.03'p=54.6a
1.81a
p=52.7b
3.14'
p=62.7a
0.89
p=55.6
3.97
p=65.0"
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns 3.21ap=59.8a
3.09a
p=54.7a
3.57'
p=62.7a
2.04
p=59.3b
5.86b
p=70.0a
Sample Size 547 425 75 27 20
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions
Market
Model
Mean Adj. Size Adj. MTBV Adj. FFTF Model
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
-1.3F vs SH -0.3 -1.2 0.5 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -1.1 -1.6 -0.4
F vs WK 0.1 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.3 0.4 -0.5
F vs MH -0.4 0.2 -1.4 -0.3 -0.6 -1.0 -0.8 -1.1 -1.0 -1.4
SH vs WK 0.2 1.1 -0.3 -0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3
SH vs MH -0.2 0.7 -1.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6
WK vs MH 0.3 -0.2 -1.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -0.7 -1.0 -0.8
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and 5% levels respectively. The superior pre-bid performance of multiple hostile acquirers,
relative to other acquirer types, may go some way to explain why they can mount a bid of
this type. However, we cannot fiilly support this argument as the test of difference in
proportions between acquirer groups (see Panel B of Table 5.1) shows that in every case
the abnormal returns for multiple hostile acquirers against other acquirer types are not
statistically significant at the 10% level. The same is also true of the test of difference in •
means between multiple hostile and other acquirer types.
Friendly acquirers experience returns which range from 1.8% to 3.1% while single hostile
acquirers receive returns which range from 0.6% to 3.3%. In the case of friendly and single
hostile acquirers, there appears to be very little difference between them. In half the number
of benchmark models, friendly acquirers outperform single hostile acquirers and vice-versa.
In most cases the returns tend to be significant at the same level for both groups. A test of
difference in proportions and means between friendly and single hostile acquirers shows
them not to be statistically significant at the 10% level. We also find that both friendly and
single hostile acquirers to have a similar statistically significant number of positive
observations. The only exception is the mean adjusted return model which shows the
positive BHAlts for single hostile to be statistically insignificant. Our results suggest that
there is very little if any difference between the pre-bid performance of friendly and single
hostile acquirers.
Our results show that on average white knight acquirers have the lowest relative
performance compared to other acquirer types. Table 5.1 (Panel A) shows white knight
acquirers to experience BHARs ranging from 0.01% to 2.7%. Only the proportion of
positive observations for the FFTF model is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Although, we find white knights to experience lower BHARs than other acquirer types we
do not find the differences to be statistically significant (see Panel B of Table 5.1).
Generally, our results show that during the pre-bid period different acquirer types
experience rather similar performance.
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3 This is especially the case if multiple hostile acquirers pay the target firrn using their over-valued equity.
5.2.2 BID-ANNOUNCEMENT ACQUIRER SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH EFFECTS
In the period day -1 to +1, the whole sample of acquirers shows negative abnormal returns
in order of 1.5% (see Table 5.2) with all models being statistically significant. We also find
the test of proportion of positive observations to be statistically significant at the 1% level.
Using monthly data for the UK, Franks et al. (1977) found their sample of acquirers to
experience a wealth gain of 0.05% in the month of the bid announcement. Our results,
which use daily data, show a negative return which is more consistent with Sudarsanam et
al. (1996) and Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) who report CARs of -1.26% and -1.4%
respectively. On the other hand, we find acquirers to experience abnormal returns which are
lower than those of Gregory (1997) who reports returns of -0.3% to -0.7% depending on
the benchmark model. Nevertheless, our results add further support to the argument that
generally acquirers experience negative abnormal returns at the time of the bid
announcement.
Looking at the different acquirer types, one finds that the pre-bid performance ranking of
acquirer performance has changed. During the bid-announcement period all acquirer types
experience negative wealth gains. However, the largest negative abnormal return (i.e. worst
performer) are the single hostile acquirers. Single hostile suffer from wealth losses in the
region of 1.8%. We find that on average 29% of single hostile acquirers experience
positive abnormal returns at the time of the bid-announcement which is lower than for the
other acquirer types. In the case of friendly acquirers we find that they experience wealth
losses in the region of 1.5% which is slightly lower than that for single hostile acquirers.
Friendly acquirers also tend to have a higher percentage of positive observations compared
to single hostile acquirers. Although, friendly acquirers experience a marginally higher
performance than single hostile acquirers we do not find the difference to be statistically
significant. (See Panel B of Table 5.2 where we show that the test of difference in
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Table 5.2	 Bid-Announcement Period Winzorised Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns
(BHARs) by Acquirer Type
The bid-announcement period is defined as days -1 to +1. A single friendly (F) acquirer is sole
bidder recommended by the target management. A single hostile (SH) acquirer is the only
bidder for the target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white
knight (WK) acquirer is a friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile
bidder and wins the contest. A multiple hostile (MB) acquirer is one which wins in
competition with another hostile bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial
Times All Share Index, and size and market to book value portfolios are based on data
obtained from Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book
value portfolios is explained in section 4.14. Winsorising is carried out with extreme
observations replaced by two standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the
proportion of positive observations in each group. a'b'c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance
levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as percentages.
PANEL A: BLEARs by Acquirer Type
Model	 Whole
Sample
Friendly Single
Hostile
White
Knight
Multiple
Hostile
Market (FT All Share)	 -1.40'
Adjusted Returns	 p=34.4a
-1.45'
p=34.1 a
-1.84'
p=29.3 a
0.02
p=51.9
-0.61 Ip=35.0'
Mean Adjusted Returns 	 -1.50'
p=32.5a
-1.5r
p=32.0'
-1.94'
p=29.3 a
0.43
p=51.9
-0.90
p=30.0'
Size Portfolio Adjusted
	
-1.43'
Returns	 p=34.0'
-1.48'
p=34.1"
-1.81'
p=29.3 3
-0.01
p=48.1
-0.91
p=30.03
Market to Book Value	 -1.41'
Adjusted Returns
	
p=34.7a
-1.46'
p=34.8a
-1.82'
p=28.0'
0.11
P=51.9
-1.01
P=35.02
Fama and French Three 	 -1.34'
Factor Adjusted Returns	 p=34.0'
-1.40'
p=34.4a
-1.793
p=26.7a
0.32
p=51.9
-0.67
p=30.0a I
Sample Size	 .	 547 425 75 27 20
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions
Market
Model
Mean Adj. Size Adj. MTBV Adj. FFTF Model
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
1.3F vs SH 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.6 1.2 0.6
F vs WK -1.6 -1.9' -1.9' -2. l b -1.4 -2.2b -1.5 -1.8' -1.7' -1.8'
F vs MH -0.9 -0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.6 1.6 -0.5 -0.0 -0.7 0.4
23 bSH vs WK -1.7' -2. l b -1.9' -2. l b -1.6' -2.0b -1.7' -2.2b -1.8'
SH vs MH -1.2 -0.5 -0.9 -0.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -1.0 -0.3
WK vs MH 0.46 1.15 0.94 1.5 0.7 1.3 0.8 1.2 0.7 1.5
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proportions and means between single hostile and friendly are not significant at the 10%
level.) Our results suggest that friendly and single hostile acquirers tend to experience a
rather similar performance during the bid-announcement period.
Acquirers in competition with another bidder, in order to acquire the same target, do not
tend to experience greater wealth losses at the time of the bid-announcement than other
acquirer types'. Multiple hostile acquirers experience statistically insignificant returns,
ranging from -0.7% to -1%. We find that these returns are similar to those of De et al.
(1996) who report returns of -1.45%, statistically significant at the 5% level, for the period
one day before till the announcement date. We find that on average 30% of multiple hostile
acquirers experience a positive abnormal return at the time of the bid-announcement.
Although, multiple hostile acquirers experience higher abnormal returns than either friendly
or single hostile acquirers we do not find the tests of difference in proportions or means to
be statistically significant at the 10% level (see Panel B of Table 5.2).
White knight acquirers tend to experience statistically insignificant BHARs which range
from -0.01% to 0.4%. Our results show white knights to experience abnormal returns
which are much lower than those of Banerjee and Owers (1992) who find their sample to
receive statistically significant, at the 1% level, returns of -1.7%. The interesting point about
white knight acquirers is that about half of the sample (i.e. 52%) experience positive returns
compared to friendly, single and multiple hostile acquirers who have far fewer positive
observations. This indicates that during the bid-announcement period more white knights
experience a positive gain compared to any other group. However, all except white knight
acquirers have statistically significant positive observations at the 1% level. •
4 In the case of multiple hostile and white knight acquirers the bid-announcement date is the date on which
the these acquirers enter the competition to gain control of the target firm.
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We find the tests of difference in means and proportions to show that the performance of
white knight acquirers not to be statistically different from those of multiple hostile
acquirers at the 10% level. Panel B of Table 5.2 shows that the test of difference in
proportions between white knights and friendly acquirers to be statistically significant at the
5% level for the size and mean adjusted models and at the 10% for the rest of the
benchmarks. In the case of the test of difference in means we find that mean and the FFTF
models to be statistically significant at the 10%. Our results suggest that the announcement
of a bid by a white knight is greeted favourably by the stock market compared to that of a
friendly acquirer even though both types of acquirers receive the recommendation of the
target board. We also find a difference in the reaction of the stock market to bid-
announcements by single hostile acquirers against those of white knights. Panel B of Table
5.2 shows that both the tests of difference in means and proportions are statistically
significant across all benchmark models. The differences in means are significant at the 10%
while the differences in proportions are significant at the 5% level across all benchmark
models.
5.2.3 BID PERIOD ACQUIRER SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
EFFECTS
In the third event window (i.e. +2 to +40 days as shown in Table 5.3) acquirers realise
negative BHARs which range from -0.3% to -2%. The only exception is the FFTF model
which shows a positive BHAR of 0.4%. However, only the mean and size adjusted returns
are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level respectively. If we exclude the FFTF,
our results appear to be consistent with previous studies such as Loderer and Martin (1992)
who find their sample of acquirers to experience a CAR of -1% for the period +1 to +24
days. Niden (1993) also reports her sample of acquirers to experience a negative CAR of -
2.2%, statistically significant at the 1% level, for the period one day before the
announcement till 40 days after. For the UK, Limmack (1991) reports a CAR of -0.2%
which is almost identical to our market adjusted return of -0.3%. More recently, Gregory
(1997) finds abnormal returns for his sample of acquirers to range between -0.5% to 1.5%,
which are broadly similar to our results.
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Table 5.3	 Bid Period Winzorised Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by
Acquirer Type
The bid period is defined as days +2 to +40. A single friendly (F) acquirer is sole bidder
recommended by the target management. A single hostile (SH) acquirer is the only bidder for
the target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white knight (WK)
acquirer is a friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile bidder and
wins the contest. A multiple hostile (MI-1)acquirer is one which wins in competition with
another hostile bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share
Index, and size and market to book value portfolios are based on data obtained from
Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is
explained in section 4.14. Winsorising is carried out with extreme observations replaced by
two standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the proportion of positive
observations in each group. a'b'e refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively
using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as percentages.
PANEL A: BHARs by Acquirer Type
Model Whole
Sample
Friendly	 Single
Hostile
White
Knight
Multiple
Hostile
Market (FT All Share)
Adjusted Returns
-0.29
p=47.5b
-0.35	 0.87
p=48.2	 p=46.7
0.86
p=51.9
-4.75'
p=30.0'
Mean Adjusted Returns -1.94"
p=40.6a
-2.14'	 -0.62
p=40.0a	 p=42.7b
-0.77
p=40.7b
-4.13
p=45.0
Size Portfolio Adjusted
Returns
-0.68'
p=45.2a
-0.72	 0.55
p=45.2'	 p=49.3
0.00
p=48.1
-5.493
p=25.0'
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns
-0.65
p=44.2a
-0.68	 0.66
p=44.7a	 p=48.0
-0.26
p=44.4
-5.53a
p=20.01
-3.66b
p=40.0e
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns
(FFTF)
0.44
p=49.2
0.39	 1.46
p=49.9	 p=49.3
1.46
p=51.9
Sample Size 547 425	 75 27 20
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions
Market
Model
Mean Adj.	 Size Adj. MTBV Adj. FFTF Model
Mean Prop Mean Prop	 Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
0.1F vs SH -1.1 0.3 -1.0 -0.4	 -1.1 -0.7 -1.2 -0.5 -1.0
F vs WK -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1	 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.6 -0.2
F vs MH 2.41J 1.6 0.7 -0.5	 2.9k 1.8 3.0a 2.2b 2.4b 0.9
SH vs WK 0.0 -0.5 0.1 0.2	 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.3 -0.0 -0.2
SH vs Mil 2.8' 1.3 1.5 -0.2	 3.2a 2.0b 3.4' 2.3b 2.6" 0.7
WK vs MH 2.3t 1.5 0.9 -0.3	 2.4' 1.6' 2.3 b 1.8' 2.2b 0.8
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Table 5.3 shows that although the whole sample experiences negative BHARs the
experience is not universal among the different acquirer types. Multiple hostile acquirers
experience the largest negative BHARs ranging from -4% to -5.5%, statistically significant
at the 1% level for all models except the FFTF return which is statistically significant at the
5% level and the mean adjusted BHAR which is statistically insignificant. It appears that
white knights, who like multiple hostile acquirers are also involved in an auction, experience
relatively lower BHARs than single hostile acquirers but higher than friendly acquirers. The
BHARs for white knights range from -0.8% to 1.5% with approximately 40% of firms
reporting a positive return. Finally, single hostile acquirers perform better than friendly
acquirers during the bid period. The BHARs for single hostile acquirers range from -0.6%
to 1.5% while for friendly acquirers it is -2% to 0.4%.
Between the bid-announcement and completion it appears that the number of companies
reporting a positive BHAR increases from approximately 35% to 45%. The only exception
are white knights who have a lower proportion of positive observations than in the bid-
announcement period event window (see Table 5.2). Although, there is a greater number
of positive observations, the test of difference in percentage positive . BHARs shows they
are largely statistically insignificant. In the case of single hostile and white knight acquirers
only the positive observations for the mean adjusted returns model are statistically
significant at the 10% level.
The test of difference in means shows that the BHARs for multiple hostile acquirers are
significantly different from other acquirer types across all except the size adjusted
benchmark model (see Panel B of Table 5.7). In the case of friendly and multiple hostile
acquirers the difference in means for the market and FFTF models are statistically
significant at the 5% level and at the 1% level for size and MTBV adjusted models. The
difference in means between single and multiple hostile acquirers are statistically significant
at the 1% level for all except the mean adjusted benchmark model. In the case of multiple
hostile and white knight acquirers the difference in means are statistically significant at the
5% level for the market, M'TBV and FFTF models and at the 1% level for the size adjusted
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model. The tests of difference in proportions presents a similar picture between multiple
hostile and other acquirer types. Our results suggest that although the performance of
multiple hostile acquirers is not significant different from other acquirer types at the time of
the bid-announcement (see Table 5.2) this is not true during the bid-period. It appears from
our results that the stock market takes a very grim view of a hostile contest to acquire the
target. Our results also show that during the bid-period friendly, single hostile and white
knight acquirers experience BHARs which are not significantly different from each other.
5.2.4 ONE YEAR SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS BY
ACQUIRER TYPE
The results from the first of the three long run event windows (-40 to +250 days) shows
that acquirers generally realise negative BHAR,s ranging from -12% to 2.4% (see Table
5.4). The BHARs are statistically significant at the 1% level for the mean adjusted and size
adjusted models and at the 10% level for the market to book model. Parkinson (1991)
finds acquirers to experience a positive abnormal returns of 6.25%. We do not find
acquirers to experience positive one year abnormal returns. Our results are negative and
consistent with Limmack (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Gregory (1997) and
Higson and Elliott (1998).
Although the whole sample of acquirers tends to experience negative BHARs, this is not
the case for all acquirer types, with some of them showing large wealth gains. The group
with the largest wealth gains are the single hostile acquirers5 . The BHARs for single
hostile acquires range from -7.6% to 8% with only the mean adjusted and the FFTF
5 Only the mean adjusted returns show a negative return of-6% and —7.6% for non-winsorised and winsorised data
respectively.
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Table 5.4	 One Year Winzorised Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by
Acquirer Type
The one year period is defined as days -40 to +250. A single friendly (F) acquirer is sole bidder
recommended by the target management. A single hostile (SH) acquirer is the only bidder for
the target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white knight (WK)
acquirer is a friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile bidder and
wins the contest. A multiple hostile (MB) acquirer is one which wins in competition with
another hostile bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share
Index, and size and market to book value portfolios are based on data obtained from
Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is
explained in section 4.14. Winsorising is carried out with extreme observations replaced by
two standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the proportion of positive
observations in each group. a'b 'e refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively
using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as percentages.
PANEL A: BHARs by Acquirer Type
Model Whole
Sample
Friendly Single
Hostile
White
Knight
Multiple
Hostile
Market (FT All Share)
Adjusted Returns
-0.43
p=47.3b
-1.59
p=46.4a
4.92
p=54.7
0.50
p=48.1
2.72
p=40.0`
Mean Adjusted Returns -11.94'
p=33.5a
-13.96'
p=32.7a
-7.63c
p=32.0'
-8.48
p=40.7b
-10.07
p=45.0
Size Portfolio Adjusted
Returns
-3.990
p= 41.7a
-5.20'
p=40.0a
2.24
p=52.0
-3.99
p=40.7b
-1.61
p=40.0`
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns -4.04'p=42.2a
-5.40
p=40.0a
3.90
p=57.3b
-5.71
p=37.0 a
-2.62
p=40.0`
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns
2.40c
p=49.9
0.97
p=47.8c
8.07b
p=62.7a
2.02
p=48.1
11.99
p=50.0
Sample Size 547 425 75 27 20
PANEL B: Paiwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions
Market
Model
Mean Adj. Size Adj. MTBV Adj. FFTF Model
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
-2.4'F vs SH -1.8c -1.3 -1.3 0.1 -2.2" -1.9b -2.7a -2.8' -1.8`
F vs WK -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.2 -0.0
F vs MH -0.5 0.6 -2.1 b -1.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -1.2 -0.2
SH vs WK 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.6` 1.8` 0.9 1.3
SH vs MH 0.3 1.2 -1.5 -1.1 0.5 1.0 0.9 1.4 -0.4 1.0
WK vs MH -0.2 0.00 -1.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9 -0.1
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models being statistically significant, at the 10% and 5% level respectively. Single hostile
acquirers also experience a greater number of positive returns compared to other acquirer
types. A test of proportion of positive BHARs shows them to be statistically significant
for a greater number of benchmark models. The positive observations are statistically
significant at the 10% level for the mean adjusted and the 11.TE returns and at the 5% level
for the market to book value adjusted returns. In the case of friendly acquirers we find
them to generally experience lowest levels of BHARs ranging from -13.96% to 0.97%.
Also friendly acquirers tend to have a higher level of negative observations. A comparison
of the relative performance between friendly and single hostile acquirers, using the tests of
differences in means and proportions is found, to be largely statistically significant. Our
results suggest that the post-acquisition conduct of single hostile acquirers allows them to
experience higher relative BHARs than other acquirer types.
During the bid period multiple hostile acquirers experience the highest wealth losses, as
shown in Table 5.3. In the first year after the takeover, multiple hostile acquirers continue
with their declining performance with BHARs of -10% (for the mean adjusted model) to
-2.6% (for the market to book value adjusted model). However, the FFTF and market
adjusted models produce a positive BHAR of 12% and 3% respectively. None of the
BHARs for multiple acquirers are statistically significant. Multiple hostile acquirers
experience a similar number of positive observations as other acquirer types. However, only
the positive observations for the market, size and market to book value adjusted returns is
statistically significant at the 10% level. Multiple hostile acquirers do not experience
BHARs, which are significantly different from other groups, apart for the mean adjusted
model against friendly acquirers at the 10% level, as shown in Panel B of Table 5.4. Like
multiple hostile acquirers white knights are also involved in a contest in order to acquire the
target.
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Our results show that white knights experience BHARs which are somewhat lower than
those of single hostile acquirers but nevertheless higher than multiple hostile acquirers for
two of the five benchmark models. Panel B of Table 5.4 shows that the tests of differences
in means and proportions between white knights and other acquirer types are not
statistically significant for any of the five benchmark models. We find that any disciplinary
nature of a hostile bid may be not be fully utilised, in the post-acquisition period, by multiple
hostile acquirers.
5.2.5 TWO YEAR SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS BY
ACQUIRER TYPE
The two year BHARs show that bidders experience wealth losses ranging from -20% to
0.7% which are all significant at the 1% level except for the FFTF model (see Table 5.5).
Thus, it seems that takeovers are bad investments for the overall sample of bidding firms
when they are examined in the long run. Negative BHARs are generated by all except the
FFTF model, although they are much lower with the market adjusted model (at -20%). The
size adjusted and market to book value adjusted are very similar at 10.6% and 10.8%
respectively. The market adjusted model tends to produce the higher returns at -4.5%.
Interestingly, the number of positive BHARs has fallen from the bid period where it was an
average of 45% to 40% in the first year to 35% in the second year. This shows that, with
time, a greater proportion of acquirers under-perform relative to the market and firms of a
similar nature. This lends support to the argument that acquirers may have carried out tad
takeovers' where expected pre-bid gains did not materialise. Our results cannot support
those of Parkinson (1991) who reports her sample of acquirers to experience positive
abnormal returns of 4.2%. Our results are more in line with those of Kennedy and Lirrunack
(1996), Gregory (1997), Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) and Higson and Elliott (1998) who all
report negative two year post bid-announcement abnormal returns of -5.08%, -11.22% to
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Table 5.5	 Two Year Winzorised Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by
Acquirer Type
The two year period is defined as days -40 to +500. A single friendly (F) acquirer is sole
bidder recommended by the target management. A single hostile (SH) acquirer is the only
bidder for the target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white
knight (WK) acquirer is a friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile
bidder and wins the contest. A multiple hostile (MB) acquirer is one which wins in
competition with another hostile bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial
Times All Share Index, and size and market to book value portfolios are based on data
obtained from Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book
value portfolios is explained in section 4.14. Winsorising is carried out with extreme
observations replaced by two standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the
proportion of positive observations in each group. a'b'" refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance
levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as percentages.
PANEL A: BHARs by Acquirer Type
.Model Whole
Sample
Friendly Single
Hostile
White
Knight
Multiple
Hostile
Market (FT All Share)
Adjusted Returns
-4.52'
D42.8
-6.49'
p=40.7
4.95
p=53.3
0.62
p=51.9
-5.15
p=35.0
Mean Adjusted Returns -20.10'
p=30.7
-23.12'
p=28.2
-11.85'
p=36.0
-8.68
p=44.4
-2.30
p=45.0
Size Portfolio Adjusted
Returns
-10.64'
p=35.5
-12.52'
p=35.1
-1.18
p=41.3
-6.18
p=25.9
-12.19
p=35.0
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns
-10.80'
p=36.9
-12.92'
p=35.1
0.50
p=49.3
-6.74
p=37.0
-13.47
p=30.0
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns
0.68
p=47.5
-1.57
p=45.4
10.31b
p=58•7
5.34
p=51.9
5.93
p=45.0
Sample Size 547 425 75 27 20
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions
	 .
Market
Model
Mean Adj. Size Adj. MTBV Adj. FFTF Model
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
-2.4'
Mean
-2.3 b
Prop
-2. I bF vs SH -2.4' -2.0b -1.6 -1.4 -2.6' -1.0 -3.1'
F vs WK -1.3 -1.2 -1.2 -1.8' -1.2 1.0 -1.2 -0.2 -1.0 -0.7
F vs MH -0.1 0.5 -1.4 -1.6' -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 -0.7 0.0
SH vs WK 0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.8 0.8 1.4 1.1 0.0 0.6 0.6
SH vs MH 0.9 1.5 -0.6 -0.7 1.1 0.5 1.5 1.5 0.4 1.1
WK vs MH 0.5 1.2 -0.3 -0.0 0.6 -0.7 0.7 0.5 -0.1 0.5
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-18.01%, -32% and -1.14% respectively. Apart from the 1.1. 11. model the range of our
BHARs for the overall sample across the different benchmark models is within the range
reported by Gregory (1997).
The segregated results show that single hostile acquirers tend to outperform other acquirer
types in three out of five models. The BHARs for single hostile acquirers range from 10%
(for the FFTF model) to -12% (for the mean adjusted model). However, only the mean
adjusted and FFTF returns are statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively.
The BHARs for single hostile acquirers are slightly lower than those for the first year after
the takeover, as are the number of positive returns. Panel B of Table 5.5 also shows that
both the differences in means and proportions are statistically significant between friendly
and single hostile acquirers. The differences in means are significant at the 1% level for the
market, size and MTBV adjusted models and at the 5% level for the FFTF. The differences
in proportions are significant at the 5% level for the market and FFTF models and at the
1% level for the M'TBV model.
Our results suggest that single hostile acquirers experience higher two year BHARs than
friendly acquirers. Kennedy and Limmack (1996) also show that in the 23 months
following the bid announcement hostile (what they refer to as disciplinary) bids outperform
friendly (or in their terminology non-disciplinary) ones by 0.72%. Gregory (1997) finds that
hostile acquirers outperform friendly ones in half the number of models used. More
recently, Higson and Elliott (1998) find that their sample of hostile acquirers experience
CARs of 12.8% statistically significant at the 5% level compared to -1.1% for the whole
sample for the two years following the bid announcement. In contrast, friendly acquirers
experience wealth losses of 3.74% over the same period.
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Table 5.5 also shows that white knight acquirers experience a decline in performance
during the period -40 to +500 compared to the relatively shorter period of -40 to +250.
Interestingly, the performance of white knights is relatively superior to that of the multiple
hostile acquirers during the period -40 to +500. This is a shift from their relative
performance during the shorter event window (i.e. -40 to +250) whereby multiple hostile
acquirers performed better than white knights. White knights experience BHARs in the
range of -6.7% to 5% while that for multiple hostile acquirers it is-13.5% to 6%. However,
Panel B of Table 5.5 shows that the difference in returns between white knights and
multiple hostile acquirers is not statistically significant. Finally, friendly acquirers under-
perform against all the acquirer types with BHARs of -1.6% to -23%. This under-
performance may go some way to supporting the idea that friendly acquirers have to pay a
price that is attractive for target firm management not to refuse. At the same time, in order
to receive the support of the target firm, they are limited by the level of changes that they
can carry out.
5.2.6 THREE YEAR SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS BY
ACQUIRER TYPE
Table 5.6 shows that three year BHARs for the whole sample of acquirers ranges from
-18% to 0.5%. A comparison between Tables 5.5 and 5.6 shows that the overall sample of
acquirers experience only a small decline in the performance during the latter period. This
implies that the bulk of the losses is experienced in the first two years after a takeover.
However, the lack of improvement in the wealth experiences of acquirers implies that, on
average, they tend to be wealth reducing investments. This is reflected in the number of
positive BHARs which is in the region of 35% and far lower than the bid period. All the
192
Table 5.6	 Three Year Winzorised Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by
Acquirer Type
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. A single friendly (F) acquirer is sole
bidder recommended by the target management. A single hostile (SH) acquirer is the only
bidder for the target firm and wins despite resistance • by the target management. A white
knight (WK) acquirer is a friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile
bidder and wins the contest. A multiple hostile (MH) acquirer is one which wins in
competition with another hostile bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial
Times All Share Index, and size and market to book value portfolios are based on data
obtained from Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book
value portfolios is explained in section 4.14. Winsorising is carried out with extreme
observations replaced by two standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the
proportion of positive observations in each group. a'b'' refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance
levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as percentages.
PANEL A: BHARs by Acquirer Type
Model Whole
Sample
Friendly Single
Hostile
White
Knight
Multiple
Hostile
Market (FT All Share)
Adjusted Returns
-6.62'
p=43.5a
-9.21 a
p=40.7a
5.58
p=57.3b
0.81
p=48.1
-7.21
p=45.0
Mean Adjusted Returns -18.39a
p=28.0'
-21.45'
p=26.6a
-12.06
p=30.7a
-2.72
p=37.0'
1.61
p=35.0'
Size Portfolio Adjusted
Returns
-13.88a
p=35.5a
-16.00'
p=33.6a
-3.53
p=48.0
-7.59
p=29.6'
-17.23'
p=35.011
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns
-13.92'
p=35.8a
-16.11'
p=33.4a
-2.38
p=50.7
-7.53
p=29.6a
-19.30b
p=40.0'
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns
0.53
p=46.4a
-2.24
p=43.5a
10.97'
p=58.6a
8.79
p=55.6
9.03
p=50.0
Sample Size 547 425 75 27 20
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions
'
Market
Model
Mean Adj. Size Adj. MTBV Adj. FFTF Model
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
F vs SH -2.7a -2.7a -0.9 -0.7 -2.6a -2.4' -2.8' -2.9' -2. l b -2.4'
F vs WK -1.4 -0.8 -1.0 -1.2 -1.3 0.4 -1.3 0.4 -1.2 -1.2
F vs MH -0.2 -0.4 -1.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -0.6
SH vs WK 0.6 0.8 -0.5 -0.6 0.5 1.7' 0.7 1.9' 0.2 0.3
SH vs MB 1.0 1.0 -0.6 -0.4 1.2 1.0 1.6' 0.9 0.1 0.7
WK vs MH 0.6 0.21 -0.2 0.1 0.8 -0.4 1.0 -0.7 -0.0 0.4
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BHARs are statistically significant at the 1% apart from the market adjusted and H . IP
models with only the latter being statistically significant for the winsorised data. iligson
and Elliott (1998) report a positive return of 0.83% in the third year following the
takeover. We find only the FFTF returns to be similar to those of Fligson and Elliott
(1998). However, consistent with Ffigson and Elliott (1998) we find our sample of
acquirers to improve their performance during the period -40 to +750 days compared to the
-40 to 250 and -40 to 500 days.
Looking at the performance of different acquirer groups we finds that single hostile
acquirers out-perform all other acquirer groups. The BHARs for single hostile acquirers
range from -12.1% to 11% which are slightly lower than those for the two year post
acquisition period. However, the number of positive BHARs has increased compared to the
two year post acquisition results. The proportion of positive returns for single hostile
acquirers tends to be in the region of 50%. Panel B of Table 5.6 shows that single hostile
acquirers experience BHAR.s which are significantly different from those of friendly
acquirers for the market, size adjusted and FFTF returns. Single hostile acquirers also have
BCARs which are significantly different from multiple hostile acquirers at the 10% level
using the market to book model.
White knight experience BHARs ranging from -7.6% to 8.8%. However, none of them are
statistically significant. Even though there has been a small change in the performance of
white knights the number of positive BHARs has actually fallen compared to Table .5.5.
This implies that the general trend is downwards with on average 60% of white knights
experiencing negative three year BHARs. Multiple hostile acquirers have i similar number
of positive BHARs but lower returns. The returns for multiple hostile acquirers range from
-19% to 9%. Again, this performance is slightly lower than that for the two year period (see
Table 5.5). The only significant results tend to be for the size and market to book value
models at the 10% and 5% level respectively. The long term under-performance by multiple
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hostile acquirers leads one to assume that they do not overcome the winner's curse effect.
Finally, friendly acquirers experience BHARs ranging from -21% to -2% which are all
statistically significant at the 1% level except for the FFTF returns. Like the other acquirer
groups, friendly acquirers also experience a small decline in their performance. This result
may imply that friendly acquirers not only overpay to purchase their target but are
constrained by their purchase, and opportunities to carry out disciplinary action may be
limited. The market, size and market to book value returns for friendly and single hostile
acquirers are statistically significant different at the 1%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
All the models used in this study show single hostile acquirers to outperform all other
acquirer types. Similarly, friendly acquirers tend to under-perform all acquirer types while
white knight and multiple hostile acquirers experience abnormal returns which are not
significantly different from each other (see Table 5.6). However, multiple hostile acquirers
tend to under-perform white knights for all models, except the FFTF model, and have a
greater proportion of companies reporting a negative return.
5.2.7 OVERALL RESULTS
Using five different models for calculating abnormal returns, this study finds that they all
produce rather similar results except for the FFTF model which shows acquirers to
experience positive returns. Although the results appear to be similar, the magnitude of
returns tends to be different across the models. The difference in magnitude is more
relevant for mean adjusted returns than for the other models. In many ways one would
expect this to be the case because (as explained in section 4.5.2.3) the mean adjusted model
assumes that the return in the estimation period will be expected in the post-bid period. Of
course, a merger is bound to change the bidder firm during the observation period and
returns from the estimation period are no longer relevant.
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All the models show acquirers to perform well prior to the bid with abnormal returns in the
region of 2% to 3%. An examination of the different acquirer types during the pre-bid
returns suggests that acquirers in multiple hostile bids outperform other acquirer types
while white knights experience the worst pre-bid performance. However, the test of
differences in means shows that none of the returns are significantly different from each
other during the pre-bid period. The long run event windows (i.e. -40 to +250, -40 to +500
and -40 to +750 days) show the whole sample of acquirers to experience negative abnormal
returns which are consistent with Limmack (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Holl
and Kyriazis (1997a), Gregory (1997) and, to some extent, with Higson and Elliott (1998).
An examination of the shareholder wealth experience of different acquirer types shows that
single hostile acquirers consistently experience higher returns than the other groups. Our
results show single hostile acquirers to outperform friendly acquirers by an average of
approximately 12% and 13% for non winsorised and winsorised data respectively. The
outperformance of hostile acquirers relative to friendly acquirers is also true for acquirers in
multiple hostile bids although the difference is not statistically significant for the latter case.
Table 5.6 shows that acquirers in multiple hostile bids outperform friendly acquirers by an
average of approximately 9%. Only the size and market to book value models show
friendly acquirers to outperform multiple hostile acquirers. Our results of superior
performance by hostile acquirers is consistent with those of Franks et al. (1991), Servaes
(1991) for the US and Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Gregory (1997) and Efigson and
Elliott (1998) for the UK. Based on the results presented in this chapter, we find partial
support for our first hypothesis that shareholders of hostile acquirers will experience greater
wealth gains compared to those of friendly acquirers.
Varaiya (1988) found that the winning bidder in a multiple bid tended to over-estimate the
value of the target. De et al. (1996) also found that successful bidders in multiple bids
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under-performed other acquirer types. Our results show that between the bid-
announcement and completion dates acquirers in a multiple bid (both friendly and hostile),
tend to under-perform acquirers not competing with another bidder to purchase the target.
In each of the three long term event windows (i.e. -40 to +250, -40 to +500 and -40 to
+750 days) it appears that the average return to single acquirers (both friendly and hostile)
is greater than that of acquirers in a contest with another bidder (i.e. white knights and
multiple hostile acquirers) 6 . During the period -40 to +750 days our results show that the
difference between single and multiple acquirers is much lower. This is largely due to a
poor performance by friendly acquirers and an improvement in the performance of white
knights.
Franks et al.. (1991) for the US and Gregory (1997) for the UK found little evidence to
support the argument that a second bidder leads to a worse performance by the winning
bidder. Franks et al. (1991) find that single acquirers under-perform relative to multiple
acquirers by an average of 0.42%. Gregory (1997) finds that the size adjusted and the
FFTF models show bidders in contested takeovers to outperform those in non-contested
takeovers. Our results show that for the one, two and three year event windows there only
appears to be a statistically significant difference in BHAlts between friendly and single
hostile acquirers. The inability to find both friendly and single hostile acquirers (i.e. single
acquirers) to outperform white knight and multiple hostile (i.e. multiple) acquirers leads us
to reject our second hypothesis that shareholders of single acquirers will experience greater
wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers involved in an auction.
Banerjee and Owers (1992) and Niden (1993) find that white knight acquirers under-
perform relative to other acquirer types at the time of the bid announcement. Our results
show that shareholders of white knight acquirers tend to receive higher abnormal returns
than other acquirer types at the time of the bid announcement (see Table 5.2). In each of
6 This is calculated as the average equally weighted returns received by friendly and single hostile acquirers across
all five models compared to the average return for white knights and multiple hostile acquirers.
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the three long run event windows we find that shareholders of white knight acquirers
experience higher wealth gains than shareholders of friendly or multiple hostile acquirers
but not as high as those of single hostile acquirers. To a certain degree our results are
similar to those of Gregory (1997) who finds that white knight acquirers outperform
friendly acquirers. However, unlike Gregory (1997), we do not find any evidence of white
knight acquirers outperforming single hostile acquirers'. Even though white knights
experience higher abnormal returns than friendly and multiple hostile acquirers, Tables 5.4,
5.5 and 5.6 show that the differences in means are not significantly different from one
another during the periods -40 to +250 days, -40 to +500 days and -40 to +750 days.
Similarly, the difference in means are not statistically significant between white knight and
single hostile acquirers. Based on the results presented in this chapter we do not find
evidence to support our third hypothesis that shareholders of planned (i.e. non white
knight) acquirers experience greater wealth gains relative to unplanned acquirers.
5.3.1 LONG RUN SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF
ACQUIRERS BY MARKET CAPITALISATION
In section 4.14.1 we argue that a firm's market capitalisation is very important in
determining the cross-section of average returns. Two explanations have been offered for
the differing performance of large and small companies, namely undervaluation and
overreaction. In the case of the former one has the argument that size is a proxy for risk and
as smaller companies have a greater level of risk they should be associated with greater
returns (Fama and French, 1992). Overreaction takes place when market participants
overestimate the value of positive information leading to rise in the share price (for negative
news the opposite will take place). Very few previous studies attempt to examine the size
effect of acquirer firms but those that do report rather mixed results. Earlier studies such as
Franks et al. (1991) find that the smallest portfolio of acquirers outperform the largest in all
7 Gregory (1997) finds that for five out of six benchmark models white knights experience higher abnormal
returns than single hostile acquirers. Only the Dimson and Marsh model shows single hostile acquirers to
experience higher abnormal returns than white knight acquirers.
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Table 5.7	 BHARs for Different Sized Acquirer Portfolios (Winzorised BHARs)
Market capitalisation is defined as the price per share, three months before the bid announcement,
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. The high market value portfolio is constructed by
ranking all the 547 acquirers according to their market value and selecting only the 183 largest firms.
The low market portfolio is constructed in the same way as the high market value portfolio but includes
only the 182 smallest firms. We refer to firms neither in the high or low portfolios as neutral. The share
price, number of shares outstanding, returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, size,
market to book value and Fama and French Three Factor (FFTF) portfolios are based on data obtained
from Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is
explained in section 4.14. Winsorising is carried out with extreme observations replaced by two
standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each
group. a'b'c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. BHARs are reported as percentages.
Panel A: Event Window 1 (-40 to +250 days)
High Market
Capitalisation
Neutral Market
Capitalisation
Low Market Capitalisation
Market Adj. 1.23	 p=51.4 -2.42	 p=42•3 a -0.12	 p=48.4
Mean Adj. -4.48c p=37.2 8 13.06	 p=31•3" -18.33	 p=31.9
Size Adj.	 . -2.30	 p=42.6a -5.44'	 p=36.8" -4.24c p=45.6b
MTBV Model -2.69	 p=44•3 a -5.16'	 p=37.4a -4.27c p=45.1"
TTFT Model 3.76c p=51.4 2.95	 p=51.6 0.47	 p=46.7c
Panel B: Event Window 2 (-40 to +500 days)
High Market
Capitalisation
Neutral Market
Capitalisation
Low Market Capitalisation
Market Adj. 0.23 p=48.1 -6.88'	 p=39.0' -6.94b	 p=41.2a
Mean Adj. -8.78b p=38.3 a -20.75b	 p=27.5 a -30.85' p=26.4a
Size Adj. -6.52	 p=37•7a -12.40'	 p=31.9a -13.04a p=36.8"
MTBV Model -6.7P p=42.6 a -12.03'	 p=31.3 a -13.67' p=36.8"
FFTF Model 4.03	 p=52.5 1.86	 p=48.9 -3.88	 p=41.28
Panel C: Event Window 3 (-40 to +750 days)
High Market
Capitalisation
Neutral Market
Capitalisation
Low Market Capitalisation
Market Adj. -1.32	 p=47.5 -8.17a	 p=42.3a -10.39a	 p=40.78
Mean Adj. -6.06	 p=32.8 a -15.88b p=28.6a -33.3P	 p=22.5a
Size Adj. -10.45'	 p=35.0' -15.11' p=33.0' -16.11a	 p=38.5"
MTBV Model -10.30'	 p=37.7 -14.32' p=33.0' -17.16'	 p=36.8"
FFTF Model 3.06	 p=50.3 2.31	 p=47.3 -3.81	 p=41•8'
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Table 5.7 Continued
Panel D: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 1)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted 1.37 1.74' 0.43 0.57 -0.71 1.17
Mean Adjusted 2.09b 1.19 3.13a 1.07 1.13 0.12
Size Adjusted 1.24 1.13 0.68 -0.58 -0.41 1.71'
MTBV Model 0.96 1.34 -0.55 -0.15 -0.30 1.49
FFTF Model 0.27 -0.04 0.98 0.90 0 .72	 . -0.94
Panel E: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 2)
Large vs Neutral Large vs Small Neutral vs Small
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted 1.96b 1.75' 1.71' 1.33 0.01 0.43
Mean Adjusted 1.99b 2.20b 3.70a 2.43a 1.58 -0.24
Size Adjusted 1.76' 1.16 1.77' 0.18 0.16 0.99
MTBV Model 1.59 2.24' 1.94' 1.13 0.43 1.11
FFTF Model 0.54 0.69 1.83' 2.17b 1.25 -1.48
Panel F: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 3)
Large vs Neutral Large vs Small Neutral vs Small
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted 1.56 1.00 1.85' 1.31 0.43 -0.31
Mean Adjusted 1.07 0.87 3.34a 2.20b 1.98b
Size Adjusted 1.18 0.40 1.32 -0.69 0.22 1.10
MTBV Model 1.01 0.94 1.64' 0.18 0.64 0.76
FFTF Model 0.15 0.57 1.29 1.64' 1.08 -1.06
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of the five benchmarks used. On the other hand more recent studies such as 1-ligson and
Elliot (1998) find that the whole sample of acquirers experience wealth losses of -1.14%
over a two year post-acquisition period. However, the hundred largest acquirers performed
better than the whole sample with a CAR of 1.33%.
Table 5.7 shows the BHARs for three different sized acquirer portfolios with one third of
the sample in each group'. The first year (i.e. -40 to +250 days) BHARs for the whole
sample range from -12% to 4% (see Table ) 5.4). However, the larger sized (i.e. highest
market capitalisation) acquirers experience BHARs ranging from -4.5% to 3.8% while that
for the smallest companies range from -18% to 0.5%. For the neutral companies the
BHARs range from -5.4% to 13%. The differences between the large and small samples
show the former to outperform the latter for all benchmark models. The difference in most
cases is very small and in the region of 2% to 3%. The only exception being the mean
adjusted model which shows an under-performance by smaller companies of 13.8%. The
tests of differences in means between different sized acquirers (see panel D of table 5.7)
shows only the mean adjusted returns between high versus neutral and high versus low
companies to be statistically significant.
The two year (i.e. -40 to +500 days) BHARs for the whole sample range from 0.7% to -
40,. 20% (see Table 5). However for the large companies it tends to be around -6% to -9%
(except for the market adjusted and FFTF models where it is 0.2% and 4% respectively).
For smaller acquirers during the same period the BHARs tend to range from -3.9% to -
31%. In every model the larger companies tend to outperform the smaller companies. The
differences between the large and small acquirers is in the region of 7% . (except for the
mean adjusted model where it is 22%). Panel B of Table 5.7 shows that for all benchmark
models the tests of differences between high and low companies are statistically significant.
However, the tests of differences in proportions between high and low companies is only
s We construct three portfolios of acquirers based on their market capitalisation. This is carried out by segregating
the sample of acquirers into three groups based on their market value three months prior to the bid-announcement.
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statistically significant for the mean adjusted and FFTF models.
The three year (i.e. -40 to +750 days) BHARs in Table 5.7 show that the largest acquirers
outperform the smallest acquirers. The whole sample of acquirers experience wealth losses
ranging from -18% to 0.5% (see Table 5.6) while those for the larger companies ranges
from -10.5% to 3%. Smallest acquirers on the other hand experience far greater wealth
losses ranging from -3.81% to -33%. In every model the larger acquirers outperform the
smaller acquirers by an average of 6% to 9% except for the mean adjusted model where it
27%. Panel B of Table 5.7 shows that for all except the size adjusted benchmark models
the tests of differences between high and low companies are statistically significant.
However, the tests of differences in proportions between high and low companies is only
statistically significant for the mean adjusted and FFTF models'.
Based on these results, we cannot find support for the argument that acquirers with a small
market capitalisation experience greater wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers with a
larger market value. Our results indicate that larger acquirers tend to outperform smaller
acquirers. Our construction of size quintiles along with the ABM Amro Hoare Govett
Smaller Companies (HGSC) index (see Dimson and Marsh, 1996) shows that the
performance of small and large companies has not been constant throughout the last 40
years. It appears from the HGSC index (see Dimson and Marsh, 1996:exhibit 25) that when
our sample of acquirers started in 1983, smaller companies in the HGSC index
outperformed the FT All Share index by about 17%. The HGSC index outperformed the
FT All Share index from 1983 to 1988 and thereafter the relationship changed. From 1989
to the present the FT All Share index has outperformed the HGSC index apart from 1993
and 1994. Therefore, as smaller companies performed less well against larger companies, in
the 1990s, this would be reflected in their long run BHARs (i.e. -40 to +250, -40 to +500
and -40 to +750 days).
9 The higher abnormal returns for large bidders can also be explained in terms of their relative size in relation
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5.3.2 LONG RUN SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF
ACQUIRERS BY MARKET TO BOOK VALUE
Graham and Dodd (1934) argue that a successful investment strategy is based on selecting
companies with a low market to book value (i.e. high book to market value). The recent
empirical CAPM models, such as the Fama and French (1992) type, incorporate market to
book value as a proxy for unobservable common risk factors. Lakonishok et al. (1994)
extend this argument by claiming that financial ratios are efficient at predicting returns on
shares because they capture the systematic errors of investor expectations of future returns
and the inefficiency of stockmarkets. In the area of takeovers Rau and Vermaelen (1998)
investigate acquisitions completed between 1980 and 1991 and find the whole sample of
acquirers experience wealth effects in the region of -13% over a three year period. They
find acquirers with a low market to book value to experience wealth effect of 25.5% over
the same period. However, acquirers with a high market to book value experience far
worse wealth effects of-47.7% over a three year post acquisition period.
In Table 5.4 we show the BHARs for the whole sample of acquisitions which range from -
12% to 2.4% for the period -40 to +250 days. In Panel A of Table 5.8 we report the
BHARs for acquirers based on their market to book value. We divide acquirers into three
groups, namely those with high, neutral and low market to book values. Acquirers with a
high market to book value experience negative BHARs ranging from -14.9% to 1.8%. All
BHARs are statistically significant at the 1% level except for the market to book value
returns and the mean adjusted and FFTF models which are insignificant. For acquirers with
a low market to book value the BHARs tend to be higher ranging from -8.4% to 2.8%.
The results are significant at the 1% level for the mean adjusted returns and at the 10%
level market to book value returns. The results show that in every case acquirers with a low
market to book value outperform those with a high market to book value in the range of
1% to 4.5%. Also, the number of positive returns tends to be higher for acquirers with a
to the target (see section 2.4.4). Also, it may be the case that large companies cany out acquisitions which
are different to those by smaller acquirers.
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Table 5.8	 BHARs for Different Market to Book Value Acquirer Portfolios (VVinsorised
BHARs)
The market to book value is defined as the market capitalisation of the firm's equity and the book value
of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. Market capitalisation is defined as the price per
share, three months before the bid announcement, multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. The
high market to book value portfolio is constructed by ranking all the 547 acquirers according to their
market to book value and selecting only the 183 firms with the highest values. The low market portfolio
is constructed in the same way as the high market value portfolio but includes only the 183 firms with
the lowest values. We refer to firms in neither the high or low portfolios as neutral companies. The
share price, number of shares outstanding, book values, returns for acquirers, Financial Times All
Share Index, size, market to book value and Fama and French Three Factor (FFTF) portfolios are
based on data obtained from Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book
value portfolios is explained in section 4.14. Winsorising is carried out with extreme observations
replaced by two standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the proportion of positive
observations in each group. a.b.c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
Panel A: Event Window 1 (-40 to +250 days)
High MTBV Portfolio Neutral MTBV Portfolio Low MTBV Portfolio
Market Adj. -3.37	 p=43.2 0.93	 p=48.4 1.15	 p=50.5
Mean Adj. -14.86'	 p=27.9 -12.54'	 p=34.3 -8.43'	 p=38.5
Size Adj. . -7.08'	 p=35.5 -2.00	 p=45.6 -2.88	 p=47.0
MTBV Model -6.36'	 p=38.8 -2.08	 p=45.1 -3.66°	 p=42.9
TTFT Model 1.75	 p=50.3 2.61	 p=48.1 2.84	 p=51.1
Panel B: Event Window 2 (-40 to +500 days)
High MTBV Portfolio Neutral MTBV Portfolio Low MTBV Portfolio
Market Adj. -10.55'	 p=36.6 -0.49	 p=47.3 -2.49	 p=44.5
Mean Adj. -25.08a	 p=25.8 -21.55'	 p=30.2 -13.70a p=36.3
Size Adj. -16.62'	 p=29.0 -6.33'	 p=39.0 -8.938 p=38.5
MTBV Model -15.72'	 p=33.9 -6.07'	 p=40.1 -10.55' p=36.8
FFTF Model -3.16	 p=42.6 3.00	 p=48.1 2.23	 p=51.6
Panel C: Event Window 3 (-40 to +750 days)
High MTBV Portfolio Neutral MTBV
Portfolio
Low MTBV Portfolio
Market Adj. -15.02a	 p=36.6 -1.09	 p=46.2b -3.68	 p=47.8
Mean Adj. -24.10'	 p=24 .2a -21.35'	 p=28 .6a -9.77	 p=31 .3s
Size Adj. -21.06'	 p=30.6a -8.47a	 p=39.68 -12.06' p=36.3a
MTBV Model -19.45'	 p=34.4" -8.40'	 p=39.6a -13.85' p=33.5"
FFTF Model -5.84	 p=42.6° 5.83	 p=49.5 1.64	 p=47.3
Table 5.8 Continued
Panel D: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 1)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted -1.44 -1.00 -1.48 -1.40 -0.07 0.40
Mean Adjusted -0.52 -1.32 -1.42 -2.15b -0.94 0.83
Size Adjusted -1.87' -1.97a -1.48 -2.23b -0.32 0.27
MTBV Model -1.57 -1.22 -0.93 -0.80 0.57 0.36
FFTF Model -0.26 0.42 -0.33 -0.15 -0.07 0.57
Panel E: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 2)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted -2.58' -2.07b -1.92' -1.54 0.50 -0.54
Mean Adjusted -0.57 -0.94 -1.80' -2.17b -1.28 1.24
Size Adjusted -2.86' -2.02b -2.06b -1.92b 0.73 -0.10
MTBV Model -2.72' -1.23 -1.39 -0.58 1.30 -0.65
FFTF Model -1.44 -1.06 -1.21 -1.72' 0.18 0.67
Panel F: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 3)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted -2.96a -1.86c -2.34b -2.17b 0.54 0.31
Mean Adjusted -0.33 -0.95 -1.57 -1.52 -1.31 0.56
Size Adjusted -3.02' -1.80' -2.08b -1.16 0.85 -0.65
MTBV Model -2.66a -1.03 -1.30 0.18 1.32 -1.21
FFTF Model -2.18b -1.32 -1.40 -0.90 0.79 -0.42
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low market to book value. Panel D of table 5.8 shows that non of the differences in means
between high and low MTBV acquirers are statistically significant across all benchmark
models. In the case of differences in proportions between high and low MTBV acquirers
only the mean and size adjusted models are statistically significant at the 5% level.
In Table 5.5 we show that in the second long run event window (i.e. -40 to 500 days) the
whole sample of acquisitions show a returns range of -20% to 0.7%. In Panel B of Table
5.8 we show that acquirers with a high market to book value experience wealth losses of
3% to 25%. For all benchmark models, except the FFTF, the BHARs for acquirers with a
high market to book value are significant at the 1% level. Low market to book value
acquirers outperform other groups with BHARs ranging from -14% to 2%. All except the
mean adjusted and FFTF models produce significant returns at the 1% level. For every
model the low market to book value acquirers outperform the other groups. Panel E of
Table 5.8 shows that only differences in means for the market, mean and size adjusted
BHARs tend to be significantly different for the high and low market to book value groups.
In the case of differences in proportions between the high and low MTBV acquirers only
the mean, size and FFTF models are statistically significant.
In Table 5.6 we show that the three year event window (i.e. -40 to +750 days) shows the
whole sample of acquirers experience BHARs of-18 to 0.5%. In Panel C of Table 5.8 we
show that acquirers with a high market to book value the BHARs range from -24% to 0%
with all, except the FFTF returns being statistically significant at the 1% level. .This
represents a small decline in the BHARs compared to the previous period (i.e. -40 to +500
days) as do the number of positive returns. In the case of acquirers with a low market to
book value the BHARs range from -13.9% to -1.6%. However, only the size and the
market to book value models are significant at the 1% level. The results show that for all
models the low market to book value acquirers outperform the high group, as well as
having a higher number of positive BHARs. These results lead us to support the argument
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that low market to book value acquirers experience greater wealth gains than high market
to book value acquirers. These results also tend to be consistent with previous studies
which have found that low market to book value companies outperform high market to
book value companies such as Barber and Lyon (1996). Also, in the area of takeovers, as
mentioned above, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) found that low market to book value
acquirers outperformed high market to book value acquirers in each of the three post
acquisition years.
5.3.3 LONG RUN SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF HIGH
AND LOW PRICE TO EARNINGS RATIO ACQUIRERS
Table 5.4 shows the relationship between the PE ratio or as Brealey et al. (1995:449) state,
"the esteem at which the company is held by investors" and the post-acquisition abnormal
returns. For the whole sample of acquirers the BHARs range from -12% to 2.4%, during
the period -40 to +250 days. Over the same period a portfolio of acquirers with a high PE
ratio at the time of the takeover experience BHARs which range from -20% to 2..5% (see
Panel A of Table 5.9). All the BHARs are statistically significant except for the market
adjusted and FFIT models. For a portfolio of low PE ratio acquirers the BHARs range
from -7.8% to 2.9%. Only the mean adjusted returns is significant at the 1% level. Low PE
acquirers tend to have a larger number of positive BCARs across all models. Also, the
returns tend to be greater for the low PE group in every case compared to the high PE
group and these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
In the second long run event window (i.e. -40 to +500 days) the whole sample of takeovers
experience BHARs ranging from 0.7% to -20% (see Table 5.5). Over the same period a
portfolio of high PE ratio acquirers experience BHARs ranging from -36.9% to -3.3% with
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Table 5.9	 BHARs for Different Price to Earnings Ratio Acquirer Portfolios (Winzorised
BHARs)
The price to earnings (PE) ratio is defined as the price per share, three months prior to the
announcement, divided by the earnings per share. The high PE ratio portfolio is constructed by ranking
all the 547 acquirers according to their PE ratios and selecting 183 firms with the highest values. The
low PE portfolio is constructed in the same way as the high PE portfolio but includes only the 182
firms with the lowest values. We refer to in neither the high and low portfolios as neutral. The share
price, PE ratio, returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, size, market to book value and
Fama and French Three Factor (FFTF) portfolios are based on data obtained from Datastream
International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is explained in section
4.14. Winsorising is carried out with extreme observations replaced by two standard deviations (see
section 4.12.2). p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each group. a'b'c refers to 1%, 5%
and 10% significance levels.
Panel A: Event Window 1 (-40 to +250 days)
High PE Portfolio Neutral PE Portfolio Low PE Portfolio
Market Adj. -0.46	 p=46.6 -1.45	 p=46.2b 0.60	 p=49.5
Mean Adj. -20.12a	 p=25.7 -7.93a	 p=35.7a -7.81a	 p=39.0a
Size Adj. -0.97a	 p=38.3 4.59b	 p=40.7" -2.42	 p=45.2b
MTBV Model -5.48a	 p=37.7 -4.06b	 p=42.9a -2.58	 p=46•2b
TTFT Model 2.49	 p=50.3 1.84	 p=50.5 2.86	 p=48.9
Panel B: Event Window 2 (-40 to +500 days)
High PE Portfolio Neutral PE Portfolio Low PE Portfolio
Market Adj. -7.03a	 p=39.9a -6.02b	 p=41.8a -0.54	 p=46.7'
Mean Adj. -36.90a	 p=21.9' -14.61'	 p=31.3 a -8.86b	 p=39.0a
Size Adj. -13.96'	 p=32.8a -11.92a	 p=32.4a -6.07b	 p=41.2a
MTBV Model -14.57a	p=33.3' -11.55a	 p=34.6 a -6.308	 p=42.9a
FFTF Model -3.28	 p=45.4b -0.35	 p=46.2b 5.63'	 p=51.1
Panel C: Event Window 3 (-40 to +750 days)
High PE Portfolio Neutral PE Portfolio Low PE Portfolio
Market Adj. -12.09a	 p=37.2a -6.72'	 p=44.5 8 -1.07	 p=48.9
Mean Adj. -43.23a	 p=18.0a -10.36'	 p=32.4a -1.67	 p=33.5"
Size Adj. -19.41'	 p=29.5" -14.47a	 p=35.7 a -0.78°	 p=41.28
MTBV Model -19.58'	 p=30.6 a -13.68a	 p=36.3 a -8.52	 p=40.7a
FFTF Model -6.05a	 p=41.5 8 0.82	 p=48.1 a
7 n Ft
0.78'	 p=52.7
Table 5.9 Continued
Panel D: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means (Event Window 1)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted 0.33 0.08 -0.35 -0.56 -0.68 0.63
Mean Adjusted -2.80' -2.07b -2.78' -2.72" -0.02 0.65
Size Adjusted -0.14 -0.47 -0.91 -1.34 -0.79 0.87
MTBV Model -0.51 -1.01 -1.02 -1.65' -0.53 0.63
FFTF Model 0.20 -0.04 -0.11 0.27 -0.31 -0.31
Panel E: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means (Event Window 2)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted -0.25 -0.37 -1.58 -1.31 -1.33 0.94
Mean Adjusted -3.81a -2.0315 -4.68' -3.55' -0.91 1.54
Size Adjusted -0.57 0.08 -2.15 -1.66' -1.60 1.74'
MTBV Model -0.85 -0.26 -2.31b -1.89' -1.45 1.64'
FFTF Model -0.69 -0.15 -2.0e) -1.09 -1.37 0.94
Panel F: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means (Event Window 3)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted -1.12 -1.42 -2.30 -2.26b -1.16 0.84
Mean Adjusted -4.16' -3.17a -4.92' -3.39' -0.93 0.22
Size Adjusted -1.19 -1.26 -2.73' -2.38 -1.55 1.08
MTBV Model -1.42 -1.15 -2.65' -2.021) -1.21 0.86
FFTF Model -1.30 -1.27 -2.42b -2.151' -1.10 0.88
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all except the FFTF BHARs being significant at the 1% level (see Table 5.9). On the other
hand the portfolio of acquirers with low PE ratios experience BHARs which are much
higher ranging from -8.9% to 5.6%. All except the market adjusted returns are statistically
significant. Across benchmark models the portfolio of low PE ratio acquirers outperform
those with a high PE ratio and these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level
except for the market and size adjusted models. Also, the portfolio of low PE ratio
acquirers have a higher proportion of positive BHARs than the high PE ratio group. Panel
E of Table 5.9 shows that the differences in means are significant for the mean adjusted at
the 1% level and the market to book value and FFTF models at the 5% level.
The three year event window (i.e. -40 to +750 days) BHARs for the whole sample of
acquirers ranges from 0.5% to -18% (see Table 5.6). Over the same period we show in
Table 5.9 that for a portfolio of high PE acquirers the BHARs range from -6% to -43%.
On the other hand those for the low PE ratio acquirers the BHARs range from 0.8% to
-8.5%. The BHARs for the high PE ratios are significant at the 1% level. In the case of low
PE ratio acquirers only the size and FFTF returns are statistically significant at the 1% and
10% level. Panel F of Table 5.9 shows that the portfolio of high and low PE companies are
significantly different for all except the market model in the three year event window. These
results lead us to support the argument that shareholders of acquirers with a low PE ratio
will experience greater abnormal returns than shareholders of high PE ratio acquirers. This
result is consistent with previous studies such as Rau and Vermaelen (1998) which have
found similar results.
5.4 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we sought to examine the effect of different acquirer types on their long
term performance. In doing so we attempted to answer three questions. First, as to
whether friendly or hostile acquirers experience superior relative post-acquisition
performance. Second, whether the winning bidder in a takeover with more than one
bidder experiences lower relative post-acquisition performance. Third, whether
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unplanned (i.e. white knight acquirers) or planned acquirers experience superior
performance. This chapter has also sought to investigate the relationship between
post-acquisition performance and acquirer market capitalisation, market to book value
and PE ratio. In the light of the discussion presented in the previous section we can
summarise our final conclusions as follows.
First, in all except the FFTF model, we find acquirers to experience negative post-
acquisition BHARs in the region of -2% to -3%. This result is consistent with recent
evidence from Limmack (1991), Kennedy and Lirnmack (1996), Ho11 and Kyriazis
(1997a) and Gregory (1997). An examination of different acquirer types shows that
single hostile acquirers outperform all other types by an average of 12% in each of the
three long run event windows (i.e. -40 to +250, -40 to +500 and -40 to +750 days). A
comparison of friendly and multiple hostile acquirers shows that in the long run the
latter outperform the former by an average of 7.6% and 9% for non winsorised and
winsorised BHARs respectively. The difference in means between friendly and single
hostile acquirers are statistically significant. However, the same is not true for multiple
hostile and white knights or friendly acquirers. From these results we find partial
evidence to support our first hypothesis that shareholders of hostile acquirers receive
greater wealth gains than shareholders of friendly acquirers.
Our results show that in the short run (i.e. during the bid announcement and
completion period) acquirers involved in multiple bids tend to under-perform other
acquirer types. In each of the three long run event windows single acquirers (i.e.
friendly and single hostile) tend to outperform multiple bidders (i.e. white knights and
multiple hostile) acquirers. However, the difference between single and multiple hostile
acquirers is much lower in the third year following the takeover. Our results reject the
second hypothesis which states that shareholders of acquirers not competing with
another bidder to purchase the target will experience greater wealth gains than to those
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acquirers involved in an auction.
This chapter has shown that white knights experience returns which are higher than
those of friendly or multiple hostile acquirers for each of the three long run event
windows. Even though white knights experience higher abnormal returns relative to
friendly and multiple hostile acquirers, they are not significantly different from each
other in the second or third year following a takeover. Based on these results we reject
our third hypothesis that shareholders of white knights experience lower abnormal
returns relative to other acquirer types.
This chapter has sought to investigate whether portfolios of acquirers with differing
market capitalisation experience similar performance. Our study has shown that
shareholders of large acquirers (by market capitalisation) outperform relative to
shareholders of small acquirers (by market capitalisation). Second, we do find that
shareholders of acquirers with a low market to book value to experience greater
abnormal returns than shareholders of acquirers with a high market to book value. We
also find that our portfolio of acquirers with a low PE ratio tend to outperform those
with a high PE ratio.
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Appendix 5.1 Pre-Bid Announcement Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by
Acquirer Type
The pre-bid announcement period is defined as day's -40 to -2. A single friendly acquirer is
sole bidder recommended by the target management. A single hostile acquirer is the only
bidder for the target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white
knight acquirer is a friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile bidder
and wins the contest. A multiple hostile acquirer is one which wins in competition with
'another hostile bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share
Index, and size and market to book value portfolios are based on data obtained from
Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is
explained in section 4.15. p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each group. a,b,c
refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are
reported as percentages.
PANEL A: BHARs by Acquirer Type
Whole
Sample
Friendly Single
Hostile
White
Knight
Multiple
Hostile
Market (FT All Share)
Adjusted Returns
3.62'
p=57.6a
3.67'
p=56.9a
3.28'
p=64.0"
3.47
p=51.9
4.09
p=55.0
Mean Adjusted Returns 1.73a
p=51.9c
1. 78b
p=52.2e
0.40
p=48.0
1.38
p=55.6 p=55.0
Size Portfolio
Adjusted Returns
2.82a
p=54.7a
2.86'
p=53.9a
2.71b
p=57.3 b
1.70
p=51.9
3.93
p=65.01
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns
2.65'
p=54•7'
2.58'
p=52.7b
3.14'
p=62.7a
1.32
p=55.6
4.00
p=65.0'
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns
3.87a
p=59.83
3.85'
p=45.7a
3.60'
p=62.7a
3.20
p=59.3b
6.26b
p=70.01
Sample Size 547 425 75 27 20
1	
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Pro 1 ortions
	 I
Market
Model
Mean Adj. Size Adj. MTBV Adj. FFTF
Model-
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
-2.7'F vs SH 0.3 -1.2 0.8 0.7 0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -1.6c 0.2
F vs WK 0.2 0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.2 -1.4
F vs MH -0.1 0.2 -1.3 -0.3 -0.4 -1.0 -0.5 -1.1 -0.8 -2.1b
SH vs WK -0.1 1.1 -0.3 -0.7 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.3
SH vs MH -0.3 0.7 -1.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -2.3 a -0.2 -0.8 -0.6
WK vs MH -0.1 -0.2 -1.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
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Appendix 5.2 Bid-Announcement Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by
Acquirer Type
The bid-announcement period is defined as days -1 to +1. A single friendly acquirer is sole
bidder recommended by the target management. A single hostile acquirer is the only bidder for
the target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white knight acquirer
is a friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile bidder and wins the
contest. A multiple hostile acquirer is one which wins in competition with another hostile
bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size
and market to book value portfolios are based on data obtained from Datastream
International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is explained in
section 4.15. p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each group. a'b'e refers to
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as
percentages.
Whole
. Sample
Friendly
_
Single
Hostile
White
Knight
Multiple
Hostile
Market (FTAll Share)
Adjusted Returns
-1.31 a
p=34.4
-1.41c
p=34.1a
-1.37`
p=29.3a
-0.15
p=51.9
-0.56
p=35.0a
Mean Adjusted Returns -1.40a
p=32.5 a
-1.52a
p=32.0a
-1.43c
p=29.3a
0.27
p=51.9
-0.90
p=30.0a
Size Portfolio
Adjusted Returns
-1.34a
p=34.0a
-1.43a
p=34.1 a
-1.36`
p=29.3a
-0.18
p=48.1
-0.88
p=30.0a
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns
-1.32a
p=34.7a
-1.41a
p=34.8a
-1.40b
p=28.0a
-0.04
p=51.9
-0.98
p=35.0a
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns
-1.24a
p=34.0a
-1.35a
p=34.5 a
-1.29
p=26.7a
0.16
p=51.9
-0.65
p=30.03
Sample Size 547 425 75 27 20
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions
MTBV Adj. FFTF
Model
Market
Model
Mean Adj. Size Adj.
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
•	 1.3F vs SH -0.0 0.8 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.8 -0.0 1.2 -0.1
F vs WK -1.1 -1.9c -1.5 -2.l' -1.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.8c -1.3 -1.8c
F vs MH -0.8 -0.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.6 0.4 -0.4 -0.0 -0.7 0.4
SH vs WK -0.9 -2.1 b -1.2 -2.1 b -0.9 -1.8 ` -1.0 -2.2b -1.0 -2.4a
SH vs MH -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3
WK vs MH 0.3 1.2 0.8 1.5 0.5 1.25 0.6 1.2 0.5 1.5
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Appendix 5.3 Bid Period Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by Acquirer Type
The bid period is defined as days -1 to +40. A single friendly acquirer is sole bidder
recommended by the target management. A single hostile acquirer is the only bidder for the
target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white knight acquirer is a
friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile bidder and wins the
contest. A multiple hostile acquirer is one which wins in competition with another hostile
bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size
and market to book value portfolios are based on data obtained from Datastream
International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is explained in
section 4.15. p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each group. 11.13e refers to
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as
percentages.
-
Whole
Sample
Friendly	 Single
Hostile
White	 Multiple
Knight	 Hostile
Market (FT All Share)
Adjusted Returns
0.17
p=47.51,
0.19	 1.10
p=48.2	 p=46.7
0.86	 -4.75a
p=51.9	 p=30.0a
Mean Adjusted Returns -1.95a
p=40.6a
-2.20a	 -0.39
p=40.0a	p=42.'7 b
-0.77	 -4.13
p=40.7b	p=45.0
Size Portfolio
Adjusted Returns
-0.29
p=45.2 a
-0.24	 0.77
p=45.2a	p=49.3
0.00	 -5.493
p=48.1	 p=25.0a
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns
-0.29
p=44.2a
-0.25	 0.86
p=44.7a	p=48.0
-0.26	 -5.533
p=44.4	 p=20.0a
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns
0.70
p=49.2
0.67	 1.74
p=49.4	 p=49.3
1.46	 -3.66b
p=51.9	 p=40.0`
Sample Size 547 425	 75 27	 20
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions
MTBV Adj. FFTF
Model
Market
Model
Mean Adj.	 Size Adj.
Mean Prop Mean Prop	 Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
• 0.0F vs SH -0.7 0.2 -1.1 -0.4	 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 -0.5 -0.8
F vs WK -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1	 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.3
F vs MH 2.7a 1.6 0.7 -0.5	 3.1 a 1.8' 3.2a 2.2b 2.5a 0.8
SH vs WK 0.1 -0.5 0.1 0.2	 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 -0.2
SH vs MH 2.8a 1.3 1.2 -0.2	 3.2a 1.9b 3.4a 2.3b 2.7a 0.7
WK vs MH 2.3 b 1.5 0.9 -0.3	 2.3 b 1.6' 2.3 1.8` 2.2b 0.8
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Appendix 5.4 One Year Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by Acquirer Type
The one year period is defined as days -40 to +250. A single friendly acquirer is sole bidder
recommended by the target management. A single hostile acquirer is the only bidder for the
target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white knight acquirer is a
friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile bidder and wins the
contest. A multiple hostile acquirer is one which wins in competition with another hostile
bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size
and market to book value portfolios are based on data obtained from Datastream
International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is explained in
section 4.15. p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each group. a.b.c refers to
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as
percentages.
.
Whole
Sample
Friendly
	 Single
Hostile
White	 Multiple
Knight	 Hostile
_
Market (FT All Share) 0.49 -0.96	 7.90` 0.50	 3.50
p=47.3b p=46.4a	p=54.7 p=48.1	 p=40.0`
Adjusted Returns
Mean Adjusted Returns -9.98a -12.52a	 -5.95 -7.17	 -25.06
p=33.5a p=32.73	p=32.0" p=40.7b	p=45.0
Size Portfolio -3.16a -4.69a	 5.28 -3.99
p=41.7a p=40.0a	p=52.0 p=40.7b	 p=40.0'
Adjusted Returns
Market to Book Value -3.16° -4.86a	 7.05 -5.71	 -1.80
p=42.2a p=40.0a	p=57.3 b p37.0'	 p=40.0`
Adjusted Returns
Fama and French Three
353 b 1.87	 10.79b 2.23	 13.42
p=49.9 p=47.8`	 p=62.7a p=48.1	 p=50.0
Factor Adjusted Returns
Sample Size 547 425 •	 75 27	 20
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of frfferences in Means and Proportions
Market Mean Adj.	 Size Adj. MTBV Adj. FFTF
Model Model
Mean Prop Mean Prop	 Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
F vs SH -1.9` -1.3 -1.2 0.1	 -2.2b 19b -2.8' -1.8' -2.4'
F vs WK -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9	 -0.1 -0,1 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.0
F vs MH -0.5 0.6 -1.9b	. -1.1	 -0.5 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -1.2 -0.2
SH vs WK 1.1 0.6 0.1 -0.8	 1.4 1.0 2.0b 1.8` 1.15 1.3
SH vs MH 0.5 1.2 -1.5 -1.0
	 0.8 1.0 1.1 -0.3 -0.3 1.0
WK vs MH -0.3 0.6 -1.5 -0.3	 -0.3 0.1 -0.5 0,0 -1.0 -0.1
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Appendix 5.5 Two Year Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by Acquirer Type
The two year period is defined as days -40 to +500. A single friendly acquirer is sole bidder
recommended by the target management. A single hostile acquirer is the only bidder for the
target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white knight acquirer is a
friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile bidder and wins the
contest. A multiple hostile acquirer is one which wins in competition with another hostile
bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size
and market to book value portfolios are based on data obtained from Datastream
International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is explained in
section 4.15. p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each group. a'b'' refers to
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as
percentages.
Whole
Sample
Friendly Single
Hostile
White
Knight
Multiple
Hostile
Market (FT All Share)
Adjusted Returns
-3.15a
p=42.8a
-5.31`
p=40.7a
7.90
p=53.3
1.01
p=51.9
-4.13
p=35.02
Mean Adjusted Returns -16.59a
p=30.7a
-19.51 a
p=28.2a
-9.23
p=36.0a
-8.44
p=44.4
7.01
p=45.0
SizePortfolio
Adjusted Returns
-9.50a
p=35.5a
-11.53a
p=35.1 a
1.27
p=41.3a
-5.35
p=25.9a
-12.19
p=35.0a
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns
-9.59a
p=36.9a
-11.79a
p=35.1 a
2.62
p=49.3
-6.03
p=37.0a
-13.47
p=30.0a
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns
2.20 b
p=47.5
-0.17
p=45.4a
13.13b
p=51.9
5.45
p=51.9
7.22
p-45.0
Sample Size 547 425 75 27 20
PANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences 'n Means and Proportions
MTBV Adj.
I
FFTF
Model
Market
Model
Mean Adj. Size Adj.
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
-2.4a
Mean
2.1b
Prop
4.0F vs SH -2.2b -2.0 -1.3 -1.4 -2.3 b -1.0 -2.8 a
F vs WK -1.1 -1.2 -0.9 -1.8 ` -1.1 1.0 -1.0 -2.0 -0.8 -0.7
F vs ME -0.1 0.5 -1.3 -1.6e 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 -0.6 0.0
SH vs WK 0.9 0.1 -0.1 -0.8 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.0
SH vs MH 1.0 1.5 -0.7 -0.7 1.3 0.5 1.7C 1.5 0.5 0.6
WK vs MH 0.4 1.2 -0.6 -0.0 0.6 -0.7 0.7 0.5 -0.1 0.5
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Appendix 5.6 Three Year Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) by Acquirer Type
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. A single friendly acquirer is sole bidder
recommended by the target management. A single hostile acquirer is the only bidder for the
target firm and wins despite resistance by the target management. A white knight acquirer is a
friendly bidder which enters the contest for the target after a hostile bidder and wins the
contest. A multiple hostile acquirer is one which wins in competition with another hostile
bidder or a white knight. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size
and market to book value portfolios are based on data obtained from Datastream
International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is explained in
section 4.15. p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each group. a'ij'c refers to
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively using a two tail test. BHARs are reported as
percentages.
Whole
Sample
Friendly	 Single
Hostile
White	 Multiple
Knight	 Hostile
Market (FT All Share)
Adjusted Returns
-5.30a
p=43.5a
-7.66a	 6.24
p=40.7a	p=57.3 b
0.81	 -6.75
p=48.1	 p=45.0
Mean Adjusted Returns -9.57
p=28.0a
-15.36a	 -5.80
p=26.6a	p=30.7 a
-2.52	 -8.98
p=37.03	p=35.0a
Size Portfolio
Adjusted Returns
-12.57a
p=35.5a
-14.52a	-2.26 	 .
p=33.6a	p=48.0
-7.21	 -17.23a
p=29.63	 p=35.0a
Market to Book Value
Adjusted Returns
-12.65a
p=35.8a
-14.64a 	 -1.62
p=33.4a	p=50.7
-7.03	 -19.30b
p=29.6a	 p=40.0a
Fama and French Three
Factor Adjusted Returns
2.42
p=46.4a
-0.39	 13.06"
p=43.5a	p=59.7
9.22	 13.15
p=55.6	 p=50.0
Sample Size 547 425	 75 27	 20
IPANEL B: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions
MTBV Adj.Market
Model
Mean Adj.	 Size Adj. FFTF
Model
Mean Prop Mean Prop	 Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
.-2.6aF vs SH -2.4" -2.7 -0.7 -0.7	 -2.3" -2.4a -2.6a -2.9a -2.0"
F vs WK -1.2 -0.8 -0.7 -1.2	 -1.1 0.4 -1.1 0.4 -1.0 -1.2
F vs MH -0.1 -0.4 -1.0 -0.8	 0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -0.6
SH vs WK 0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.6	 0.6 1.7a 0.7 1.9a 0.3 0.4
SH vs MH 1.0 1.0 -0.9 -0.4	 1.3 1.0 1.7 0.9 -0.0 0.8
WK vs Mil 0.5 0.2 -0.9 0.1	 0.8 -0.4 1.1 -0.7 -0.2 0.4
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Appendix 5.7 BHARs for Different Sized Acquirer Portfolios (Non-Winzorised BHARs)
Market capitalisation is defined as the price per share, three months before the bid announcement,
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. The high market value portfolio is constructed by
ranking all the 547 acquirers according to their market value and selecting only the 183 largest firms.
The low market portfolio is constructed in the same way as the high market value portfolio but includes
only the 182 smallest firms. We refer to firms in neither the high or low portfolios as neutral firms. The
share price, number of shares outstanding, returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, size,
market to book value and Fama and French Three Factor (FFTF) portfolios are based on data obtained
from Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is
explained in section 4.15. p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each group. a.b.c refers to
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. BHARs are reported as percentages.
Panel A: Event Window 1 (-40 to +250 days)
High Market
Capitalisation
Neutral Market
Capitalisation
Low Market
Capitalisation
Market Adj. 1.3	 p=51.4 -1.38	 p=42.3 a 1.55	 p=48.4
Mean Adj. -2.6	 p=37.2a -10.60a p=31.3 a -16.78a p=31.9a
Size Adj. -2.24	 p=42.6a -4.37b	 p=36.8a -2.86	 p=45.6b
MTBV Model -2.66	 p=44.5 a -4.05c	 p=37.4a -2.77	 p=45.1°
TTFT Model 4•42b p=51.4 3.95	 p=51.6 2.21	 p=46.7c
Panel B: Event Window 2 (-40 to +500 days)
High Market
Capitalisation
Neutral Market
Capitalisation
Low market
Capitalisation
Market Adj. 0.43	 p=48.1 -5.40c	 p=39.0a 4.49	 p=41.2a
Mean Adj. -6.21	 p=38.3' -13.51b	 p=27.5' -30.10	 p=26.48
Size Adj. -6.19° p=37.7' -10.58'	 p=31.9' -11.74a p=36.8a
MTBV Model -6.40a p=42.6a -9.89'	 p=31.3 a -12.50a p=36.8a
FFTF Model 5.55c p=52.5 3.43	 p=48.9 -2.39	 p=41.2a
Panel C: Event Window 3 (-40 to +750 days)
High Market
Capitalisation
Neutral Market
Capitalisation
Low Market
Capitalisation
High - Low
Groups
Market Adj. -0.92 p=47.5 -6.89` p=42.3 a -8.11c p=4Ø7a 7.19°
Mean Adj. 5.27 p=32.8 a -0.78	 p=28.6' -33.28' p=22.5° 38.55°
Size Adj. -10.04' p=35.0a -13.30' p=33.0' -14.40° p=38.5' 4.36a
MTBV Model -9.88' p=37.7° -12.43' p=33.0 a -15.66° p=36.8a 5.788
FFTF Model 5.08	 p=50.3a 	. 4.81 p=47.3 -2.63	 p=41.8" 7.71"
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APPENDIX 5.7 Continued
Panel D: . Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 1)
Large vs Neutral Large vs Small Neutral vs Small
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted 0.91 3•90a -0.07 0.57 -0.77 1.17
Mean Adjusted 1.61 1.19 2.80a 1.07 1.16 0.12
Size Adjusted 0.76 1.13 0.19 -0.58 -0.44 1.71c
MTBV Model 0.49 1.38 0.03 -0.12 -0.37 1.49
FFTF Model 0.14 -0.04 0.58 0.90 0.44 -0.94
Panel D: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 2)
Large v4 Neutral Large vs Small Neutral vs Small
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted 1.46 1.75c 1.06 1.33 -0.18 0.43
Mean Adjusted 0.90 2.20" 3.66a 2.43a 2.04 -0.24
Size Adjusted 1.16 1.16 1.40 0.18 0.26 0.99
MTBV Model 0.92 2.24" 1.58 1.13 0.60 1.11
FFTF Model 0.46 0.69 1.64c 2.17b 1.14 -1.48
Panel D: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 3)
Large vs Neutral Large vs Small Neutral vs Small
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted 1.29 1.00 1.35 1.31 0.21 -0.31
Mean Adjusted 0.35 0.87 2.76a 2.20b 2.51 -1.34
Size Adjusted 0.75 0.40 0.95 -0.69 0.22 1.10
MTBV Model 0.59 0.94 1.29 0.18 0.65 0.76
FFTF Model 0.05 0.57 1.32 1.64c 1.21 -1.06
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Appendix 5.8 BHARs for Different Market to Book Value Acquirer Portfolios (Non-Winsorised
BHARs)
The market to book value is defined as the market capitalisation of the firm's equity and the book value
of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. Market capitalisation is defined as the price per
share, three months before the bid announcement, multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. The
high market to book value portfolio is constructed by ranking all the 547 acquirers according to their
market to book value and selecting only the 183 firms with the highest values. The low market portfolio
is constructed in the same way as the high market value portfolio but includes only the 183 firms with
the lowest values. We refer to firms in neither the high or low portfolios as neutral companies. The
share price, number of shares outstanding, book values, returns for acquirers, Financial Times All
Share Index, size, market to book value and Fama and French Three Factor (FFTF) portfolios are
based on data obtained from Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book
value portfolios is explained in section 4.15. Winsorising is carried out with extreme observations
replaced by two standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the proportion of positive
observations in each group. a.b.c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
Panel A: Event Window 1 (-40 to +250 days)
High MTBV Portfolio Neutral MTBV Portfolio Low MTBV Portfolio
Market Adj. -2.30	 p=43.2a 1.54	 p=48.4 2.25	 p=50.5
Mean Adj. -13.13a	 p=27.9 a -10.33a	 p=34.1 a -6.48° p=38.3a
Size Adj. -6.21a	 p=35.5a -1.37	 p=45.6b -1.87	 p=44.0a
MTBV Model -5.17"	 p=-38.8 a -1.36	 prz45.1 a -2.93	 p=42.9a
TTFT Model 2.83	 p=50.3 3.96	 p=48.4 3.80	 p=51.1
Panel B: Event Window 2 (-40 to +500 days)
High MTBV Portfolio Neutral MTBV Portfolio Low MTBV Portfolio
Market Adj. -9.85a	 p=36.6a 0.57	 p=47.3 -0.12	 p=44.5a
Mean Adj. -22.44a	 p=25.7° -19.04a	 p=30.2a -8.30	 p=36.3a
Size Adj. -15.68a	 p=29.0a -5.63"	 p=39.08 -7.13" p=38.58
MTBV Model -14.45a	 p=33.9a -5.42"	 p=40.1 a -8.86a p=36.88
FFTF Model -2.13	 p=42.6a 4.59	 p=48.4 4.18	 p=51.6
Panel C: Event Window 3 (-40 to +750 days)
High MTBV
Portfolio
Neutral MTBV Portfolio Low MTBV Portfolio
Market Adj. -13.808	 p=36.6a -0.07	 p=46.2b -1.97	 p=47.8
Mean Adj. -19.70a	 p=24.0a -7.32	 p=28.6a -1.68	 p=31.1°
Size Adj. -19.60a	 p=30.6 a -7.390	 p=39.6a -10.68a p=36.38
MTBV Model -17.84a	p=34.4 8 -7.47a	 p=39.6a -12.59a p=33.58
FFTF Model -3.86	 p=42.6a 8.58b	 p=49.5 2.62	 p=47.3
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Appendix 5.8 Continued
•	 Panel D: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means (Event Window 1)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted -1.31 -1.00 -1.28 -1.40 -0.21 0.40
Mean Adjusted -0.80 -1.28 -1.31 -2.11b -0.74 0.83
Size Adjusted -0.98 -1.97b -1.32 -1.66c 0.16 -0.31
MTBV Model -0.66 -L22 -0.67 -0.80 0.51 -0.42
FFTF Model -0.15 0.36 -0.26 -0.15 0.04 0.52
Panel D: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means (Event Window 2)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted -0.21 -2.07b -2.06b -1.54 0.15 -0.54
Mean Adjusted -1.24 -0.96 -1.76c -2.19b -1.38 1.24
Size Adjusted -1.34 -2.02b -2.02 -1.97b 0.37 -0.10
MTBV Model -0.98 -1.23 -1.33 -0.58 0.88 -0.65
FFTF Model -1.13 -1.11 -1.27 -1.72c 0.09 0.61
Panel F: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means (Event Window 3)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop Mean Prop Mean Prop
Market Adjusted -0.98 -1.86c -2.23" -2.17" 0.36 0.31
Mean Adjusted -0.65 -1.00 -1.44 -1.52 -0.34 0.52
Size Adjusted -0.75 -1.80c -1.87" -1.16 0.72 -0.65
MTBV Model -1.10 -1.03 -1.11 0.18 1.16 -1.21
FFTF Model -1.12 -1.32 -1.11 -0.90 1.02 -0.42
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Appendix 5.9 BHARs for Different Price to Earnings Ratio Acquirer Portfolios (Non-
Winzorised BHARs)
The price to earnings (PE) ratio is defined as the price per share, three months prior to the
announcement, divided by the earnings per share. The high PE ratio portfolio is constructed by ranking
all the 547 acquirers according to their PE ratios and selecting 183 firms with the highest values. The
low PE portfolio is constructed in the same way as the high PE portfolio but includes only the 182
firms with the lowest values. We refer to firms in neither the high and low portfolios as neutral
companies. The share price, PE ratio, returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, size,
market to book value and Fama and French Three Factor (FFTF) portfolios are based on data obtained
from Datastream International. The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is
explained in section 4.15. Winsorising is carried out with extreme observations replaced by two
standard deviations (see section 4.12.2). p refers to the proportion of positive observations in each
,b,cgroup. a refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
Panel A: Event Window 1 (-40 to +250 days)
High PE Portfolio Neutral PE Portfolio Low PE Portfolio
Market Adj. 12.11 p=46.4b -.1.11	 p=46.2b 1.36	 p=49.5
Mean Adj. -18.40a p=25.7a -5.52	 p=35.7a -6.03c	 p=39.0a
Size Adj. -3.58	 p=38.3a -4.30b	 p=40.7a -1.59	 p=46.2b
MTBV Model -4.04C p=37.78 -3.73C	 p=42.98 -1.71	 p=45.9b
TTFT Model 3.74	 p=50.3 2.85	 p=50.5 4.00	 p=48.9
Panel B: Event Window 2 (-40 to +500 days)
High PE Portfolio Neutral PE Portfolio Low PE Portfolio
Market Adj. -5.39C	 p=39.9a -5.39c	 p=41.8 a 1.31	 p=46.7c
Mean Adj. -35.358 p=21.9a -11.92b	 p=31.3a -2.56	 p=39.0a
Size Adj. -13.24a p=32.8 a -11.3e	 p=32.48 -3.94	 p=41.28
MTBV Model -13.90a p=33.3 a -10.898	 p=34.6a -4.02	 p=42.78
FFTF Model -0.87	 p=45.4b 1.15	 p=46.2" 8.30b	 p=51.1
Panel C: Event Window 3 (-40 to +750 days) 	 .
High PE Portfolio Neutral PE Portfolio Low PE Portfolio
Market Adj. -10.208	 p=37.2 8 -6.18c	 p=44.5 8 0.45	 p=48.9
Mean Adj. -39.02a	 p=18.0a 2.38	 p=32.4a 7.83	 p=33.58
Size Adj. -18.098	 p=29.5 a -13.95a	 p=35.68 -5.73	 p=41.2a
MTBV Model -18.46 8	p=30.6 8 -13.008	 p=36.3a -6.52'	 p=40.7a
FFTF Model -4.42	 p=41.5 8 2.03	 p=45.1 8 9.20'	 p=52.7
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Panel D: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 1)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop. Mean Prop. Mean. Prop.
Market Adjusted 0.66 0.04 -0.04 -0.59 -0.74 0.06
Mean Adjusted -2.59a -2.07 -2.59a -2.72a -0.10 0.65
Size Adjusted 0.22 -0.47 -0.62 -1.53 -0.88 1.06
MTBV Model -0.09 -1.01 -0.72 -1.59 -0.65 0.58
FFTF Model 0.23 -0.04 -0.07 0.27 -0.31 -0.31
Panel E: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 2)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral Vs Low
Mean Prop. Mean Prop. Mean Prop.
Market Adjusted -0.00 -0.37 -1.42 -1.31 -1.46 0.94
Mean Adjusted -3.51a -2.03b -4.24a -3.55a -1.15 1.54
Size Adjusted -0.50 0.08 -2.23a -1.66c -1.78c 1.74
MTBV Model -0.80 -0.26 -2.43 -1.85c -1.67c 1,59
FFTF Model -0.87 -0.15 -2.31" -1.09 4.41 0.94
Panel F: Pairwise Test of Differences in Means and Proportions (Event Window 3)
High vs Neutral High vs Low Neutral vs Low
Mean Prop. Mean Prop. Mean Prop.
Market Adjusted -0.77 -1.42 -2.00" -2.26b -1.29 0.84
Mean Adjusted -2.75a -3.17a -3.80a -3.39a -0.32 0.22
Size Adjusted -0.93 -1.24 -2.59a -2.34a -1.76c 1.10
MTBV Model -1.24 -1.15 -2.57 -2 .02b -1.40 0.86
FFTF Model -1.13 -0.69 -2.34" -2.15" -1.26 1.45
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CHAPTER SIX
SOURCES OF POST-ACQUISITION VALUE CREATION:
THEORY, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND HYPOTHESES
6 INTRODUCTION
The literature on takeovers has shown that acquisitions have been driven by a number
of different motives. Jensen and Ruback (1983) concluded that, "knowledge of the
sources of takeover gains still elude us". To date we have not yet conclusively
determined the sources of takeover gains and our knowledge in this area is incomplete.
We have seen from the discussion in Chapter 2 that the vast bulk of previous studies
examining corporate acquisitions have attempted to answer the question of whether
takeovers were value creating. As such these studies concentrated on the average
wealth experiences of all shareholders. We have also seen from the discussion in
Chapter 3 and the empirical evidence in Chapter 5 that the mood of the bid is an
important variable which determines the announcement period and long run post-
acquisition returns. In this chapter we review the literature relating to the sources of
post-acquisition value creation.
The literature dealing with the sources of post-acquisition value creation is vast but
nevertheless it can be categorised into four main theories: efficiency, wealth transfer,
mis-valuation and strategic theories. These classifications are by no means unique and
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are used purely for simplicity. This chapter intends to review the literature concerning
efficiency, mis-valuation and wealth transfer theories'. From the literature review we
are able to identify areas which require further research, especially for the UK, and
hence develop our hypotheses.
6.1 EFFICIENCY THEORY
A popular rationale for corporate takeovers is to exploit efficiencies or synergies
between the target and bidder firm. Synergy is simply the ability of two firms to
increase their performance through combining their activities. Efficiency theory
suggests that mergers have a potential for social benefit and will result in the realisation
of available synergies, which can be operational, financial or managerial in nature. The
realisation of synergy from takeovers is usually referred to as the "2 + 2 > 4" effect.
6.1.1 OPERATIONAL SYNERGY
Proponents of operational synergy argue that once the target and bidder firms combine
their operations, average costs will fall. There are two reasons why this may occur: the
first is due to economies of scale and the second to economies of scope. Economies of
scale arise because of indivisibilities. As initial overhead costs are spread over larger
volumes of output, unit production costs begin to fall. As production rises the marginal
cost falls and with it the average cost also falls with consequent increasing returns to
the producer. Economies of scale can be obtained from overhead costs such as
1 We do not review the literature relating to strategy theories for takeovers because they are not empirically
tested in this study.
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. investment in plant and machinery, research and development, marketing, Purchasing
or inventory management etc.
The second source of operational synergy is economies of scope which arises when a
multi-product firm is able to produce or sell two separate goods at a cost which is
lower than the combined cost of producing, or selling, these goods by two single
product firms. In order to realise economies of scope the two products must share
some common inputs which are quasi-public in nature 2. Hence, once these common
inputs are acquired to produce one product they must be costlessly available for use in
producing the other product. Additionally, the two products must share factors of
production which are imperfectly divisible. So that, for instance, the production of one
product leaves excess capacity which can be diverted costlessly to the production of
the other product. For example, an electronics company that is producing mobile
telephones has the experience to do research, production and marketing of related
electronic products that use the same or similar facilities.
The empirical evidence examining takeover gains due to operational synergy find
mixed results. Studies such as Singh and Montgomery (1987) which examine a sample
of 105 US takeovers between the period 1975 to 1979 find evidence to support
operational synergy. This study finds higher abnormal returns in related takeovers than
in unrelated takeovers . Also, the standardised dollar gains are much higher for related
takeovers than for unrelated takeovers. Rather different results are reported by Seth
(1990) for a sample of 104 tender offers completed during the period 1962 to 1979.
2 The quasi-public nature of the good is essential to generate economies of scale because it allows for a
sharing of resources between the production/sale of the goods in question. If the production/sale of a good
was totally private then no sharing of resources is possible.
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The results show that the combined bidder and target gains are higher in related than in
unrelated takeovers. However, Seth (1990) finds little support for the argument that
related takeovers lead to greater synergistic gains. Similar results are reported by
Sluslcy and Caves (1991) who examine 100 US takeovers during the period 1986 to
1988. The study finds that in 52% of the cases the target and bidder firms are in related
areas of business. However, the results show there to be only a weak relationship
between the premium paid to target firm shareholders and industrial relatedness.
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) examine synergistic gains accruing to single and
multiple bidders measured by the change in the total bidder and target shareholder
wealth. The authors find that successful tender offers generate significant synergistic
gains for both the target and bidder firms. Bradley et al. (1988) argue that in a multiple
bid the successful bidder has to offer a price which is close, if not higher than, that of
the rival bidder. The competition to acquire the target forces rival bidders to increase
the price that they are prepared to pay, and hence Bradley et al. conclude "total
synergistic gains are larger in multiple bidder acquisitions". This may explain why
target firm shareholders in takeovers with multiple bidders receive greater wealth gains
relative to those with single bidders. Of course, the higher wealth gains received by the
target firm shareholders are made at the expense of the acquiring firms but also from
associated synergistic gains due to the nature of the merger.
In summary one can say that takeovers may allow the merging firms to reduce their
post-acquisition operating costs due to economies of scale and scope. By their very
nature, economies of scale and scope are easier to realise in related rather than
unrelated mergers. The empirical evidence examining the impact of related takeovers
on the performance of the bidder firm tends to find mixed results. However, if related
takeovers do create value for the acquirer then we expect hypothesis 1 to be
228
supported.
Hypothesis 1 
Shareholders of acquirers experience significantly greater wealth gains in related
than in unrelated takeovers due to operational synergies.
6.1.2 FINANCIAL SYNERGY
The second type of synergy that can motivate takeovers is to exploit financial aspects
of the bidder and target firms. There are three sources of financial synergy: tax gains
from unused debt capacity, growth opportunities and coinsurance. Lewellen (1971)
suggests that a merger between two firms with differing cash flows could result in
financial synergies due to the reduced risk of default on the outstanding debt of the
combined firm. However, as Galai and Masulis (1976) point out, in the absence of any
increase in cash flow as a result of the merger, the reduction in the probability of
default will result in a transfer of wealth from the shareholders to the debt holders. In
the presence of taxes (which have the ability to alter a firm's debt management
decisions) and bankruptcy costs, the reduction in the default risk of the combined firm
could increase the cash flow of the combined firm.
The reduction in the probability of default will increase the debt capacity of the
combined firm. Since interest expenses are tax deductible, the increased use of debt
could result in an increase in the value of the firm. The value of shareholder wealth
would increase if the cash flow increase from the tax subsidy on debt is greater than
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the wealth transfer to the debt holders. Stapleton (1982) uses the option pricing model
to show that where bankruptcy costs are significant, the decrease in the default risk of
the firm will reduce the expected value of the bankruptcy costs. The decrease in the
expected value of bankruptcy costs increases the debt capacity of the firm and
consequently increases the expected value of the tax savings from the increased use of
debt.
The ability of the bidder firm to carry out a takeover to exploit tax advantages or at
least to reduce tax payments is simply a transfer of wealth from the governments to the
shareholders3 . Unlike other forms of financial synergy, taxation is very complicated and
the actual scope for exploiting this in the UK is limited (Sudarsanam, 1995:chl 0). Bad
tax planning may be costly for the firm. It is not necessarily the case that good tax
planning will add any value to the acquisition. Although the scope for exploiting tax
benefits may be limited in the UK, it nevertheless has an effect on the bid premium paid
by bidders to target firm shareholders, due to Capital Gains Tax (CGT). According to
UK law the gains from the sale of shares is taxable unless the recipient receives the
shares as payment whereby it is 'rolled over' until they are sole'.
A conglomerate merger involves two firms in unrelated types of business activity.
Financial synergy through increase in the debt capacity of the merged firm is more
likely to be realised when the cash flow of the bidder and the target are not related.
Myers and Majluf (1984) refer to this as the complementary fit between a 'slack rich'
3 This is discussed in greater detail in section 6.3.2.
See Sudarsanam (1995) chapter 10 and Section 85 of the Capital gains Tax Act 1979.
5 The tax rules for qualifying corporate bonds are different to those for shares.(see Sudarsanam, 1995:ch15).
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bidder (i.e. with a low gearing level) and 'slack poor' target (i.e. with high gearing
level). According to their model the bidder has surplus funds but an absence of positive
net present value investment opportunities. On the other hand the target has a deficit of
funds but positive net present value investment opportunities. The merger of these two
firms can correct the mismatch between resources and investment opportunities
leading to positive gains for both bidder and target firms.
Empirical evidence such as that by Nielsen and Melicher (1973) shows that the
premium paid to a target is much larger when the cashflow of the bidder is greater than
that of the target. The explanation for this is a redeployment of capital from the bidder
to the target firm. Another feature of financial synergy is the ability to carry out
investments using internal funds. Nickell (1978) argues that the ability to capture
unexpected investment opportunities is related to the size of internal funds. Markham
(1973) finds that in a sample of 30 large mergers, the post-merger investment outlay
rose by 220% compared to the pre-merger period supporting the view that mergers
improve investment opportunities. Sudarsanam et al. (1996) explicitly investigate the
hypothesis that a merger will bring about greater investment opportunities for the
acquirer for a sample of 429 UK takeovers during the period 1979 and 1989. The
authors carried out a multiple regression and found that a merger between firms with
contrasting levels of financial resources and investment opportunities was value
creating for both bidder and target shareholders.
Even if post-acquisition investment opportunities are not financed by internal funds,
the merged firm has a greater ability to raise external finance. Higgins and Schall
(1975) find that in mergers involving bidders and targets with non-correlated cash
flows, debt coinsurance increased to the benefit of the bondholders and at the expense
of the shareholders. However, Galai and Masulis (1976) state that this unequal benefit
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arising to bondholders can be evened out by increasing the leverage of the combined
firms. The obvious effect of increasing borrowing is the tax saving resulting from the
savings in tax payments, as interest payments are a tax deductible item. Where the
merging companies have differing levels of unused debt capacity then a takeover will
benefit both the target and bidder due to the tax advantage of debt. If unused debt is a
motivating factor for takeovers then we expect hypothesis 2 to be supported.
Hypothesis 2
Shareholders of acquirers experience significant wealth gains due to financial
synergy when either one of the merging firms has unused debt capacity.
6.1.3 MANAGERIAL SYNERGY
Managerial synergy arises when a more efficient management team acquires a
company, in order to replace an inefficient management team or to force the existing
management team to follow profit maximising policies. This idea of efficient managers
replacing inefficient managers is formalised by Jensen and Ruback (1983) who view
the market for corporate control as an arena in which managers compete for the right
to control the resources of a firm. Efficient managers will compete for, and acquire the
resources of, less efficient managers (Manne, 1965).The transfer of control from
inefficient to more efficient managers can take place in two ways. The first is where the
inefficient managers see the error of their ways and voluntarily decide to leave or
arrange a merger. In the second case the managers tend to be entrenched and refuse to
leave or mend their ways. The reluctance of incompetent managers to leave can be
explained by the loss in benefits that they would have to give up as a result of the
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change. In this case the incompetent managers may prevent what • can be a profitable• 
merger so that they can maintain their position and benefits. One of the mechanisms for
removing incompetent managers under these conditions is through a hostile takeover.
The managerial competition model assumes that managerial skills can be transferred
from one firm to another. However, this may not always be the case and is dependent
on the type of managerial skill. Rosen (1972) separated managerial skills into three
types (i.e. firm specific, industry specific and generic managerial skill). Each firm's
specific managerial skill refers to those which are acquired when management become
familiar with the its particular production arrangements, control systems, employee
characteristics, 'political' culture etc. These managerial skills are firm specific and
cannot be easily transferred to other firms through a merger. The transfer of firm
specific skills could be feasible in horizontal mergers, although the problems involved
in imposing the cultural environment of one firm onto another firm could make such a
transfer very difficult. Firm specific skills would probably not be transferable in vertical
or conglomerate mergers.
Industry specific managerial skills refer to the skills managers acquire through
familiarity with the production, technological and marketing functions in their specific
industries. These skills can be transferred within an industry through a merger.
Horizontal and vertical mergers represent the main vehicles for the transfer of industry
specific managerial skills. Next, one has generic managerial skills which refer to the
general competence of managers in the management functions of production planning,
financial control, personnel supervision, marketing etc. Generic managerial skills are
the skills most easily transferred through a merger. A practical question arising from
the managerial competition model is why the shareholders of the inefficient target firms
do not replace their own managers, rather than wait for a bidder firm to appear and
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replace inefficient managers. A possible answer to this lies in the nature of the
managerial skills which are being transferred between firms. The overall competence of
management results from the managers working as a team. The team effect results
from managers obtaining information about the talents and skills of individual
employees and then matching each employee to other employees with complementary
skills and talents. This team effect cannot be easily transferred through the labour
market, by the hiring of individual managers.
Weston et al. (1990) suggest reasons why the team effect is more important in the
transfer of industry specific managerial skills than in the transfer of generic managerial
skills. First, a smaller team size is needed to produce generic managerial services, than
that to produce managerial resources related to production, technology and marketing.
Hence, the organisation of a managerial team for control and planning would take less
time than that required for other managerial services. This suggests that it is easier to
replace inefficient generic managerial teams than managerial teams providing other
services. Second, information on senior managers who perform the generic services of
planning and control is more public than on managers who perform the production and
marketing functions. This suggests that the labour market for senior managers will be
more responsive to firm performance than for middle and lower ranking managers.
Therefore, it will be senior managers who will be more likely to be replaced as
opposed to middle or junior managers.
As we have seen from the discussion above that managerial synergy arises when a
more efficient management team acquirers an inefficiently managed company. This
assumes that managerial skills can be transferred from one company to another. We
use the relative valuation ratio of the bidder and target firms to proxy for superior
managerial efficiency of the acquirer (see section 7.2.2). If the motivating factor behind
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a takeover is to acquire inefficiently managed firms then hypothesis 3 should be
supported.
Hypothesis 3
Shareholders of acquirers with a high valuation ratio relative to the target firm
experience significant wealth gains due to the impact of superior managerial
efficiency managerial efficiency of the bidder.
6.2 DISCIPLINE
Takeovers have been argued to perform two functions in an economy. In the first case
takeovers allow the merging firms to realise synergistic gains (which we discuss in
sections 6.1.1 to 6.1.3) or benefit from a transfer of wealth (which we discuss in
sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.3). The second function that takeovers perform in an economy is
to transfer the ownership and control of an unsuccessful firm to a more successful or
efficient firm. The second function of takeovers is more often referred to as the, 'the
market for corporate control' (Manne, 1965). In this way mergers are a way in which
underperforming firms can be taken over by better performing ones. The literature
surveyed in Chapter 2 indicates that target firms tend to suffer wealth losses prior to
the announcement of a bid (see Asquith, 1983). This implies that target firms tend to
be under-performing companies which are taken over by more efficient firms. In a
recent article, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine firm performance and agency
control mechanisms. This study shows that better firm performance is associated with
fewer takeovers while poor performing firms are more likely to be taken over.
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Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that the relationship between the firm's management
and shareholders is governed by formal contracts. However, the firm is dynamic and no
contract can include every single future eventuality and, in time, these contracts
become outdated. When contracts become outdated then managers have the ability to
carry out actions at their discretion which may not be in best interests of the
shareholders. In this case, takeovers provide the best possible mechanism by which
inefficient managers can be removed and the ability to renegotiate contracts. In this
respect, acquisitions can be disciplinary because they restrict the extent to which
managers can carry out self-serving actions which lower the value of the firm and make
takeovers more profitable. The self-serving nature of the managers may not be an
immediate response to outdated contracts but partly due to information symmetry, in
that managers have superior information regarding the firm compared to shareholders.
This information asymmetry leads to an incomplete contract and hence gives rise to
managerial inefficiency (Harris and Raviv,1979). Shareholders are not able to
distinguish between managerial inefficiency and environmental factors for the low
value of their company.
Morck et al. (1986b) argue that friendly bids are synergistic in nature while hostile bids
are disciplinary. Therefore, previous studies examining the impact of disciplinary
takeovers on the post-acquisition performance of acquirers tend to focus their
attention on hostile takeovers which we review in section 3.4. The empirical studies
which examine acquirers in hostile bids find mixed results for both the UK and the US.
Franks et al. (1991) amongst others show that hostile acquirers experience lower
abnormal returns at the time of the bid-announcement than non-hostile acquirers. In
contrast to this Gregory (1997); Higson and Elliott (1998); Barnes (1998) amongst
others find that hostile acquirers experience higher abnormal returns than non-hostile
acquirers.
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Franks and Mayer (1996) adopt a slightly different method from previous studies in
examining the disciplinary nature of takeovers by investigating the pre-bid target
performance. This study finds that in the five years prior to the bid-announcement
targets in hostile takeovers experience abnormal losses of 0.14%. This is somewhat
different from a control sample of firms which experience abnormal gains of 0.14%. In
the case of targets in agreed bids the five year pre-bid abnormal returns are 5.53%
compared to 4.53% for the control sample. For the period two years prior to the bid-
announcement targets in agreed takeovers tend to experience very different abnormal
returns to the control sample. In the case of targets in agreed takeovers the abnormal
returns are 7.75% while for the control sample the abnormal returns are -7.84%. In the
case of targets in hostile bids the abnormal returns are -6.09% while it is 2.26% for the
control sample over the same period.
Franks and Mayer (1996) find targets in hostile bids continue to underperform the
control sample in the year preceding the bid-announcement. In the case of targets in
hostile bids the abnormal returns are -7.68% while for the control sample it is 7.9%.
Franks and Mayer (1996) also find that targets in friendly takeovers tend to not only
experience higher abnormal returns than the control sample but targets in hostile
takeovers. Franks and Mayer (1996) do not examine the impact of pre-bid target
performance on the post-acquisition wealth gains of the acquirer. However, if pre-bid
target firm under-performance does have a positive impact on the post-acquisition
shareholder wealth of the acquirer then we expect hypothesis 4 to be supported.
Hypothesis 4
Shareholders of acquirers who take over a target, which has under-performed
the general stock market index, experience significant wealth gains due to the
disciplinary nature of the acquisition.
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6.3 WEALTH TRANSFER THEORY
Wealth transfer theory suggests that acquisitions do not result in any increase in net
social benefit. Gains to one group of participants in an acquisition are the result of
losses suffered by another group of participants. Wealth transfers could be either inter-
shareholder in nature (i.e. transfers from bidder to target shareholders or vice-versa) or •
shareholders could gain at the expense of other third parties. External third parties who
could be subsidising the gains to shareholders include customers through increased
monopoly power, government through reduced taxes, and labour through lower wages
or loss of jobs.
6.3.1 WEALTH TRANSFER FROM CUSTOMERS
Wealth transfers from customers can result when takeovers are undertaken in order to
exploit increases in market power (i.e. market concentration). Abnormal profits from
increased market power could arise from a number of sources. First, market
concentration can reduce competition in the industry. In an industry with a high level
of market concentration, firms will recognise the impact of their actions and policies
upon one another. Recognition of the interdependence between their actions and
reactions will lead to a situation of tacit collusion. As a result, prices in the industry
will be higher than would be the case if competition was unfettered.
A firm with a large market share could aim to deter potential entrants from its markets.
At the most basic level the firm could use predatory pricing to force out its
competitors or to prevent new entrants coming into the market. A firm engaged in
predatory pricing could cross-subsidise products. Profits made in one market could be
used to subsidise a fight for market share in another market - the practice known as
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cross-subsidisation. Such a strategy could form the rationale for a conglomerate
acquisition.
Porter (1979) points out that the long run rate of return in an industry is a function of
its underlying structure. An industry with an above average rate of return will be
characterised by high barriers to entry, lack of substitute products, stable rivalry among
competitors and customers with limited bargaining power. The ability of a firm to gain
abnormal profits from increased market power will be dependent on the structure of
the industry permitting such excess profits. The reasons for this are obvious because
the consumer surplus is reduced and transferred to the producer in the form of
producer surplus'.
The empirical evidence looking at the monopoly motive for mergers tends to be rather
mixed. Eckbo (1983); Stillman (1983); Jensen (1984) and Eckbo and Weir (1985) find
no evidence to support the hypothesis that the drive for monopoly profits is an
important determinant for mergers. Stillman (1983) studies a sample of eleven
horizontal mergers which are challenged by the anti-trust enforcement agencies. The
study examines the share price performance of rival firms to those challenged by the
Federal Trade Commission. It is assumed that if the challenged mergers are 'socially
inefficient' then any news that improves the likelihood of a takeover (such as approval
from the FTC) will affect the share price of rival firms. The results show that in nine of
the eleven cases the rivals to the merging firms experience no abnormal returns on
either days which increase or reduce the probability of a merger. In the final case the
Consumer surplus is the difference between what the consumer is willing to pay and what he actually pays.
If the price is increased, the consumer surplus is naturally reduced although not all the difference is
transferred to the producer, because at a higher price, a lower quantity will be purchased. This leads to the
problem of dead weight loss, i.e. consumer surplus that has been lost due to an increase in price.
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results show a mixed pattern of abnormal returns. A similar methodology is adopted by
Eckbo (1983) but on a larger sample. Again, the results show that the performance of
rival firms could not lead one to assume mergers tend to produce monopoly profits.
Scott (1982) finds that at high levels of market concentration, the exploitation of
market power is a strong motive for takeovers. The study categorises the sample of
firms by using two measures: contact and seller concentration ratio. The former refers
to the probability of overlap between the pair of firms in different markets while the
latter is the extent to which the four largest firms in the industry dominate the market
(i.e. four firm concentration ratio). The results show that for firms with a high contact
(i.e. overlapping activities) and high levels of market concentration, profits are
expected to increase by 8.2%. For firms with low contact and low market
concentration the increase in profit is expected to be 5.5%. For high contact and low
market concentration the expected increase in profit is 4.2% while for high market
concentration and low contact it was 4.2%. High concentration by itself is not
sufficient to increase profits - only when it is combined with high market concentration
is there a significant positive effect on profits. Similarly, high market concentration, in
itself; is of little effect and needs a high level of contact to increase profits.
Scott's (1982) results are supported by Feinberg (1985) who investigated the
hypothesis that multimarket contacts among firms have the potential to lead to
collusion in one or more of these markets'. Using a sample of 466 US industrial firms
in 229 categories in 1976, the study analysed the effect on sales at a company and
industry level'. The results showed that with an increase in market concentration by the
7 This hypothesis was first proposed by Edwards (1955).
The precise definition of sales used was the 'sales at risk measure' which weights the number of
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firm, along with at least a 'moderate' level of overlapping markets, sales had a
significantly positive effect on its price/cost margins. However, at the industry level
there was little, if any, evidence to show that price/margins increased as a result of
firms with overlapping markets and market concentration joining forces.
In the UK, the Monopolies Act of 1948 and the Fair Trading Act of 1973 limit the
extent to which a firm can control the market in which it operates. On the
announcement of a takeover bid the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) carries out a
preliminary study to assess if there are any grounds for an investigation by the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC)". It was felt that industrial
concentration was a severe problem in the UK and in 1978 a government sponsored
study was carried out. The results of this study found that over half the industrial
concentration in British industry since the late 1950s has been due to mergers (Hannah
and Kay, 1977).
Franks and Harris (1989) examined a sample of 75 UK mergers referred to the MMC
between 1965 and 1986. On the month of the bid announcement, the average return
for targets and bidders in MMC referrals was 15% and 0% respectively, both being
significant at the 5% level. On the month of the referral the abnormal returns were -8%
and -1% for targets and bidders respectively. Bids which were later accepted tended to
have lower abnormal returns of -9% and 0% for targets and bidders respectively.
While bids which were later rejected the abnormal returns were -8% and 0%
overlapping markets for a pair of companies by the sales that are at stake in each of these areas of business.
9 In fact, both announced bids and consummated mergers can be referred to the MMC although it is very rare
for the latter.
l ° The manner in which MMC referrals are made is discussed in detail by Cooke (1986:ch5) and Sudarsanam
(1995:ch5) .
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respectively. However, in the month that the MMC report was made public the pattern
changed with targets and bidders in accepted bids experiencing abnormal returns of 2%
each. Targets and bidders in rejected bids, on the other hand, experienced abnormal
returns of -9% and 1% respectively.
For the whole sample of referrals the abnormal returns in the month of the report was
published were -3% and 1% for targets and bidders respectively. Only target firm
returns are significant at the 5% level for both the month of referral and publication of
the MMC report. These results suggest that MMC rejections do lead to a loss in
shareholder value but it is wholly borne by the target firm implying that it is they who
benefit from any increase in monopoly power. If takeovers do lead to a transfer in
wealth from customers to the acquirer firm shareholders then we would expect
hypothesis 5 to be supported.
Hypothesis 5
Shareholders of acquirers who transfer post-acquisition wealth from customers
to the bidder firm will experience significant wealth gains.
6.3.2 WEALTH TRANSFER FROM THE GOVERNMENT
Mergers aimed at exploiting tax minimising opportunities will result in a transfer of
wealth from the government to the acquirer firm shareholders. There are a number of
inducements in tax legislation which can encourage companies to merge or otherwise
expand by acquisition. The principle distortions in the tax system which encourage
mergers include the bias against dividend income, the carry over of trading losses and
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tax credits and the bias against earnings from foreign sources.
Prior to the 1988 Finance Act, dividend income attracted a higher marginal rate of tax
than capital gains income. A shareholder in the highest income tax band would pay a
marginal tax rate of 40% on any income received from the company as dividends. If
the income could be converted into capital gains the appropriate marginal rate of
income tax would then have to be paid by the shareholder. This distortion in the tax
system encouraged companies to retain profits in the firm rather than pay out
dividends. This can be a. particularly acute problem in the case of a private company.
The owners of a private company can accumulate profits in the company at moderate
corporation tax rates. The company can then be sold at a value lower than the market
value of its assets provided the price obtained (after capital gains tax) was greater than
the after tax value of annual dividends and directors' fees.
In the case of quoted companies, a mature bidder firm with few investment
opportunities can embark on an acquisition program using the retained profits which
are now equivalent to low cost capital as no interest payments need to be paid". This
can lead to bidders either overpaying for targets or investing in negative net present
value acquisitions. A rational use of these excess cash resources would arise when the
bidder acquires a growth firm requiring continued capital investment. The bidder
supplies the necessary capital investment and can later sell the acquired firm to realise
capital gains.
Of course one still has the opportunity cost (i.e. the risk free rate) but this is likely to be lower than the rate
the firm would have to pay to borrow an equivalent amount from a bank.
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Group relief of trading losses allows the trading losses of one firm to be used to shelter
the taxable profits of another if they become members of the same group resulting in a
net gain at the expense of the governrnent 12 . In order to qualify for group relief of
trading losses, two companies have to be members of the same group. The following
must also apply:
1) The parent company owns 75% of the shares of the subsidiary company; and
2) The parent company is entitled to 75% of the profits available for distribution to
the shareholders of the subsidiary; and
3) The parent company is entitled to 75% of the assets available for distribution on a
winding up of the subsidiary.
Trading losses can only be surrendered to other companies in the group if they were
incurred after joining the group. This implies that trading losses incurred by a target
before joining the group can only be carried forward and used to shelter any future
taxable profits arising from a turnaround in the target's profitability (Cooke
1986:ch11).
Jones and Taggart (1984) argue in favour of a life cycle model of firm ownership
whereby young companies have high costs, such as operating costs or research and
development. On the other hand, the mature companies have rather low costs
compared to their turnover and have few taxable allowances. In this case the mature
firm can purchase the young firm and claim taxable allowances. This form of tax is only
12 For an extensive discussion of UK tax and accounting rules relating to takeovers see Cooke (1986:ch11
and 12), Salami (1994:ch3) and Sudarsanam (1995: ch10).
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• optimal where one party pays a higher effective rate of tax while the other pays a low
rate of tax. If the reduction in the tax charge is a motivating factor behind takeovers
then we expect to find support for hypothesis 6.
Hypothesis 6
Shareholders of acquirers who reduce the post-acquisition tax charge experience
significant wealth gains due to a transfer of wealth from the government to the
bidder firm.
6.3.3 WEALTH TRANSFER FROM LABOUR
In recent years there has been a considerable amount of attention on the transfer of
wealth from employees to shareholders. A well known example of wealth transfer from
employee to bidder firm shareholders is the case of Icahn and TWA /3 . Shleifer and
Summers (1988) considered the TWA-Icahn merger and found that under Icahn there
was an average annual transfer of wealth from the unionised labour to shareholders of
US$210 million. This transfer of wealth from employees to shareholders was achieved
in a number of ways. First, Icahn signed a contract with the three unions representing
the unionised workers which restricted any reduction in operations, pilot layoffs or
aircraft sales. However, Icahn did not honour the contract and labour was reduced at
the company headquarters, aircraft leases were not renewed and one airplane was sold,
and labour costs were dropped through wage reductions. Pilots who had previously
l 'Icahn did not actually buy the whole of TWA but only 40% of the equity but nevertheless he managed to
transfer wealth from employees to shareholders.
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been paid US$90,000 (including benefits) took a 30% reduction leading to a saving of
US$100 million.
Icahn replaced experienced flight attendants earning US$35,000 by inexperienced ones
who were paid only US$18,000 (those flight attendants who remained had to accept
the lower wage) leading to a saving of US$60 million. Third, machinists previously
paid US$38,000 had to accept a 15% reduction in salary leading to a saving of US$50
million. Shleifer and Summers (1988) argued that one and a half times the bid premium
can be explained by transfers from employees to bidder firm shareholders. The authors
argued that these transfers, "were an explicit part of the justification for the
acquisition".
To some extent the transfer from employees to bidder firm shareholders can be
considered to be a 'breach of trust'. Shleifer and Summers (1988) refer to a breach of
trust where, as a consequence of a merger, investments made by the employees of the
target firm in order to achieve efficiency gains are not fully rewarded because the
bidder firm refuses to acknowledge previous implicit contracts. This refusal by the
bidder firm to acknowledge previous contracts allows it to renege on them and
expropriate the rents from employees to shareholders. Therefore, target firm managers
committed to upholding employee benefits or claims will not be willing to redistribute
them to the bidder firm shareholders. As a result, these managers will resist a takeover
leading to a possible hostile takeover. Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that
takeovers which transfers wealth from employees to shareholders have to be hostile.
The greatest potential of a transfer (hence breach of contract) from target firm
employees to bidder firm shareholders is when the hostile takeover is a complete
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surprise. If target firm employees suspect that a takeover is imminent then the implicit
contracts become worthless as the managers who enter into them will be removed. The
value of the implicit contracts is as good as the ability of the target firm management to
resist a hostile takeover. Of course, target firm employees can remedy this situation by
converting their implicit contracts to explicit ones. The latter limit the ability of the
bidder firm to breach these contracts without financial penalties.
The TWA/Icahn episode is perhaps the most well-known example of a transfer of
wealth from the employees to the shareholders, but not the only one. Brown and
Medoff (1988) argue that a takeover does not necessarily imply future 'doom' for the
employees, largely due to a better management. The authors use the Michigan
Employment Security Commission data file for the period 1978 to 1984. The results
show that three years after the takeover, wages in the firms involved were 5% lower
than the expected value. For asset only acquisitions the wages rose by 5% more than
the predicted level. Firms involved in amalgamations had 4% lower wages than
expected. Somewhat different results are obtained when looking at the level of
employment, with a 9% improvement for firms involved in a takeover. Asset-only
acquisitions had 5% lower employment while amalgamations improved by 2%14.
In the Shleifer and Summers (1988) framework the mood of the takeover is very
important in determining the transfer of wealth from employees to bidder firm
shareholders. They argue that the results obtained by the Brown and Medoff (1988)
study is reflective of small and friendly takeovers as opposed to their sample of hostile
takeovers. They also raise the question of white knights which are not hostile
14 The authors accept that they use a very crude measure of employment i.e. number of people on the payroll.
Also, the results for both employment and wage rates are very sensitive to the year of takeover.
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otherwise they would not receive the recommendation of the target firm management.
On the other hand, white knights pay more than the hostile bidder to gain control of
the target yet they 'seem' to be constrained by the level of management improvement
(i.e. breach of contract) they can carry out. Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that it
is most probable that white knights do carry out some form of breach of contract but
cannot find any theory to support this claim. If a transfer of wealth from employees to
the bidder firm is a motivating factor behind the takeover then we expect support for
hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 7
Shareholders of acquirers who reduce post-acquisition employee costs
experience significant wealth gains due to a transfer of wealth from employees to
the bidder firm.
6.4 MIS VALUATION THEORY
The mis-valuation theory suggests that the bidder places a different value on the target
from that by the market. One reason for the mismatch in valuation is that the bidder
may have private information which allows it to access the 'true' full potential of the
target firm. The bidder, therefore, places a higher value on the target firm's shares than
currently prevails in the market. The mis-valuation theory also suggests that differences
between the market value and the replacement cost of the target's assets could
motivate an acquisition. A firm wishing to add to existing capacity or diversify into a
new market might find it cheaper to acquire a target which has a Tobin's Q ratio less
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than one rather than investing in new plant and machinery from scratch 15 . If the target
has a Tobin's Q ratio of 0.7 and the bidder pays a premium over the market price of
30% in order to gain control of those assets, the cost price to the bidder of 0.7 times
1.3 which equals 0.91. This price to the bidder is still 9% below the cost of acquiring
the same assets at their replacement cost.
Lang, Stulz and Wallding (1989) examined target and bidder returns in relation to
Tobin's Q ratio. The authors argued that the Tobin's Q ratio is an increasing function of
the quality of a firm's current and expected future projects under the control of the
present management. They used a sample of 87 US mergers, including 27 hostile
takeovers, completed between 1968 and 1986. The Tobin's Q ratio is calculated in the
same manner as that by Lang and Litzenberger (1989). The univariate tests showed
that the average Tobin's Q ratio for all targets to be 0.845 in the year prior to takeover.
This result was broadly similar to that of Masbrouck (1985) and Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1988a) both of whom found a Tobin's Q ratio in the region of 0.886 for the
year prior to the takeover. More importantly, Lang et al.'s (1989) results showed that
target firms experienced declining Tobin's Q ratios for the five year period prior to
takeover.
Lang et al. (1989) found that the bidder firm abnormal returns were related to the
Tobin's Q ratios of the bidder and target firms. Shareholders of high Tobin's Q ratio
targets taken over by low Tobin's Q ratio bidders experienced abnormal returns which
were 14% lower than shareholders of low Tobin's Q ratio targets taken over by a high
15 Tobin's Q ratio is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm's total assets to the replacement cost of
these assets. A Tobin's Q ratio of less than one represents a firm with minimal or negative growth
opportunities while the opposite is true for a value greater than one. For the UK it is not possible to calculate
the Tobin's Q Ratio and is proxied using the valuation ratio see equation 7.3.
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Tobin's Q ratio bidder. An explanation for this may be that a well performing target
offers few, if any, opportunities for value increasing improvements. The combined
bidder and target abnormal returns, during the period -5 to +5 days, were 5% higher
when an acquirer with a high Tobin's Q ratio acquired a target with a low Tobin's Q
ratio compared to a target with a high Tobin's Q ratio. However, for the sample of
hostile bids the greatest gain occurs when a high Tobin's Q ratio bidder acquires a
similarly high Tobin's Q ratio target. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that a
combination of a high Tobin's Q ratio bidder and low Tobin's Q ratio target offer the
best opportunity to carry out value enhancing changes. With this exception the results
confirm the view that well managed bidders increase the value of poorly managed
targets while well managed targets benefit less than poorly managed targets.
Servaes (1991) investigated the Tobin's Q ratio of target and bidder firms in relation to
their abnormal returns at the time of announcement. Servaes (1991) used a sample of
704 targets and 384 bidders between the years 1972 and 1987. The bulk of the
mergers considered were friendly (82%) with cash being the dominant method of
payment (58%). Consistent with the literature, bidder CARs were -1.07%, while those
for the target were 23.6%, at the time of the bid announcement until effective or
delisting date. Using the Tobin's Q ratio for the year prior to the takeover, the study
found that the combination of bidder and target Tobin's Q ratio were important in
determining takeover gains. Servaes (1991) found that the greatest potential gain was
for bidders with a high Tobin's Q ratio taking over targets with a low Tobin's Q ratio
which is consistent with Lang et al. (1989). The least potential gain was when both
bidders and targets had a high Tobin's Q ratio. Servaes (1991) argued that these
results were not due to any spurious correlation between the Tobin's Q ratio and the
characteristics of the takeover but reflected the potential opportunities for creating
value enhancing changes.
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• More recently, Ho11 and Kyriazis (1996a) investigate the relationship between the
valuation ratio and post-acquisition acquirer performance 16 . The authors find that the
valuation ratio has a negative and statistically significant, at the 1% level, relationship
with post-acquisition acquirer returns. These results lead Ho11 and Kyriazis (1997a) to
conclude that bidders tend to acquire low valued target firms in order to reap wealth
gains. If the takeover of undervalued targets has a positive impact on the post-
acquisition acquirer performance then we expect hypothesis 8 to be supported.
Hypothesis 8
Shareholders of acquirers who take over under-valued firms experience
significant wealth gains due to target firm undervaluation.
6.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed the efficiency, wealth transfer and mis-valuation theories for
a bidder firm attempting to carry out a takeover. The efficiency theory is based around
the idea of creating synergy from a merger. There are operational synergies such as
economies of scale which arise due to the increase in output; financial synergies as in
the case of lower cost of finance and managerial synergy from improved management.
Wealth transfer theories argue that wealth can be transferred from customers,
governments, employees and target firm shareholders to bidder firm shareholders. The
mis-valuation theory argues that bidders place a very different value on the target than
16 Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) do not use Tobin's Q ratio but the valuation ratio due to the problem of
calculating the former ratio for the UK. A definition of the Suciarsanam et al. (1996) type valuation ratio is
given in Chapter 7.
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target firm shareholders. Our discussion of the theories and empirical evidence relating
to sources of value creation has allowed us to identify areas which require further
research especially for the UK. From this we have been able to develop our hypotheses
which are empirically tested in the next chapter. -
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SOURCES OF POST-ACQUISITION VALUE CREATION:
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
7 INTRODUCTION
One obvious reason why takeovers may take place is that the target firm is
undervalued and the acquirer firm places a higher value on it. However, target firm
undervaluation is not the only reason for takeovers and nor can it guarantee that
acquirer firm shareholders will receive positive post-acquisition abnormal returns. In
Chapter 5 we saw that almost half the number of acquirer firms have a positive long
run performance while the other half experience negative abnormal returns. If this is
the case then there have to be certain sources of post-acquisition value creation which
drive up the abnormal returns of some acquirers and not others.
The literature reviewed in Chapter 6 showed that despite over three decades of
research in the area of mergers and acquisitions no single theory can explain why they
occur. It is not only the lack of a single coherent theory driving mergers that eludes us
but also the factors which have the ability to increase acquirer firm shareholder wealth
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Sudarsanam et al.., 1996). Chapter 6 indicated various
sources of value creation in the literature which are reported to have either a positive
or negative effect on the acquirer firm share price. However, we do not know whether
these factors are important in driving up the long term value of the acquirer firm. In
particular, very few studies have investigated the long run performance of acquirers in
relation to the sources of value creation.
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The long run performance of acquirers can also be argued to be related to not only the
sources of value creation but also to the mood of the bid. We have seen from the
literature discussed in Chapter 2 that the mood of the takeover determines the division
of gains accruing to bidders and targets. Targets in hostile bids receive greater wealth
gains than those in friendly bids. At the same time, a bid with more than one bidder
creates an auction whereby the acquirer has to pay more than the other bidders to
purchase the target. This clearly increases the bid premium paid to target firm
shareholders while reducing the shareholder wealth of the acquirer. In Chapter 5 we
found that, in the long run, hostile acquirers tend to outperform friendly acquirers.
Acquirers in a multiple bid received greater wealth gains than friendly acquirers but not
as high as single hostile bidders.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argued that the difference between friendly and
hostile acquirers can be explained by their respective motivations. Hostile takeovers
are motivated by discipline while friendly takeovers are motivated by synergy. As
described in section 2.1.1, a white knight bidder does not neatly fit into either of these
two categories. On the one hand, it may not necessarily be motivated by synergy,
because if this was the case it would not have waited until a hostile bidder had been
identified. At the same time, as the white knight bidder has received the support of the
target firm, its disciplinary powers are not as strong as that of a hostile bidder. In this
respect it is difficult to ascertain the motivations of a white knight bidder.
In this chapter we empirically investigate the explanatory power of three different types
of post-acquisition sources of value creation, namely synergy, wealth transfer and
misvaluation, for our sample of UK acquirers consisting of friendly, hostile and white
knight acquirers. To avoid any problems associated with omitted variables we also use
a number of exogenous control variables which are discussed in Chapter 2. This
chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which discusses the methodological
issues relating to this chapter. The second section presents the definitions of the
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sources of value creation and control variables. The third section reports results of our
univariate tests. In the fourth section, we present our results from our estimation
models and compare them to previous studies.
7.1 METHODOLOGY
We attempt to estimate the relationship between the post-acquisition acquirer returns
and the sources of value creation within the context of the following estimation
model':
AR = f (SYNERGY, DISCIPLINE, WEALTH, MIS VAL, CONTROL) (7.1)
where:
AR = abnormal returns based on the winsorised market, mean, size, market to
book value and Fama and French Three Factor benchmark models during the
period -40 to +750 days2.
SYNERGY = synergistic sources of post-acquisition value creation.
DISCIPLINE = the disciplinary nature of the takeover.
WEALTH = wealth transfer sources of post-acquisition value creation.
MISVAL = target firm rnis-valuation.
CONTROL = control variables which represent the dynamic of the bid •
process.
I We discuss the justification for our proxies in chapter 6.
2 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the different models used in this study to estimate the abnormal returns.
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7.2 DEFINITION OF POST-ACQUISITION VALUE
CREATION VARIABLES
In Chapter 6 we identified a number of post-acquisition sources of value creation
which have the ability to affect the long term performance of acquirers. Below we
define these variables.
7.2.1 INDUSTRIAL RELATEDNESS (RELATE)
We use the variable RELATE as a dummy term which is equal to zero if the bidder and
target have the same three digit Standard Industrial Classification code (available from
Datastream) and one if the merging companies are unrelated.
7.2.2 RELATIVE TOBIN'S Q RATIO (RELQ)
The Tobin's Q ratio is defined as:
Market value of Total Assets Tobin' sQ ratio =
Replacement Cost of Total Assets
In the UK, it is impossible to calculate the Tobin's Q ratio as shown in equation 7.2
because there is no data on replacement cost of assets in place. Instead, previous
studies have tended to use a proxy for Tobin's Q such as the valuation ratio (VR)
which is defined as follows:
Market value of Equity + Book Value of Total Debt
VR =
Book value of Total Assets
(7.2)
(7.3)
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The valuation ratio has been argued to be a good proxy for Tobin's Q ratio and there have
been a number of studies in finance which have used it (see Smith and Watts, 1992; Gayer
and Gayer, 1993; Sudarsanam et al.., 1996). Smith and Watts (1992) have argued that one
method of assessing a firm's growth prospects is to consider its 'assets in place'. A firm
with a high proportion of its assets in place will have low growth opportunities and the
book value is a good 'surrogate' for this. Similar arguments have been made by Collins and
Kothari (1989) who claim that the difference between the market value and book value of
assets makes it an ideal proxy for a firm's future investment opportunities.
We use the variable RELQ to measure the relative managerial efficiency of the bidder and
target firms. RELQ is calculated as the logarithm of the valuation ratios of the bidder over
that of the target in the following manner:
log VR(Bidder) 
RELQ —
log VR(T arget)
where:
VRs of bidder and target are calculated as shown in equation 7.3.
7.2.3 ABSOLUTE GEARING RATIO (ABSGEAR)
We estimate the gearing ratio as the total liabilities of the firm divided by the book value of
total assets based on the accounts of the last financial year before the bid announcement3.
This can be expressed as follows:
TotalLiabilities
GearingRatio —
TotalAssets
3 After a merger the creditors of the merging firms now have the asset backing of both firms. The reduction
in the probability of default will allow the merged firm to increase the level of debt in its capital structure.
(7.4)
(7.5)
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We then calculate the absolute gearing ratio (ABSGEAR) as the absolute difference
between the bidder and target gearing ratios i.e.:
ABSGEAR= Absolutevalue of (Gearingratio of bidder- Gearingratio of target
(7.6)
Through ABSGEAR we attempt to proxy for the level of unused debt capacity as a source
of financial synergy4.
7.2.4 RELATIVE SIZE (RELSIZE)
The relative size of the bidder to the target firm is calculated as:
RELSIZE = Log Bidder's Market Capitalisation
Target's Market Capitalisation
where:
the market capitalisation is the share price multiplied by the number of outstanding
shares. Both variables are for the period three months prior to the bid
announcement. We carry out a log transformation to minimise the problem of
outliers.
7.2.5 TARGET FIRM PRE-BID SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE
(TARSH)
There are a number of ways in which firm performance can be measured such as sales
during a certain period. However, these measures are limited in that they take a micro
level view of the firm. The use of share prices avoids these problems and provides an
4 See section 6.1.2 for a discussion on financial synergy.
(7.7)
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objective market based measure of the firm's performance. We define pre-bid target
firm performance relative to the Financial Times All share as:
TARSH_ 15 _3 months = Target-15 to -3 months - Financial Times All Share Index-15 to -3 months
(7.8)
where:
the target firm return is calculated as the percentage change in the share price
during the period 15 months to three months prior to the bid announcement. We
measure the share price performance over a year in order to capture a long term
change in performance.
the FT All Share Index is calculated as the percentage change in the index during
the period 15 months to three months prior to the bid announcement.
7.2.6 WEALTH TRANSFER (PROMAR/ TAXRAT/ AVGSAL/
TARVAL)
We use the variable PROMAR to measure the change in post-acquisition profit margin of
the bidder firm and it is defined as:
PROMAR is the change in the acquirer's average operating profit margin during the
three year post-acquisition period compared to the weighted average of the
bidder's and target's profit margin in the three year pre-acquisition period.
(We do not include data for the year of the bid-announcement in either
group.) The operating profit margin is simply the ratio of the operating
profit over the total sales multiplied by one hundred. We denote an
improvement in the profit margin during the post-acquisition period by a
one and zero otherwise. The change in operating profit margin can be
expressed as shown in equation 7.9.
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TS + BS ) + (BOPM x
AOPM —[(TOPM x TS BS
TS + BS )] (7-9)
where:
AOPM is the post-acquisition acquirer operating profit margin
TOPM and BOPM are the pre-acquisition target and bidder operating profit
margins respectively.
TS and BS are the pre-acquisition target and bidder sales respectively.
In this study, we use the variable TAXRAT to measure the change in the post-acquisition
tax charge for the bidder firm which we define as:
TAXRAT is the change in the acquirer's average tax ratio in the three year post-
acquisition period compared to the weighted average of the bidder's and
target's tax charge in the three year pre-acquisition period. The tax ratio is
calculated as the total tax charge over the pre-tax profits. (We do not
include data for the year of the bid-announcement in either group.) We
denote an improvement in the tax rate (i.e. a fall in the tax charge) during
the post-acquisition period by a one and zero otherwise. This can be
expressed as shown in equation 7.10.
TPTP 
ATC—[(17'C x 	 (BTC x
	TPTP + BPTI-0-')+	 TPTPBP:BP PTP"
(7.10)
where:
ATC is the post-acquisition acquirer tax charge
TTC and BTC are the target and bidder tax charge respectively.
TPTP and BPTP are the target and bidder pre-tax profit respectively.
260
We use the variable AVGSAL to measure the change in real average salaries of employees.
We define AVGSAL as:
AVGSAL is the change in the acquirer's real average salary in the three year post-
acquisition period compared to the weighted average of the bidder's and
target's real average salary in the three year pre-acquisition period. This is
calculated as the total remuneration paid to employees (excluding board
members) adjusted by the annual change in the retail price index divided by
total number of employees including part time staff where available. (We do
not include data for the year of the bid-announcement in either group.) We
denote an improvement in the average salary per employee during the post-
acquisition period by a one and zero otherwise. This is expressed as
follows:
TNE	 BNE AAR - [(TTR x 	
-)+(B7Rx
	
)] (7.11)TNE + BNE
	 TNE + BNE
where:
AAR is the acquirer's post-acquisition average salary adjusted by changes in the RPI
TTR and BTR are the target and bidder total remuneration adjusted by changes in the RN.
TNE and BNE are the target and bidder total number of employees.
7.2.7 MIS VALUATION
We attempt to measure target firm valuation using the valuation ratio as a proxy for the
Tobin's Q ratio. We use a proxy due to the difficulty in calculating the Tobin's Q ratio for
the UK. Our definition of the valuation ratio is shown in equation 7.3.
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7.2.8 MOOD OF THE BID
In Chapter 3 we discuss the literature relating to the impact of the mood of the takeover
bid. In section 3.2 we define the different acquirer types we use in this study. In this chapter
we examine different acquirer types as in section 3.2, as well categorising them into four
broad groups namely: friendly, hostile, single or multiple bid. In the case of friendly bids
the bidder receives the recommendation of the target board management. In the case of
single bids the acquirer faces no competition from a second (or third) bidder in order to
acquire the target. We denote a friendly or single bid as one and a hostile or multiple bid as
zero. We can summarise the four broad acquirer groups as follows:
Friendly bid - bidder receives the recommendation of the target board either with
or without competition from other bidders.
ii	 Hostile bid - bidder wins despite resistance by the target management either with or
without competition from other bidders.
iii	 Single bid - the only bidder which may or may not receive the recommendation of
the target board.
iv	 Multiple bid - bidder wins in competition with other hostile bidders or a white
knight.
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7.3 DEFINITION OF CONTROL VARIABLES
The discussion in Chapter 2 suggests that there are several variables which have the
power to affect the long run performance of acquirers, as well as capture the dynamics
of the bid process. We include these variables so as to avoid any problems associated
with omitted variables in our model. In this section we define our use of these
variables.
7.3.1 METHOD OF PAYMENT (MOP)
In our review of the literature dealing with the method of payment, in section 2.4.2, we
saw that where target firm shareholders are given a choice they have to decide which
to accept.' The decision as to which offer to accept essentially rests on the ability of
the target firm shareholders to compare the value of one payment against another. For
example, the advantage of cash is that its value is known and does not fluctuate like
that of the bidder's equity since the post-acquisition value of the bidder's equity can go
up as well as down. From the bidder's point of view the method of payment has the
ability to affect announcement and post-acquisition acquirer performance with cash
offers leading to relatively superior returns compared to equity offers ( Servaes, 1991;
Limmack and McGregor, 1992; Salami, 1994). Previous studies have also shown that
the method of payment is reflective of the type of the bid where for the US equity
offers have been found to be associated with mergers while cash offers with tenders
(Travlos, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 1997). This study attempts to divide the method
of payment into three main categories:
i) Cash Offers:	 all cash and cash or debt offers
ii) Equity Offers:	 all equity offers
iii) Mixed	 Cash or Equity Offers (equity with a cash alternative) and
Cash and Equity Offers(equity plus cash offers).
5 For a discussion of the UK regulatory requirements regarding method of payment see Sudarsanam
(1995:ch6)
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7.3.2 BIDDER'S TOEHOLD (BIDTOE)
The pre-bid announcement shareholding (or toehold) in the target firm by the bidder
can increase the latter's bargaining strength (see section 2.4.1 for a discussion of
bidder's toehold). As a result, of this bidders with a toehold are expected to experience
relatively higher returns while targets experience lower returns (Walking, 1985;
Walking and Edminter, 1985; Franks and Harris, 1989). We use the variable B1DTOE
to measure the extent of the bidder firm's interest in the target firm which is defined as:
B1DTOE	 is the proportion of target firm shares held by the bidder firm three
months prior to the bid announcement.
7.3.3 FREE CASHFLOW (NPDA)
Finance literature has identified a number of ways of calculating the free cash flow (see
section 2.4.3 for a discussion of free cashflow. Our definition of free cash flow, which
is similar to that of Bowen et al.. (1981), is defined as:
OP — MI— TAXES — DIV + DEP
NPDA —
NA
where:
OP is the operating profit
MI is the minority interest
DIV is the dividend
DEP is the depreciation
NA is the net assets
(7.12)
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7.3.4 ECONOMIC CYCLE (ECOCYE)
Sudarsanam (1995:chl) shows that mergers usually take place in waves, which at
times coincide with a booming stock market and economy (see section 2.4.5 for a
discussion of business cycles) 6 . Pepper (1998) shows that there are a number of ways
to measure the economic cycle, such as: the GDP growth, leading or lagging
indicators, coincidental indicator and unfilled vacancies'. Each of these indicators show
the position of the economy in different time periods. For example, the leading
coincident indicator attempts to forecast the future position of the economy while the
lagging coincident indicator takes a retrospective view of the economy. In a similar
way, the growth in GDP and unfilled vacancies suffer from being backward looking
(i.e. report on past performance) due to the delay in reporting. This means that the best
measure of economic activity is the composite coincident indicator which includes a
number of macroeconomic factors and attaches a weighting based on their
importance'. In this study we identify the peaks and troughs in the coincident indicator
from the start of the economic cycle in 1980 to 1995 when our sample period ends.
Takeovers completed between the start and end of an economic boom (as shown in
Table 7.2) are denoted as 1 while those taking place between the start ZIY& tI14. 'Zk Z.
recessionary period are denoted as 0.
6 It may be the case for some companies that their pre-bid performance is reflected in the share price.
'Unfilled vacancies are jobs advertised at employment offices which remain vacant at the time of the survey.
For a definition of the coincident indicator see Table 7.2
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Table 7.2 Start and End Dates of UK Economic Cycles 1980 to 1995
Type of
Economic Cycle
Start Date
of Cycle
Coincidental
Indicator
End Date of
Cycle
Coincidental
Indicator
Boom 1981 Q1 93.33 1984 Q2 102.43
Recession 1984 Q3 100.67 1985 Q4 92.73
Boom 1986 Q1 93.50 1990 Q1 105.90
Recession 1990 Q2 104.80 1992 Q2 91.47
Boom 1992 Q3 93.03 1995 Q2 104.73
Recession 1995 Q3 103.00 1995 Q4 101.63
The composite coincident indicator is calculated and published, every quarter, by the
Office of National Statistics (ONS). The composition of the variables included in the
coincident indicator are not constant over time and change periodically. From 1986 to
1992, the coincident indicator included GDP (income based estimate), manufacturing
production, retail sales volume and proportion of companies which were operating
below capacity according to the Confederation of British Industry Trends Survey. In
1992, the coincident indicator was changed to include GDP (factor cost estimate),
industrial production, volume of retail sales, percentage change in stocks of materials
and proportion of companies operating below capacity. The latter two items are
obtained from the Confederation of British Industry Industrial Trends Survey.
Source: Pepper (1998)
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7.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE TESTS
Our aim here is to analyse the relationship between post-acquisition returns and sources of
value creation, and also to become familiar with our sample data. The first step towards
achieving this is to present descriptive statistics and carry out univariate tests in which we
compare the statistical significance of the difference in the median values between the
groups. We examine the data for all takeovers in our sample as well as for different acquirer
groups. Table 7.4 shows the descriptive statistics for the sources of value creation and
control variables for the whole sample of acquirers while Table 7.5 shows the same but for
different acquirer types. Table 7.6 shows the difference in means test across acquirer types.
Synergistic Variables
Table 7.4 shows that the bulk of takeovers in our sample tend to be between firms in
related industries. For the whole sample of acquisitions 68% were between firms in non-
related industries (1 refers to non-related takeovers). The median acquirer took over a firm
in a non-related sector. The proportion of related takeovers in our sample is slightly lower
than that of Sudarsanarn et al.. (1996) and Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) who investigate an
earlier time period of 1980 to 1990 and 1979 to 1989 respectively. Holl and Kyriazis
(1997a) find 40% of takeovers in their sample to be in related areas while it is only 34% in
the case of Sudarsanam et al.. (1996) . The mean relative valuation ratio for the whole
sample of acquirers is 0.04 with a median value of 0.1 and a standard deviation of 1. A high
standard deviation along with a median value greater than the mean implies that the data is
skewed to the right. This is not surprising as we predict that takeovers may be motivated by
the superior managerial efficiency of the bidder relative to the target. A higher bidder
valuation ratio relative to the target would be consistent with our prediction. However,
RELQ is much lower for our sample than that for Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) . and
Sudarsanam et al.. (1996) who find average values of 1.7 and 0.3 respectively.
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Table 7.4 Descriptive Statistics for the Sources of Post-Acquisition Value Creation:
The Full Sample
St.Dev refers to the standard deviation and No. of Obs refers to the number of
observations. The explanatory and control variables are defined in tables 7.1 and 7.3. The
acquirer types are defined in section 3.2 The number of observations is different for each
variable because complete data was not available for all of them. The source and definitions
of the data is provided in sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.7.
PANEL A: The Full Sample Excluding Method of payment
Variable MEAN MEDIAN St. Dev No. of Obs
RELATE* 0.68 . 1.00 0.47 547
RELQ 0.04 0.10 1.00 322
ABSGEAR 0.05 0.02 0.78 339
RELSIZE 1.69 1.49 1.59 523
TARSH 6.56 0.00 48.56 545
BIDTOE (%) 6.86 0.00 14.22 541
NPDA 0.25 0.16 0.84 453
PROMAR 0.60 1.00 0.49 458
TAXRAT 0.40 0.00 0.49 470
AVGSAL 0.68 1.00 0.47 465
TARVAL 0.60 0.54 0.05 412
ECOCYE 0.76 1.00 0.43 547
PANEL B: METHOD of PAYMENT
Number Percentage
CASH 88 17.3
EQUITY 102 20.0
MIXED 318 62.6
*1 refers to non-related takeovers.
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In our discussion of financial synergy (see section 6.1.2) we argue that the absolute
difference between the bidder and target gearing ratios (i.e. ABSGEAR) will lead to
financial synergy due to the exploitation of unused debt capacity. For the whole group we
find the mean value for ABSGEAR to be 0.05 while the median is 0.02 and the standard
deviation is 0.78. This implies that for the mean (and median) acquirer there are
opportunities to exploit financial synergies but they are very small. ABSGEAR for our'
sample is higher than that for Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) who find an average value of 0 for
their sample of acquirers. On the other hand we find that our sample of acquirers have a
lower potential to exploit financial synergy than that of Sudarsanam et al.. (1996) who find
average values for ABSGEAR to be 0.11 for their sample of acquirers. The relative bidder
and target (i.e. RELSIZE) is a measure of the potential synergistic gains and the ease with
which post-acquisition integration can be carried out. For the whole sample RELSIZE is
1.69 and the median 1.49 which is almost identical to that of Sudarsanam et al.. (1996) and
Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) who report a mean value of 1.72 and 1.6 respectively. Our study
shows that, on average, takeover the bidder is 169% the size of the target.
Disciplinary Variables
In our discussion of disciplinary takeovers we predict that the target will underperform the
general stockmarket index (see section 6.2). In Table 7.5 we show that the average pre-bid
announcement target return against the market index is 6.56% while the median value is
0%. In other words the average target firm actually out-performs the general stockmarket
index while the median firm does not under-perform relative to the market index. However,
the standard deviation is very high implying that a considerable number of targets do
underperform or underperform the market index.
270
Wealth Transfer Variables
In our discussion of the transfer of wealth from customers to acquirer firm shareholders we
predicted that a takeover will increase the weighted operating profit margin (see section
6.3.1). Table 7.4 shows that in 60% of cases the post-acquisition acquirer operating profit
margin (i.e. PROMAR) increases compared to the weighted average of the bidder and
target firms pre-acquisition operating profit margin. Also, the median acquirer tends to
increase its operating profit margin during the post-acquisition period. In section 6.3.2 we
predicted that a takeover may also be carried out in order to transfer wealth from the
government in the form lower tax payments. In table 7.4 we show that the tax charge (i.e.
TAXRAT) increases in only, an average, of 40% of the cases in the post-acquisition period
compared to the pre-acquisition period. The third wealth transfer we predict is from
employees to acquirer shareholders which is brought about as a reduction in the acquirer's
average real salary (i.e. AVGSAL) in the post-acquisition period compared to the
weighted average of the bidder and target firm's real salary during the pre-acquisition
period (see section 6.3.3). In table 7.4 we show that on average in 68% of cases the post-
acquisition real salary is higher compared to the pre-acquisition period. We also find that
the median firm in our sample tends to increase weighted bidder and target average real
salary.
Misvaluation Variable
In our discussion of the mis-valuation motive for takeovers we predict that a target with a
valuation ratio below 1 is undervalued. In Table 7.4 we show that for our sample of
takeovers the mean target firm valuation ratio is 0.6. This implies that a bidder who pays a
premium of 66% on the current market price can still purchase the target at the book value.
Therefore, if a premium lower than 66% is paid for the target it will lead the bidder to
acquire the former's assets below its book value. The median value for TARVAL is very
similar to the mean value at 0.54 and the standard deviation is 0.05.
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Control Variables
In Panel B of Table 7.4 we show that the most common method of method for acquirer in
our sample is mixed which includes a combination of equity and cash (see section 7.4.1 for
the definitions). 66.6% of acquirers in our sample used a mixed form of payment compared
to 20% for equity and only 17.3% for cash. We find almost identical results for method of
payment to those of Sudarsanam et al.. (1996) who report 67% of the acquirers in their
sample to use a mixed form of payment while 17% use equity and 16% use cash. This is
not surprising as mixed forms of method of payments are the most common in the UK
(Sudarsanam 1995:11).
In section 2.4.1. we argue that a higher level of bidder's teohold in the target firm increases
the probability of a successful takeover and reduced bid premium. For our sample of
takeovers we find that the average bidder's toehold is 6.9% compared to 6% in the case of
Sudarsanam et al.. (1996). However, the median firm in our sample does not have any pre-
bid ownership interests in the target firm. In our discussion of the free cash flow, in section
2.4.3, we argued that surplus cash may be a factor motivating takeovers. In our study we
find that the average acquirer firm has a free cashflow equivalent to 25% of its net assets.
The median level of free cashflow is lower 0.16 with a standard deviation of 0.84. Such a
high standard variation in relation to the mean suggests that some acquirers in our sample
have considerable positive while other have negative free cashflow. Finally, we find that
three quarters (i.e. 76%) of the takeovers in our sample are carried out during an economic
boom. The median and standard deviation values for ECOCYE imply that that takeovers
are largely carried out during an economic boom.
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Synergisic Variables by Acquirer Type
In Table 7.5 we find that most of the different acquirer types tend to carry out takeovers
between firms in related industries. Except for single acquirers all other acquirer types tend
to have a mean value for RELATE in the region of 0.7 (1 and 0 imply non-related and
related takeovers respectively). In all the cases the median value is 1. In the case of single
hostile acquirers the mean value for RELATE is 0.6 and as Table 7.6 shows the difference
in means is statistically significant only against friendly acquirers at the 1% level. In the
case of the relative bidder and target valuation ratio (i.e. RELQ) we would expect
disciplinary or hostile takeovers to have a higher value compared to other acquirer types.
The reason for this is a higher value for RELQ implies superior bidder management
efficient compared to the target firm. Table 7.5 shows that single and multiple hostile
acquirers have a higher mean value for RELQ than friendly but not white knight acquirers.
In the case of friendly acquirers the mean value for RELQ is 0.01 while for single and
multiple hostile acquirers it is 0.04 and 0.29 respectively. White knight and multiple hostile
acquirers have very similar values for RELQ of 0.3 and 0.29 respectively. Table 7.6 shows
that the relative bidder and target valuation ratio is significantly different between all
acquirer types except for single hostile against friendly acquirers and white knights against
multiple hostile acquirers.
In the case of ABSGEAR we report in Table 7.5 that it tends to be larger for friendly and
white knight acquirers at 0.08 compared to single and multiple hostile acquirers at 0.03 and
0.01 respectively. However, Table 7.6 shows that ABSGEAR is not significantly different
between acquirer types. Table 7.5 shows that the size differences between the bidder and
target tend to be the greatest for friendly and white knight acquirers while single and
multiple hostile acquirers have lowest values for RELSIZE. The average friendly and white
knight acquirer is 180% and 197% the size of the target respectively. Single hostile
273
„ co -,-,
-5 .;(..) 2 .?.- S
§ t tr.') :4 V 'g0	 .!....-' 3 4 0
a) = = „,
	 .5:6 .5.3, cr .4 a) 74.
.g cl C-o) 0 4.) 0
a ^0 ..., v) 0.
> ,9 15 7: E o
E E 8 •1
.b, E x 'S	 t4:4
8- o tu cr. 	 tl)k),	 U ] -co
-,0g 0 =
o , ...I ,.= cz
....
el)
r:/., 1.0 a) a) '.7.1 4 ,=
p ai 4 01 g 8L)
a) g 3 E ''t '27..	 0
...
a.	
• 6. r) 17); .a.'
o	 . tto a) L'
cr	 0 10 1... --. 4..)
u i 7.:.3 '.5 g
4t	 4' °.' uu a) .0 a) . v)
4 .0 (13 >- n 	 P gtn 0	 ••= ....0	 ••0 Cia
: LI. CKS a) = •,..9 100	 o En a) • 5. -_, 0)
C 26' 1:;
	l a i .i
•r •• I = , •• •••041:
6 § 4a)(..)	 7.; 2 5 z, 1
v .... v 0,.  0a) .5 a) .- 0 ,.., .b
: --, .= • 5- o V •B
71	 2 ,?-.. 73. ..ha ,.0 ,,..
>	 N"clOg o0 0 tn -;-_,  = -e
= =
2 cti ' R .2-•.' '')
-.
'
2
.0, o 
-0	 0 r- 0
rA	 a) ••= --.	 • c•n-•
. MI	 *2 W IF;
: e L74 = .1"1 00
r 0 0 •a)
c? 0 1:3 	 '0 $2.
.!C	 •ct le.), lei m Q.) E
Iti	 g .,_, -0 E ..= tu..„..,	 _ P.
CO	 IV G.) • ,..-1 cil c4-, '''
0 Iv .'.74
 . 0 .2 o .1.
a	 0 , ...
6. 4 cr , ,... 0 °0 0 0 -0 G 03	 ms IL", li
z a ›, ›.-. :0 8 g0?	 .0 0 .17) c.) en
c.)	 al 0 0 0 1_, cz,
L• 6 . 11) .4 . - a 1•n10	 CC
0 2 '1:1 e '6' Z 0,
ci) Q a) c,2, = . oc, -
, 0 3.-- 0 •= ,r,C.1-1 = •-•4	 E ...., tu I.... ..w lg:id
6 n
o C/3	 OK)
4.	 ›;	 ...,	 =
Co)	 o°1 73 0) to	 ..,:.--a) ,.... e
.> g e'rd 2 0,
V0
COI
•41:
rn >
.43 a) ° Z47.1	 g	 ,_, .0 ,2, ..,,
1.0CC ii 6 0 4-' '«..1. i. Ii) •1••CA 0) cn6. ' S ,2 .40 a.,
to	 E, t-:
 Sr 1-ii 6. °
..«.	
.„„ co 0 1.)>
0 0Z.	 7-1 0 0 0
. .I	 a-,
6' 	 (..) =u e --! 8 . co(0)	 0 r-	 -
cl.)	 2 d5 0	 .0
a.)
.c' p
=
V
....
,-.9L. 0N ON.-I 0,--1 0N 0N ON.- ,Zi"CNI n0N nC)N n0es1 0(NI 0N
a?
.=(/)
4
.1.
a)
•-=
b14)0
-5
86
.1)
CI.1
.4:7
c--:
.--.
kr)
ri
rs1
ON
Qx57r)CA(i)
,-t
,--,
6
.-4
en
6
l"---
C)
6
0
en
6
00
esi
.
e1-0
ci
"m,
,--4
6
N
,--.
6
N
.--.
6
en
.--.
6
en
en
6
0
.--.
6
_.
c) c) en 7/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 (--- 00 77.7 0 en 0 7,-) 0 C> (N1 0 0 0 h. 0 =Z 2 - 6 ci c; . 6 6 --. 6 --a 6 -.
at
az
1:4
¢
0
r--
6
CnN
6
"10
6
C)n0
6
C)N
c:)
",
.t)
t--:
^'
m
6
ONnD
6
n-n
en
en
n0
0000
N
l"---
,,-)
r---
E
=
4 en el- c).-.
0 t.... oo oo 7r) 7-- nC) er el- 7r) el- c::n e- a)Z N -. --, N es1 N SI t-‘) N N .-. N 04
IF/
.67 le, 0cu
-gl cT --. el- oo 7i- 7,-) en 0 0 0 en oo VE e. 0 0 0
....
j
(::1
V)
0
6 --.6
0
6
rs1
6
ON
N:
kr)
N
0
6
, -,
00
n-•-4 ..--.
6
•-•
6
0
6 ' ,4?" enIm. en1.. el:N
V V
...
= 'CI C) ,r) kr/ r's C) C) nD C> 0 0 ON 0
..a
41 0
--.
es1
6 06 0esi
0
0
0
0
.-,
6
7r1
6
(:).
o
o
.--.
.,-,
6
c).
-4 ,_,
r^
Z 6eU
W -CI
Of 0 0 00 e-- CT ON 0 0 er el- ON oo 2 E
>
d
r--
6
en
6
0
6
Ch.
--,
"1
4
en
q5
N
6
ten
6
et
6
ten
6
el-
6
les-
6
--,,
0
4cnrn-a1--
44
Com
o
0
.7• kr)N C\,r) ".7r) '1.S if,S 7,-)S en‘0 er‘.7:) enn.0 el-‘0 ennO If)1--- 0....pug a)bL0
=
4E'a)
*.1:5VI =
(/)
n.riC)
6
NI
".
6
-1-C)
6
rn
' ....
6
v:)
ON
tr;
en
en
-;
er
eq
6
.c.
C)
6
%.,c)
C)
6
‘o
C)
6
-,
.	 4
6
In
C:'
6
F
W.1ILnI4
a)
=
•nn•
,.1
©
4,V1.,
4)0*
00
cNiN
WI
6
-.
h
v5n.0
...6. :61 =
a?
..?tl ..,1 •-[A 1:140 - 0 if) en oo C:). ON 7-- 0 0 0 in 6 ,_,.- c•-
cn
au
2
c,
-i
,_,
6
c::,
6
•-n
-;
en
'7'
01
4
^,
6
0
-;
0
6 0-n '71-6 0--a 44•tC
Ow
. ''
ci)
WI"
-0
bl 0 •:1- en ON S oo ON 0 00 (11 NO r"••• E
d
VD
6
0
6
0
6
N
-.
C>
4
en
c;)
71-
6
S
6
en
6
n0
6
et
6
7--
6 0..•,„Or--n en.--. %.0 oocn
6 c) -1- r-) ^. esi .1. ,C) ". C.1 kr)
Z CNIel- eN1N n0N 071- N-1- N7r rn rn incr) kr)cri VDcsi (NI•zr <l)ar0
V
>1
1:3
*
5
C
CI
En
N0
6
r--0
6
kr)0
6
000
6
kr)
en
r‘i
eqt----
6
en0
6
en0
6
enC>
6
en0
6
v.:)0
6,
N0
6 27,-0
=cu
*C
i
a)0.4
°A°,
..L,
•-n
r''.
,-..
es]
r
.-4
12 Ca (f) N .-t Ca 0 nID 0 0 0 t-- CD 7...
- c,
-;
c>
6
0
6
n.0
-;
0
6
0
6
--1
6
0
-1
0
6
0
6
tr)
 6
0
--. 6cu
.0
ti4 ON --4 00 0 en --( 0 CT .-. 0 et S E
> ,./D
6
c)
6
c,
.6
00
.
-.
0
.
r--
et
.
.0
N
.6
in
.6
.1-
.6
r-,
.
o
, )^
.
o
t--
.
o
c
Z n)'")v) 'Tr00
00
Crl(NI
a)
-fet
Tn
az
>
W
E-4
.tt
I-4
co
I:4
d
W
u
,044
'•
rAt :c4
*t
1.-,
LT.10E.
1n.1
:la
$4Cno-7==QCDV.)C40
.!t
f:14
Z
C4
a.,
E-4
=
...;
¢
cn
›.
¢
.4
¢
•tt
E-
w
>4U
U
w
•
:
cn
d
u
›.E-11n(
0'
w
A
W
g
acquirers are a little large than the target at 129%. Multiple hostile acquirers tend to be
60% of the size of the target firm. Table 7.6 shows that the differences in means for
RELSIZE are statistically significant at the 1% level between all acquirer types except for
friendly against white knight acquirers.
Disciplinary Variable by Acquirer Type
A comparison between acquirer type, in Table 7.5, shows that pre-bid announcement
target firm performance (i.e. TARSH) is higher for multiple hostile takeovers. The mean
value is lowest for single hostile and white knight acquirers. A comparison of the median
values shows that friendly and white knight acquirers takeover targets with no under or
over-performance relative to the market index. Single hostile acquirers however tend to
take over targets that under-perform the market index by 13%. This difference between
acquirer types may imply that some targets taken over by single hostile do under-perform
the market prior to the bid-announcement. The median TARSH value for multiple hostile
acquirers is 1. Our results do not suggest that multiple hostile acquirers take over targets
that have underperformed relative to the general market index. The difference in target pre-
bid performance is borne out in Table 7.6 where we find that the difference in mean values
between all acquirer types is statistically significant except for single hostile and white
knight acquirers.
Wealth Transfer Variables by Acquirer Type
A comparison between different acquirer groups in Table 7.5 shows that hostile acquirers
(both single and multiple) are more likely to increase post-acquisition operating profit
margin (PROMAR) than acquirers who receive the recommendation of the target board
(i.e. friendly and white knights). We find that 59% of friendly and 50% of white knight
acquirers to increase post-acquisition operating profit margin while the figure is 70% and
69% for single and multiple hostile acquirers respectively. Table 7.6 shows that the
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Table 7.6	 Difference in Means Test for Explanatory and Control Variables by
Acquirer Type
WK refers to white knight bidders, MR refers to multiple hostile bidders, SH refers to
single hostile bidders, F refers to friendly bidders. The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 73 respectively. The acquirer types are defined in section 3.2. In
the case of MOP the following codes 100,103 and 104 were used for cash, equity and
mixed offers respectively. The source and definitions of the data is provided in sections .
7.4.1 to 7.4.7. a'ke refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Variable F v SH F v WK F v MB SH v WK SH v MB WK v MR
RELATE 3.098 -0.17 -0.13 0.00 -1.26 0.00
RELQ -0.62 -3.62a -2.17b -2.88a -1.85c 0.07
ABSGEAR 0.37 0.00 0.52 -0.18 0.07 0.12
RELSIZE 11.548 -1.59 9.738 -5.978 5.338 8.468
TARSH 10.15" 5.19' -2.798 -0.20 -6.228 -5.30a
CASH -7.61' 3.03a -0.57 6.928 3.348 -2.508
EQUITY 3.45' 5.21' -5.138 -3.938 -20.34a -8.58a
MIXED -5.748 -8.6? 1.59 -4.488 4.338 7.11a
BLDTOE -8.34 0.04 -1.89' 5.828 2.74' -1.73c
NPDA 4658 0.00 -1.61 4.088 1.96b
PROMAR -3.458 1.38 -1.46 2.83' 0.14 -1.991
TAXRAT 0.93 -0.47 1.46 -0.85 0.94 1.40
AVGSAL 0.70 1.06 0.45 0.59 0.00 -0.53
TARVAL 4.058 1.78c -0.62 -0.35 -1.96b -1.51
ECOCYE 0.00 -0.18 0.28 -0.17 -0.27 0.34
difference in means between single hostile acquires against white knight and friendly
acquirers is statistically significant at the 1% level. In the case of multiple hostile acquirers
we find significant results only against white knights at the 5% level.
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We find all acquirer types to have similar mean and median values for TAXRAT. The mean
. values for TA)GZAT are in the region of 0.4 while the median is 0. Table 7.6 shows that
TAXRAT is not statistically significant across acquirer types. This is not unexpected as we
have discussed in section 6.1.2 that post-acquisition tax reducing opportunities exist in the
UK but they are limited. Table 7.5 shows that the mean value for AVGSAL is lower for
friendly acquirers at 0.6. The other acquirer types have values in the region of 0.7 for
AVGSAL. The median values show that in the post-acquisition period friendly acquirers
tend not to increase AVGSAL while all the other acquirer types experience a rise. Table 7.6
shows that differences in means for AVGSAL across acquirer types are not statistically
significant.
Misvaluation Variables by Acquirer Type
Table 7.5 shows that single hostile and white knight acquirers purchase targets with the
lowest valuation ratio (i.e. TARVAL) of 0.46 and 0.49 respectively. Friendly acquirers
tend to purchase targets with the highest valuation ratios of 0.64. This is borne out in Table
7.6 where the differences in means for friendly against single hostile and friendly against
white knights are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level respectively. We also find
the difference in means between single and multiple hostile acquirers to be statistically
significant at the 5% level..
Control Variables by Acquirer Type
Table 7.5 shows that the average (i.e. mean and median) firm in all acquirer types tend to
pay using a mixed form of consideration for the target. In the case of bidder toehold in the
target firm we can see from Table 7.5 that friendly and white knight acquirers tend to have
lower levels. In the case of friendly and white knight acquirers the bidder's toehold is
6.41% and 6.39% respectively. However, for single and multiple hostile acquirers the
bidder's toehold is 9.38% and 7.61% respectively. The median values show that all
acquirer types except for single hostile bidders have zero bidder's toehold in the target firm.
We find the difference in means for single hostile acquirers against white knights and
multiple hostile acquirers to be statistically significant at the 1% level (see Table 7.6). We
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also find differences in means for multiple hostile acquirers against friendly and white
knights to be statistically significant at the 10% level.
Table 7.5 shows that single hostile acquirers tend to have larger levels of free cashflow than
other acquirer types. In the case of single hostile acquirers the free cashflow is 0.49 while it
is 0.2, 0.31 and 0.2 for friendly, multiple hostile and white knight acquirers respectively.
However, the median values of free cashflow for the different acquirer types are very
similar in the region of 0.17. Finally, Table 7.5 shows that takeovers are usually carried out
during economic booms for all acquirer types. All acquirer types have median values of 1
and means in the region of 0.77. The similarly between acquirer types is borne out in Table
7.6 where we find differences in means across acquirer types to be statistically insignificant.
7.4.1 PEARSON CORRELATION TEST
Table 7.7 shows the results of our Pearson correlation tests which illustrates the level of
relationship between any two variables in our regression. A correlation coefficient above
0.3 for any two variables assumes that they are related to each other and their joint use in a
regression may lead to multicollinearity (Gujarati, 1995:10)9. In our case the relative
valuation ratio (i.e. RELQ) and the target firm valuation ratio (i.e. TARVAL) have a
correlation coefficient ratio of -0.65. This indicates a high negative correlation between the
two variables which is not surprising as the relative bidder and target valuation ratio
incorporates the variable TARVAL. To overcome the problem of multicollinearity we
examine the impact of the variables defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3 twice whereby in the first
case we include RELQ but not TARVAL (which we refer to as equation 1). In the second
instance we reverse this and include TARVAL and exclude RELQ (which we refer to as
equation 2). All the other combinations of variables in our equations have a correlation co-
efficient which is lower than 0.3 and therefore are not likely to pose problems associated
with multicollinearity.
9 There is no statistical rule which states that we have to use 0.3 as the cut-off point and it is somewhat
arbitrary (Gujarati, 1995). We use 0.3 as the cut-off point because we feel that it implies a 'strong' linear
relationship between the pair of variables.
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7.5 RESULTS
We have estimated the relationship between the three year BHARs (i.e. -40 to +750 days)
using the market, mean, size, market to book value and the Fama and French Three Factor
(FFTF) adjusted models against a range of dependent variables as shown in equation 7.1. In
this section we report our results and compare them to previous studies. We summarise our
findings in Table 7.8 and report the detailed results in appendix 7.1 to 7.10.
Operational Synergy
Proponents of operational synergy argue that once the target and bidder firms combine
their activities total costs will fall. The fall in total costs may come about from removing
duplication of activities and/or the exploitation of economies of scale. In hypothesis 1 we
predicted that related takeovers would lead to greater wealth than unrelated ones. The
reason for this is that related takeovers allow for greater ability to exploit economies of
scale (see section 6.1.1). Table 7.8 shows that for both equations 1 and 2 acquirers in
related takeovers experience a negative and statistically significant impact. Our results
suggest that industry relatedness does not lead to operational synergy. In this respect our
results are similar to those of Seth (1990) for the US and Sudarsanam et al.. (1996) as well
as Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) for the UK.
US studies such as Bhide (1989) find that almost 20% of friendly acquirers achieve
operational synergy. This is not the case for our study whereby we find that friendly
acquirers like the whole sample experience a statistically significant and negative impact in
related talceovers 10 . Bradley et al.. (1988) argue that total synergistic gains are larger in
multiple bidder acquisitions. We investigate two types of multiple bidder acquisitions
namely white knights and multiple hostile acquirers. Our results in Table 7.8 show that this
is not the case for the UK. In fact, we find no difference in operational synergy between the
different acquirer groups. We find evidence which leads us to reject our first hypothesis of
Due to the small sample size we cannot derive strong conclusions regarding the different acquirer types
nor can the tests of statistical significance be relied upon for complete accuracy. The problem of small sample
size is especially acute for the white knight and multiple hostile groups.
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Table 7.8 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Summary Table
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MR refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equations 1 and 2 are defined in section 7.4.1. + and - refer to the most common sign
across all five benchmark models which is statistically significant at or above the 10% level (see
appendix 7.1 to 7.10). A missing sign refers to a statistically insignificant coefficient. The returns for
acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book value portfolios are obtained
from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market to book value portfolios is
explained in section 4.15) The explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables '7.1 and 7.3. **
refers to variables excluded from the estimation model.
Equation 1 Equation 2
All F SR WK Mil ALL F SR WK MR
Intercept - - + + - - + -1+
RELATE- - - - - - - - -
RELQ - -
ABSGEAR - - - - -
RELSIZE + + + + -
TARSH + + + + + + + + + +
HOST + ** ** ** ** + ** ** ** **
MULT ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
CASH + + + - + + + - -1+
MIXED + + -
PROMAR + + + + + + + +
TAXRAT - + - +
AVGSAL + + + + + + +
TARVAL ** ** ** ** ** - - - -
BID TOE + + + + + + -
NPDA + - + - +/- + + -
ECOCYE - - -
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19 314 226 51 18 19
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greater wealth gains in related takeovers. In fact, we find the opposite to be the case
implying that acquirers who carry out related takeovers experience dis-economies of scale.
Our first hypothesis that related takeovers lead to greater shareholder wealth gains than
unrelated takeovers is also rejected for our different acquirer types. Our results suggest that
conglomerate takeovers lead to greater shareholder wealth gains compared to related
takeovers.
Financial Synergy
The absolute difference in the bidder and target firm gearing ratio is the measure of the
difference in debt capacity (see section 6.1.2). Our second hypothesis predicts shareholders
of acquirers will experience greater wealth gains when the merging companies have unused
debt capacity due to financial synergy. The summary of our findings in Table 7.8 show that
ABSGEAR is not statistically significant. However, in Appendix 7.1 to 7.10 we find that in
two of the three cases ABSGEAR has the predicted sign (i.e. the market and FFTF
models). Although, ABSGEAR has the predicted sign for two of our models the lack of
statistical significance leads us to reject our second hypothesis. We conclude that there is no
support for unused debt capacity as a value creator for acquirers. Sudarsanarn et al.. (1996)
also find a statistically insignificant and negative impact for ABSGEAR for their sample of
acquirers. In the case of different acquirer types we find that all groups except for the
friendly acquirers experience a statistically significant and negative impact for ABSGEAR.
In the case of friendly acquirers appendix 7.1 to 7.10 shows that ABSGEAR is also
negative but not statistically significant.
Managerial Synergy
Our third hypothesis argues that shareholders of acquirers with a high valuation ratio
relative to the target (i.e. RELQ which is a measure of superior managerial efficiency of the
bidder) will experience significant wealth gains. We find that RELQ is not statistically
significant and is negative for three out of the five benchmark models. In the case of
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different acquirer groups we find that acquirers in competition with another bidder actually
experience a statistically significant negative impact. Sudarsanam et al.. (1996) argue that
the negative and statistically significant result for RELQ may be due to acquirers with
highly rated pre-bid share price over-rating their ability and hence overpaying for the target.
Our results tend to support this claim in the case of acquirers in competition with other
bidders in order to gain control of the target. We feel that acquirers in competition with
other bidders may actually be tainted by having to mount a counter offer for the target.
Based on these results we find no evidence to support our third hypothesis that
shareholders of acquirers with a high valuation ratio relative to the target experience greater
wealth gains than acquirers with a low valuation ratio relative to the target firm. In the case
of acquirers in competition with another bidder we actually find the opposite to be true.
Synergy in General
Previous studies find mixed results for the presence of synergy in takeovers (see section
6.1.1 to 6.1.3). Our results show that even if there is potential for synergy we do not seem
to find evidence for it in the long run. Table 7.8 shows that none of the three types of
synergies that we investigate in this chapter to have the predicted sign across all five
benchmark models. Table 7.8 and appendix 7.1 to 7.10 show that for all the models
RELSIZE is positive but only statistically significant in the case of the size adjusted model.
The positive effect of RELSIZE implies that the smaller the target the greater the wealth
effect for the bidder firm. The smallness of the target size probably allows the bidder to
more easily integrate the target firm with its own operations thereby realising the merger
benefits. In the case of different acquirer groups we find that RELSIZE is positive and
statistically significant for single hostile acquirers and white knights. In the case of multiple
hostile acquirers RELSIZE is negative and statistically significant. This is not surprising as
Table 7.5 shows that all acquirer types in our sample take over targets with a lower market
value than their own except for multiple hostile acquirers. Our results suggest that multiple
hostile acquirers experience difficulty in integrating the relatively larger target firm leading
to negative post-acquisition shareholder returns.
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Discipline
Our fourth hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers who carry out a disciplinary
takeover experience greater wealth gains than acquirers who carry out a non-disciplinary
takeover. Table 7.8 shows that for the overall sample TARSH is positive and statistically
significant. In Table 7.4 we find that on average targets outperform the general market
index in the run up to the acquisition and as Table 7.8 shows that this adds to the acquirer.
In the case of different acquirer types we also find a positive and statistically significant
relationship between pre-bid target share price performance and post-acquisition acquirer
shareholder wealth. Our results are consistent with those of Franks and Mayer (1996) who
find that targets outperform a matched sample of firms in the run up to the bid irrespective
of acquirer type hence contribute to value creation in the acquirer firm. We find little
evidence of poor target firm performance prior to the takeover suggesting that acquisitions
are not driven by past failure. Our results suggest that a target firm resistance to a takeover
is largely to do with the terms of the bid and not whether it should take place in the first
instance.
Wealth Transfer from Customers to Acquirer Shareholders.
Our fifth hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers who transfer wealth from
customers to acquirer shareholders will experience significant wealth gains. It may be the
case that acquirer firm shareholder wealth can increase independently of any transfer of
wealth from customers. Acquirer firm shareholder wealth may increase due to
improvements in efficiency through the exploitation of economies of scale. In section 6.1.2
we argue that economies of scale are more likely to occur in related takeovers rather-than
unrelated takeovers. Our results show that RELATE is statistically significant but negative
implying that conglomerate takeovers lead to higher acquirer firm shareholder wealth gains
than non-conglomerate takeovers. Our results also show that PROMAR has a positive and
statistically significant impact on acquirer firm shareholder gains (see Table 7.8). This
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implies that improvements in post-acquisition acquirer operating profit margins have not
come about as a result of increases in economies of scale and are likely to be due to a
transfer of wealth from customers to acquirer firm shareholders. We find similar results for
all acquirer types except for single hostile acquirers. Appendix 7.1 to 7.10 show that
PROMAR is largely positive for single hostile acquirers but not statistically significant.
Based on these results we find evidence to support our fifth hypothesis that acquirers who
transfer wealth from customers to acquirer firm shareholders experience significant wealth
gains.
Wealth Transfer from the Government
Our sixth hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers who reduce their post-acquisition
tax charge will experience significant wealth gains. As we point out in section 6.3.2 that
there is limited opportunity to reduce post-acquisition tax charge in the UK. Although, tax
opportunities may be limited, bad tax planning can be very costly. We find the results for
the overall sample to be statistically insignificant. Appendix 7.1 to 7.10 shows that in all
except the mean adjusted model TAXRAT is positive. In the case of different acquirer
groups we find that single hostile acquirers experience a negative and statistically
insignificant impact from TAXRAT. This suggests that single hostile acquirers may not
adequately plan for post-acquisition tax savings. Friendly and white knight acquirers tend to
have a positive but statistically insignificant impact from TAXRAT (see Appendix 7.10 to
7.10). In the case of multiple hostile acquirers TAXRAT tends to be positive and
statistically significant impact on post-acquisition performance. Our results suggest that
multiple hostile acquirers carry out takeovers which allow them to reduce their post-
acquisition tax charge. Based on these results we find no evidence to support our
hypothesis that shareholders of acquirers who reduce post-acquisition tax charge
experience significant wealth gains for the overall sample of acquirers. In the case of
friendly and white knight acquirers we find weak if any evidence and reject our hypothesis
for single hostile acquirers. We find evidence for tax saving opportunities only in the case of
multiple hostile acquirers.
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Transfer of Wealth from Labour
Our seventh hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers who reduce average post-
acquisition salaries will experience significant wealth gains. Table 7.8 shows that the overall
sample of acquirers experience a positive and statistically significant impact from
AVGSAL. To some extent this result reinforces our earlier finding that post-acquisition
operating profit margin increases without the presence of economies of scale. In other
words one source of post-acquisition value is the reduction in average salaries. In the case
of the different acquirer types we find that all except white knight acquirers tend to reduce
post-acquisition average salaries. Appendix 7.1 to 7.10 shows that in the case of white
knights AVGSAL tends to have a negative sign but is statistically insignificant. This
suggests that white knights may have to make some concessions to safeguard employment
or salaries in order to obtain recommendation from the target firm. Our results find support
for hypothesis seven that shareholders of acquirers who reduce average post-acquisition
salaries experience significant wealth gains for the overall sample, friendly and hostile
acquirers but not white knights.
Under-Valuation
Our final hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers who takeover an undervalued
target will experience significant wealth gains. Table 7.8 shows that for the overall sample
of acquirers we find TARVAL to be negative and statistically significant". Our results
show that the acquisition of undervalued targets generates positive returns for the whole
sample and all acquirer types except for friendly sample. Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) also
report negative and statistically significant results for target firm valuation ratio. We find
evidence to support our hypothesis that shareholders of acquirers who take over
undervalued targets to experience significant wealth gains for the whole sample and all
acquirer types except for the friendly sample.
11 The negative impact of TARVAL means undervalued targets generate more positive returns to acquirers.
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Control Variables
We test various control variables which aim to capture the dynamics of the bid process.
Table 7.8 shows that in the case of method of payment CASH has a positive and
statistically significant impact on acquirer shareholder wealth. This also true for the different
acquirer types except for acquirers in competition with another bidder. Our results show
that for white knight and multiple hostile acquirers CASH tends to have a negative and
statistically significant impact on acquirer shareholder wealth. A MIXED form of payment
is positive and statistically significant only for friendly acquirers. For the overall sample,
white knight and multiple hostile acquirers MIXED is positive but not statistically
significant. (We use equity as the base case.)
We find that NPDA has a positive and statistically significant impact on acquirer
shareholder wealth. In the case of different acquirer types we find that for single hostile
acquirers NPDA has a positive and statistically significant impact while for white knights it
is significant but negative. This implies that single hostile acquirers may use their free cash
flow to carry out value enhancing acquisitions while the opposite is true for white knights.
We find that B1DTOE is positive and statistically significant for the overall sample. In the
case of the different acquirer types we find that it is also positive and statistically significant.
This suggests that a pre-bid bidder stake in the target firm is value enhancing. This result is
somewhat different from previous studies such as Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) and
Sudarsanam et al.. (1996) which report a negative result for BlDTOE. Our results show
that ECOCYE has a negative impact on acquirer performance for the whole sample and
across different acquirer types but is only significant for single hostile acquirers and the
overall sample. Finally, we find that a hostile takeover leads to a positive post-acquisition
impact on acquirer wealth while in the case of MULT the results are both positive and
negative depending on the benchmark model.
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7.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we sought to analyse the impact of four different types of sources of
post-acquisition value creation namely synergy, wealth transfer, target firm
misvaluation and the disciplinary nature of the takeover using both univariate tests and
multiple regression analysis. We have seen from the discussion in Chapter 6 that
synergy is argued to be an important motivation for takeovers. In this chapter we •
investigated the post-acquisition impact of three different types of synergy namely,
operational, financial and managerial, on acquirer performance. Contrary to our
prediction we do not find support for related takeovers leading to superior wealth
gains for shareholders of acquirer firms. Our results are consistent with those of
Sudarsanam et al.. (1996) and Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) which found a negative
relationship between relatedness and acquirer wealth. Our results suggest a weak, if
any, support for financial synergy and none for managerial synergy. Our results show
that there is very little difference between acquirer types in the case of the three form
of synergy.
This chapter has shown that target firm under-valuation has a negative but statistically
significant impact on post-acquisition acquirer wealth. For the different acquirer types
we find statistically significant and negative impact for all groups except the friendly
acquirers. In the case of wealth transfer motivations for takeovers, this chapter has
shown that an improvement in post-acquisition operating profit, has a positive impact
on acquirer wealth. As we find a negative impact for related takeovers it implies that
some of this improvement in operating profits may come about from customers. With
the exception of white knights, we find evidence to show that acquirers tend to transfer
wealth from employees to their own shareholders. However, we do not find evidence
to support a transfer of wealth from governments to acquirer shareholders in the form
of a reduction in taxation. This result is in accordance with the limited scope for tax
saving opportunities, due to takeovers, in the UK.
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Appendix 7.1 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Market Adjusted Returns (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the reconunendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 1 is defined in section 7.4.1 a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskedastici
All F SR WK MB
Intercept -0.28' -0.32b -0.13 -0.04 -0.28
RELATE -0.08 -0.03 -0.19 -0.12 0.09
RELQ -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.01
ABSGEAR 0.75 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.37
RELSIZE 0.02 -0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.13
TARSH 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HOST 0.16b
MULT -0.02
CASH 0.14 0.21' 0.34b -0.19' -0.36*
MIXED 0.02 -0.09 -0.20 0.06 0.44
PROMAR 0.22a 0.26a 0.12 0.11 0.36'
TAXRAT 0.03 0.07 -0.14 0.07 0.31
AVGSAL 0.14' 0.14b 0.36' -0.04 0.39a
TARVAL
BLDTOE 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.06
NPDA 0.00 -0.29' 0.04' -0.07 0.30a-
ECOCYE -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06
Adj. R2 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.09
F-Statistic 2•38b 2.22b 1.02 0.42 0.94
No. of Obs 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 7.2 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Market Adjusted Returns (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 2 is defined in section 7.4.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskedastici
All F SH WK MR
Intercept -0.20' -0.28" -0.08 -0.02 -0.35a
RELATE -0.09 -0.03 -0.20 -0.17 0.20
RELQ
ABSGEAR 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.03
RELSIZE 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.03 -0.02
TARSH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
HOST 0.15b
MILT -0.03
CASH 0.15' 0.20' 0.33b -0.24" 0.10b
MIXED 0.01 0.08 -0.21 0.06 -0.04
PROMAR 0.23' 0.25' 0.17 0.11 0.08
TAXRAT 0.01 0.07 -0.14 0.07 0.08
AVGSAL 0.11" 0.13b 0.30' -0.04 0.23'
TARVAL -0.09" -0.07 -0.10 0.09 -0.091
BIDTOE 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
NPDA 0.01 -0.19 0.04 -0.07 0.03	 •
ECOCYE -0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 -0.04
Adj. R2 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.08
F-Statistic 2.80' 2.281' 0.76 0.42 0.13
No. of Ohs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 7.3 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Mean Adjusted Returns (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MR refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 1 is defined in section 7.4.1 a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation .incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK MB
Intercept 0.15 -0.03 0.90a 2.22° 0.31
RELATE -0.408 0.29' -0.91b -1.27b -0.42
RELQ 0.04 0.04 0.24 -1.38" -0.43b
ABSGEAR -0.02 0.19 -0.83' -0.09' -0.43
RELSIZE 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.26 -0.04
TARSH 0.00 0.00 0.01' 0.22' 0.03'
HOST -0.02
MUT 0.22
CASH 0.46b 0.556 0.67" -0.20 -0.59°
MIXED -0.15 -0.17 -0.14 0.56 0.14
PROMAR -0.15 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 0.35
TAXRAT -0.11 -0.02 -0.29 0.07 0.25
AVGSAL 0.27" 0.28' 0.55 -0.59 0.86
TARVAL
BIDTOE 0.01" 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
NPDA 0.13' 0.02 0.12' -0.21 0.14	 -
ECOCYE -0.46' -0.43 -0.88' 0.78 -0.64
Adj. R2 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
F-Statistic 3.49a 2.89' 2.05b 0.52 0.64
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 7.4 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Mean Adjusted Return (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 2 is defined in section 7.4.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskedastici
All F SH WK MB
Intercept 0.25 -0.05 0.08' 0.72 0.588
RELATE -0.41 -0.288 0.82' 0.45 -0.748
RELQ
ABSGEAR -0.05 0.18 -0.948 -0.65a 0.39
RELSIZE 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.12
TARSH 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01
HOST -0.03
MULT 0.21
CASH 0•46b 0.54" 0.92' 0.51 -0.18
MIXED -0.16 -0.17 -0.99 0.56 -0.37
PROMAR -0.14 -0.57 -0.14 -0.50 0.52
TAXRAT -0.12 -0.15 -0.32 0.07 0.178
AVGSAL 0.23" 0.298 -0.10 0.59 0.31'
TARVAL -0.12 0.00 -0.32' -0.31b -0.45
BIDTOE 0.01" 0.018 -0.01 0.01 0.05`
NPDA 0.148 0.07 0.13' -0.21 0.21	 •
ECOCYE -0.43 -0.44 -0.79' 0.78 0.13
Adj. R2 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14
F-Statistic 3.64' 2.878 2.56' 0.52 0.29
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 7.5 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Size Adjusted Returns (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MEI refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 1 is defined in section 7.4.1 a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskedastici .
All F • SH WK MR
Intercept -0.25' 0.26' -0.10 -0.10 -0.14
RELATE 0.07" -0.08" 0.00 0.03 -0.04
RELQ -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.04
ABSGEAR -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 -0.49' -0.03
RELSIZE 0.02" 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.06
TARSH 0.00" 0.00" 0.00 0.00 0.00
HOST 0.07
MILT 0.03
CASH 0.168 0.19' 0.15 -0.09 0.08
MIXED 0.01 0.01 -0.22 -0.06 0.01
PROMAR 0.18' 0.188 0.11 0.28' 0.20'
TAXRAT 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.19 0.09
AVGSAL 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.07 -0.03
TARVAL
BIDTOE 0.00 0.00 0.01a -0.00 -0.00
NPDA 0.00 -0.03 0.02a 0.64c
ECOCYE -0.07 -0.05 -0.15' -0.04 -0.06
Adj. R2 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.07
F-Statistic 5.30' 4.52' 1.13 0.99 0.29
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 7.6 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Size Adjusted Returns (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MR refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 2 is defined in section 7.4.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskalastici
All F SH WK MB
Intercept -0.248 -0.25a -0.10 -0.11 -0.12
RELATE -0.07b -0.08b -0.02 0.07 -0.08
RELQ
ABSGEAR -0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -0.29 -0.20
RELSIZE 0.02' 0.02 0.02 0.068 0.06
TARSH 0.008 0.00b 0.00' 0.00' 0.00'
HOST 0.06
MULT 0.03
CASH 0.178 0.198 0.16 0.08 0.16
MIXED 0.01 0.02
-0.03 -0.06 -0.03
PROMAR 0.18a 0.18a 0.14 0.28" 0.21b
TAXRAT 0.01 0.01
-0.06 0.02 0.14
AVGSAL 0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.02
TARVAL -0.04' -0.29 -0.04 -0.31b -0.18c
BIDTOE 0.22° 0.00 0.01' -0.00 -0.00
NPDA 0.00 -0.02 0.02' -0.640 -0.16 •
ECOCYE -0.64' -0.05 -0.12 -0.04 .	 -0.06
Adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.14
F-Statistic 5•548 4.65' 1.10 0.99 1.61
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 7.7 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Market to Book Value Adjusted Returns (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MR refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 1 is defined in section 7.4.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskedasticitv.
All F SH WK MH
Intercept 0.34' -0.35b -0.14 -0.10 -0.66b
RELATE -0.06 0.00 -0.15 0.19' -0.08'
RELQ 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.21 -0.18
ABSGEAR 0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.07
RELSIZE 0.02 -0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.09
TARSH 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01
HOST 0.12b
MULT -0.03
CASH 0.14' 0.23' 0.31' -0.03 -0.25'
MIXED 0.03 0.16' -0.21 0.11 0.23
PROMAR 0.18a 0.26' 0.14 0.15b 0.09'
TAXRAT 0.04 0.11 -0.17' 0.13 o.or
AVGSAL 0.10b 0.20 0.271) -0.06 -0.42'
TARVAL
BIDTOE 0.00 -0.00 0.01
_
o.or 0.05'
NPDA 0.01 -0.12 0.04' -0.04 -0.26b -
ECOCYE -0.59 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.19
Adj. R2 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.14
F-Statistic 2.13' 1.65' 0.84 1.21 1.17
No. of Ohs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 7.8 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Market to Book Value Returns (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 1 is defined in section 7.4.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskedasiicitv.
All F SH WK MB
Intercept -0.298 -0.33b -0.13 0.13 -0.45'
RELATE -0.07 -0.00 -0.18 0.45b 0•57a
RELQ
ABSGEAR 0.04 -0.57 0.02 -0.18 -0.45'
REISIZE 0.01 -0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.08b
TARSH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
HOST 0.11'
MULT -0.04
CASH 0.14c 0.23' 0.32a -0.29 -0.24"
MIXED 0.02 0.16c -0.23c 0.11 0.07
PROMAR 0.198 0.268 0.19 0.15 0.09
TAXRAT 0.03 0.11 -0.16' 0.13 0.09
AVGSAL 0.08c 0.20b 0.24' -0.06 0.36'
TARVAL -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.36 -0.02
BIDTOE 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04
NPDA 0.01 -0.11 0.048 -0.04 -0.06	 •
ECOCYE -0.04 -0.08 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Adj. R2 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
F-Statistic 2.31c 1.66c 0.86 1.15 1.08
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 7.9 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Fama and French Three Factor Return (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 1 is defined in section 7.4.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskedasticily.
All F SH WK MR
Intercept -0.22' -0.35b -0.18 -0.04 -0.49
RELATE -0.07 0.00 -0.24 -0.06 0.08
RELQ -0.00 0.00 0.05 0.21 -0.07
ABSGEAR -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.26 -0.08
RELSIZE 0.02 -0.00 0.07 0.09 -0.13
TARSH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
HOST 0.05
MULT 0.01
CASH 0.16' 0.23' 0.408 -0.33 -0.55
MIXED 0.06 0.16c -0.27 0.11 0.11
PROMAR 0.238 0.26' 0.22 0.15 -0.03
TAXRAT 0.08 0.12 -0.06 -0.10 0.19
AVGSAL 0.15b 0.208 0.37 -0.20 -0.23
TARVAL
BIDTOE 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.09
NPDA 0.00 -0.12 0.03a 0.29 -0.15	 -
ECOCYE -0.12' -0.09 -0.09 -0.13 -0.34
Adj. R2 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.04
F-Statistic 1.58 1.65' 0.83 0.24 0.68
No. of Ohs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 7.10 Impact of Sources of Value Creation on Three Year BHARs:
Fama and French Three Factor Returns (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equation 2 is defined in section 7.4.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. The returns for acquirers, Financial Times All Share Index, and size and market to book
value portfolios are obtained from Datastream International. (The construction of the size and market
to book value portfolios is explained in section 4.15.) The explanatory and control variables are
defined in Tables 7.1 and 7.3. Least squares estimates of the parameters of the equation incorporate
White's adjustment for hetroskalastici
All F SR WK MR
Intercept -0.17 -0.33b -0.15 0.14 -0.69
RELATE -0.08 -0.00 -0.21 -0.21 0.28
RELQ
ABSGEAR -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.32 -0.28
RELSIZE 0.01 -0.00 0.08' 0.05 -0.04
TARSH 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
HOST 0.04
MULT -0.00
CASH 0.16' 0.23' 0.36b -0.43 -0.31
MIXED 0.05 0.16' -0.26 0.11 0.07
PROMAR 0.248 0.268 0.20 0.15 0.07
TAXRAT 0.07 0.11 -0.07 -0.10 0.24
AVGSAL 0.13b 0.20b 0.35b -0.20 -0.25
TARVAL -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.11 -0.05
BIDTOE 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07
NPDA 0.00 -0.11 0.038 0.29 -0.34	 •
ECOCYE -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.13 -0.06
Adj. R2 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08
F-Statistic 1.59 1.66' 0.83 0.24 0.50
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 .18 19
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CHAPTER EIGHT
AGENCY MONITORING MECHANISMS AND POST-
ACQUISITION ACQUIRER PERFORMANCE:
THEORY, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND HYPOTHESES
8 INTRODUCTION
The question of corporate accountability has been an area of popular discussion not
only in academic circles but also in wider groups, such as recent newspapers and
political debates. The central question regarding corporate governance is the extent to
which stakeholders can affect the behaviour of management. There is no guarantee that
managers will behave in the interest of all stakeholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
argue, that due to the separation of ownership and control, the objectives of managers
may differ from those of owners. If this is the case, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ask the
question, how can the owners or suppliers of finance ensure they receive a return on
their investment? If there is a separation of objectives between managers and owners
then there is no reason why managers may not carry out actions which maximise their
utility. In other words, managers may be tempted to steal funds or divert it to activities
which seek to further their own interests. There is some evidence of managerial fraud
in the UK, such as the case of Barlow Clowes, Maxwell Communications, BCCI, Polly
Peck International, to show that suppliers of finance (e.g. shareholders) are not always
guaranteed back their investment.
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that even though managerial mismanagement and
fraud occur, most developed nations have, "at least solved the problem of corporate
governance reasonably well" 1 . However, this does not mean that it is perfect or cannot
be improved upon. Other writers on the subject, such as Jensen (1989), state that
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance structures are clearly flawed and need changing.
Alternative structures that are considered to be superior to the Anglo-Saxon model are
those of Germany and Japan (see Roe, 1993; and Charkham, 1995:ch7). Good
corporate structures are considered to be those that effectively monitor the activities of
top management and allow for 'independent advice' provided through the presence of
non-executive directors on the board of directors (Bain and Band, 1996). Through
close monitoring of managers, the corporate governance structure can ensure that the
interests of shareholders are closely followed.
The corporate governance structure is not the only way in which the top managers or
agents can be monitored to limit the possibility of them furthering their own
objectives2. Another important group of stakeholders who assess the activities of the
firm is its creditors'. Creditors, especially those with collateral, have the power to
influence the actions of the firm to a desired manner (Bolton and Scharstein, 1990). On
the other hand, the problem of moral hazard may mean that once creditors lend the
funds to the firm they actually have very little control over its use or the behaviour of
Evidence of this is the large flow of capital to firms and the repayment of profits back to the providers of
finance. In the absence of reasonably efficient corporate governance structures the holders of capital would be
reluctant to supply their capital to managers for fear of not being able to recover it at a later date. Managers
then will be likely to hold on to the capital or divert it to further their own gain.
2 Managers can further their own objectives in a number of ways such as carrying out bad acquisitions etc.
(see Sudarsanam, 1995:16).
3 As we show later in this chapter, secured loans are provided against the value of the underlying asset and
the ability of the company to make the interestkapital payments. In the case of unsecured loans they are
provided on the strength of the firm's profit and loss accounts and balance sheet. In both cases the lender can
impose certain covenants which alter managerial behaviour to ensure that the lender's utility is maximised.
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top management. Alternatively, top managers may wish to improve or extend their
relationship with their creditors by carrying out 'bonding actions' which reduce the
possibility of creditor control applied to the firm (Jensen and Meclding, 1976).
The separation of control and ownership has gained importance not only in the context
of firm management but also in other areas. Since the Second World War the
importance of investment and pension funds has grown to the extent that the bulk of
private investment is carried out through them. Data from the Office of National
Statistics (ONS) share register survey for 1998 showed that institutional investors
owned 60% of UK shares. The largest institutional investors were pension funds who
owned one third of UK shares. Insurance companies owned one fifth of UK shares.
The remaining institutional shareholding were owned by unit and investment trusts and
financial companies.
In most cases institutional investors are judged on the performance of their investments
which means that they have an incentive to make sure that managers of the companies
they invest in increase shareholder value and thereby improve the performance of the
investment/pension fund'. The experience of institutional investors has been that
underperforming managers will not be supported and some like the Mercantile and
General (M&G) make this point clear in their policy statement which states, "we do
not presume to tell the management how to run their business but, if a company's
actions are likely to jeopardise the interests of shareholders, we find that constructive
intervention can often be preferable to disposing of a holding". However, in the case of
takeovers the recent case of the hostile bid for Forte by Granada shows that
4 Investment and Pension funds are regularly compared by various investment journals such as Money
Management and professional organisations (e.g. Micropal) against each other to measure their ability to
select efficient managerial teams in order to attract further/new business.
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institutional investors tend not to support underperforming targets in their defence.
Mercury Asset Management was an investor in Forte but chose to support the hostile
bidder, i.e. Granada, because they felt that the target had underperformed the market
(Financial Time 23/01/96 pagel9c).
Agency monitoring mechanism is relevant to the market for corporate control. The
literature on takeovers, in Chapter 2, shows that there is conclusive evidence of target
firm shareholders gaining from a takeover. In the case of bidder firms the results tend
to be inconclusive, showing them to experience small positive, negative or zero gains
(see Franks et al., 1991; Schwert, 1996; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Limmacic, 1991;
Sudarsanam et al., 1996; Holl and Kyriazis, 1997a; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996;
Gregory, 1997 and Higson and Elliott, 1998). Various reasons have been offered to
explain the inconclusive results for bidder returns. In Chapter 5 we examined the
impact of the mood of the bid on bidder returns and found that, in the long run,
friendly bidders underperformed hostile bidders.
This chapter attempts to extend our analysis of the long run post-acquisition acquirer
performance by presenting and discussing aspects of agency monitoring mechanisms
which have been shown to affect firm performance. We also identify gaps in our
knowledge relating to the relationship between agency monitoring mechanisms and
post-acquisition performance which allows us to develop our hypothesis. In the next
chapter we empirically test these agency monitoring variables for our sample of UK
acquirers involved in takeovers completed between 1983 and 1995.
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8.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
8.1.1 AGENCY CONFLICT
The traditional economic analysis of the firm assumes it to carry out actions which
maximise profits subject to certain constraints such as technology (Koutsoyannis,
1985; Estrin and Laidler, 1995) 5 . However, the traditional economic view of the firm
ignores the manner in which production is organised and is merely concerned with
inputs and outputs while the transformation from one to the other is simply a 'black
box'. The agency theory attempts to explain the intra-firm relationships between
managers and the various stakeholders (such as owners, lenders, etc.). The agency
theory arises because shareholders do not manage the day to day operations of the
firm but delegate it to others who are referred to as agents. However, agents do not
necessarily share the same goals as owners who may simply supply the funds while
managers are left to manage the operations of the firm, in some cases without an equity
stake (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b)6.
One view of the agency conflict is that if managers are left alone they may act in their
own best interest rather than that of the owners or principals (see Baumol, 1959;
Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964; Jensen, 1986a; Grossman and Hart, 1988).
Proponents of the agency conflict argue that if managers are not monitored they are
likely to invest owners' funds in low value projects to expand their own egos or
empires or what Grossman and Hart (1988) refer to as, "private benefits of control".
Also, managers are likely to hang onto badly performing assets when new managers
In practice, firms may have alternative goals such as sales or utility maximisation but by and large, the vast
bulk of firms attempt to maximise their profits (Koutsoyannis, 1985).
6 Table 9.4 shows that the mean level of managerial ownership (including shares held by associated
shareholders) for our sample of acquirers is 9% while for the median firm it was 1.76%.
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can run them more efficiently. This may lead managers to reject takeover bids which
offer a profitable opportunity for their shareholders for fear of losing their jobs or
privileges. Finally, managers may tend to award themselves high salaries and other
benefits such as bonuses.
Even though a contract may exist between agent and principal, it is no guarantee that
the former will conform to the wishes of the latter. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue
that even though contracts may exist between agents and the principals the latter
cannot fully control the activities of the former. The divergence between the objectives
of agents and principals leads to certain costs, commonly referred to as the agency
cost. Jensen and Meclding (1976) separate agency costs into three types, the first of
which is the actual cost incurred in monitoring the agents to ensure that they follow the
objectives of the principals.
The second type of agency cost is 'bonding expenditure' incurred in order to help
assure principals that the agent will not carry out actions which reduce their wealth.
The third type of cost that arises from the agency conflict is the 'residual loss' which is
fall in the principal's wealth as a result of the actions of the agent which deviate from
those that would have been carried out by the principal. The optimal level of agency
monitoring is the point where costs incurred equal the benefits received. Any further
expenditure on agency monitoring beyond this level will have a detrimental effect on
the firm's wealth.
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8.2 TYPES OF AGENCY MONITORING MECHANISMS
In a modern firm the shareholder (or owner) is only one stakeholder, along with
managers, banks and bondholders'. Jensen and Meckling (1976) look at the role of
debt holders and the contractual relationship which exists between them and the
agents. With the increase in the number of stakeholders, the actions of the agent have
conflicting benefits in that one group may gain at the expense of another. For example,
if the agent invests borrowed funds in a risky project then the risk is borne by the debt
holder. However, if the agent were to follow a policy of risk aversion then the
shareholder suffers from an increased opportunity cost in what could have been
profitable investments while the debt holders benefit from reduced risk.
The extent to which one group of stakeholders benefits at the expense of another
largely depends on the level of monitoring carried out and the control mechanism
imposed on managers. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) investigated the relationship
between firm performance and the extent to which various control mechanisms are
used for a sample of 400 US companies. The firm's performance was measured by the
Tobin's Q ratio and was regressed against seven agency control mechanisms. The
results from this study showed that firm performance was not related to a single
control mechanism and the use of one control mechanism was dependent on the use of
others. To some extent, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) supported the earlier findings by
Jensen (1989) who argued that in a leveraged buyout (LBO) the high level of debt was
not the only controlling mechanism. In fact, the concentrated ownership, governance
structure and close involvement of creditors which were inherent in a LBO jointly
imposed restrictions on the actions of managers and hence helped improve firm
performance.
7 Our analysis excludes groups such as employees, customers, etc., who have an interest in the firm but have
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In the absence of complete monitoring, debt holders can restrict the activities of
managers, by imposing restrictions or covenants (Jennifer, 1990; Citron, 1992; Messod
and Press, 1993; Sung et al.; 1994). Common examples of restrictions placed on
managers by debt holders are the reduction of dividend payments, the limiting of future
borrowings, the closing down of available lines of credit etc. However, managers can
pre-empt debt holders from employing their restriction by supplying them with
information so as to reduce the level of uncertainty. If debt holders are informed of the
present situation and future direction of the company they may be less likely to impose
restrictive terms on the managers. Alternatively, the debtor can employ independent
auditors to assess the current state of the company and thereby reassure the creditors
that their funds will be repaid. The costs associated with supplying both these types of
information falls on the company, and Jensen and Meckling (1976) refer to them as
debt bonding costs.
The concept of ownership and control is very important in understanding modern
companies. For example, in the UK almost 60% of UK listed shares are owned by
institutions such as pension funds (see Charkham, 1995: p282). These institutions carry
out the task of investing funds on behalf of their clients. However, the clients
themselves have very little say over which companies should be invested in8.
Historically, these institutions have not been very active in promoting good
management (Dimsdale, 1994). The increased role of institutions in capital markets has
meant that if one institution sells the shares they will simply be bought by another
institution. Dimsdale (1994) argues that most major UK companies are now owned by
25 to 30 institutions. Although there may be a few institutions owning (hence
very little control over the decisions it makes.
8 By 'clients' we refer to private individuals who supply funds to institutional investors such as pension
funds. Of course, these 'clients' can select the range of funds i.e. small companies or European, but they
cannot name individual companies for investment.
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controlling) major UK companies, Dimsdale (1994) argues that there does not appear
to be any strong collaboration between them to improve the management of the
companies in which they invest. One reason for this could be that different institutions
may not have the same objectives. For example, institutions holding speculative or
short term stakes may not want to incur the costs of replacing the management.
8.2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AGENCY
MONITORING MECHANISMS
Between 1945 and the mid 1990s the economic performance of Germany and Japan
has exceeded that of the UK and USA, and in part, this has been argued to be a
reflection of the manner in which Anglo-Saxon companies are managed or governed
(Dimsdale,1994: p14). 'The processes by which companies are run' was referred to as
corporate governance by Tricker (1984). More recently, the Cadbury Report on the
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) referred to corporate governance
as, "the system by which companies are directed and controlled". The slightly different
emphasis between Tiicker's (1984) and the Cadbury Report (1992) definition of
corporate governance is largely due to the latter being concerned with the structure of
the company having adequate checks and balances to ensure that power is not
concentrated in the hands of a few top directors.
The Hampel Report (1998) which sought to review the implementation of the findings
of the Cadbury Report (1992) argues that, "good governance is not just a matter of
prescribing particular corporate structures and complying with hard and fast rules.
There is a need for broad principles. All concerned should then apply these flexibly and
with common sense to the varying circumstances of individual companies". In
accordance with the earlier reports (i.e. the Cadbury Report and the Greenbury
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Report) the Hampel Report places considerable emphasis on desirable corporate
governance principles. There are four broad groups of principles which the Hampel
Report lays considerable emphasis upon. These are the role of directors; the
remuneration of top management; involvement of shareholders and accountability; and
firm audit. In part the Hampel Report's recommendations were a response to the high
salaries which top management of large companies were awarding themselves9. In part
the Hampel committee's recommendations are an echo of popular feeling at the time.
For example, Bain and Band (1996) argue that good corporate governance structure
consists of five broad principles of which four are the same as those in the Hampel
Report (1998). The recommendations put forward by Bain and Band (1996) are as
follows:
i) having an appropriate pay policy for top management
ii) to monitor and restrict abuse of power by top management
iii) to protect the company from fraud or bad practice
iv) to limit the behaviour of selfish/greedy top management
v) to protect the interests of shareholders.
9 The period prior to the preliminary and final reports produced by the Hampel conunittee were witnessed by
'fat cat' stories whereby top management were awarded high salaries. An example of these fat cat stories
was the case of Cedric Brown the CEO of British Gas. Mr Brown's rather large pay award was a matter of
discussion in the House of Commons.
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8.2.2 ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
According to the UK Company Act 1985 (section 282), all companies registered after
1929, are required to have at least two directors. The Act does not specify the ranking
or class of directorship but merely that they should fulfil certain statutory
commitments. For many registered companies the statutory commitments are limited to
preparing and delivering annual accounts to the relevant groups (section 227 and
241) 10 . Although the Companies Act and Stock Exchange Rules compel directors to
carry out specific tasks, neither of them detail how they should manage their
companies. In fact, the law does not require directors of the company to be managers
but simply that they ensure the business is properly managed. The lack of a clear legal
role for directors has meant that there exists wide disparities between companies over
how they are managed with a direct effect on their performance. Generally speaking,
the board have a wide role, (see Bain and Band, 1996), which encompasses the
following:
i)	 to act as the representative of the shareholders and ensure clear attainable goals are
'set and achieved
to agree the strategy followed by top management
to appoint top management
iv) to regularly review the activities of top management
v) to set the values of the company and monitor them, e.g. operating climate.
l ° Companies listed on the stock exchange have additional requirements which have to be fulfilled which are
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The Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Committees have all made recommendations as
to what the board of directors' remit should be. These rules are not voluntary for
companies listed on the UK stock exchange who, in their annual report, must state to
what extent they comply with the recommendations of these committees. The Hampel
Report (1998) states that every listed company should have a board of directors whose
main roles should be to lead and control the activities of the company. The efficient
running of a board requires both a CEO and a chairman, and companies which combine
these roles should explain why they have done so. The board of directors should also
include a balance of executive and non-executive directors and any appointments have
to be transparent. Finally, all members of the board of directors should be supplied
with all the relevant information in order to allow them to make informed judgements.
8.2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND TAKEOVER MOOD
The monitoring of top management is not a costless exercise and the larger the number
of stakeholders the greater is the incentive to free ride. Even if one group of
stakeholders were to monitor the top management the gains from their actions would
be minimal. The total gains may be large but as they are not the only benefactor, the
gains are shared out. There are two methods by which inefficient managers can be
removed or replaced by more efficient ones. The first is simply to dismiss them as in
the case of Pilkington Plc where the CEO was ousted by the board of directors for
failing to improve the performance of the company (Financial Times 22/5/97). The
second method of removing inefficient managers is through corporate acquisitions
whereby the control of assets is transferred to more efficient managers (Franks . and
Mayer, 1996). However, the top management of the target firm will be unwilling to
accept the bid and in this case the only way the bidder can gain control is through a
detailed in the Stock Exchange Listing Rules or Yellow Book.
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hostile bid. If the bid is successful then acquisitions are a method in which bad
managers are more likely to be punished as target firm top management turnover is
greater in a hostile takeover (Franks and Mayer, 1996).
Hart (1995) and Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that hostile bids may not be as
profitable as the bidder may think. One reason for this is that the hostile bidder has to
appeal directly to the shareholder who has to be motivated to sell his holding to the
hostile bidder. The lowest price that a target firm shareholder will accept is that which
he can obtain from the market and therefore the hostile bidder has to offer a higher
price (see section 2.4.1 for a discussion of the free rider problem). The empirical
evidence, for both the UK and the USA, in the long run, does not entirely support this
view. Our results from Chapter 5 show that single hostile acquirers tend to outperform
all other acquirer types. Similar results have been found by Kennedy and Liminack
(1996), Ho11 and Kyriazis (1997a), Gregory (1997) and Higson and Elliott (1998).
8.2.4 NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND POST-ACQUISITION
ACQUIRER PERFORMANCE
One important recommendation of the Cadbury Report (1992), and repeated by the
Hampel Report (1998), is that publicly listed companies should have non-executive
directors. The Cadbury Report (1992) states that there should be a minimum of three
non-executive directors on the board. More importantly, each listed company should
have independent directors on its board." The Hampel Report (1998) is more general
The report prepared by the Cadbury Committee is vague as regards the precise definition of independence.
The report largely leaves the directors to judge each non-executive director's independence (Dimsdale,
1994 : p268).
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and simply states that, "the board should include a balance of executive directors and
non-executive directors such that no individual or small group of individuals can
dominate the board's decision making process". It is generally assumed that non-
executive directors have less of a managerial entrenchment motive and will therefore
be more objective in their actions. The objectivity of non-executive directors increases
in a competitive labour market where alignment with top management, or support of
strategies, detrimental to shareholders may reduce their own chances of being invited
to join the boards of other companies (Kaplan and Reihus, 1990).
The monitoring aspect of non-executive directors has received considerable attention
in recent years (see Mayers et al., 1997; Cotter et al., 1996 amongst others). The
reason for this is that they perform the important task of evaluating the performance of
executive directors. This role cannot be performed by executive directors because they
are a part of top management. If the top management were to underperform then it is
usually the role of the non-executive directors to replace the top management. The
empirical evidence shows that non-executive directors perform an effective role in
monitoring the behaviour of managers. Also, the presence of non-executive directors is
associated with a greater probability of forced turnover of top management in poorly
performing companies. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) investigated the hypothesis that
fear of dismissal is an effective monitoring mechanism of top management. Their study
found the hypothesis to be supported and concluded that these mechanisms tend to
align the incentives of top management with those of the shareholders.
The empirical evidence from Byrd and Hickman (1992) generally supports this view
but finds a non-linear relationship. In other words an increase in the number of
independent board members improves bidder returns up to a point after which the
bidder returns fall. This may be in part due to the non-executive directors appointed
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onto the board for political reasons (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) 12 . Byrd and
Hickman found that with more than 60% of independent directors, the board becomes
ineffective at monitoring the activities of top management. This result challenges
studies which call for a board to be made up entirely of non-executive directors
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985).
In the context of takeovers, the presence of non-executive directors on the board of
the bidder firm should mean that it does not overpay for the target. One reason why
this may be true is that the board of directors are always made aware prior to a formal
bid. In fact, Weiss (1991) argues that it is the role of the board to review the takeover
proposals put forward by top management°. In particular, non-executive directors may
have a comparative advantage in evaluating the benefits of any takeover proposal due
to their outside experience (Bacon, 1985). As board members of other companies,
non-executive directors gain experience and considerable information from their
external duties. The benefits of their business acumen, along with their objectivity,
should ensure that the takeover proposals will be carefully considered prior to being
made to the target firm (Byrd and Hickman, 1992)14.
For the US, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find that the presence of non-executive
directors does not increase the probability of takeovers and are more likely to be
appointed onto the boards of underperforming companies. The presence of non-
12 Political appointments of non-executive directors is not unique to the USA and examples of this exist in
the UK, such as Nigel Lawson joining Barclays Bank Plc after leaving his post as the Chancellor of the
Exchequer.
13 Byrd and Hickman (1992) argue that the board needs to pay special attention to takeovers otherwise they
may receive lawsuits from unhappy shareholders, however in the UK,this is extremely rare.
" See Sudarsanam (1995:10) for a discussion of the directors' responsibilities in the UK.
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executive directors on the board, according to Shivdasani (1993), does not affect the
mood of the bid. More recently, Cotter et al. (1997) examined the role of the target
firm's non-executive directors during a takeover for a sample of US companies. This
study found that with a high proportion of non-executive directors on the board of the
target firm the bid premium is higher and the incidence of 'poison pills' and takeover
resistance greater. If non-executive directors effectively monitor the acquisitive
activities of the bidder firm then we expect hypothesis 1 to be supported15.
Hypothesis 1 
Shareholders of acquirers with a larger number of non-executive directors on the
board experience greater wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers with a
smaller number of non-executive directors.
8.2.5 CEO DUALITY AND POST ACQUISITION ACQUIRER
PERFORMANCE
The top two positions in a company are the chairman and chief executive officer
(CEO) 16 . The role of chairman in a company has no legal basis and the Companies Act
(1985) does not require there to be one present (Charkham, 1995:p226). This may be
one reason why the role of the chairman varies greatly depending on the size,
complexity and type of business. Further, the role of the chairman is affected by that of
Is In the context of takeovers the monitoring role of non executives has not been tested.
16 We use the titles of chairman and CEO to refer to the top two executive directors within a company.
However, these titles vary from company to company and in some cases the role of the post of a CEO may be
referred to as the managing director (MD). Similarly, the title of chairman is sometimes referred to as
President.
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. the CEO. Generally, the chairman deals with the monitoring of managers, external
relations, setting out the firm's strategy and chairing meetings. The CEO, on the other
hand largely deals with the internal affairs of the company (Charkham, 1995:p266). In
some cases the role of the chairman and CEO may be combined and performed by a
single individual. Where a top manager performs both the role of CEO and chairman,
this is commonly referred to as CEO duality. The Cadbury and Hampel Reports
strongly suggest that companies should separate these two roles. The latter requires all
listed companies to explain in their annual accounts why the roles of chairman and
CEO are combined. One reason for the separation of CEO duality is that the two roles
are incompatible. A CEO, by its very nature, is an agent of the shareholders (Fama and
Jensen, 1983a,b). As an agent his primary role is to increase shareholder utility. The
chairman, on the other hand, performs the role of monitoring and disciplining managers
on behalf of the shareholders (Charkham, 1995:p266)' 7 . Greenan (1984) points out
that this incompatibility of roles means that the CEO cannot pass judgement on
himself.
As shown in section 8.1.2, with a separation of ownership and control, an agency
conflict arises. Even if the CEO owns part of the equity he may still have an incentive
to forward his own objectives. In the case of CEO duality the CEO (who is also the
chairman) has the power to determine the composition of the board and set its agenda.
This effectively reduces the monitoring power of the board as it is likely to simply
rubber stamp the decisions of the CEO leading to a lower performance (Jensen, 1993).
An alternative view of CEO duality is that it prevents a gridlock or a dispute between
the CEO and chairman. The probability of a boardroom gridlock or disputes is
increased with an independent chairman (see the case of Lonhro in the Financial Times,
17 The chairman, with the approval of the board, appoints the CEO and therefore assesses his performance. If
the CEO has underperformed, the chairman can remove him and appoint a successor (see the case of
Pillcington Plc, Financial Times 22/5/97).
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25th March, 1997) 18 . The CEO duality gives the CEO greater flexibility to seek out
profitable opportunities and maximises shareholder utility 19 . CEO duality provides the
firm with a clear line of direction as leadership is merged within a single commanding
force (Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994).
The relationship between CEO duality and firm performance does not conclusively
support a negative relationship. In a comparison between the performance of firms
with and without CEO duality, Rechner and Dalton (1989) could not find a significant
difference. In contrast to this, Duggal and Cudd (1996) report that in a sample of 131
US bidders, 70% had CEO duality. When companies with CEO duality were compared
with those without, the former group experienced CARs of -15.28% compared to
2.3% for the latter during the period -20 to +20 days. If CEO duality does lower the
monitoring role of directors then we expect to find support for hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2
Shareholders of acquirers with non-CEO duality experience greater wealth gains
than shareholders of acquirers with CEO duality.
18 Other instances where a boardroom gridlock may occur are with differing views on the company and future
direction, personality differences, etc.
19 The greater flexibility allows the CEO to carry out actions without constant references to the board. This is
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8.2.6 TOP MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE AND POST-
ACQUISITION ACQUIRER PERFORMANCE
In section 8.2.4, we saw that non-executive directors brought experience and independence
to the board of directors. If the presence of non-executive directors on the board improves
the performance of the company, the question then arises as to whether outside
directorships of the top management also improve corporate performance. In other words,
the experience gained by top management in other companies may help them run their
company more profitably. Lorsch and MacLver (1989) found that, out of the Fortune 1000
companies, 63% of the CEOs had outside directorships. One view of CEOs holding outside
directorships is that they accept them to fulfil their own objectives and not to promote the
shareholder interests of their own company (Byrne, Symonds and Siler, 1991).
An alternative view of top management's outside experience reflects the financial
health of the company in that only managers who improve the performance of their
own company will be invited to join the boards of other companies. Kaplan and
Reishus (1990) found that the likelihood of a CEO being offered outside directorships
was related to the performance of his own company. Similar results are found by
Gilson (1990) supporting Fama's (1980) argument that labour market forces in the
market for non-executive directorships discipline the behaviour of top management
(see also Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b). The simple reason for this is that no firm would
want to appoint a chairman or CEO or chairman as a non-executive director who has
either neglected or badly managed his own company.
especially important where quick decisions are required.
317
Top management experience has also been argued to act as a tool for creating good
relations between companies. This type of top management experience is common
where companies have cross ownership or joint projects. The cross-directorships of
top management between companies has been found to improve inter-firm
relationships (Schoorman, Bazerman and Atkin, 1981). More importantly, if 'CEO or
chairman bonding' is vital to these relationships then the CEO is more likely to hold
outside directorships. Booth and Deli (1996) report that outside directorships by CEOs
were negatively related to the firm's growth opportunities. Smith and Watts (1992)
argue that as CEOs who can manage growth opportunities are scarce, they have a
higher value than managers who manage existing assets. This implies that managers
who manage companies with growth opportunities take on fewer, time consuming,
outside directorships.
If the above theories of top management experience are true, then one can assume that
a firm, whose top management have extensive experience measured by outside
directorships, will be well managed. One can also assume that the top management do
not neglect their company but manage it profitably. As we saw above, outside
directorships can also bring in experience learnt from other companies to the benefit of
their own company. In the case of a takeover, no study to date has looked at the effect
of top management experience and long run performance. If outside directorships held
by the chairman and CEO does bring in experience beneficial to the company then we
expect to find support for 3 and 4.
Hypothesis 3
Shareholders of acquirers with a more experienced chairman receive greater
wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers with a less experienced chairman.
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Hypothesis 4
Shareholders of acquirers with a more experienced CEO receive greater wealth
gains than shareholders of acquirers with a less experienced CEO.
8.3 THE ROLE OF DEBT IN MONITORING AGENTS
The corporate governance structure of a company is only one monitoring device that
regulates the behaviciur of top management. Another very important source of
discipline on top management is imposed by the financial structure of the company.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that in the post Modigliani and Miller (1958)
framework debt is considered to be a tool of control to be used by creditors. Debt by
its very nature is a contract, whereby the borrower receives funds now and promises to
pay it back in the future. The borrower not only has to pay back the funds borrowed
but also adhere to certain restrictions on its 'behaviour. Therefore, an increase in debt
imposes restrictions on management and binds them towards certain types of behaviour
(Grossman and Hart, 1982). Jensen (1986) argues that the fear of managers not being
able to service their debt acts as a motivating force leading to a much more efficient
organisation".
The common method of imposing restrictions on the management by debtholders is to
include covenants in the debt agreement 21 . This means that if the borrower violates any
20 Jensen (1986) accepts that debt will not always have a positive motivating effect on companies such as
those with rapid and profitable growth but no free cash flow. These companies frequently demand new funds
and each time they are required the bank will reassess their situation.
21 A covenant is a contract between a firm and its lenders which sets out the terms and conditions of the
borrowing and the rights and obligations of each party.
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terms of the covenant the lender has rights which may allow him to repossess some of
the company's assets or force it into bankruptcy. In a survey study of 33 lenders,
Citron (1992) found that the use of financial ratio covenants was common in the UK.
More importantly, the study showed that lenders were willing to impose high costs on
managers who breach these covenants22.
8.3.1 BANK LENDING AND AGENCY MONITORING
Mayer (1990) found that bank loans were by far the most popular form of debt in the
UK, largely due to its cost advantage and the ease with which they could be arranged.
However, bank lending can result in various problems for the bank such as information
asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse selection. For an efficient financial market
informational symmetries have to exist but this is not always possible in reality because
borrowers have greater information regarding their project than lenders. To some
extent it may pay a borrower to exaggerate the likely outcome of the project so as to
increase the probability of loan (Leland and Pyle, 1977).
Also, once funds have been lent, the bank suffers from moral hazard i.e. the inability to
control the actions of the borrower. Even worse, with information asymmetry the
bank could suffer from adverse. selection24 . Campbell (1979) and Leland and Pyle
22 The precise nature of the costs depends on the terms of the covenant but common forms include a penalty
charge. However, if the company keep an open line of communication, (i.e. provides regular information
regarding the financial state of the firm) with the lender, the likelihood of punishment for breach of
convenant is lower.
23 As discussed above, the bank may impose restrictions but these are not costless to administer or monitor.
24 Adverse selection refers to the problem of asymmetric information that occurs, in the case of debt contract,
because lenders cannot differentiate between high and low quality borrowers.
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(1977) .argue that this problem can be avoided if the borrower provides greater
information to the bank. In this way the bank becomes a quasi insider and is able to
make optimal decisions regarding future lending without the borrower suffering public
disclosure of information to competitors. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that adverse
selection can be avoided if collateral is provided. This is because the lender needs only
concern himself with the value of the collateral and not the value of the whole firm.
Not only can borrowers provide banks with private information but also the economies
of scale that arise from the business of banking implies that banks have a comparative
advantage in screening loans (Buckle and Thompson, 1996:ch2)25 . This view is
supported by Boyd and Prescott (1986), Chan (1983), Chan et al. (1986), amongst
others, who claim that the screening mechanism used by banks allows them to separate
good loans from bad. Also, the monitoring of borrowers means that lenders can choose
who to lend funds to in the future. By carrying out these activities banks then pass on
important signals to the financial markets in valuing the company.
In an empirical study, Hull and Moellenberndt (1984) investigated the relationship
between a firm retiring its bank and non-bank debt against its share price performance.
The results of this study showed that retiring bank debt provided a greater negative
signal to the market than retiring non-bank debt. In the case of retiring bank debt, the
abnormal returns were three times lower than for retiring non-bank debt. Similar
results have been reported by James (1987) where the announcement of new bank
lending led to a greater increase in its share price than private placements or straight
debt financing. Both studies show that bank debt provides the market with unique
25 If banks were to make foolish loans they would not survive for long. The fact that banks exist mean that
they have managed to screen loans effectively.
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information about borrower quality. If bank lending is effective in monitoring the
activities of firms then we expect hypothesis 5 to be supported.
Hypothesis 5
Shareholders of acquirers with a high level of bank debt experience greater
wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers with a low level of bank debt.
8.3.2 SHORT TERM LENDING AND AGENCY MONITORING
Short term lending is normally for a period under one year and in the UK it largely
consists of bank overdrafts. Short term debt has many of the advantages of bank
borrowing, such as flexibility and the ease with which it can be arranged. However,
there are also disadvantages associated with short term borrowing such as having to
repay the loan even though the net present value of continuing with the project is
positive. In other words, with a short term loan the bank has the ability to terminate
the loan with a greater flexibility than with a long term loan. Also short term
borrowing involves the borrower having to regularly re-negotiate the loan as in the
case of unauthorised overdrafts. The frequent appeal for funds implies that the lender is
able to exert considerable influence on the behaviour of the borrower. The frequent re-
negotiations that take place between the borrower and lender imply that that the latter
is more likely to carry out a greater level of monitoring on the former. Both the credit
renewal process and frequent monitoring have been found to increase the bargaining
power of lenders (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; Rajan, 1992; Diamond, 1993; Ofek,
1993; Brown et al., 1994). If short-term lenders are effective at monitoring the firm
then we expect hypothesis 6 to be supported.
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Hypothesis 6
Shareholders of acquirers with a high level of short-term debt experience greater
wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers with a low level of short-term debt
8.3.3 SECURED AND UNSECURED LENDING AND AGENCY
MONITORING
A considerable number of lending agreements with banks are unsecured where the loan
is made on the strength of the borrower (McWilliams and Sentence, 1994). This type
of lending is commonly referred to as financial statement lending because the loan is
based on the strength of the income statement and the balance sheet of the company. The
lender looks at the cash flow generating capabilities of the company to assess if the firm is
able to repay the loan. If the borrower defaults on the loan the bank does not have a
specific claim on the assets of the firm. In contrast, a secured loan gives the lender a specific
claim on a set of assets. In terms of monitoring, one would assume that unsecured loans are
monitored more than secured loans because they are unprotected. To some extent this
argument can be supported by Myers and Majluf (1984) who claim that with a secured loan
the lender is simply concerned with the value of the collateral and not the whole firm.
Although a secured loan may not be monitored to the same extent as an unsecured
loan, it can nevertheless alter managerial behaviour. Hart and Moore (1994) construct
a model which shows that managerial fear of repossession of assets ensures that
lenders are repaid. The extent of fear, or control, depends on what the lenders can
seize once the borrower defaults. Of course, if the collateral is low in value, then the
cost of default is also lower. In other words, there exists a positive relationship
between the level of control by the lender on the borrower and the value of collateral.
The relationship between control and value of collateral is not linear. If unsecured
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lenders effectively monitor the activities of the firm we expect hypothesis 7 to be
supported.
Hypothesis 7
Shareholders of acquirers with a high level of unsecured debt experience greater
wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers with a low level of unsecured debt.
8.3.4 AGENCY COSTS AND BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH
DEBT
There are a number of costs associated with debt, the first of which is that profitable
projects may not be financed. The lack of finance may be due to the inability of the
borrowers to raise sufficient collateral or the un-willingness of the lender to offer
finance and debt covenants. The debt covenants may impose very strict restrictions on
the behaviour of managers which they might not wish to accept (see Stulz, 1990;
Diamond, 1991; Hart and Moore, 1994). Even if the funds are lent, lenders may have
an enormous amount of control over the borrower, which may mean that the lender is
forced to terminate profitable projects so that the funds may be repaid. In an attempt
to avoid this, the borrower may be willing to incur bonding costs such as an
independent assessment of the firm. Alternatively, managers may disclose private
information to debtholders to reduce the costs of monitoring and make them into
quasi-insiders (Leland and Pyle, 1977). This private information is not so readily
available to shareholders. The information asymmetry and greater control of managers
by debtholders may mean that there is a transfer of risk away from debtholders to
shareholders.
324
One major benefit of debt is that it results in a reduction in agency costs. These arise
because debt prevents managers from investing in projects with a negative net present
value. This is especially important in the case of takeovers where . the monitoring
mechanisms imposed by debtholders will increase the probability that bidders do not
overpay. A bidder who knowingly overpays for a target is very likely to receive
disapproval from debtholders. Also, the fear of not being able to repay the debt and
face repossession increases the probability that the bidder will not overpay for the
target. From the point of view of the target firm, if the target managers themselves
cannot make efficient use of their asset then debt will force them to sell it to managers
who can. Also, once funds have been lent, the involvement of debtholders increases the
probability of greater monitoring of managers.
8.4 THE ROLE OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN
MONITORING AGENTS
Although managers may carry out the day to day operations of a company the
shareholders have the final say in the actions of top management and therefore have an
incentive to monitor their behaviour. The final control over managers may rest with
shareholders but this does not mean that all shareholders have an equal incentive to
monitor managers. Hart (1995) argues that small shareholders have little, if any,
incentive to monitor managers or enter into proxy fights. However, even if there are
large shareholders, monitoring of managers does not improve because not all investors
have the same incentive to monitor managers. For example, some large shareholders
may simply hold shares in the company for a short duration and may not wish to incur
costs involved in monitoring managers while others may wish to free ride on the
actions of other large shareholders. In this section we look at the role of ownership in
monitoring bidders in takeovers.
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8.4.1 MANAGERIAL SHAREHOLDING AND AGENCY
MONITORING
We have seen from section 8.1 that the basic agency conflict arises due to a separation
of ownership from control given to managers to run the day to day operations of the
company which gives rise to a difference in the objectives of agents and owners.'
Managers are appointed to run the company and have the ability to pursue their own
objectives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, managers may opt to select less
risky projects as opposed to more profitable ones (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Managers
may be induced to take on the objectives of the owners by having a financial interest in
the company through the ownership of shares. This argument is supported by Demestz
(1983) who claims that if the wealth of the manager is related to that of the
shareholder, then mutually beneficial decisions will be carried out. Managerial
ownership of the company acts as an incentive to align their interests with those of the
shareholders. In other words, there exists a negative relationship between managerial
ownership and self interest (Lewellen et al., 1985; You et al., 1986).
There have been various empirical studies that have examined the relationship between
management ownership of shares and the market value of the company. If the
managerial alignment hypothesis is correct then one would expect that managers will
try to acquire companies that increase shareholder wealth. However, if the
management entrenchment hypothesis is correct then managers may carry out
takeovers which improve their position. Lewellen, Loaderer and Rosenfeld (1985)
examined the effects of managerial compensation and shareholding on shareholder
wealth as a result of mergers. The data covered 191 mergers during the period 1963 to
1981. The results showed that bidders with a negative CAR during the five days prior
to the bid announcement to completion had a managerial shareholding of 7.4% while
those with a positive CAR had a shareholding of 10.4%.
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Lewellen et al. (1985) also carried out a simple Spearman's rank correlation between
shareholding and abnormal returns and found a positive relationship. Dividing the
sample into deciles revealed that the top 10% of bidders with the largest levels of
managerial shareholding received abnormal returns of 2.6% while the remaining 90%
of bidders experienced average returns of -3.5% for the period five days before the bid
announcement to completion. The 10% of firms with the lowest percentage of shares
held by managers experienced wealth losses of -4.8%. These results showed there to
be a positive but not necessarily a linear relationship between abnormal returns and
managerial shareholding.
Although, Lewellen, Loaderer and Rosenfeld (1985) found a positive relationship
between managerial shareholding and abnormal returns around the announcement date,
their methodology has been attacked by Miklcelson and Ruback (1985). Mikkelson
and Ruback (1985) argued that the negative abnormal returns around the
announcement date can be due to a whole range of factors and not just due to the
agency problem between managers and shareholders. However, this does not mean
that managerial shareholding has no impact on bidder performance but it is an omitted
variable problem.
Morcic, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a) investigated the relationship between managerial
shareholding and bidder performance using Tobin's Q ratio as a proxy for corporate
valuation. The results from this study showed a positive relationship between
managerial ownership and the Tobin's Q ratio in the 0% to 5% board ownership range.
However as managerial ownership increased from 5% to 25% there was a negative but
less pronounced relationship while beyond the 25% shareholding it became positive.
McConnel and Servaes (1990) also used a non linear regression in order to test the
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relationship between the Tobin's Q and the proportion of shares held by managers.
Using data from 1976 and 1986 the study found a strong evidence of a curvilinear
relationship between the Tobin's Q and managerial shareholding.
Hubbard and Palia (1995) begin their analysis of the relationship between managerial
shareholding and takeover gains with the premise that the control of a company has a
positive utility for managers and hence its valuation26 . These benefits are only available
to those in control and cannot be passed on to others. There are various types of
benefits that managers can derive such as control over investment projects. Once a
takeover takes place managers may lose these benefits. The authors investigate the
effect of managerial ownership on takeovers gains by examining a sample of 334 US
acquirers during the period 1983 to 1992. The study finds that abnormal returns
increases when managerial ownership increases up to the 5% level and then decreases
thereafter. For managerial ownership of between 5% and 25% there is a small negative
effect on abnormal returns. Managerial shareholdings beyond 25% result in slightly
negative abnormal returns but this relationship is not statistically significant.
If we are to believe that low levels of managerial ownership can have a positive impact
on firm performance while very high levels can be detrimental then we expect
hypothesis 8 to be supported.
Hypothesis 8
Shareholders of acquirers with a low level of managerial ownership, experience
greater wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers with high levels of
managerial ownership.
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8.4.2 INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDING AND AGENCY
MONITORING
Since the Second World War there has been a marked shift towards institutional
ownership of public companies (Buckle and Thompson, 1996:ch6). The growth of
institutional shareholding has been largely due to the growth in pension plans and
investment funds. Almost all investment and pension funds attempt to invest in
companies or sectors which are seen to offer overall above market average growth.
The reason for this is that institutional investors themselves are judged on their ability
to select companies that will offer a rate of return which is higher than that available on
the market. The success of institutional investors in being able to 'beat' the market is
frequently used in their advertising material in order to attract further business, as well
as hold to their existing clients (Buckle and Thompson, 1996:ch6). Therefore, these -
pension and investment funds tend to invest in equity due to its superior returns
relative to other investments such as bonds. These investment funds tend to invest in
companies that are considered to offer superior long term returns. According to
Buckle and Thompson (1996:ch6), investment fund managers aim to minimise short
term failure and hence increase long term success.
Investment and pension funds have two options available to them in the case of badly
performing companies, namely to sell their shareholding in the company or to help
improve its performance . With the former, the investment fund simply cuts its losses
and exits its investment in the company. However, the large holdings that funds have in
companies may mean that they may not be able to exit without depressing the share
price. However, institutional investors can exert pressure on the management through
its large shareholding. Some investment funds, such as the M&G, publicly declare that
15 The same argument is made by Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988).
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this is their usual policy in dealing with underperforming companies (Charkham,
1995:p283). Institutional investors can also influence the firm's investment towards a
preferred direction. Rechner (1986) found that institutional investors placed a greater
value on capital investment in longer term projects. This is consistent with an
appreciation in the share price with firm announcements of research and development
expenditure (Bain and Band, 1996).
In the case of takeovers, Jarrel and Pousen (1987) found that targets with relatively
lower institutional shareholding were more likely to adopt the most value reducing
form of anti-takeover charter amendment 27 . In terms of institutional support for anti-
takeover amendments Brickley et al. (1988) found that institutional investors who do
not have business dealings with corporate management are more likely to vote against
them. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) examined 372 firms proposing anti-takeover
charter amendments between 1979 and 1985. The study found a positive and
statistically significant relationship (at the 5% level) between institutional shareholding
and shareholder wealth at the time of the bid announcement. This is consistent with the
active monitoring hypothesis i.e. institutional shareholders have an incentive to monitor
managers as argued by Demsetz (1983).
On the other hand Pound (1988) argues that large investors are not active monitors of
managers but tend to be rather passive. Instead, of actively monitoring the
performance of managers institutional investors are more likely to vote with them or
avoid the confrontation by selling their shareholding. Alternatively, institutional
investors may have other business dealings with the company which may lead to a
27 Monitoring of managers can be illustrated using anti-takeover charter amendments because they need
shareholder approval.
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conflict of interest thereby detracting them from effectively monitoring the managers.
If large or institutional investors do perform an effective monitoring role then we
expect hypothesis 9 to be supported.
Hypothesis 9
Shareholders of acquirers with a high level of block shareholders (both
associated and non-associated) experience greater wealth gains than
shareholders of acquirers with a low level of block share ownership.
8.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have seen that the actions of managers may be influenced by internal
and external agency monitoring mechanisms. We have presented and discussed the
literature dealing with three different types of agency monitors, namely the corporate
governance structure, lenders and the ownership structure. Under UK legislation the
role of the board of directors is not stated and therefore there exists a wide disparity
between companies. However, three committees (i.e. Cadbury, Greenbury and
Hampel) have examined the aspect of corporate governance. Their recommendations
are now compulsory for firms listed on the UK stock exchange. The most recent of the
committees examining corporate governance (i.e. the Hampel Report, 1998) considers
four broad areas, namely the structure of the board of directors, remuneration of top
management, role of shareholders and company audits. To our knowledge no study has
examined the relationship between an acquirer's post-acquisition performance and its
corporate governance structure.
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Another agency monitoring mechanism which we examine in this study are lenders
who seek to reduce the risk of losing their finds while maintaining their reputation as
'good lenders'. The bulk of borrowing in the UK is from banks largely due to its
flexible nature and the ease to which it can be arranged. At the same time banks have a
comparative advantage in screening loans (Buckle and Thompson, 1996:ch2). We have
seen from the discussion in this chapter that a large proportion of bank borrowing is in
the form of overdrafts and very short term. The short term nature of this debt implies
that the lender has considerable influence on the behaviour of managers. Also, frequent
requests for funds implies that the lender will carry out a greater monitoring role.
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that lenders who have their loans backed up by
collateral, which is equal or greater in value to the loan, need not monitor the
company. In the event of the firm failing, the secured lenders can simply take
ownership of the collateral.
The third group of agency monitoring mechanisms which we examine in this chapter
also discussed in Chapter 3 are the owners. We have seen from our discussion that
managerial ownership has a non-linear relationship with firm performance. At low
levels of managerial ownership, firm performance increases while at very high levels
managers become entrenched and firm performance declines. In the case of
institutional investors the empirical evidence is not conclusive and previous studies find
that they carry out a passive monitoring role. On the other hand, there is also support
to show that they are efficient monitors of managers In the next chapter we empirically
test the relationship between agency monitoring mechanisms and post-acquisition
acquirer performance.
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CHAPTER NINE
AGENCY MONITORING MECHANISMS AND POST-
ACQUISITION ACQUIRER PERFORMANCE:
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
9 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter we saw that there was a separation between the ownership of
a firm and control. In other words, the day to day activities of managing the company
are left to managers or agents who may not have the same objectives as the owners of
the firm (Jensen and Meclding, 1976).This leads to the problem of monitoring the
agents so that they behave in a manner that increases the utility of the shareholders. In
the previous chapter we discussed three types of agency monitoring mechanisms;
namely the corporate governance, debt and ownership structures which have been
shown to affect the behaviour of managers (Weisbach, 1988; Rosenstein and Wyatt,
1990; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Cotter et al., 1996; Mayers et al., 1997; Lai and
Sudarsanam, 1997 amongst others).
In this chapter we attempt to extend our earlier analysis to investigate the impact of a
range of agency monitoring mechanisms, discussed in the previous chapter, on long
run post-acquisition acquirer performance, for our sample of UK acquirers consisting
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of friendly, hostile and white knights'. This chapter is divided into four sections. The
first section discusses methodological issues specific to this chapter. The second
section presents the definitions of the agency monitoring mechanisms and control
variables. In the third section, we carry out descriptive statistics and univariate tests. In
the fourth section we present and discuss our results on the impact of agency
monitoring mechanisms.
9.1 METHODOLOGY
We examine the impact of agency monitoring mechanisms on post-acquisition acquirer
performance along with some control variables which aim to capture the effect of the
bid process. We estimate the following OLS regression in order to detect the influence
of the agency monitoring mechanisms on post-acquisition acquirer performance:
BHAR = f (GOVERNANCE, LENDERS, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL) (9.1)
where: BHAR refers to abnormal returns based on the winsorised market, mean, size,
market to book value and Fama and French Three Factor adjusted models for
the period -40 to +750 days2.
GOVERNANCE refers to corporate governance variables.
LENDERS refers to the various holders of corporate debt.
OWNERSHIP refers to the owners of the firm's capital.
CONTROL refers to control variables which represent the dynamics of the bid
'To the best of our knowledge there is no UK published study that has investigated the relationship between
long run post-acquisition acquirer performance and agency monitoring mechanisms.
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We provide descriptive statistics and conduct univariate tests of differences between
acquirer types. We also test for multicollinearity between our variables using the
Pearson Correlation Coefficient (see Table 9.6), and any two variables with a value
greater than 0.3 are investigated separately.
9.2 DEFINITION OF EXPLANATORY AND CONTROL
VARIABLES
There are a number of stakeholders in a firm, such as the owners, employees,
customers etc. This study looks at three of these; namely the board of directors, debt
holders and shareholders. In each case the agency monitoring features are sub-divided
into component factors. In the case of borrowings by the firm we look at bank, secured
and unsecured debt. For corporate governance we examine the number of non-
executive directors, top management experience and CEO duality. Finally, in the case
of shareholders, we examine managerial ownership and large shareholdings. We define
these variables below:
9.2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES
We divide the corporate governance mechanisms into three types, namely outside
monitoring (i.e. the number of non-executive directors on the board of directors),
concentration of power (i.e. whether the roles of chairman and CEO are performed by
a single person) and top management outside experience. In each case data are
collected for the accounting year preceding the bid announcement. Unfortunately,
there is no UK database on corporate governance structures and this meant that data
2 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the different models used in this study to estimate the abnormal returns.
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on corporate governance structure had to be manually collected. We collected
corporate governance data from the Hemmington Scott Corporate Register and
Company Guides, The Stock Exchange Year Book, annual company reports and the
Directory of Directors3 . All of these sources identified non-executive directors and
listed the names along with the positions for the executive directors.
First, we examine what the Cadbury Committee (1992) refer to as the level of
'independent judgement' that is brought to bear on firm performance. We use the
number of non-executive directors as a proxy for 'independent judgment' which we
define as:
NONEXEC: the number of non-executive directors on the board in the accounting
year prior to the bid announcement.
The second corporate governance aspect we examine in this study is whether the roles
of the CEO and chairman were played by a single person. (Some companies in our
sample have a managing director (MD) and President instead of a CEO and chairman
respectively.) We define CEO duality as:
DUALITY: whether the roles of CEO (MD) and chairman (president) are played by
a single person. If a single person carried out the roles of a CEO (or
MD) and chairman (or President) we denote this as 1 or 0 otherwise.
3 We also use these sources to cross check our data.
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In this study, we examine the number of outside directorships, held by the CEO and
chairman, as a proxy for top management outside experience which we define as:
CEOEXP:	 refers to the number of outside directorships held by the CEO (MD).
CHMEXP:	 refers to the number of outside directorships held by the
chairman(president).
9.2.2 LENDER VARIABLES
In this study, we segregate debt into four different types; namely, bank-based, short run,
unsecured and tota14. We obtain data from Datastream International and annual company
accounts for bank, short run and unsecured debt and equity and reserves. All values are
taken for the accounting year preceding the bid announcement.
We use the ratio of bank-based lending to equity and reserves of the company, which we
define as:
BANKLEV = bank borrowings repayable within one year and after one year divided by
equity and reserves of the company.
We differentiate between short and long run borrowing due to the flexibility with which the
former can be terminated. Short run borrowing gives the lender greater flexibility as the
loan can be terminated with ease even when the net present value of the underlying project
4 The four types of lending we investigate in this study are not mutually exclusive and there is a high level of
correlation between them.
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is positive. We define short run borrowing as:
SRLEV = refers to bank overdrafts, loans and other short-term borrowings payable
within one year divided by the equity and reserves of the firm of the
company.
Borrowings are not always secured against an asset and may be made based on the strength
of the profit and loss account and balance sheet. In this study, we define unsecured loans as:
UNSECLEV = all loans repayable in one year and longer subtracted by total secured
loans. We then divide the result by the equity and reserves of the company.
The fourth type of lending we investigate in this study is total loans which includes not only
bank-based, and unsecured lending but also other types of loans that the firm may have
taken out such as debentures.
BIDLEV = all loans payable which include bank loans, unsecured loans, as well as
debentures, convertible loans, promissory notes, leasing and hire purchase
all divided by the equity and reserves of the company.
9.2.3 OWNERSHIP VARIABLES
We collected managerial and blockholder shareholding data from Hemmington Scott
Corporate Register and Company Guides, annual company reports and Stock Exchange
microfiche for the year preceding the bid-announcement. We use the variable MANOWN
to measure the pre-bid announcement managerial shareholding in the bidder firm which
is defined as:
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MANOWN = the proportion of bidder firm shares, held by members of the board of
directors, three months prior to the date of the bid-announcement, as
reported in the Extel Financial news summaries or obtained from company
annual reports.
We postulate a non-linear relationship between managerial shareholding (i.e.
MANOWN) and the post-acquisition bidder firm performance. Therefore, we use a
piecewise linear regression model to capture this non-linearity. The piecewise
regression model is a technique that allows for multiple changes in the gradient of the
regression describing the relationship between two variables (see Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1988).The variable MANOWN is modified as follows:
MANOWNO to 10%	 =	 Actual MANOWN if less than 10%
10% if MANOVVN is greater than or equal to 10%
MANOWNilw25%	 ---	 0% if MANOWN is less than 10%
MANOWN minus 10% if greater than 10% and less than
25%
15% if MANOWN is greater than 25%
MANOWN0ver0.25	 .	 0% if MANOWN is less than 25%
MANOWN minus 25% if greater than 25%
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We use the variable INSOWN to measure the pre-bid announcement institutional
shareholding which is defined as:
1NSOWN: is the proportion of bidder finn shares held by institutions and large
blockholders, three months prior to bid announcement, as reported in the
Extel Financial News Summaries. We use institutional shareholding above
and including 5% for takeovers carried out before 31 1 May 1990 and 3%
for those completed after this date.
9.2.4 CONTROL VARIABLES
We test our agency monitoring variables along with other variables which aim to capture
the dynamics of the bid process. We employ the following control variables: the method of
payment (discussed in section 2.4.2), bidder's toehold (discussed in section 2.4.1), free
cashflow (discussed in section 2.4.3), the economic cycle (discussed in section 2.4.5) and
the mood of the takeover (see Chapter 3). We have seen from section 3.2 that acquirers can
be divided into four groups namely friendly, white knight, single and multiple hostile. (We
examine the relationship between acquirer type and the impact of agency monitoring
mechanisms by testing equation 9.1 for each group separately.) These four acquirer types
can be categorised into two broad groups i.e. friendly or hostile (we refer to this variable as
HOST) and single or multiple bidders (which we refer to as MULT).
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9.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE TESTS
As an initial step towards our analysis of the relationship between post-acquisition
acquirer returns and agency monitoring, as well as to become familiar with our sample
data, we present descriptive statistics and carry out univariate tests of differences in
median values between acquirer types. We examine the sample data for all takeovers,
as well as for different acquirer groups. Table 9.4 shows the descriptive statistics for
the agency monitoring mechanisms and control variables for the whole sample of
acquirers while Table 9.5 shows the same but for different acquirer types. (We present
and discuss the descriptive statistics for control variables in section 7.4.) Table 9.6
shows the test of difference in means between the different acquirer groups. We also
show the Pearson correlation coefficients between the explanatory and control
variables in Table 9.7.
Whole Sample Variables
Table 9.4 shows that the average firm has 3.38 non-executive directors on its board of
directors with a standard deviation of 2.28 and a median value of 3. This is very similar
to the survey by PRO NED (1990) which finds 82% of the top UK 100 companies in
the 'Times 1,000' list to have three or more non-executives on the board of directors.
More recently, PRO NED (1996), finds that the average number of non-executives on
the board of publicly listed companies has increased to 3.6. We find that the average
value for CEO duality is 0.34. The low level of duality in our sample is borne out in the
median value of 0 with a standard deviation of 0.48. Again, our results are very similar
to those of PRO NED (1990) which finds that 26% of the top 100 UK companies
combine the roles of CEO and chairman. Since, PRO NED's (1990) study there has
been a marked reduction in the number of companies with CEO duality. The PRO
NED (1996) study finds that only 12% of companies have CEO duality and this falls to
6% for the very large firms (i.e. with a turnover over £2 billion). We find that chairmen
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tend to have greater outside experience than CEOs. The average chairman has 6.2
outside directors with a median value of 4 and a standard deviation of 7.25. CEOs on the
other hand have a mean and median values of 5.34 and 2 respectively.
Table 9.4 Descriptive Statistics for Agency Monitoring Mechanisms
St.Dev refers to the standard deviation and No. of Obs refers to the number of
observations. The explanatory and control variables are defined in table 7.3. The
explanatory variables are described and defined in Tables 9.1 to 9.3.
Variable MEAN MEDIAN St. Dev No. of Obs
NONEXEC 3.38 3.00 2.28 461
DUALITY 0.34 0.00 0.48 540
CHMEXP 6.20 4.00 7.25 538
CEOEXP 5.34 2.00 6.75 360
BIDLEV 0.36 0.26 0.57 428
SRLEV 0.21 0.15 0.21 428
BANKLEV 0.32 0.28 0.75 399
UNSECLEV 0.16 0.13 0.18 431
MANOWN (%) 8.97 1.76 14.42 488
BIDTOE (%) 6.86 0.00 14.22 541
INSOWN 7.08 6.59 13.40 490
The average acquirer firm in our sample has total loans repayable of one third of the value
of its equity and reserves. The median value is marginally lower at 0.26 with a standard
deviation of 0.57 implying a high level of dispersion. The average acquirer in our sample
has short term leverage which is equivalent to 21% of its equity and reserves with a median
value that is marginally lower at 15%. Table 9.4 shows that the average acquirer in our
sample has unsecured leverage to the value of 16% of its equity and reserves. In the case of
the ownership structure of the firm we find that the average firm has managerial ownership
of 9% and a median value of 1.8%.
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Corporate Governance Variables by Acquirer Type
A comparison of the proportion of non-executives on the board of companies between
acquirer types shows friendly and single hostile acquirers have an almost identical
average number of non-executive directors at 3.34 and 3.35 respectively (see Table
9.5). It appears that bidders involved in an auction (i.e. competing with another bidder
for the same target) have an above average number of non-executive directors on their
board. Multiple hostile acquirers have an average of 3.6 non-executives on their board
of directors while for white knights it is 4. For all four types of acquirers the median
value is almost identical to the mean and the standard deviation is approximately 2.
Table 9.6 shows that the test of difference in means finds there to be a statistically
significant difference between the number of non-executive directors on the board of
white knights against single hostile acquirers and white knight against friendly
acquirers at the 5% level. If the presence of non-executives does bring about
independent and perhaps superior management decisions then we expect white knight
acquirers to experience higher post-acquisition performance compared to other
acquirer types.
Table 9.5 shows that hostile acquirers (both single and multiple) are more likely to
have CEO duality than either friendly or white knight acquirers. The mean value for
friendly acquirers is 0.32 while for white knights it is marginally lower at 0.31. Single
hostile acquirers have a mean value of 0.41 while for multiple hostile acquirers it is
0.45. However, none of the differences in means are statistically significant (see Table
9.6). Inter-group comparisons from Table 9.5 show that chairmen of friendly and white
knight acquirers to have more outside directorships than hostile acquirers. The average
number of directorships for friendly acquirers is 6.29 while for white knights it is 6.92.
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Table 9.6	 Test of Difference in Means for the Variables Explaining Post-
Acquisition Performance by Acquirer Type
WK refers to white knight bidders, MR refers to multiple hostile bidders, SH refers to
single hostile bidders, F refers to friendly bidders. The explanatory variables are defined in
Tables 9.1 and 9.2. The acquirer types are defined in section 3.2. a'b'c refer to significance at
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Variable F v
SH
Fv
WK
Fv
Mill
SHv
WK
SHv
MH
WKv
111II
NONEXEC -0.05 -2.21 b -0.71 -1.98b -0.63 1.01
DUALITY -1.02 0.07 -0.80 0.64 -0.22 -0.67
CHMEXP 1.30 -1.02 3.27' -1.56 2,26" 2.97
CEOEXP -0.46 -2.76' -3.82' -2.26b -3.29' -1.00
RIDLEY -1.33 -0.16 -1.11 0.82 -0.48 -0.94
SRLEV -0.87 -0.78 -1.16 -0.16 -0.61 -0.41
BANICLEV -1.55 -1.20 -1.92 0.06 -0.58 -0.58
UNSECLEV 0.08 0.51 -0.72 0.36 -0.68 -0.93
MANOWN 10.56' 2.90' 1.01 -2.66' -5.13' -1.60
BIDTOE -21.30' 0.06 -2.98' 8.79' 4.20' -2.40'
INSOWN 3.12 3.52' -9.16' 1.21 -9.81' -9.12"
However for single and multiple hostile acquirers it is 5.89 and 4.60 respectively implying
that chairmen of hostile acquirers may either have greater growth opportunities or be of a
lower quality (see section 8.2.6) than friendly and white knight white knight acquirers.
However, we find that only the difference in means between friendly and multiple
hostile acquirers to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Chairmen of single
hostile acquirers tend to have more outside experience than those of Multiple hostile
acquirers. Table 9.6 also shows the differences in means between the chairman's
outside experience for single hostile acquirers against multiple hostile acquirers to be
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statistically significant at the 5% level.
In the case of CEO outside experience we find from Table 9.5 that acquirers involved in an
auction have higher levels than either single bidders, both friendly and hostile. In the case of
friendly acquirers the average CEO has 5.11 outside directorships while for single hostile
acquirers it is slightly higher at 5.29. For white knights the average CEO has 7 outside
directorships while for multiple hostile acquirers it is 8. Not only is the mean value higher
for multiple bidders but so is the median value. Table 9.6 shows that the test of difference in
means to be statistically significant at the 1% level between friendly and multiple hostile
acquirers.
Lender Variables by Acquirer Type
A comparison of leverage between acquirer groups shows that the mean values tend to be
lower for agreed takeovers (i.e. friendly and white knights) compared to contested bids (i.e.
single and multiple hostile). Friendly and white knight acquirers have mean leverage values
of 0.33 and 0.35 respectively. For single hostile acquirers the mean leverage value is 0.48
while for multiple hostile acquirers it is 0.61. In other words, the average multiple hostile
acquirer has a leverage value which is almost twice that of a friendly acquirer. It may be the
case that friendly acquirers may have lower monitoring by lenders. However, Table 9.6
shows that none of the differences in means are statistically significant.
We find that short term leverage tends to be largely similar across different acquirer groups.
In the case of friendly acquirers we find average short term leverage to be 0.28 while it is
0.27, 0.29 and 0.36 for single hostile, white knights and multiple hostile acquirers
respectively. The similarity in mean values across acquirer types is borne out in Table 9.6
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where we find none of the values to be statistically significant. However, the median values
tend to be somewhat different between acquirer types. In the case of friendly and single
hostile acquirers the median values are 0.14 and 0.18 respectively compared to 0.23 and
0.24 for white knight and multiple hostile acquirers respectively.
Bank based borrowing forms a large proportion of UK borrowing and this is borne out in
Table 9.5. We find that friendly acquirers have the lowest average levels of bank borrowing
at 0.28 compared to 0.56 for multiple hostile acquirers who have the largest levels. We also
find that the difference in means between friendly and multiple hostile acquirers is
statistically significant at the 5% level (see table 9.6). A large part of bank based borrowing
tends to be in the form of overdrafts which tend to be unsecured. Therefore, it is not
surprising that we find a similar pattern across different acquirer types for both unsecured
leverage and bank borrowing. As in the case of bank borrowing we find that with
unsecured leverage friendly acquirers have the lowest levels while multiple hostile acquirers
have the highest levels. We do not find differences in means across acquirer types to be
statistically significant for unsecured leverage (se Table 9.6).
Ownership Variables by Acquirer Type
Inter group comparisons show that friendly acquirers have the highest levels of managerial
ownership at 9.78% while single hostile acquirers have the lowest levels at 5.1%. The test
of differences in means (see Table 9.6) for friendly acquirers against single hostile and
white knight acquirers is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, differences in
means for single hostile acquirers against multiple hostile and white knight acquirers are
significant at the 1% level. In the case institutional ownership we find that multiple hostile
acquirers have the highest levels at 12.8% while single hostile acquires have the lowest
levels. Institutional ownership is significantly different between single and multiple hostile
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acquirers and multiple hostile acquirers versus white knights at the 1% level. Also the
difference in means for friendly acquirers is significantly different against all other acquirer
types at the 1% level. Friendly and white knight acquirers have a bidder's toehold
marginally lower than the average at 6.41 and 6.39% respectively. Hostile acquirers tend to
have to higher bidder's toehold than agreed bids at 9.38% and 7.61 for single and multiple
hostile acquirers respectively. We find differences in means between all acquirer types to be
significant at the 1% with the exception of single hostile and white knight acquirers.
9.3.1 PEARSON CORRELATION TEST
Table 9.7 reports the Pearson correlation test for the explanatory and control variables. Out
of the 105 pairwise correlations between 15 explanatory and control variables only six
exceed a value of 0.3 5 . Of these five correlations, four of them are between our debt
variables which is not surprising as they are not mutually exclusive. The four highest
correlations are equal or above 0.8 which are unsecured leverage (UNSECLEV) against
total loans repayable (BIDLEV); UNSECLEV against short term leverage (SRLEV); bank
based borrowing (BANKLEV) against SRLEV and BANKLEV against UNSECLEV at
0.80, 0.81, 0.87 and 0.85 respectively. The correlation between BIDLEV and bank based
borrowing it is 0.7 while between BIDLEV and short term borrowing is 0.59. This is not
surprising as the bulk of firm borrowing in the UK is unsecured, consisting of overdrafts
and short term loans.
5 We feel that any correlation above 0.3 implies a strong linear relationship between the pair of variables.
Gujarati (1995) argues that there is not set value above which variables can be considered to be correlated.
We use a low value of 0.3 to separately test the pair of variables in order to avoid any problems associated
with multicollinearity.
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We carry out four variations of equation 9.1 whereby the first includes only a general
measure of leverage i.e. BEDLEV and excludes the other measures which are SRLEV,
BANKLEV and UNSECLEV (i.e. equation 1). The second equation includes only SRLEV
and excludes B1DLEV, BANKLEV and UNSECLEV (i.e. equation 2). In the third
equation we include only BANKLEV and exclude BlDLEV, SRLEV and UNSECLEV
(i.e. equation 3). Finally, we include UNSECLEV and exclude BlDLEV, SRLEV and •
UNSECLEV (i.e. equation 4). The four equations can be summarised as follows:
Equation 1:
BHAR = gGOVERNANCE, BlDLEV, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL)
	
(9.2)
Equation 2:
BHAR = gGOVERNANCE, SRLEV, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL)
	
(9.3)
Equation 3:
BHAR = gGOVERNANCE, BANKLEV, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL)
	
(9.3)
Equation 4:
BHAR = f(GOVERNANCE, UNSECLEV, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL) (9.4)
By carrying out these four variations to equation 9.1, for each of our five abnormal return
models, we ensure the robustness of our results and avoid the problems associated with
multicollinearity.
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9.4 RESULTS
We have estimated the relationship between the three year BHARs (i.e. -40 to +750
days) using the market, mean, size, market to book value and the Fama and French
Three Factor (FFTF) adjusted models against agency monitoring mechanisms as shown
in equation 9.1. In this section we largely discuss the summary of our findings which
are shown in Tables 9.8 and 9.9. (In appendices 9.1 to 9.20 we report the model
coefficients for our estimation models.) We first report and discuss the results for the
whole sample of acquirers then for each acquirer type.
9.4.1 THE WHOLE SAMPLE
Non-Executive Directors
Our first hypothesis states that acquirers with a larger number of non-executive
directors will experience significant wealth gains (see section 8.2.4). The results for the
whole sample of acquirers shows there to be a positive and statistically significant
relationship between the number of non-executive directors and post-acquisition
performance. This result tends to support studies such as Weiss (1991) which argue
that the role of the non-executive directors is to review takeover proposals. With a
greater proportion of non-executive directors the review process will be extensive and
there will greater room for independent opinion. Although, we find positive and
statistically significant results appendices 9.1 to 9.20 shows that the coefficient values
are very small and close to zero. In other words we find that non-executive directors to
have only a marginal impact on acquirer performance.
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Table 9.8 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Summary Tables for Equations 1 and 2
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equations 1 and 2 are defined in section 9.3.1. + and - refer to the most common sign
across all five benchmark models which is statistically significant at or above the 10% level. (see
appendix 9.1 to 9.20). Missing signs refer to statistically insignificant coefficients. The explanatory
and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. ** refers to variables excluded from the
estimation model.
Equation 1 Equation 2.
All F SH WK Mil ALL F SH WK Mil
Intercept - - - - +
NONEXEC + + - - + + - -
DUALITY + + + - - +/- +1- + - -
CHMEXP - +/- - + +/- +/- + +
CEOEXP +/- + + +/- + +
BlDLEV - - + - ** ** ** ** **
SRLEV ** ** ** ** ** - - + +
MANOWN1 + + + +/- + + + +/- -
MANOWN2 + + - + +/- -
MANOWN3 - - + - -
INSOWN- - - - - - _ - -
BIDTOE + + + + + + + + + +
HOST + ** ** ** ** + ** ** ** **
MULT ** ** ** ** ** ** ** • **
CASH + + + + - + + + - -
MIXED + +
NPDA + - + + - + - + + -
ECOCYE - - - - + - - - + +
No. of Ohs. 314 226 51 18 19 314 226 51 18 19
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Table 9.9 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Summary Tables for Equations 3 and 4
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the
target firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite
resistance by the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the
target after a hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a
multiple hostile acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of
the target. Equations 3 and 4 are defined in section 9.3.1. + and - refer to the most common sign
across all five benchmark models which is statistically significant at or above the 10% level. (see
appendix 9.1 to 9.20). Missing signs refer to statistically insignificant coefficients. The explanatory
and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 7.3. ** refers to variables excluded from the
estimation model.
Equation 3 Equation 4
All F SH WK MB ALL F SH WK MB
Intercept - - - -
NONEXEC + + - + + + - -
DUALITY +/- +/- + - - +/- + + - +1-
CHMEXP - +/- - + + - - - + +
CEOEXP + +/- + +/- + + +
BANICLEV - - - +1_ + ** ** ** ** **
UNSECLEV ** ** ** ** ** -
MANOWN, + + + +/- - + + + +/- +/-
MANOWN2 - - + +/- +/- - - + +
MANOWN3 + + - - - +1-
INSOWN- - - - - - - - - -
BIDTOE + + + + + + + + + +
HOST + ** ** ** ** + ** ** ** **
MULT ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
CASH + + + + + + .	 -
MIXED + + + + +
NPDA + + + + - + -
ECOCYE - - - + + - - - + +
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19 314 226 51 18 19
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CEO Duality
Our second hypothesis (see section 8.2.5) predicts that CEO duality will have a
negative impact on post-acquisition acquirer performance because the roles of
chairman and CEO are conflicting in nature. Section 8.2.5 argues that the role of the
CEO is to increase the wealth of shareholders while the chairman monitors and •
disciplines managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b). Our summary findings show that we
find both statistically significant positive and negative impact of CEO duality on
acquirer performance. As in the case of non-executive directors we find that the
coefficient values (see appendices 9.1 to 9.20) to be very small and close to zero. This
implies that although CEO duality may have some beneficial properties such as
avoiding boardroom gridlock the gains to acquirers in the long run are marginal at
best. At the same time the negative effects of CEO duality such as concentration of
power may also have a very small and best marginal impact on long run acquirer
performance. Our results can neither support or reject our hypothesis that CEO duality
will have a negative impact on acquirer performance.
Chairman and CEO Outside Experience
Our third and fourth hypotheses state that a greater level of outside directorships by
the chairman and CEO respectively will have a positive impact on acquirer firm
shareholder wealth (see section 8.2.6). Our results show that outside experience by the
chairman has a negative and statistically significant impact on acquirer firm
performance (see Tables 9.8 and 9.9). Our results suggest that chairmen who have
outside directorships may neglect their own firm. In the case of CEO outside
directorships we find a positive and statistically significant impact on acquirer
performance. In both cases appendices 9.1 to 9.20 shows that the coefficient values are
small and close to zero. This implies that the impact of chairman and CEO outside
experience is marginal at best. Overall we find evidence to reject the hypothesis of a
positive relationship between acquirer performance a chairman's outside experience. In
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the case of the CEO we find evidence to support our hypothesis of a positive
relationship between outside experience and acquirer performance.
Leverage
We predict that shareholders of acquirers with a high level of leverage will experience
greater wealth gains than shareholders with a low level of leverage due to increased
external monitoring (see section 8.3). We find that for the whole sample of acquirers
leverage has a statistically significant and negative impact on acquirer performance.
Therefore we reject our hypothesis of a positive relationship between acquirer
performance and leverage. For the most part the coefficient values for leverage are
small (see appendices 9.1 to 9.20). Our results suggest two possible explanations for
the negative impact. In the first case lenders may have very little control over the funds
once they have been lent (i.e. moral hazard). Alternatively, lenders do not have an
incentive to actively monitor borrowers.
Bank Leverage
Our fifth hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers with a greater proportion of
bank debt will experience greater wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers with a
lower proportion of bank debt (see section 8.3.1). Table 9.9 show that bank debt has a
statistically significant but negative impact on acquirer performance. As in the case of
other debt variables the coefficient values are small and close to zero. Our results show
that access to bank borrowing has at best a marginal impact on acquirer performance.
Short Run Leverage
Our sixth hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers with a high level of short
term debt will experience greater wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers with a
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low level due to greater monitoring by short term lenders (see section 8.3.2). We find
short run leverage has a negative and statistically significant impact on acquirer
performance for the whole sample. Appendices 9.1 to 9.20 show that the coefficient
values are small and close to zero. As much of short term leverage is from banks in the
form of overdrafts it is not surprising we find similar results. We find results which do
not support our hypothesis of a positive relationship between acquirer performance
and short term leverage.
Unsecured Leverage
Our seventh hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers with a greater proportion
of unsecured debt will experience greater wealth gains than shareholders of acquirers
with a lower proportion due to increased lender monitoring (see section 8.3.3). Table
9.9 shows that we find statistically insignificant results for the whole sample, friendly
and single hostile acquirers. However, appendices 9.1 to 9.20 show that the
coefficients are largely negative and close to zero. Based on these results we find no
evidence to support our seventh hypothesis.
Managerial Shareholding
Our eighth hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers with a high proportion of
managerial shareholding will experience greater wealth gains (see section 8.4.1.). Our
results for the whole sample of acquirers shows that in the case of managerial
shareholding we find rather mixed results. For shareholdings below 10% we find
largely positive and statistically significant impact on acquirer performance. Generally
speaking we tend to find negative and statistically significant impact on acquirer
performance for managerial shareholdings between 10% and 25%. For managerial
shareholdings above 25% we find a positive impact on acquirer performance. Our
results tend to support a non-linear relationship between managerial shareholding and
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acquirer performance.
Institutional Shareholding
Our final hypothesis states that shareholders of acquirers with a higher proportion of
institutional shareholdings will experience greater wealth gains due to increased
monitoring (see section 8.4.2). Our results show that institutional shareholding has a
negative impact on acquirer performance. Based on these results we find evidence
which rejects our hypothesis.
9.4.2 RESULTS FOR EACH ACQUIRER TYPE
Non-Executive Directors
In the case of different acquirer types we find that the results for single hostile
acquirers to be statistically insignificant6. However, appendices 9.1 to 9.20 show the
coefficients to be both positive and negative but the values are very close to zero.
Friendly acquirers on the other hand tend to have a positive and statistically significant
relationship between post-acquisition performance and the number of non-executive
directors. However, the same cannot be said for white knight and multiple hostile
acquirers both of whom have larger numbers of non-executive directors on their board
(see Table 9.5). Tables 9.8 and 9.9 show that white knight and multiple hostile
acquirers experience a negative impact due to non-executive directors. Our results
show that our hypothesis can be supported for friendly acquirers. Although, we find
support for our hypothesis, in the case of friendly acquirers, the impact of non-
executive directors on acquirer performance is negligible. We reject our hypothesis for
6 Due to the small size we cannot make any conclusions regarding the different acquirer types nor can the
tests of statistical significance be relied upon for complete. The problem of small sample size is especially
acute for white knight and multiple hostile groups.
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white knight, single and multiple hostile acquirers.
CEO Duality
Tables 9.8 and 9.9 show that CEO duality tends to have a statistically significant and
positive impact on acquirer performance for friendly and single hostile acquirers.
However, for acquirers in competition with another bidder (i.e. white knights and
multiple hostile acquirers) CEO duality has a negative impact. This result suggests a
lack of CEO monitoring in the case of acquirers who have the highest probability of
suffering from the winner's curse (see chapter 2). Appendices 9.1 to 9.20 show that
the coefficient values for friendly acquirers tend to be very small and close to zero. For
white knights and multiple hostile acquirers the coefficient values tend to be quite
large. Based on these results we cannot find evidence to support our second hypothesis
for friendly and single hostile acquirers. However, for white knight and multiple hostile
groups we find that CEO duality has a large and statistically negative impact on
acquirer shareholder wealth.
Chairman and CEO Outside Experience
In the case of different acquirer types we find that outside experience by the chairman
and CEO tend to have a statistically significant negative and positive impact
respectively for friendly and single hostile acquirer. In the case of acquirers competing
with another bidder (i.e. white knights and multiple hostile acquirers) outside
experience by the chairman has a positive and statistically significant impact on
acquirer performance. We also find white knight and multiple hostile acquirers tend to
experience a negative but statistically insignificant impact due to CEO outside
experience. Based on our results we reject our hypothesis which argues in favour of
increased outside experience by the chairman for friendly and single hostile acquirers.
In the case of white knight and multiple hostile acquirers we find evidence to support
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our hypothesis which argues in favour of CEO outside experience for friendly and
single hostile acquirers. In the case of white knight and multiple hostile acquirers we
reject our fourth hypothesis.
Leverage
We find that leverage does not have a statistically significant impact on the long run
performance of single hostile acquirers. However the same is not true for friendly and
multiple hostile acquirers where we find a negative relationship between leverage and
long run performance. In the case white knight acquirers we find a positive relationship
between leverage and acquirer performance. From Table 9.5 we can see that the
differing impact of leverage on acquirer performance is not necessarily related to the
level of leverage. Although, we find multiple hostile acquirers to have leverage that is
twice that of other acquirer types we can see from Table 9.6 that the differences in
means are not statistically significant across the different acquirer groups. It may be the
case that different acquirer types use different forms of leverage and this may affect
their performance. Our results lead us to support our hypothesis of a positive
relationship between leverage and acquirer performance for white knights. In the case
of friendly, single and multiple hostile acquirers we reject our hypothesis of a positive
relationship between leverage and acquirer performance.
Short Run Leverage
As in the case of overall leverage (i.e. BlDLEV) we do not find a statistically
significant relationship between short term leverage (i.e. SRLEV) and long run post-
acquisition acquirer performance across all acquirer types. Our results from Table 9.8
show that short term leverage tends to have a positive impact for acquirers involved in
a competition with another bidder in order to acquire the target. For friendly acquirers
we find short term leverage to have a negative and statistically significant impact on
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long run post-acquisition acquirer performance. One explanation for the differing
impact of short term leverage on post-acquisition acquirer performance could be the
different levels of short term leverage. Table 9.5 shows that friendly acquirers tend to
have the lowest levels of short term leverage and lenders may not wish to monitor
them to the same extent as larger borrowers such as white knight and multiple hostile
acquirers. Our results lead us to support our hypothesis of a positive relationship'
between short term leverage and post-acquisition acquirer performance for white
knight and multiple hostile acquirers but not for friendly and single hostile acquirers.
Bank Leverage
We find bank leverage to have a positive and statistically significant impact on long run
post-acquisition performance for multiple hostile acquirers. In the case of friendly and
single hostile acquirers we find bank leverage to have a negative and statistically
significant impact on long run post-acquisition acquirer performance. Table 9.5 shows
that multiple hostile acquirers tend to have higher levels of bank leverage and this may
affect the level of monitoring carried out by bank based lenders. Our results lead us to
support our hypothesis of a positive relationship between bank leverage and acquirer
performance for multiple hostile acquirers and reject it for friendly and single hostile
acquirers. In the case of white knight acquirers we find a mixed result depending on
the benchmark model used.
Unsecured Lending
Table 9.9 shows that unsecured leverage does not have a statistically significant impact
on the long run post-acquisition performance of either friendly or single hostile
acquirers. However, in the case of white knight and multiple hostile acquirers we find a
negative relationship between unsecured leverage and acquirer performance. It may be
the case that unsecured lenders have very little control over their borrower's actions
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and this is borne out in the case of white knight and multiple hostile acquirers. We find
evidence to reject our hypothesis of a positive relationship between unsecured leverage
and post-acquisition acquirer performance.
Managerial Shareholding
For managerial shareholdings of below 10% we generally find a positive impact on
post-acquisition acquirer performance across all acquirer types except white knights. In
the case of white knights we find both a positive and negative impact depending on the
benchmark model used. For managerial shareholdings of between 10% and 25% we
find a consistently positive relationship for single hostile acquirers. Results for other
acquirer types tend to be sensitive to the benchmark model used. In the case of
managerial shareholdings above 25% we find a negative impact for white knight and
multiple hostile acquirers. Based on our results we find evidence to reject our
hypothesis of a positive relationship between managerial shareholding and acquirer
performance.
Institutional Shareholding
We find that institutional investors have a negative and statistically significant impact
on acquirer performance across all acquirer types. In other words, a high level of
institutional shareholding has a negative impact. It may be the case that institutional
investors do not actively monitor the companies in which they invest their clients'
funds. The PRO NED (1996) survey reports that only a minority of companies (i.e.
16%) in their sample are influenced by institutional shareholders when appointing a
new chairman. Even fewer companies (i.e. 13%) felt that institutional investors will
affect their choice in appointing the next chairman. Our results lead us to reject the
hypothesis of a positive relationship between institutional investors and acquirer
performance.
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9.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we attempted to investigate the relationship between various agency
monitoring mechanisms and the post-acquisition acquirer performance. We sought to
test for the influence of three different groups of agency monitoring mechanisms
namely the corporate governance structure, lenders and shareholders. We have carried
out descriptive statistics, univariate tests of differences in median values, and
estimation of the impact of agency monitoring mechanisms on acquirer performance.
Our descriptive statistics show that multiple hostile acquirers to have the highest levels
of debt but relatively low levels of corporate governance related agency monitoring
mechanisms. White knights tended to have chairman and CEO with the highest levels
of outside experience relative to other acquirer types. Friendly acquirers were found to
have the highest average levels of managerial shareholding compared to other acquirer
types.. In terms of debt friendly acquirers had the lowest average levels which tended to
be significantly different from other acquirer types.
The results from our estimation model show that in general corporate governance
monitoring mechanisms have a positive but small impact on acquirer performance. We
find that in the case of different acquirer types there is a clear distinction between
single and multiple bidders. Acquirers in competition with another bidder tend to have
the opposite results to the whole sample as well as friendly and single bidders. Our
study finds that non-executive directors increase firm monitoring for friendly and single
hostile acquirers but not for white knight and multiple hostile acquirers. CEO duality
has a positive impact for friendly and single hostile acquirers and the opposite for white
knight and multiple hostile acquirers. In the case of CEO and chairman's outside
experience we find a positive and negative impact respectively for friendly and single
hostile acquirers while its the opposite for white knight and multiple hostile acquirers.
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In the case of monitoring by lenders we find it is only relevant for white knight and
multiple hostile acquirers. One explanation for this may be the higher levels of debt for
these groups. We find that managerial shareholding to have a positive impact for
holdings below 10% and negative thereafter for all acquirer types. Finally, we find that
institutional shareholding has a negative impact on acquirer performance for all
acquirer types. Our results lead us to believe that agency monitoring mechanisms have
at best a weak impact on acquirer performance.
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Appendix 9.1 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Market Adjusted Returns (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WIC refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
I is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK MEE
Intercept
-0.0679 -0.0319 0.2344 -0.2676a 0.1161
NONEXEC 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001
DUALITY 0.0006a 0.0006a 0.6979' 0.3731 0.0002
CHMEXP -0.0005' -0.0004' -0.0033 0.0075 -0.0037
CEOEXP 0.0002' 0.0002a 0.0007a 0.0015 0.0022
BIDLEV -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.4981 0.4316a -0.1691b
MANOWNI -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0171a 0.0036 -0.0478'
MANOWN2 0.0083 0.0117 0.0141 0.0187 0.0315'
MANOWN3 -0.0016 -0.0030 -0.0012 -0.0142a -0.0060
DISOWN 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0166a -0.0078' -0.0057
BIDTOE 0.0032 0.0022 0.0109a 0.0106' 0.0129b
HOST 0.0225'
MULT -0.0642
CASH 0.0135 0•2317b 0.1762 -0.3138' -0.2304
MIXED 0.0218 0.0622 -0.0359 0.1321' 0.0679
NPDA -0.0107 -0.3392 0.0468' -0.1617 -0.4054.b
ECOCYE -0.0263 -0.0061 0.0081 0.1111 0.0599
Adj. R2 0.05	 . 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03
F-Statistic 1.56 1.38 1.20 1.32 1.14
No. of Obs 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.2 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Market Adjusted Returns (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
2 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SR WK MU
Intercept
-0.0583 -0.0405 0.0728 -0.0081 0.0401
NONEXEC 0.0000 .	 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0004'
DUALITY 0.0006' 0.0006' 0.5724' 0.4021 -0.0557
CHNIEXP -0.0005' -0.0004' -0.0071 0.0028 0.0039
CEOEXP 0.0002a 0.0002a 0.0006' 0.0006 0.0002
SRLEV -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001a 0.0003'
MANOWN, -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0178a -0.0320b -0.0399b
MANOWN2 0.0082 0.0111 0.0223' 0.0313b 0.0329'
MANOWN3 -0.0017 -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0133b -0.0156b
1NSOWN 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0173' -0.0078 -0.0057'
BIDTOE 0.0032 0.0022 0.0123' 0.0106b 0.0129b
HOST 0.0216'
MULT -0.0785
CASH 0.0139 0.2258" 0.1795 -0.3138' 0.2304b
MIXED 0.0215 0.0617 -0.0608 0.1321 0.0679
ECOCYE -0.0256 0.0036 0.0200 0.1111 0.0599.
NPDA -0.0102 -0.3271a 0.0452 -0.1617 -0.4054'
Adj. R2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
F-Statistic 1.53 1.42 0.95 1.04 1.14
No. of Obs 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.3 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Market Adjusted Returns (Equation 3)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
3 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the •
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK
Intercept
-0.0979 -0.0795 0.0288 -0.0082 0.0400
NONEXEC 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003a -0.0004a
DUALITY 0.0006a 0.0006a 0.5533a 0.4009 -0.0571
CHATEXP -0.0005a 0.0005a -0.0091 0.0028 0.0039
CEOEXP 0.0002a 0.0002b 0.0006a 0.0006 0.0002
BANKLEV -0.0002' -0.0002 -0.0003a 0.0001b 0.0003a
MANOWN 1 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.01753 -0.0320b -0.0399b
MANOWN2 0.0074 0.0099 0•0263b 0.0313b 0.0329e
MANOWN3 -0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0034 -0.0133b -0.0156b
INSOWN 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0172a -0.0078 -0.0057`
BlDTOE 0.0030 0.0018 0.0111a 0.0106b -0.1286b
HOST 0.0200a
MULT -0.0859
CASH 0.0162` 0.2501b 0.1824 -0.3138 -0.2304b
MIXED 0.0330 0.0740 -0.0677 0.1321 0.0679
NPDA -0.0095 -0.3225' 0.0398 -0.1617 -0.4054a
ECOCYE -0.0158 0.0168 0.0343 0.1111 0.0599
Adj. R2 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03
F-Statistic 1.86' 1.59 1.22 1.04 1.14
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.4 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Market Adjusted Returns (Equation 4)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. ME refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
4 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK MR
Intercept
-0.0740 -0.0435 0.0976 -0.0094 0.1219
NONEXEC 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002c
DUALITY 0.0006' 0.0006a 0.5844' 0.0409 0.6889'
CHMEXP -0.0005' -0.0004' -0.0059 -0.0014 -0.0176
CEOEXP 0.0002a 0.0001a 0.0006a 0.0022 0.0079'
UNSECLEV -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0411 0.0017 -0.0002a
MANOWN I -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0178' -0.0306b -0.0465'
MANOWN2 0.0074 0.0108 0.0211` 0.0279' 0.0208
MANOWN3 -0.0014 -0.0028 -0.0009 -0.0088 -0.0046
INSOWN 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0173' -0.0078 -0.0468
B1DTOE 0.0033 0.0023 0.0117 0.0106a 0.0129b
HOST 0.0226a
MULT -0.0674
CASH 0.0140c 0.2389b 0.1791 -0.3138' -0.2304b
MIXED 0.0221 0.0610 -0.0613 0.1321" 0.0679
NPDA -0.0100 -0.3298" 0.0472 0.1617 -0.405e
ECOCYE -0.0194 0.0021 0.0238 0.1111 0.0599
Adj. R2 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.03
F-Statistic 1.59 1.39 0.95 0.85 1.14
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.5 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Mean Adjusted Returns (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the 'contest. 1n{H refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
1 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK
Intercept 0.2498 0.1994 0.4765 -0.9100 -0.5601
NONEXEC -0.0000 0.0003" -0.0003 -0.0025' -0.0025'
DUALITY -0.0019a -0.0019a 0.4507 -0.5517 -0.4163
CHIVIEXP 0.0003' 0.0005" 0.0133 0.1572c 0.1068'
CEOEXP . 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0008" -0.0349 -0.0197
B1DLEV -0.0005 -0.0005' -0.9321 0.0384 -0.2795
MANOWNI 0.0009' 0.0007a 0.0158 0.1674 0.1286"
MANOWN2 -0.0275' -0.0211 -0.0457 -0.0689 -0.0785
MANOWN3 0.0053 0.0054 0.0124 -0.0842' -0.0747a
1NSOWN -0.0011" -0.0010e -0.0143 0.0475 0.0469
B1DTOE 0•0113b 0.0129b 0.0130 0.0450 0.0369
HOST -0.0744
MITT 0.2100
CASH 0.0372' 0.5615' 0.7093 0.3509 -0.5092
MIMED -0.1930 -0.1854 0.1036 -0.7518 -0.7090
NPDA 0.1193' -0.0322 0.2291a -0.2262 0.1249.
ECOCYE -0.5287a -0.5152' -0.8448' -0.0079 0.0031
Adj. R2 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.14
F-Statistic 3.16a 3.42' 1.11 1.38 0.54
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.6 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Mean Adjusted Returns (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MI-I refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
2 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SIT WK NM
Intercept
-0.26670 0.1566 0.1831 -0.8877b -0.2485
NONEXEC 0.0001 0.0003b -0.0005 -0.0008a -0.0014b
DUALITY -0.0019a -0.0019' 0.2463 0.9019 0.5334
CHMEXP 0.00031' 0.0005" 0.0095 0.1037b 0.0302
CEOEXP 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0144 0.0105
SRLEV -0.0010" -0.00110 0.0002 -0.0018a -0.0011`
MANOWNI 0.0009' 0.0007a 0.0176 0.1814' 0.1000
MANOWN2 -0.0273' -0.0239" -0.0357 -0.1117a -0.1338b
MANOWN3 0.0058' 0.0058 0.0136 4.02840 4.0293
1NSOWN -0.0011b -0.0010' -0.0161 0.0475 0.0469
BIDTOE 0.0129" 0.0128b 0.1286 0.0450 0.0366
HOST -0.0197
MULT 0.0105
CASH 0.0376" 0.5348a 0.7481 -0.3509 -0.5092
MIXED -0.2112 -0.1871 0.0585 -0.7518 -0.7090
NPDA 0.1260a 0.0320 0.2280a -0.2262 0.1249-
ECOCYE -0.5398' -0.4600a -0.76980 -0.0079 0.0031
Adj. R2 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.14
F-Statistic 4.02a 3.78' 0.95 0.44 0.54
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.7 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Mean Adjusted Returns (Equation 3)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
3 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK MB
Intercept 0.1286 0.0883 0.0957 -0.8870b -0.2482
NONEXEC -0.0000 0.0003' -0.0004 -0.00081 -0.0014b
DUALITY -0.0018' -0.0018' 0.1823 -0.8924 ' 0.5374
CHMEXP 0.0002 0.0004' 0.0027 0.1036b 0.0303
CEOEXP 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0004 -0.0144 0.0105
BANKLEV -0.0007a -0.0005' -0.0005 -0.0018' -0.0011'
MANOWN I 0.0008' 0.0006' 0.0166 0.1812a 0.0999
MANOWN2 -0.0311'	 • 4).02591' -0.0234 -0.1116. -0.13381'
MANOWN3 0.0064' 0.0069' 0.0085 -0.0284' -0.0293
1NSOVVN -0.0010' -0.0009' -0.0155 0.0475 0.0469
B1DTOE 0.0101' 0.0113 0.0133 0.0450 0,0369
HOST -0.0180
MELT 0.1200
CASH 0.0477a 0.6359a 0.7213 -0.3509 -0.5092
MIXED -0.1486 -0.1483 0.0447 -0.7518 -0.7090
NPDA 0.1239a 0.0028 0.21651 -0_2262 0.1249.
ECOCYE -0.4865' -0.44631 -0.7961' -0.0079 0.0031
Adj. R2 0.13
1
0.14 0.04 0.04 0.02
F-Statistic 4.34' 3.75' 1.10 0.44 0.54
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.8 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Mean Adjusted Returns (Equation 4)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
4 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK MR
1 Intercept 0.2575 0.1759 0.4487 -0.8268 -0.5789
NONEXEC -0.0000 0•0004b -0.0004 -0.0025' -0.0025'
DUALITY -0.0018a -0.0019" 0.2989 -0.7350 -0.1193
CHMEXP 0.0003 0.0004" 0.0136 0.1535c 0.1182b
CEOEXP 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0006' -0.0341 -0.0213,
UNSECLEV -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.4844 -0.0872 0.0010"
' MANOWNI 0.0009' 0.0007a 0.0162 0.1635" 0.1265c
MANOWN2 -0.0291a -0.0241b -0.0344 -0.0703 -0.0847
MANOWN3 0.0054 0.0060 0.0118 -0.0825' -0.0737a
INSOWN -0.0010b -0.0009' -0.0147 -0.0475 0.5329
BIDTOE 0.0108" 0.0128b 0.0133 0.0450 0.0469
HOST -0.0885
MULT 0.1845
CASH 0.0395' 0.6055' 0.6483 -0.3509 -0.5092
MIXED -0.1901 -0.1860 0.0479 -0.7518 -0.7090
NPDA 0.1210" -0.0090 0.2456" -0.2262 0.1250
, ECOCYE -0.5123a -0.4820a -0.88046 -0.0079 0.0031
Adj. R2 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.04
F-Statistic 3.00a 3.29 1.07 0.44 0.54
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
376
Appendix 9.9 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Size Adjusted Returns (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
1 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The .
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SR WK MB
Intercept
-0.1811a -0.2071a -0.0218 -0.0399 -0.0320
NONEXEC 0.0112' 0.0121 0.0032 0.0077 0.0008
DUALITY -0.0487 -0.0265 -0.0668 -0.1817" -0.2646b
CHMEXP 0.0015 0.0023 -0.0064 0.0033 0.0056"
CEOEXP -0.0006 -0.0018 0.0018 0.0002 -0.0024
BlDLEV 0.0163 0.0370 -0.0365 0.0296 -0.0856
MANOWNI -0.0091 -0.0082 -0.0125 -0.0214 -0.0007
MANOWN2 0.0079 0.0059 0.0292` 0.0041 0.0010
MANOWN3 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0047 0.0041 0.0017
1NSOWN -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0021 -0.0056 -0.0003
BIDTOE 0.0018 0.0013 0.0114' -0.0015 -0.0025
HOST 0.0863'
MULT 0.0054
CASH 0.0153' 0.1623' 0.1576' -0.0991 0.1429
MIXED 0.0307 0.0387 -0.0339 0.0701 0.0141
NPDA -0.0011 -0.0319 0.0182" -0.4393 -0.3192
ECOCYE -0.0439 -0.0282 -0.0517 0.0619 -0.0559
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.05
F-Statistic 2.031 1.68e 1.36 0.38 0.54
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.10 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Size Adjusted Returns (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
2 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK Mil
Intercept
-0.1798a -0.2024' -0.0273 -0.0532 -0.0560
NONEXEC 0.0114' -0.0127' 0.0021 0.0094 -0.0038
DUALITY -0.0476 -0.0223 -0.0660 -0.2076e -0.2586b
CHMEXP 0.0015 0.0023 -0.0063 0.0057 0•0054b
CEOEXP -0.0006 -0.0016 0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0036
SRLEV 0.0137 0.0075 -0.0316 0.2128 0.1088
MANOWNI -0.0091 -0.0087 -0.0116 -0.0272c -0.0040
MANOWN2 0.0079 0.0061 0.0287' 0.0036 0.0036
MANOWN3 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0045 0.0043 0.0016
INSOWN -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0056 -0.0003
BlDTOE 0.0018 0.0013 0.0112a -0.0015 -0.0025
HOST 0.0873'
MULT 0.0054
CASH 0.0154' 0.1676' 0.1676c -0.0991 0.1429
MIXED 0.0305 0.0388 -0.0294 0.0701 0.0141
NPDA -0.0006 -0.0251 0.0200' -0.4393 -0.3192
ECOCYE -0.0431 -0.0298 -0.0650 0.0619 -0.0559
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.06
F-Statistic 2•02b 1.62 1.34 0.38 0.54	 -
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.11 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Size Adjusted Returns (Equation 3)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
3 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK
Intercept
-0.1759a -0.2000a -0.0084 -0.0421 -0.0441
NONEXEC 0.0115' 0.0129` 0.0009 0.0065 -0.0021
DUALITY -0.0481 -0.0221 -0.0613 -0.1942b -0.2633b
CHAU& 0.0015 0.0023 -0.0066' 0.0050 0.0055b
CEOEXP . -0.0006 -0.0017 0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0024
BANKLEV -0.0119 -0.0095 -0.0860 0.0771 -0.0189
MANOWN I -0.0095 -0.0091 -0.0129 -0.0257 -0.0017
MANOWN2 0.0082 0.0064 0.0294' 0.0062 0.0020
MANOWN3 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0048 0.0038 0.0018
INSOWN -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0021 -0.0056 -0.0003
BLDTOE 0.0019 0.0013 0.0119 -0.0015 -0.0025
HOST 0.0889b
MULT 0.0068
CASH 0.0155' 0.1693' 0.1492' -0.0991 0.1429
MIXED 0.0307 0.0391 -0.0334 0.0701 0.0141
NPDA 0.0002 -0.0235 0.0183' -0.4393 -0.3192.
ECOCYE -0.0000 -0.0306 -0.0465 0.0619 -0.0559
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.06
F-Statistic 2.02" 1.63 1.44 0.38 0.54
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.12 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Size Adjusted Returns (Equation 4)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WIC refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
4 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
,
All F SR WK Mil
Intercept
-0.1786a -0.2040a -0.0319 -0.0425 -0.0337
NONEXEC 0.0115' 0.0126' 0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0016
DUALITY -0.0481 -0.0232 -0.0665 -0.1867b -0.2528b
CHMEXP 0.0015 0.0023 -0.0064' -0.0053 0.0055b
CEOEXP -0.0006 -0.0016 0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0024
UNSECLEV 0.0019 0.0090 0.0008 0.0968 -0.0515"
MANOWNI -0.0093 -0.0085 -0.0115 -0.0271 0.0018
MANOWN2 0.0081 0.0061 0.0285` 0.0086 0.0010
MANOWN3 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0045 0.0035 0.0013
INSOWN -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0056 -0.0003
BIDTOE 0.0018 0.0013 0.0110 -0.0015 -0.0025
HOST 0.0875`
MULT 0.0054
,
CASH 0.0155' 0.1662' 0.1722' -0.0991 0.1429
MIXED 0.0308 0.0389 -0.0314 0.0701 0.0141
NPDA -0.0003 -0.0251 0.0190 -0.4393 -0.3192
ECOCYE -0.0440 -0.0294 -0.0631 0.0619 -0.0559
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.06
F-Statistic 2.01" 1.63 1.34 0.38 0.54
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
380
Appendix 9.13 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Market to Book Value Adjusted Returns (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
1 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SR WK Mil
Intercept
-0.1442b -0.0305 0.1194 -0.4684' -0.0027
NONEXEC 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001
DUALITY 0.0008a 0.0006a 0.6789' -0.2992 -0.1768
CHMEXP -0.0007a -0.0004' -0.0029 0.0250 0.0076
CEOEXP 0.0001a 0.0001 0.0007a -0.0102 -0.0080
BIDLEV -0.0001 -0.0002' -0.4078 0.4364 -0.27111
MANOWN1 -0.0000 -0.0003 0•0145b 0.0312 -0.0304
MANOWN2 0.0027 0.0094 0.0004 0.0324 0.0459
MANOWN3 -0.0005 -0.0025 0.0019 -0.0272' -0.0171b
INSOWN -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0144b -0.0171a -0.0148"
BIDTOE 0.0031 -0.0013 0.0091a 0.0108' 0.0126b
HOST 0.0174'
MTJLT -0.0566
CASH 0.0132' 0.2190' 0.1265 -0.1512 -0.0740
MIXED 0.0272 0.1403 -0.0778 0.5049" 0.4387"
NPDA -0.0038 -0.1878c 0.0252 -0.3583 -0.5076!
ECOCYE -0.0097 -0.0185 0.0505 0.4128 0.3574"
Adj. R2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03
F-Statistic 1.61 0.91 1.15 2.10" 1.12
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.14 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Market to Book Value Adjusted Returns (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MR refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
2 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK Mil
Intercept
-0.1386' -0.0331 -0.0148 -0.2060 -0.1101
NONEXEC 0.0001	 . 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004" -0.0005b
DUALITY 0.0008a 0.0006a 0.5693a -0.0517 -0.3650
CHMEXP -0.0007a -0.0004a -0.0067 0.0222 0.0170
CEOEXP 0.0001a 0.0001 0.0006a -0.0119 -0.0102
SRLEV -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 0•0002b 0.0004b
MANOWN 1 -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0149a -0.0054 -0.0192
MANOWN2 0.0026 0.0087 0.0083 0.0468' 0.0463
MANOWN3 -0.0006 -0.0026 0.0020 -0.0283a -0.0304
DISOWN -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0149a -0.0171a -0.0148'
B1DTOE 0.0031 -0.0016 0.0108a 0.0108' 0.0126b
HOST 0.0164a
MTJLT -0.0714
CASH 0.0135' 0.2214c 0.1218 -0.1512 -0.0740
MIXED 0.0267 0.1417 -0.0986 0.5049" 0.4387'
NPDA -0.0033 -0.1764 0.0236 -0.3583 -0.5076a
ECOCYE -0.0093 -0.0027 0.0485 0.4128" 0.3574'
Adj. R2 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
F-Statistic 1.59 0.87 0.96 2.10b 1.13
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.15 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Market To Book Value Adjusted Returns (Equation 3)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
3 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The,
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK MH
Intercept
-0.1735b -0.0661 -0.0510 -0.2061 -0.1102
NONEXEC 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004" -0.0005b
DUALITY 0.0001a 0.0007 0.5594a -0.0536 -0.3671
CHMEXP -0.0007a -0.0005a -0.0077 0.0222 0.0170
CEOEXP 0.0001a 0.0001 0.0005a -0.01194 -0.0102
BLDLEV -0.0002" -0.0002 -0.0002a 0.0002" 0.0004b
MANOWNI -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0148a -0.0054 -0.0191
MANOWN2 0.0019 0.0077 0.0107 0.0468a 0.0462
MANOWN3 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0283' -0.0304°
INSOWN -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0149a -0.0171" -0.0148b
BlDTOE 0.0029 -0.0021 0.0092a 0.0108 0.1256"
HOST 0.0151a
MITT -0.0760
CASH 0.0155" 0.2500b 0.1314 -0.1511 -0.0740
MIXED 0.0372 0.1544` -0.1042 0.5049e 0.4387b
NPDA -0.0028 -0.1774a 0.0192 -0.3583 -0.5076a
ECOCYE -0.0004 0.0072 0.0722 0.4128a 0.3574"
Adj. R2 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03
F-Statistic 1.90` 0.93 1.20 0.96 1.12
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.16 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Market To Book Value Adjusted Returns (Equation 4)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MR refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
4 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK Mil
Intercept
-0.1494" -0.0342 0.0015 -0.0508 0.0028
NONEXEC 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002
DUALITY 0.0008' 0.0006' 0.5844a -0.6547 -0.5604
CHAU& -0.0007a -0.0004 -0.0052 0.0086 -0.0099
CEOEXP 0.0001a 0.0001 0.0006' -0.0076 -0.0003
UNSECLEV -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0230 -0.2255 -0.0002'
MANOWN I -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0151a -0.0055 -0.0290
MANOWN2 0.0020 0.0084 0.0062 0.0357 0.0303
MANOWN3 -0.0004 -0.0024 0.0022 -0.0186 -0.0249
MOWN -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0150a -0.0171' -0.0148b
BIDTOE 0.0031 -0.0015 0.0097 0.0108' 0.0126b
HOST 0.0174'
MITT -0.0601
CASH 0.0137' 0.2391' 0.1306 -0.1511 -0.0740
MIXED 0.0276 0.1411 -0.0984 0.5049` 0.4387b
NPDA -0.0033 -0.1822 0.0251 -0.3583 -0.5076'
ECOCYE -0.0045 -0.0058 0.0651 0.4128' 0.3574b
Adj. R2 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
F-Statistic 1.61 0.82 0.93 0.96 1.12
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.17 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Fama and French Three Factor Model Adjusted Returns (Equation 1)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
1 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK MR
,	 Intercept 0.0235 -0.0305 0.2606 -0.0430 0.0626
NONEXEC 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003b -0.000313
DUALITY 0.0006' 0.0006a 0.6461a -0.2886 0.4403
CHMEXP -0.0005' -0.0004' -0.0026 0.02202 0.0143
CEOEXP. 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007a -0.0031 -0.0012
MEDLEY -0.0002b -0.0002c -0.4218 -0.1512 0.2901c
MANOWN I -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0200a -0.0014 -0.0146
MANOWN2 0.0070 0.0094 -0.0030 0.0365 0.0376
MANOWN3 -0.0018 -0.0025 0.0019 -0.0301" -0.0276'
INSOWN 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0195a -0.0164 -0.0141
BIDTOE 0.0011 -0.0013 0.0117a 0.0098 0.0115
HOST 0.0115
MULT -0.0301
CASH 0.0122 0.2190c 0.1570 -0.3181 -0.2411'
MIXED 0.0541 0.1403 -0.1243 0.4344 0.3660
NPDA -0.0220 0.1878c 0.0413 -0.3947 0.5187b
ECOCYE -0.0548 -0.0185 -0.0148 0.2621 0.2042
Adj. R2 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.13
F-Statistic 0.80 0.91 1.10 0.52 0.73
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.18 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Fama and French Three Factor Model Adjusted Returns (Equation 2)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MH refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
2 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK Mill
Intercept 0.0396 -0.0331 0.1237 -0.1338 -0.0288
NONEXEC 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005' -0.0006'
DUALITY 0.0006' 0.0006a 0.5396a -0.8808 -0.9867
CHMEXP -0.0005' -0.0004' -0.0058 0.0312 0.0195
CEOEXP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006a -0.0057 -0.0017
SRLEV -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0003
MANOWNI -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0206a 0.0087 -0.0048
MANOWN2 0.0069 0.0087 0.0040 0.0383 0.0348
MANOWN3 -0.0019 -0.0025 0.0022 -0.0383b -0.0386b
INSOWN -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0202a -0.0164 -0.0141
BEDTOE 0.0009 -0.0016 0.0129' 0.0098 0.0115
HOST 0.0927
MULT -0.0623
CASH 0.0131 0.2214' 0.1595 -0.3181 -0.2411'
MIXED 0.0538 0.1417 -0.1454 0.4344 0.3660
NPDA -0.0210 -0.1764' 0.0400 -0.3947 -0.51871?
ECOCYE -0.0528 -0.0027 -0.0050 0.2621 0.2042
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.13
F-Statistic 0.69 0.86 0.94 0.51 0.73
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.19 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Fama and French Three Factor Model Adjusted Returns (Equation 3)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
finn management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MR refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
3 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK Mil
Intercept
-0.0052 -0.0661 0.0687 -0.1339 -0.2883
NONEXEC 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0005a -0.6484a
DUALITY 0.0006a 0.0007a 0.5140a -0.8801 • -0.9855
CHMEXP -0.0005a -0.0005a -0.0085 0.0312 0.0195
CEOEXP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005a -0.0057 -0.0017
BANICLEV -0.0002b -0.0002 -0.0003a 0.0002 0.0003
MANOWN1 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0202a 0.0087 -0.0048
MANOWN2 0.0059 0.0077 0.0093 0.0383 0.0348
MANOWN3 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0383 -0.0385b
INSOWN -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0200a -0.0164 -0.0141
BLDTOE 0.0006 -0.0021 0.0116a 0.0098 0.0115
HOST 0.0781
MULT -0.0633
CASH 0.0158e 0.2500a 0.1609 -0.3181 0.2411e
MIXED 0.0681 0.1544e -0.1540 0.4344 0.3660
NPDA -0.0204 0.1774e 0.0331 -0.3947 -0.5187
ECOCYE -0.0407 0.0072 0.0089 0.2621 0.2042
Adj. R2 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.13
F-Statistic 0.95 0.93 1.36 0.51 0.73
No. of Obs 314 226 51 18 19
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Appendix 9.20 Impact of Agency Monitoring Mechanisms on Three Year BHARs:
Fama and French Three Factor Model Adjusted Returns (Equation 4)
The three year period is defined as days -40 to +750. All refers to the entire sample of acquirers. F
refers to a single friendly acquirer which is a sole bidder and receives the recommendation of the target
firm management. SH refers to a single hostile bidder which is a bidder who wins despite resistance by
the target management. WK refers to a friendly acquirer which enters the contest for the target after a
hostile bidder has made its intention known and wins the contest. MR refers to a multiple hostile
acquirer which is in competition with another hostile or white knight for control of the target. Equation
4 is defined in section 9.3.1. a,b,c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. The
explanatory and control variables are defined in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. Least squares estimates of the
parameters of the equation incorporate White's adjustment for hetroskedasticity.
All F SH WK NE
Intercept 0.0252 -0.0342 0.1466 0.2857 0.0642
NONEXEC 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003a
DUALITY 0.0006' 0.0006' 0.5505' 0.7518 0.0612
CHIVLEXP -0.0005' -0.0004' -0.0047 0.0053 0.0007
CEOEXP 0.0001' 0.0001 0.0006a 0.0018 0.0054
UNSECLEV -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0382 -0.6092' 0.0000
MANOWNI -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0205' 0.0050 -0.0137
MANOWN2 0.0061 0.0084 0.0030 0.0173 0.0227
MANOWN3 -0.0017 -0.0024 0.0022 -0.0234b -0.0255b
INSOWN -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0201a -0.0164 -0.0141
BlDTOE 0.0009 -0.0015 0.0123' 0.0098 0.0085
HOST 0.0108
MULT -0.0425
CASH 0.0133 0.2391' 0.1589 -0.3181 -0.2411
MIXED 0.0556 0.1411 -0.1459 0.4344 0.3660
NPDA -0.0211 -0.1822 0.0418 -0.3947 -0.5187
ECOCYE -0.0458 -0.0058 -0.0021 0.2621 0.2042
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.13
F-Statistic 0.70 0.83 0.94 0.51 0.73
No. of Obs. 314 226 51 18 19
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION
10. INTRODUCTION
As stated in Chapter 1, the broad objective of this study is to examine the post-
acquisition performance of different acquirer types. We attempt to explain such
performance by analysing the acquirers' relationship with various sources of value creation
and agency monitoring mechanisms, which have been cited in the literature dealing with
takeovers. In the light of these objectives we formulate (see section 1.3) three research
questions:
i)	 What is the relative long run performance of different acquirer types during
the post-acquisition period?
What are the sources of long run post-acquisition value creation for each
acquirer type?
iii)	 How effective are agency monitors in determining the long run post-
acquisition performance of acquirers?
In attempting to answer the above questions we also examine a number of subsidiary issues
that arise in the context of the relative post-acquisition performance of different acquirer
types defined in terms of their financial profile. The subsidiary issues are:
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i)	 Whether the acquirer firm size affects the long term post-acquisition
acquirer performance?
Whether the acquirer's profile as a glamour or value stock, measured by the
book to market value, affects the long term post-acquisition performance?
Whether the acquirer's profile as a glamour or value stock, measured by the
price to earnings ratio, affects the long term post-acquisition performance?
We begin this chapter by summarising the results we obtain with respect to each of our
three objectives and subsidiary issues mentioned above. We then discuss the implications of
our results and issues for future research.
10.1 IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL RESISTANCE
In Chapter 2 we discuss the literature relating to target and bidder firm performance at
the time of the bid-announcement and during the post-acquisition period for acquirers.
Previous studies for both the UK and the USA show that target firm shareholders
experience positive and statistically significant wealth gains at the time of bid-
announcement. For bidders, the results are inconclusive with previous studies reporting
both small positive and negative abnormal returns at the time of the bid-announcement.
We also see in Chapter 2 that previous studies using event study methodology attempt
to identify certain factors which may affect the distribution of takeover gains between
the bidder and target firm shareholders. However, Chapter 3 argues that these factors
do not fully explain the shareholder wealth experiences for bidder firms. One important
determinant of the distribution of wealth gains at the time of the bid-announcement is
the mood of the takeover leading to different acquire types.
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In Chapter 5 we empirically examine pre- and post-acquisition shareholder wealth
effects for a sample of 547 M( acquirers during the period 1983 to 1995. Our results
show that except for the Fama and French Three Factor Model (FFTF) all acquirers
experience negative post-acquisition buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) in the
region of 2% to 3%. This result is consistent with recent evidence. An examination of
different acquirer types shows that single hostile acquirers outperform all other types in
each of the three long run event windows (i.e. -40 to +250, -40 to +500 and -40 to
+750 days). Shareholders of multiple hostile acquirers also experience higher returns
than friendly acquirers but the difference between them is not statistically significant.
The literature reviewed in Chapter 3 suggests that acquirers in competition with
another bidder overpay in order to acquire the target firm. Although, we could not
exclude the possibility of bidder's overpayment due to hubris and the existence of the
agency problem in bidding firm we nevertheless find support for the winner's curse
argument. Our results show single bidders to experience greater wealth gains than
multiple bidders. The difference between single and multiple bidders is far greater in
the short run (i.e. during the bid-announcement period) than in the long run (i.e. -40 to
+750 days).
We show in Chapter 3 that a white knight differs from a hostile bidder in that it
receives the support of the target firm. However, it differs from a friendly bidder
because it appears on the scene after a hostile bidder has been identified. In this respect
the motivations of a white knight are not as clear as those of a friendly or hostile bidder
(see sections 3.51 and 3.5.2). Our results show that shareholders of white knight
acquirers receive higher abnormal returns than other acquirer types at the time of the
bid-announcement. In each of the three long run event windows we find that
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shareholders of white knight acquirers experience higher wealth gains than
shareholders of friendly or multiple hostile acquirers but not as high as those of single
hostile acquirers.
10.2 SOURCES OF POST-ACQUISITION VALUE-CREATION
The results from Chapter 5 show that on average takeovers are bad investments for
acquirer firms. Having said this we find that on average almost half the acquirers
experience positive long run post-acquisition performance. This leads us to identify
certain sources of post-acquisition value creation which might drive up the abnormal
returns of some acquirers and not others. In Chapter 6 we discuss the theoretical and
empirical literature relating to various sources of post-acquisition value creation having
either a positive or negative effect on acquirer firm performance. In Chapter 7 we
empirically investigate the explanatory power of three different types of post-
acquisition sources of value creation, namely synergy, wealth transfer and
misvaluation, for our sample of 314 UK acquirers consisting of friendly, hostile and
white knight acquirers.
Our results show that industry relatedness does not lead to positive post-acquisition
value creation, for the whole sample of acquirers, as we predicted. In this respect our
results are similar to other recent UK studies which examine a similar period to that of
ours (see section 7.5). The negative post-acquisition effect of industry relatedness is
also true for all the different acquirer types. In the case of financial synergy we find no
evidence for unused debt capacity as source of post-acquisition value creation. Third,
we examine the post-acquisition impact of managerial synergy and find it to be
negative for three out of the five benchmark models. In the case of different acquirer
groups we find that acquirers in competition with another bidder actually experience a
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statistically significant but negative effect on their post-acquisition performance. Our
overall results for synergy show that even if there is potential for synergy there is no
evidence for it in the long run post-acquisition period.
Chapter 6 predicts that disciplinary takeovers have a positive impact on the post-
acquisition performance of acquirers. Our results show that on average targets
outperform the general market index in the run up to the acquisition and this adds value to
the acquirer. In the case of different acquirer types we also find a positive and statistically
significant relationship between pre-bid target share price performance and post-acquisition
acquirer shareholder wealth. We find little if any evidence of poor target firm performance
prior to the takeover suggesting that acquisitions are not driven by past managerial failure.
Our results suggest that a target firm resistance to a takeover is largely to do with the terms
of the bid and not whether it should take place in the first instance.
Our results show that an improvement in the post-acquisition operating profit margin
has a positive and statistically significant impact on acquirer performance. This is also
true for all acquirer groups except single hostile bidders. We also find that
improvements in operating profit margins do not come about as a result of economies
of scale as we find no support for industry relatedness. We point out in section 6.3.2
that there is limited opportunity to reduce post-acquisition tax charge in the UK. This
explains why our results for tax as a source of post-acquisition value creation are
statistically insignificant. Our results also show that single hostile acquirers have a
negative tax impact on post-acquisition acquirer performance implying that they may
not adequately plan for tax savings.
Our results show that wealth may be transferred from employees to acquirer firm
shareholders. We find that post-acquisition reduction in average real employee salaries
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has a positive impact on post-acquisition acquirer performance. We also find the same
to be true for different acquirer types except for white knights. Our results suggest that
white knights may have to make certain concessions to safeguard employment or
salaries in order to obtain recommendation from the target firm. Finally, we find that
acquirers who purchase undervalued targets experience a positive impact on post-
acquisition performance. This is also true for different acquirer types.
10.3 AGENCY MONITORING MECHANISMS AND POST-
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE
If agents are efficiently and effectively monitored then they are more likely to carry out
value enhancing acquisitions. In Chapter 8 we discuss the literature dealing with three
different types of agency monitors, namely the corporate governance structure, lenders
and the ownership structure. In Chapter 9 we examine the impact of agency
monitoring mechanisms on a sample of 314 UK acquirers consisting of friendly, hostile
and white knight acquirers.
Our results show that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship
between the number of non-executive directors on the board and post-acquisition
acquirer performance. In the case of different acquirer types we find that friendly
acquirers experience a positive impact on post-acquisition acquirer performance due to
the presence of non-executive directors while white knights and multiple hostile
acquirers experience a negative impact. In Chapter 6 we predict that CEO duality to
have a negative impact on the post-acquisition performance of acquirers. Our results
show that this is not necessarily the case and CEO duality may have, at best, marginally
beneficial properties by avoiding board gridlock etc. Our results show that outside
experience by the chairman has a negative impact on post-acquisition acquirer
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performance. It could be the case that chairman who spend time on the boards of other
companies may be neglecting their own company. On the other hand for CEOs outside
experience has a positive impact on acquirer post-acquisition performance. Our results
suggest that CEOs use outside directorships to the benefit of their own company.
Our results show that leverage has a negative impact on the post-acquisition
performance of acquirers. We find largely similar results for different types of leverage
(e.g. short run, bank based and unsecured) as well as for different acquirer types. In the
case of managerial ownership our results show it to have a non-linear relationship with
post-acquisition acquirer performance. For managerial shareholding below 10% we
find a positive and statistically significant impact on post-acquisition acquirer
performance. We find managerial shareholdings between 10% and 25% to have a
negative and statistically significant impact on post-acquisition acquirer performance.
For managerial shareholdings above 25% we find a greater number of negative and
statistically significant results than positive ones. Finally, our results show that
institutional shareholdings has a negative impact on post-acquisition acquirer
performance. Our results suggest that institutional investors do not actively monitor
the companies in which they invest and allow the directors to carry out wealth
reducing actions.
10.4 RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF HIGH BOOK TO
MARKET VALUE, PE RATIO, AND MARKET
CAPITALISATION ACQUIRERS
In section 4.14.1 we argue that that the size effect is of considerable importance when
analysing wealth effects by acquirer type especially in the long run. Our results show
that in the first year (i.e. -40 to +250 days) larger acquirers experience higher BHARs
than small sized acquirers. However, the differences between the groups is small and in
the region of 2% to 3%. However, in the second year (i.e. -40 to +250 days) the
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difference in BHARs between small and large acquirers increases. The three year (i.e.
-40 to +250 days) show large acquirers to substantially outperform smaller acquirers.
We also partition our sample of 547 UK acquirers by their respective market to book
value. Our results show that in the first year after the takeover acquirers with a low
market to book value experience higher BHARs than acquirers with a high market to
book value. The difference in returns between low and high market to book value
acquirers is in region of I% to 4.5%. In the second year the difference in returns
between low and high market to book value acquirers continues to increase with the
former performing the latter. In the third year low market to book value acquirers
continue to outperform high market to book value acquirers but the differences
between the two groups fell slightly. Our results are consistent with the idea that value
acquirers outperform glamour acquirers.
Finally, we partition our sample of 547 UK acquirers based on their respective price to
earnings (PE) in order to compare the post-acquisition performance value and glamour
acquirers. We find that in the first year after a takeover acquirers with a low PE ratio
experience higher returns than acquirers with a high PE ratio. In the second year the
sample of acquirers with a low PE ratio experience higher returns than the sample of
acquirers with a high PE ratio. As in the case of market capitalisation and market to
book value the difference in returns between the low and high PE ratio companies
increase. In the third year the sample of low PE ratio acquirers continue to outperform
the sample of high PE ratio acquirers. However, the difference in returns between the
high and low PE ratio acquirers fell slightly. The difference in the relative performance
between high and low PE acquirers adds further support to the argument that value
acquirers outperform glamour acquirers.
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10.5 IMPLICATIONS OF OUR RESEARCH
Our discussion in Chapter 2 shows that overall (i.e. for bidders and targets combined)
merger activity is value enhancing and hence companies should engage in it. However,
for acquirer firms the average wealth experiences are negative. Our results show that
that not all acquirers "get it wrong" and almost half of them experience positive long
run returns. One factor that affects acquirer post-acquisition performance is the mood
of the bid leading to different acquirer types. We find that single hostile bids may be
desirable as they tend to experience higher returns in the long run compared to other
acquirer types. It may be the case that hostile bids due to their disciplinary nature (see
Morck et al., 1988) are more likely to correct managerial failure and increase
managerial efficiency. We find that the late entrance of a white knight acquirer does
not adversely affect its post-acquisition performance. Our results also show that
bidders in competition with another bidder suffer from the winner's curse. Finally, we
find that white knights experience higher long run returns than friendly or multiple
hostile acquirers but not as high as single hostile acquirers.
In 1992 the UK government initiated a committee to examine the efficiency with which
firms are directed and controlled (i.e. The Cadbury Committee). Since then two further
committees have extended and analysed the activities as well the remuneration of
directors namely the Crreenbury and Hampel Committees. The main proposal of these
committees is that all publicly listed companies should have non-executive directors on
their board. Our results show that the presence of non-executive directors has a
positive impact on the post-acquisition performance. The Cadbury Report also called
for a separation between the roles of the CEO and chairman. We find that this does
not lead to any significant gain and there may be a strong argument to combine the
roles of CEO and chairman in order to avoid boardroom gridlocks etc.
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We find results which do not favour chairman with outside directorships. The Cadbury,
Greenbury or Hampel Reports do not mention outside directorships which we show to
have a detriment impact in the case of the chairman. One reason for this could be that a
chairman with a large number of outside directorships is more likely to neglect his own
company. In the case of a CEO we find our results to favour a higher level of outside
directorships. Therefore, a control on the number of outside directorships, at for the
chairman, will increase the time that the top management spend dealing with their own
company's affairs.
Our results imply that the monitoring role of institutions and large shareholders can be
enhanced and encouraged. For our sample of 314 UK acquirers we find that
institutional shareholdings have a negative impact on post-acquisition acquirer
performance. It may be the case that institutional shareholders have a "cosy"
relationship with the managers of the companies in which they invest. It may also be
the case that institutional shareholders will be more likely to sell their shareholdings
than carry out the expensive and time consuming activity of monitoring the managers
of the companies in which they invest.
Our results imply that lenders are not actively monitoring the firms to whom they lend
funds. This may suggest that lenders are happy to loan funds to borrowers when times
are good. When borrowers are faced with hardship it may be the case that lenders tend
to "pull the rug underneath the feet of their borrowers". In other words if lenders feel
that their funds are at risk of not being paid back then they are fast to call their loans
even if the firm may be financially solvent. We feel that lenders should take a greater
monitoring role in the firms to whom they lend funds. We feel that the late entrance of
lenders (i.e. when the firm is in distress) has a negative effect. A more preferred
solution would be the adoption of the German model where representatives from
lending institutions are present on the board of directors. This will provide lenders with
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a level of information regarding the financial health of their borrower and allow them
to vet potential takeovers before they are carried out.
The lack of support for operational, financial or managerial synergy in our study
implies that managers should be very careful in calculating potential gains from a
takeovers. Also, managers should only carry out acquisitions if they have a clear
strategy. Our results show that an acquirer has a 50% probability of overpaying and
any price paid to the target firm should not be greater than its expected post-
acquisition value. There are certain types of targets that acquirers should attempt to
seek. These are targets where the post-acquisition average real salary of the combined
firm can be reduced and the operating profit margin increased. The takeover of
undervalued targets has a positive impact on post-acquisition acquirer performance.
Similarly, tax saving opportunities in the UK are limited. Nevertheless efficient tax
planning is important.
10.6 ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Our results show that single hostile acquirers tend to experience higher returns than all
other types of acquirers. If hostility is the only factor that leads to higher returns then
we would also expect multiple hostile acquirers to experience high returns compared
to other acquirer types. As we show in this study that this is not the case and multiple
hostile acquirers experience lower long run returns than most other acquirer types. In
other words multiple hostile acquirers may not be as disciplinary as single hostile
acquirers. A natural extension of this research would be to examine the post-
acquisition disciplinary action carried out by different acquirer types such as the level
of top management dismissal.
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We find that an improvement in operating profit margin and a reduction in average
salaries has a positive impact on the post-acquisition acquirer performance. However,
in this study we do not investigate whether average real salaries are falling due to
lower number of employees or a reduction in real salaries. In the case operating profit
margins we find that it is not likely to take place due to economies of scale. One
possible explanation may be that firms carry out post-acquisition restructuring such as
selling loss making subsidiaries. However, from our study we cannot confirm or reject
this and future research may wish to investigate the level of post-acquisition
restructuring carried out by different acquirer types.
The Hampel Report states that 'levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract
and retain the directors needed to run the company successfully. The component parts
of remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual
performance'. If this is the case then one would expect a direct relationship between
directors' remuneration and acquirer performance. An interesting extension of our
study could examine whether highly paid directors (who in theory should be better
directors) actually carry out acquisitions which lead to higher shareholder wealth gains
than acquirers with low paid directors.
The Hampel Report also states that voting by institutional shareholders is voluntary. In
other words institutional investors are in no way required to either attend the
company's meetings or actively participate in the decision making process by voting.
The Hampel Report argues that although abstention remains an option institutional
shareholders should make considered use of their votes. An extension of this research
could examine why institutional investors abstain from voting. In doing so one could
examine the relationship between the acquirer and the institutional investors.
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Finally, our examination of the ownership structure of the acquirer focused on
managerial and institutional ownership. An interesting distinction can be made between
managerial ownership and that through an employee share ownership programme
(open to all employees). Employees are a group of stakeholders who we do not
consider in this study. However their presence on the board of directors may increase
agency monitoring. Also, employees even if they are shareholders have very different
concerns to shareholders, lenders or top management.
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